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Abstract 
The boundaries of “community archaeology” are being stretched around 
the world, even to include projects intended to enhance the economic well-being 
of those who live in the communities in which archaeologists work.  While 
economic development projects are far from the archaeologist’s conventional 
remit, theoretical, practical and ethical factors are driving this diversification of 
community archaeology.  However, there is no theoretical or practical foundation 
within archaeology to govern the design of archaeologists’ development projects.  
This research addresses that gap by exploring whether theoretical, experimental 
and case-study evidence developed by economists interested in community 
governance of Common Pool Resources (CPRs) contains lessons of value for the 
archaeological community. The research involved case studies of long-surviving, 
community-based economic development projects located in communities that 
sought to benefit from archaeological or heritage sites at their doorsteps.  The 
communities are similarly small, but are located in very different economic, 
political and cultural contexts in Peru, Belize and Ireland.  Using qualitative and 
quantitative data developed in interviews conducted in each village, each 
project’s institutional structure—the formal and informal rules that govern 
members’ activities in each project—is compared to a set of design principles for 
CPRs based on studies by Elinor Ostrom.  As the thesis explains, Ostrom’s 
principles are the most evidence-based and theoretically supported set of design 
principles to be articulated for CPRs.  The conclusion reached is that Ostrom’s 
principles clearly apply to the two projects that manage a “true” CPR, which in 
these cases were organisations that controlled community members who sell 
crafts to visitors to the heritage site.  In one case, where there was no “true” CPR 
to manage, certain of Ostrom’s governance principles are clearly applicable and 
important, but those that most distinguish CPR governance are not.  One 
implication of this study for archaeology is that it is important to understand 
deeply the nature of a community and a project before applying an external 
model to its design.   
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Preface 
A Personal Note 
In many respects this thesis has been a lifetime in the making. Its first 
roots were planted four decades ago, when I studied economics and history as an 
undergraduate.  The challenges facing developing countries, which I studied 
from the perspective of both disciplines, occupied a large portion of my 
undergraduate studies. In those days, of course, neoclassical microeconomics and 
Keynesian macroeconomics were in full flower and my courses were about the 
efficiency and effectiveness of markets to solve even the most vexing problems, 
including economic development. In my first few years out of college, I 
practiced as an economic journalist and as an economist in research and policy 
settings. There I was introduced to the important role played by political and 
social context both in the functioning of economies and in the practical 
constraints imposed by the political process on the functioning of markets and 
government behaviour.  The following three decades in business revealed to me 
more fully the reality of markets and government policy. I have had occasion 
both to be, and to be battered by, a monopolist. I have experienced the effects of 
regulation influenced more by political forces than economic sense.  I have done 
business in developing and developed economies and seen the results of 
conventional economic wisdom.  Violations of the assumptions of neo-classical 
economics, I have come to realize, are vastly more likely to be encountered than 
are idealized efficient markets.  As a specialist in turnarounds, I have lived the 
reality that the fate of corporations operating in risk-filled environments is 
determined by their governance (often called “management”). 
In the same interval, I also became engaged with local communities, 
particularly in Philadelphia where I have served on and chaired major non-profit 
organisation boards of directors. Particularly at the Philadelphia Zoo, which I 
served as Chairman for six years, I engaged deeply with questions of governance 
and the puzzle of why some organisations fail and disappear while others, like 
the 150 year old Zoo, survive for many decades.  Governance, the institutions 
through which an organisation determines its purpose, selects its leaders, polices 
its activities, and changes in the face of circumstances, clearly was central to the 
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survival of non-profit organisations. Where governance was outstanding, 
organisations prospered.  Where governance was weak, they faltered.   
In the early 2000’s, these interests coalesced at the University of 
Pennsylvania. There I simultaneously joined the Overseers of the University’s 
Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology and began evening work on a 
master’s degree, studies that evolved over time into a preliminary approach to 
the topic of this thesis. At the museum I became intrigued with the growing 
interest in archaeological circles in the potential for heritage resources to 
contribute to the advancement of neighbouring communities. Meanwhile, in my 
studies, I was introduced to many advances in the field of economics since I had 
abandoned it many years before, particularly institutional and behavioural 
economics and their close relative, the study of common pool resource 
governance. Here four elements came together:  My longstanding interest in why 
development projects succeed or fail; the re-energizing of my interest in history 
through archaeology; my experience with real world economies, which 
comported more comfortably with the institutional and behavioural models that 
emerged in economics after the 1970’s; and my experience overseeing 
community organisations in the United States.  Governance institutions, it 
seemed, may be central to understanding how community projects in the 
archaeology and heritage spheres may contribute importantly to local economic 
development.  Pursuing that idea is the motivation for the study reported upon in 
this thesis.  
An Interdisciplinary Caveat 
The subject matter of this thesis straddles disciplinary fences. Indeed, the 
contribution it seeks to make to the field of archaeology is to introduce concepts 
and tools from the fields of economics and political science that may contribute 
to archaeology’s emerging interest in economic development as an important 
area of practice.   
As such, there is very little literature within either discipline that 
addresses the other. There are, for example, no studies in the University of 
Indiana’s common pool resource case study database that address archaeology or 
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heritage sites per se. Therefore, Chapters 1 through 5 are intended as overviews 
that introduce the fields to one another. Although every effort has been made to 
present matters precisely as well as concisely, this recounting may be criticized 
for skipping too lightly over many complex topics and, as in any 
interdisciplinary work, experts in any area surely can criticize aspects of the 
treatment here of their speciality. However, if this presentation has been 
successful, the convergence of these seemingly unrelated fields and the relevance 
of common pool theory to archaeology should be clearer to the reader at the 
conclusion of the thesis. 
It is important to emphasize at the outset that this thesis indeed finds that 
Ostrom’s concepts are relevant to archaeology—but only in specific and well-
defined circumstances.   As the discussion at the conclusion of Chapter 5 makes 
clear, Ostrom’s work in particular and the concept of the “commons” in general 
have been misunderstood in archaeology or used in a fashion that is at best 
romanticized and at worst applies her concepts to inappropriate situations.  One 
risk of crossing disciplinary borders is that ideas are co-opted from other fields 
without the context that is crucial to understanding their correct application.  The 
extensive theoretical backdrop presented in this thesis, even though constrained 
by the practicalities of length, is intended both to explain the fields to one 
another and to contribute to a better understanding within archaeology of when 
and how, and when not, to appropriate economic concepts for archaeological 
research and practice. 
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Chapter 1: Research Questions, Key 
Definitions and Thesis Overview 
The Research Questions Addressed by this Thesis 
For archaeologists, engagement with communities has become de 
rigueur, an ethical obligation in many cases and a practical necessity in others.  
The forms of that engagement vary widely, as Chapter 2 will explore.  Most 
frequently, “community archaeology” takes the form of educational 
presentations and community participation in excavations or heritage-related 
activities.  In some regions, notably involving indigenous communities in 
Australia / New Zealand and North America, community members have acquired 
the right to participate in and even control archaeological research.  In a small 
but increasingly important number of cases, archaeologists are building museums 
and underwriting other projects to improve the economic conditions and life-
chances of the people who live in the communities in which archaeologists work, 
typically through tourism-related projects.  This thesis explores the latter activity, 
the involvement of archaeologists in the business of community economic 
development, with particular focus on organisational governance considerations 
that are central to the success or failure of this most intensive form of community 
archaeology. 
Economic change is ubiquitous. Recent decades have seen the 
“developed” world falter.  Japan has endured a decade-long malaise and 
problems of low growth and joblessness presently plague Europe and the United 
States.  Meanwhile, some “developing” countries have emerged strongly, though 
often by following models far different than those promoted just a few decades 
ago as the best routes to prosperity.  Throughout this period of change, 
development, as will be discussed below, has taken on more intricate meanings.  
Days are long past when “development” equated to “progress” and “under-
developed” was seen as a pejorative appellation.  No longer is development just 
about increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, it also is about the 
dynamics of change in political systems, the impact of economic change on 
social relations, and ultimately the consequences of economic, political and 
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social change on the cultural underpinnings of nations, their subdivisions, and 
the local communities that make them up. 
Archaeologists tend to encounter these relationships from the bottom up.  
Field archaeologists excavate a particular site in a particular community.  
Heritage experts work at a museum, document local cultural practices or 
otherwise engage with the past of a distinct group.  Even where the 
archaeological record under study is not the legacy of ancestors to current 
residents in adjacent communities, many archaeologists and heritage specialists 
nonetheless find it impossible to ignore social, political and economic challenges 
facing the localities in which they practice. Relationships with local community 
members are often personal and intense, and the archaeologist often observes the 
consequences of actions by governmental policy makers or the effects of 
globalizing economic competition or the global dissemination of Western culture 
through the lens of the community in which he or she works. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the relationship of archaeologists to development 
in general and economic development in particular is strained. The 
homogenisation of cultural aspirations and life styles occurring today often 
affronts those whose profession it is to understand, explain and celebrate the 
past.  Nonetheless, as will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the 
archaeologist today often finds him or herself drawn into development issues out 
of necessity or out of empathetic concern to advance the economic conditions of 
communities in which they work by exploiting, as an economist might say, the 
one resource those communities can control and derive benefit from—their 
heritage.  However much communities may welcome this interaction, it can be a 
distracting or even distasteful process for the archaeologist, one that takes him or 
her well outside professional comfort zones. 
Archaeologists have appropriated technologies from across the spectrum 
of the sciences to advance their ability to locate, analyse, date and preserve the 
tangible heritage of past civilizations. Heritage specialists are able to call on 
every modern technology to capture, comprehend, preserve and disseminate the 
intangible manifestations of past cultures and of those unique cultures that still 
survive in a globalizing world. However, engagement with communities on 
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economic matters is not part of the curriculum of training for archaeologists and 
heritage specialists. Those brave souls, and there are many, who have determined 
to address economic development at the same time they explore their academic 
interests often do so with no training in any dimension of the development 
problem and without a set of purpose-designed and tested tools that can be 
utilized to achieve their goals. As a consequence, the track record for 
archaeologists’ interventions in local economic development does not reveal 
outstanding success. The list is sparse of projects that have survived for many 
years and delivered tangible benefits to the communities in which they are 
located. 
This thesis has been conceived as an initial effort to explore whether 
models may exist that would better inform archaeologists who embark on 
economic development projects. In particular, the purpose is to conduct an initial 
investigation into whether insights from the disciplines of economics and 
political science and their joint research into common pool resources may be 
imported into archaeology in order to promote more successful community 
projects. To do so, the thesis explores two central research questions: 
1. Do long-surviving, community-based heritage projects focused on local 
economic development demonstrate consistent institutional features and, 
if so,  
2. To what degree do those features map onto a framework derived from the 
theoretical and empirically-based model that emerges from research into 
the governance of common pool resources? 
Long-survival has been chosen as the metric of success, following 
Ostrom (1990), both because Ostrom’s work is central to the research presented 
in this thesis and because survival is perhaps the single most information-laden 
metric one can identify for success.  A project that survives must be delivering 
value to its members —in economic, social or psychological terms—or they 
would not continue to dedicate time and effort to it, and the project’s governance 
must have been structured to overcome the interpersonal conflicts and political 
clashes that are inevitable in any organisation that passes through multiple 
generations of leadership. Other metrics will tend to be relative to their context—
what is economic success in Peru may be deemed failure in Ireland—but if a 
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community values the results of an organisation sufficiently to manage through 
conflicts, crises and challenges then, on its own terms, that project has performed 
successfully for that community. 
At its core, this thesis is about governance, the act of “controlling or 
regulating influence” (OED 2002, 1132).  International organisations frequently 
focus on issues of national governance—macroeconomic, tax, regulatory, social 
and administrative policies—and how those policies ramify through the nation-
state and affect private and public sector entities at all levels (OECD 2005; 
United Nations Development Programme 2010). That is not the sort of 
governance addressed here.  Aspects of corporate or not-for-profit organisation 
governance practices are more closely aligned with this study (see page 322). 
However, the focus here is quite narrow indeed.  It is on the governance 
processes followed by small, community-based organisations in rural settings, 
the sort that archaeologists create or interact with when they engage in 
development-related activities.  Governance matters relating to larger entities or 
those higher up in the governmental structure certainly affect these sorts of 
organisations, but those interactions are not the primary concern of this study. 
Instead, this thesis addresses the two research questions through case 
studies of three long-surviving community-based heritage projects created with 
explicit economic development objectives, one each in Belize, Peru and Ireland. 
Fieldwork, consisting of extensive structured and unstructured interviews, was 
conducted primarily from 2011 to 2013. The objective of the fieldwork was to 
document the economic impact of the projects, specify the institutions of 
governance that contributed to their long survival, and position those institutions 
within the political and social context of the communities in question. This thesis 
presents the results of that research and positions that research within two very 
different disciplinary contexts:  archaeology, broadly defined, and economics, 
narrowly focused on theories relating to the governance of self-organized 
common pool resources and the antecedent theoretical work in institutional and 
behavioural economics. The structure of the thesis will be explored later in this 
chapter.  First, however, a few critical terms should be defined for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
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Four Essential Definitions 
The title of this thesis incorporates three concepts that beg a clear 
definition from the outset: Archaeology, community and economic development.  
A fourth term central to the thesis, common pool resource, also merits a 
definitional discussion from the outset. 
Archaeology 
Archaeology is used in this thesis in the sense that the word is used within 
the discipline in the United Kingdom.  In the UK, archaeology is a broad 
umbrella under which sit traditional activities of archaeologists: excavation, 
material analysis, analysis of artefacts, and preservation and conservation of 
objects as well as entire buildings or sites.  Equally, though, archaeology in the 
UK incorporates studies in the theory and practice of cultural heritage, 
museology, public archaeology, and related fields, even topics as remote to 
traditional archaeology as the subject of this thesis.  
Throughout this thesis, the terms archaeology and archaeologist 
generally may be read in the broad UK sense of the term.  Certainly in the title of 
this work, the intention is to include not only those academic and commercial 
archaeologists who excavate or study artefacts for a living, but also those 
specialists in tangible and intangible heritage whose activities bring them into 
regular contact and occasional activist involvement with communities at the local 
level.  As will be discussed further in Chapter 2, archaeological encounters with 
the public can be subdivided into public and community archaeology, and 
community archaeology has several distinct flavours. All of these different 
activities, sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting, are subsumed in 
the term archaeology as it is used here. Heritage will be used here somewhat 
interchangeably, but with particular emphasis on natural and intangible aspects 
of the human inheritance.  Where the term heritage professional or a similar term 
is used, the intention is to distinguish in a particular context field archaeologists 
who conduct excavations from heritage specialists who work in all other aspects 
of this broadly defined discipline of archaeology. In general, however, 
archaeologist will be used as an all-inclusive term in this thesis.  
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Community 
Community is a more contentious term. A typical definition is that 
community  “refers to people who live in some spatial relationship to one 
another and who share interests and values” (Cary 1983, 2).     The word is used 
far more expansively in other contexts to encompass various forms of “imagined 
communities” (Anderson 2006), ranging from geographically dispersed groups 
identified by their common interests and acknowledgement of their 
interconnectedness  (Wood Jr. and Judikis 2002, 12) to epistemic communities of 
expertise and common disciplinary interests such as “heritage professionals” 
(Smith and Waterton 2009, 19).  Community analysts have considered the 
complex social and political networks that can make up any single geographic 
“community” (Haggstrom 1983; Richards and Hall 2000; Stonich 2005; Sutton 
Jr. 1983).  Joppe (1996) argues that the term is “self-defining” because it is based 
on shared purpose and goals, and points out that “communities” in this sense can 
easily extend beyond the official boundaries of towns or even nations.  The term 
“community,” as will be seen in this thesis, is ubiquitous in public archaeology, 
although only occasionally are these complexities acknowledged with deep 
reflection on their implications (see, however, Isherwood 2013; Pyburn 2012; 
Sen 2002). 
 Smith and Waterton, in their extended deconstruction of the term (2009, 
Chapter 1), are particularly critical of the “conservative nostalgia” and implied 
condescension of the term as it is used in heritage studies that elevate those who 
study “communities” to positions superior in expertise and authority to the 
“communities” they study.  Smith and Waterton’s critique, which relates to the 
power relations between archaeologists and the people they study, is deeply 
embedded in the form of “community archaeology,” influenced by developments 
in indigenous people’s rights, that empowers local people to control 
archaeological research agendas at the expense of professional archaeologists 
(see page 45). 
The problem confronted in this thesis is somewhat different. Clearly, any 
site with a heritage asset available to exploit is a potential collision-ground for 
competing “communities” in the broader senses of the term. In actual physical 
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communities, as will be seen in the case studies to follow, even ethnically 
homogeneous localities can be riven by family rivalries, political party 
affiliations or economic competition.  The issue at the core of this thesis is how 
those differences are managed in pursuit of successful community-based 
projects. Thus, without denigrating the issues raised by critical considerations of 
the term,  nor the problems associated with mis-definition of the relevant 
community in a particular project  (see Chirikure et al. 2010), a simple definition 
of “community” is adopted here.  The objective is to focus attention on the 
geography that is the field of contention in which various communities-of-
interest must resolve their differences and agree to work together to achieve 
some common goal.   
Therefore, following Aas et al (2005, 30-31), community, as the word is 
used in this thesis, simply will mean all of the residents who live in the vicinity 
of a heritage resource, whether or not they are a culturally homogenous group 
and whether or not individuals have competing traditional, economic or political 
interests or claims to the heritage. This approach parallels Hart’s use of 
“neighbourhood” as “multidimensional nodes in complex social networks” 
(2011, 26). An essential premise of this thesis is that projects that succeed in 
such complex “communities” do so because of the institutional frameworks they 
have created to manage the collision points between individuals and the various 
“imagined communities” that constitute a local community of real people in a 
real place.  Furthermore, in practice the whole “community” is rarely engaged in 
a project.  Those involved, whether as participants or members or shareholders in 
a project, are most likely to be a subgroup, albeit often a large one, of the entire 
“community.” Customary, political, and social relationships in the community as 
a whole will be reflected in and influence the governance of projects such as 
those studied here.  But the actual degree of “community” engagement will be 
limited to those actively involved in the project.  
Economic development 
As Arndt points out, economic development is a relatively new concept, 
one that in earlier periods was denoted by “progress” (Arndt 1981). A leading 
textbook on the subject describes development economics as 
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being concerned with the efficient allocation of existing scarce ( or idle) 
productive resources and with their sustained growth over time, (but) it 
must also deal with the economic, social, political and institutional 
mechanisms, both public and private, necessary to bring about rapid (at 
least by historical standards) and large scale improvements in levels of 
living for the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the formerly 
socialist transition economies. (Todaro and Smith 2011, 8. Italics in the 
original.) 
 This sort of definition suggests that the ultimate goal of economic 
development is the achievement of increases in GDP per capita and, as a 
consequence of society’s access to greater economic resources, increases in a 
society’s capacity to deliver the health, education, nutrition and life-style benefits 
associated with higher personal and national incomes.   
Lafrentz-Samuels (2009), an archaeologist, argues that this approach, 
while convenient for analysis, renders secondary other perspectives on economic 
welfare, such as access to resources or levels of capability. Indeed, economists 
today readily acknowledge that the metrics for evaluating “development” need to 
be comprehensive. Current development indicators involve not only wealth 
creation but also access to resources; metrics for health, housing, education or 
employment; standards for political rights; and measures to recognize cultural 
identity and the sustenance of the fabric of society (Stiglitz et al. 2009; Telfer 
and Sharpley 2008, 6).  Furthermore, the domain of issues encompassed in the 
study of economic development is broad.  Development economists study 
aspects of poverty and inequality, the mechanisms for generating economic 
growth, issues of urbanization and urban revitalization, education and training, 
agricultural reforms, and the role of governments in setting trade policies, 
domestic fiscal and monetary policies, and the provision of credit (see, e.g., 
Todaro and Smith 2011). Amartya Sen (1999) suggests that economists’ focus on 
income growth has the entire process backwards, and that development should be 
seen as an expansion of personal capabilities and freedoms that will lead, in due 
course, to higher incomes.  In short, “economic development” encompasses 
every conceivable aspect of life in emerging economies, and even the chain of 
causation between economic variables and quality-of-life outcomes is open for 
debate.  
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While accepting a broad definition of the term “economic development” 
that embraces the multi-faceted character of the development process, this thesis 
is concerned only with a narrow range of the issues considered in development 
economics. Specifically, it is looking at the potential contribution that a 
particular group of economic theories may make to village-level economic 
advancement in monetary terms.  Those theories relate to the self-organized, 
collective management of common pool resources.  The focus here is on rural 
and small-scale settings, and the discussion to follow will be limited to issues 
affecting such settings.  Broad indicators of social welfare, while important, are 
not the topic of discussion, nor are philosophical propositions, such as Sen’s, 
regarding the primacy of a focus on income versus a focus on skills, power and 
rights.  This thesis is about generating income growth through community 
efforts.   
Furthermore, some matters highly relevant to archaeology—in particular, 
the issues surrounding the revitalization of historic urban cores—will not be 
explored in depth in this study.  That is not to say that the findings of this 
research may not be relevant to the experience of urban dwellers seeking to 
control their heritage resources.  Urban dwellers, however, live and work in 
contexts very different from and more complex, in political and economic terms, 
than rural counterparts. Any extension of the principles explored in this thesis to 
the urban environment would require considerable, separate research. 
Common pool resource 
The final term to be defined is the term central to Ostrom’s work and to 
the institutional model that this study is evaluating for relevance to archaeology.  
That term is “Common Pool Resource” or CPR.  Chapters 4 and 5 will delve into 
the nature of CPRs in greater depth, but it is appropriate even at the outset to 
offer at least a first consideration of the term.  Ostrom defines a CPR in this way: 
The term ‘common pool resource’ refers to a natural or man-made 
resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not 
impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits 
from its use.  To understand the processes of organizing and governing 
CPRs, it is essential to distinguish between the resource system and the 
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flow of resource units produced by the system, while still recognizing the 
dependency of the one on the other. (1990, 30. Italics in the original) 
A CPR thus is an asset, a resource system that generates a stream of 
economic value (resource units) to those who are entitled to access it.  Key issues 
relating to CPR governance, as will be explored in Chapter 4, include the 
determination of who may access the CPR, how the rules governing their access 
are established, how compliance with the rules on access is monitored, and how 
deviations from the rules are disciplined.  These themes—limitations on access, 
procedures for establishing rules governing use, monitoring of compliance and 
disciplinary sanctions—will loom large in the analysis to follow, both from a 
theoretical and a practical standpoint.  Not only are they central to the theory 
appropriated from economics for study in this thesis, but they ultimately will be 
dispositive in the final analysis of how well the three projects under study 
conform to Ostrom’s model.  
Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is presented in ten chapters.  The objective of this Chapter 1 is 
to provide a roadmap to the thesis for the reader and to put the study itself into 
context.  This initial chapter has provided an overview of the rationale for the 
study, definitions of four terms that are essential to the entire study, and turns 
now to an overview of the thesis as a whole.  
Chapter 2 positions the subject matter of this study within the field of 
archaeology.  It begins with a discussion of archaeological theory that is focused 
on three strands of the post-processual critique that are directly relevant to the 
discipline’s current engagement with community: Critiques of archaeological  
theory and practice inspired by Marxist analysis; critiques derived from post-
modern theorizing and the introduction of multi-vocal practice arising from field 
experience; and the implications of the concept of “agency” and the debate over 
whether individuals have a personal  or collective capacity to make change.  
Chapter 2 then shifts to explore the discipline’s increasingly activist engagement 
with the public and communities through consideration of six important trends.  
First are developments in indigenous people’s rights that dramatically altered 
archaeology’s perceptions of its political and social assumptions.  Second is the 
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development of Cultural Resource Management (CRM) as a field of endeavour 
and a worldview about the interaction between archaeologists, governments, and 
communities. Third and fourth are the related emergence of Public Archaeology 
and Community Archaeology as new sub-fields of the discipline, which 
produced novel understandings of the role of community members in the 
archaeological process. Fifth is the professionalization of the discipline, which, 
among other things, codified the ethical obligations of archaeologists in their 
dealings with communities.  Finally, the chapter considers the emergence of 
cultural economics and the idea that heritage, tangible or intangible, is an asset 
that can be valued, analysed and utilized like any other economic resource. 
Chapter 3 examines the relationship of archaeologists to economic 
development. It introduces this central issue with a cursory overview of the 
problem of economic development.  The chapter then turns to a longer 
discussion of heritage tourism and economic development, the principal vector 
through which archaeologists engage with development.  Archaeologists’ critical 
perspectives on heritage tourism are then explored under three topical headings: 
The commodification of archaeological heritage, the political conflicts and 
economic inequities deriving from the exploitation of archaeology for tourism, 
and the problem of sustainability especially of tangible archaeological resources. 
Archaeologists and tourism professionals typically address these issues through 
increased engagement with community representatives as “stakeholders” in the 
tourism development process.  The chapter critically considers the stakeholder 
approach, and then turns to more activist projects being undertaken by 
archaeologists who are engaging directly with economic development activities. 
Finally, the chapter transitions from archaeological theory and practice to the 
economic theories and field studies underlying this research by addressing a 
question central to the thesis: Can archaeology be considered a common pool 
resource? 
Chapter 4 introduces the economic theories that are relevant to the 
analysis of CPRs.  A strict application of neo-classical economic theory to the 
problem of collaboration yields the disturbing result that individuals are 
exceedingly unlikely to cooperate even when doing so would make all of them 
better off, the so-called “problem of collective action.”   The chapter sets the 
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stage with a brief review of the relevant neo-classical economic theories, 
especially as they relate to public goods and other economic resources that 
cannot be optimized in a market setting. It turns then to an explication of the 
problem of collective action as it is expressed in theory.  Next, the chapter 
describes an alternative perspective that has become known as the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE).  The NIE is a corrective model to some of the 
shortcomings of neo-classical theory that has been instrumental in the thinking of 
Ostrom and other common pool resource scholars.  The chapter briefly outlines 
the nature of the NIE and then proceeds to an extended consideration of relevant 
findings from the newer field of behavioural economics and of laboratory 
experiments based on game theory that together provide the theoretical 
underpinnings for the common pool resource literature.  
 Next, Chapter 5 explores the literature on common pool resources.  The 
chapter describes the history of research into CPRs, discusses the analytical 
models used in CPR research, discusses the field studies that lay behind 
Ostrom’s project, and explores briefly the literature on trust and social capital as 
it applies to the issues explored in CPR research.  The chapter closes by 
presenting Ostrom’s framework of governance principles, which she derived 
from a meta-analysis of numerous field studies of long-surviving CPRs, studies 
that inspired and were supported by the behavioural and experimental insights 
discussed in Chapter 4. Although several other scholars have studied CPR 
governance, as will be discussed in this chapter, it is Ostrom’s model, the one 
most thoroughly grounded in both theory and in-depth field research, that this 
thesis will utilize to examine existing long-surviving heritage-based community 
projects and to answer the second of the two research questions.  Chapter 5 
brings the review of theory and past practice to a close and the thesis transitions 
to discussion of the field research. 
The methodology utilized to conduct the field research is summarized in 
Chapter 6. The chapter opens with a discussion of the methods utilized by 
Ostrom and her colleagues to assess case studies of CPRs and explores various 
theoretical and practical issues associated with the case-study approach.  
Building on that discussion, the chapter turns to the specific method used in this 
research, which involved extended interviews with members of each project and 
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other individuals in the communities involved.  Those interviews were directed 
by a questionnaire that included both open-ended and close-ended questions 
designed to supply both qualitative and quantitative data.  The questionnaire is 
described in some detail.  Following the approach to analysing case studies 
described at the outset of Chapter 6, specific hypotheses, called Model 
Institutional Features (MIFs) in this study, were developed to test the second 
research question stated above. The chapter next articulates the MIFs and links 
them to the questionnaire items that are used to assess responses.  Next, the 
process utilized to select the three projects studied for this thesis is exposed.  
Finally, the chapter concludes with an extensive discussion of methodological 
and practical issues arising from the study, including shortcomings in the 
research that result either from flaws in the study design or from practical 
realities encountered while conducting the fieldwork.   
Chapters 7 through 9 follow a parallel structure to present the three case 
studies conducted for this thesis.  Each begins with a brief overview of historical, 
economic and heritage management considerations relevant to understanding the 
national context within which the community hosting the project is situated.  
There then follow brief summaries of the history and relevant features of the 
community itself and of the history of the project as it was gleaned from the 
research interviews.  The fourth section of each chapter describes the governance 
institutions of the project under study utilizing parallel topical headings to 
facilitate comparisons.  The final section of each chapter applies the qualitative 
and quantitative findings of the research to test the validity of the MIFs set forth 
in Chapter 6.  Chapter 7 discusses the Asociacíon Inkallaqta in Raqchi, Peru; 
Chapter 8 the Maya Centre Women’s Group (MCWG) in Maya Centre, Belize; 
and Chapter 9 the Burren Centre and its parent entity, the Comhar Conradh na 
Boirne Teoranta (the “Comhar”), in Kilfenora, Ireland. 
Chapter 10 presents the conclusions of this research.  The chapter begins 
with a discussion of the first research question posed in this thesis and 
summarizes the similarities among the projects identified in the preceding 
chapters.  Then, reflecting the institutional analysis model utilized in this 
research, it examines several important contextual differences among the projects 
and the impact of those differences on the specific institutions employed in each 
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project.  Having established that the differences in detail are substantial, the 
chapter then turns to the second research question to assess whether, nonetheless, 
the three sites do exhibit higher-level features that conform to Ostrom’s model.  
The chapter closes with a discussion of the implications of this research for 
archaeologists and a consideration of areas for future research. 
There are eight appendices to the thesis. Bound into the thesis itself are: 
(1) the questionnaire used in the research, presented in the English and Spanish 
languages, (2) a summary of the results of the internet survey conducted to 
identify candidate sites for this research, (3) a chronological record of all 
interviews conducted for this thesis, (4) a summary of archaeological codes of 
ethics that is referenced in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2), (5) a summary of 
international agreements that is referenced in Chapter 2, (6) a document, 
prepared by the author for the Sustainable Preservation Initiative that is intended 
as a brief guide to archaeologists contemplating initiating or supporting 
community economic development projects, (7) a summary of the coding used to 
translate open-ended comments into numerical data for purposes of analysis, 
which includes a summary of the variable names used in the computer analysis 
of the data, and finally (8) print-outs of all of the cross-tabulations of statistical 
data developed for the thesis. 
Separately, a computer disk is included that contains the notes and 
recordings of the interviews at each location, plus the SPSS input file containing 
the raw data.  Most interviews were recorded using the Livescribe System (see 
on page 161), which enables field notes to be linked directly to recorded words.  
The enhanced PDF’s presented on the disc can be used in this way. An 
instruction guide to using the Livescribe PDFs is included on the disc.  These 
data are included in this version of the thesis for the benefit of examiners, but 
will be removed from the final version submitted to UCL due to confidentiality 
commitments made to interviewees.  In the future the author will make 
interviews available to other researchers, if requested, subject to confidentiality 
restrictions.   
Where cross-references have been provided in the text of the thesis, page 
numbers refer to the page on which begins the section that contains the 
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referenced material. This approach has been taken in order to place such 
references in their full context.  When in doubt about the translation of American 
English to UK English, the author has relied upon the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary and the MRHA Style Guide. 
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Chapter 2: Archaeology and Community  
Introduction 
This thesis considers whether, and if so how, archaeology can contribute 
to enhancing the economic conditions of communities that live in conjunction 
with archaeological sites and other tangible and intangible heritage resources.  
This particular study has been conducted in a very narrow context—it is an 
exploration of the potential for very small communities to organize community-
based projects, with or without external assistance, in order to benefit from 
archaeological and heritage resources.  Nonetheless, one might wonder about the 
relevance of the topic to the field of archaeology.  The purpose of this chapter is 
to anchor this research within an array of changes in archaeological theory and 
practice that have occurred in the post-World War II era.  In the broadest terms, 
the argument here is that the economic development activities described in 
Chapter 3 represent one aspect of the diverse activities conducted under the label 
of “community archaeology.”  This chapter will discuss the roots of community 
engagement by archaeologists, its diverse manifestations, and the confluence of 
theoretical, legal, ethical and practical developments that have led community-
engaged archaeologists to become interested, despite many misgivings, in 
economic development. 
The chapter begins with a short discussion of theory in archaeology.  
Even though theory per se is not directly linked to community engagement, the 
discourse around theory in archaeology has involved matters that have both 
broadened the horizon for legitimate archaeological inquiry and transformed the 
archaeologist from an antiquarian into a scientist and then, in some cases, further 
again into a social activist.  The chapter focuses on three aspects of theoretical 
development that are relevant to this discussion.  The first involves the 
consequences of the post-war revival of interest in Marxist critiques of the 
political and economic structures of the time, which had consequences for the 
political engagement of archaeologists with community development.  Second is 
the post-war critical perspective on knowledge and political power inspired 
particularly by post-modern analysis.  These theories interacted with the practical 
experience of archaeologists working amid the expansion of indigenous people’s 
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rights in the 20
th
 Century both to embed archaeological analysis within local 
communities and to activate a new degree of political engagement by 
archaeologists. The third, which also has roots in Marx, involves the emergence 
of the concept of individual “agency” and the ensuing discourse over the degree 
to which individuals are capable of independent action, including collaboration 
of the sort considered in this thesis. 
This increasingly politicized theoretical framework for archaeology 
emerged in tandem with greater practical recognition that community members 
are partners in the project of excavation and interpretation.  The second segment 
of the chapter will place in historical context the appearance and articulation of 
several important ideas and developments in the practice of archaeology that are 
closely related to the emergence of archaeological activism in community 
matters, including in some cases engagement by archaeologists in economic 
development projects.  In order of discussion, those ideas are: 
 The acknowledgement of indigenous people’s rights, which in many 
(though not all) countries redefined the relationship of archaeology to 
study sites and the people living on them; 
 The emergence of Cultural Resource Management (CRM) as a field for 
study and practice that extended the field of archaeology, expanded the 
role of government in it, and mandated a very different engagement with 
communities; 
 The emergence of public archaeology and later community archaeology 
as specialties in the field, developments that were the result of the 
discipline’s increasing need for public support, the emergence of CRM, 
and the political awakening associated with the indigenous rights 
movement and the practice of archaeology in post-colonial contexts; 
 The refinement of archaeology into a profession, including the 
development of codes of conduct that incorporated the new ethical 
obligations emerging from the above developments; and 
 The recognition, by cultural economists and archaeologists, of heritage 
as an asset that can produce benefits for the public, including local 
communities. 
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Most of these developments occurred in the years after World War II, 
which are often cited as a stark dividing line in the history of archaeological 
practice and heritage management. (Chamberlin 1979; Cleere 1989b; McGimsey 
2003; Wylie 1996).  World War II marks this transition because of the radical 
restructuring of national priorities and global power that followed it.  The shift of 
military power to two wartime allies that became arch rivals, the Soviet Union 
and the United States, was accompanied by a dramatic shift in economic might to 
the United States, which in turn identified its commercial interests with 
promoting an ever more open-bordered and international financial, trading and 
production system.   
For a discipline that had both deep ties to 19th Century European 
nationalism and colonialism, and a strong operational focus on regions 
dominated by Europe before the war, archaeology was heavily impacted by the 
collapse of the European colonial system in the decades after World War II.  The 
founding of the United Nations in 1945 was followed by the creation of a 
succession of specialist international organisations, most notably in the heritage 
context the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO).  In addition, there emerged new economic development-oriented 
financial, governmental and non-governmental organisations, each focused on 
advancing economic conditions in the newly liberated former colonies and other 
impoverished lands. Decolonization had a profound effect on many branches of 
archaeological practice, particularly influencing its ethical and epistemological 
perspectives (Nicholas and Hallowell 2007). This chapter will explore the 
implications of these post-war developments for the emergence of community 
archaeology generally and set up the discussion in Chapter 3 of the role of 
archaeologists in economic development. 
Archaeology and Community in Theory 
Gamble proposes that the relevant theoretical questions in archaeology 
are three: Who do we want to know? What can we know? How do we know?  
(Gamble 2004, Chapter 4).  Hodder and Hutson parse the points slightly 
differently, seeing theory as an exploration of the relationships between (a) 
behaviour and material culture, (b) cause and effect and (c) fact and theory  
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(Hodder and Hutson 2009, 14-17).  Regardless, questions of epistemology, 
sources of cultural dynamism, the interpretation of sites and artefacts, the roles of 
individuals and social groups, and the vexing question of the appropriate role for 
archaeologists have found numerous, often competing, answers during past 
century and one-half. Some of these directly play into the present discussion. The 
objective of this section, however, is not to summarize the history of 
archaeological theorizing, which has been done comprehensively elsewhere  
(Barnard 2000; Gamble 2004; Hodder and Hutson 2009; Johnson 1999a; Trigger 
2006).  Rather, the more modest goal is to consider briefly three strands of 
archaeological theory that are directly relevant to the discipline’s growing 
engagement with communities.   
This story really begins with the end of World War II, when archaeology 
began to shy away from the culture-history approach that had dominated 
archaeology for the prior century or more. The culture-history method for 
analysing the material record produced important diachronic and synchronic 
matrices illuminating the chronology of human activity throughout the world.  It 
was fundamental to American, Soviet, Central European and Asian 
archaeological practice (Trigger 2006, 248-278) and continues to have relevance 
in Latin America (Politis 2003), and in Canada and other regions where the 
historical chronology remains incomplete (Trigger 2006, 312). However, the 
concept implicit in the culture-history approach—that cultures are static and that 
change is caused exogenously—fell away (Johnson 1999a, Chapter 2; Trigger 
2006, 217-222) just as the break-up of colonial empires focused the discipline on 
past abuses of cultural-historical archaeological research for nationalist purposes, 
(Funari 1999; Meskell 1998; Trigger 1984; Trigger 2006, 240-241, 248-278), 
abuses that lay behind calls for a “post-colonial archaeology”  (Nicholas and 
Hallowell 2007). 
Processualism and post-processualism 
By the early 1960s objections to the culture-history model had coalesced 
into a “New” or “Processual” Archaeology.  The challenge to culture-history was 
propelled by two broad trends of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries (Johnson 
1999a, Chap. 2).  First, archaeology was profoundly influenced by the shift to an 
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“objective” and “scientific” method of inquiry that permeated the “social 
sciences” starting in the 19th Century and accelerated markedly in the mid-20th  
in the wake of the success of technological innovations in World War II and the 
emergence of research-based disciplines (physics, chemistry, engineering) as 
leading economic forces (Whitley 1998a, 3).    
The second trend was the influence on archaeological research of field 
studies and theoretical work in anthropology that encouraged archaeologists to 
plumb the archaeological record for deeper insights into the processes through 
which cultures adapt and change (Barnard 2000).  This “New Archaeology” 
rejected culture-history’s mechanical and externalized theory of change and 
looked inside societies to understand the processes of cultural innovation.  It was 
a positivist approach based on the view that well-designed field study using new 
scientific dating and analysis tools, when coupled with clearly articulated and 
testable hypotheses, would yield scientifically credible results (Binford 1962; 
Caldwell 1959; Renfrew and Bahn 2004; Whitley 1998a).   Underlying the 
processualist standpoint was a view that human cultures had commonalities, if 
not universal characteristics, that could be identified through meticulous 
excavation and methodical, often statistical analysis to test “middle range 
theories.”  There was optimism that meaningful generalizations could be 
deduced from properly structured scientific archaeology (Caldwell 1959, 129).   
Critics of processualism emerged almost from the beginning (Hodder and 
Hutson 2009, 1) but “post-processualism” presents no unified alternative 
worldview (Hodder & Hutson 2009; Renfrew & Bahn 2004; Shanks and Tilley 
1987; Trigger 2006; Whitley 1998b) and many post-processual propositions are 
debated within the discipline to this day.  However, three elements of post-
processual thinking are relevant to the present study.    
Marxism and political engagement 
One of these was the revival of interest in Marxist analysis in the post-
World War II era.  Economics as a driver of cultural change appeared in 
archaeology at least by the 1920’s in the work of V.G. Childe, himself an early 
Marxist (Trigger 2006, 322).  During the 1960’s and 1970’s,  the dialectical and 
materialist theories of Karl Marx (Marx 1906 (1867); Marx and Engels 1967 
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(1848)) enjoyed an intellectual resurgence in the West.  Intellectuals in Europe 
and the United States reconsidered contemporary political and economic 
conflicts in a Marxist light, and especially in Latin America generated policy 
prescriptions that directly affected regional development (Frank 1969).  In the 
realm of political-economy, a Marxist-influenced school arose in part as a 
reaction to W.W. Rostow’s (1960) influential “stages of economic growth” 
model, which critics decried for its complacent view of the global capitalist 
system’s impact on the world’s poor.  Resonating with Lenin’s analysis of 
imperialism (Lenin 1917), Immanuel Wallerstein (1979), Andre Gunder Frank 
(1969), and others articulated a “World Systems” model which described a 
global capitalist structure that created and exploited a dependency relationship 
between wealthy metropolitan core and peripheral underdeveloped countries.  
Marxist archaeologists sought to describe the social and economic class structure 
of past societies and explain their dynamics through changes in the relationship 
of social classes to the “means of production” (Barnard 2000, 87-91; Hodder and 
Hutson 2009, Chap. 4; Trigger 2006, 444-446) while even non-Marxists utilized 
the concept of the dialectic  and world-systems concepts to explain the dynamics 
of their theories (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991; Hall and Chase-Dunn 1993; 
Peregrine and Feinman 1996; Schneider 1991).    
More importantly for the present discussion, the World Systems critique 
of contemporary power relationships contributed to an awakened sensitivity 
among archaeologists to the conditions of those who lived on and around 
archaeological sites, particularly in developing countries (Benavides 2001; 
Funari 1999; Oyuela-Caycedo 1994; Trigger 1984).   In particular, the economic 
and social activism advocated by dependency and world systems theorists was 
embraced by archaeologists, particularly in Latin America, who evolved a school 
of “social archaeology” that emphasized utilizing the archaeological record and 
other aspects of tangible and intangible heritage to challenge the political and 
economic status-quo and, in some cases, to advance the causes of present-day 
indigenous communities (Arenas and Sanoja 1999; Benavides 2001; Díaz-
Andreu 2013; Patterson 1994; Politis 2003). Renfrew and Bahn comment that 
“the neo-Marxist element carries with it a strong commitment to social 
awareness: that it is the duty of the archaeologist not only to describe the past, 
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but to use such insights to change the present world” (2004, 46).  Thus propelled 
by theory,  archaeology became, in the hands of some Marxist archaeologists, 
vehicles for overt political action (Politis 2003) and moved the discipline directly 
into confrontation with issues at the community as well as the national levels. 
Post-modernism, multivocality and communities 
A second stream of doubts about processualist epistemology and practice 
came from archaeologists inspired by the “post-modernist” critical perspective in 
literature.  Post-modernists questioned the existence of “objective” reality and 
pointed out how power relationships are evident in virtually every form of social, 
intellectual and political discourse.  In the archaeological  context, post-
modernism called into question the political position of the contemporary 
discipline and, from an epistemological perspective,  it criticized archaeologists’ 
projection of present-day structures, norms and thought onto an unknowable past 
(Shanks and Tilley 1987).  The consequence of the post-modernist critique was 
to undermine confidence in the objective meaning of data, which critics argued 
were always contaminated by selectively biased and often unarticulated theories 
that typically have political implications (Shennan 1989).  In doing so, post-
modernists raised doubts about the scientific process in general as well as its 
relevance to archaeological research (Shanks and Tilley 1987, 43-44). 
Taken to extremes, some saw this critique leaving archaeology 
rudderless, and some leading post-processualists called upon the discipline to 
avert a descent into relativism even as they called for “reflexivity,” or self-
awareness, in practice (Bourdieu 1972, 16-22; Hodder 1998; Hodder and Hutson 
2009, 22-30).   Nonetheless, the post-modernist critique made it intellectually 
acceptable for archaeologists to incorporate anecdotal memories of living 
peoples, folklore, indigenous religions and contemporary local perspectives—not 
just the “facts” gleaned from the archaeological record—as potentially valid 
contributions to an inherently obscure ancient past (see, for example, Friesen 
2002; Giblin 2012).   
As a consequence, archaeologists now accept the legitimacy of  
“multivocality,” or the admission of multiple interpretations of the 
archaeological record, for example by presenting an indigenous interpretation 
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alongside technical archaeological findings in museum settings (Shanks and 
Hodder 1998; Shanks and Tilley 1987).  Particularly in contexts in which 
indigenous peoples have legal or moral authority over excavations (see page 45), 
multivocality transforms local communities from objects of study, or perhaps 
mere bystanders, into active partners in a collaborative search for meaning (see 
numerous examples in Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2008; Colwell-
Chanthaphonh et al. 2012, 240-241). The methodological implications of 
multivocality find expression in increasingly intense interactions with 
communities during excavations (Friesen 2002; Giblin 2012; Gnecco 1999; 
Green et al. 2003; Hodder 1998), which in turn contributes materially to 
archaeologists’ growing awareness of communities and the impact of 
archaeology on their lives, political actions, and worldviews.  With that 
awareness have come multiple ethical implications for archaeologists (see page 
62). 
Agency and collective behaviour 
The third relevant strand of the post-processual critique involves agency, 
the question of whether social behaviour is determined by cultural and 
environmental forces or whether individuals have the capacity to innovate and 
otherwise influence their conditions (Gamble 2004, Chapter 4).  Proponents of 
the latter view are highly influenced by the writings of the anthropologist Pierre 
Bourdieu and insights of Karl Marx. Marx, in a widely-quoted passage, 
observed:   
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from 
the past. (1959 (1852), 320) 
  Bourdieu labels his modulation of this concept “habitus,” the complex 
of formal rules and informal customary practices that shape and constrain, but do 
not dictate, the values, inventive behaviours and personal strategies of 
individuals (1972, Chap. 2).  Rejecting deterministic views of culture and 
behaviourist models of human psychology, Bourdieu argues that individual 
“agents” have interests and employ strategies which, depending on 
circumstances, lead them either to align with or subvert cultural norms and 
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practices.  Agency—the question of the capacity of individuals to influence 
cultures in the past—has emerged as a side stream in theoretical archaeology 
(Dobres and Robb 2000) that explores both the general role of agents in social 
change and addresses methods to detect and evaluate agency in the 
archaeological record.   
Agency engages with the subject of this thesis, community action to 
foster economic development, because some development scholars argue that 
socially imposed limitations to change create “constraining preferences” that 
explain many failures in economic development (Rao and Walton 2004, 9-18). 
Rao and Walton comment that: 
Individuals are not just limited by obstacles to their individual effort but 
by collectively determined factors that result from ideological, cultural, 
historical and social factors that are beyond their immediate control. 
(2004, 29) 
Citing the Hindu caste system as an example, Rao and Walton see the 
structure of social hierarchies and the resulting group cultures as defining the 
limits to individuals’ aspirations to such a degree that only efforts to advance the 
equality of agency can truly enhance the capacities of individuals.  Abraham and 
Platteau (2004) also point out the limitations on individual agency that members 
of a community can face due to cultural constraints when they try to change their 
position in the social structure. Analysts taking this perspective argue that there 
exists a collective constraint to effective collaboration, one that would sit 
comfortably alongside economists’ pessimistic view of the capacity of 
individuals to collaborate (see page 104), potentially dooming collaborative 
projects of the sort considered in this thesis. 
In the same volume, however, Amartya Sen (2004) and Arjun Appadurai, 
(2004) make the opposite case.  They argue for pushing decision-making to the 
lowest possible level in society in order to free individual actors to the extent 
possible from the constraints imposed by cultural limitations so that they can 
make decisions more favourable to themselves and their communities.  This 
perspective will find echoes in the literature on human behaviour in experiments 
that is discussed in Chapter 4 (see page 111).  Action by communities or 
individuals to improve their conditions would be inconceivable unless one 
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accepts that individual actors, however bounded by social norms or individual 
psychology, have the agency to act in their own interest.   
Altogether, critiques of processualist “scientific objectivity” and of 
archaeology’s quest for broad theories (Benavides 2001; Hodder and Hutson 
2009; Shanks and Tilley 1987; Whitley 1998b) opened the door to a variability 
in the interpretation of the archaeological record that moved the discipline 
uncomfortably close to the indeterminacy of quantum physics (see Bourdieu 
1972, 117) and quite far from the comfort of positivism and the New 
Archaeology. Even though agency-related theories accept that some constraints 
still exist on the capacity of individuals to advance their conditions, Marxist-
inspired practice and the increasing credibility and application of multi-vocal 
research have opened the way to intense, mutual and increasingly equal 
interaction between archaeologists and people living in the communities in 
which they work.   
Theory impacts practice 
Post-processualist critiques are neither universally nor unreservedly 
accepted within the discipline of archaeology.  Even partisans endeavour to find 
methodologies to preserve the science in archaeological method despite the 
epistemological critique (Hodder and Hutson 2009, Chap. 10; Shanks and Tilley 
1987, Chap. 9; Wylie 1989).  The transition of archaeology from its cultural-
historical past to what some perceive as a theoretically cacophonous present has 
had one clear-cut effect:  It has removed archaeologists from the observer’s 
distanced perch to become actively engaged participant observers, often 
politically and morally exercised by the conditions in which present-day 
communities affected by archaeological projects find themselves.   
Furthermore, by injecting members of local communities into the 
archaeological process, post-processual archaeology has illuminated for the 
profession the fact that archaeologists, when they expose the material past, are 
shaping “new” collective memories and contributing to an emerging sense of 
identity in affected communities (Benavides 2001, 362; Hodder and Hutson 
2009; Meskell 2002).  Indeed,  as Ucko emphasized,  a certain “multivocality” 
has emerged in archaeological thinking itself in recent decades, one in which 
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regional archaeological theorizing and practice have been  “driven variously, and 
to different extents, by ethnicity, by heritage concerns and by nationalism” (Ucko 
1995, 8. Emphasis in the original).  Politis (2003, 253) observes that “the existence 
of large indigenous populations and popular social movements in several South 
American countries make some post-processual concerns immediately relevant,” 
and Moser (1995) makes a similar point about the impact of the Australian 
aboriginal rights movement on Australian archaeological practice. Political 
implications have followed quickly. As Laurajane Smith puts it:  
Conflicts over the meaning of the past become more than just conflicts 
over interpretation or differing values, they become embroiled in 
negotiations over the legitimacy of political and cultural claims made on 
the basis of links to the past. (2004, 3)  
Trigger (2006, 467) identifies some post-processualists, such as Michael 
Shanks, Christopher Tilley, and Peter Ucko, with a school of thought “concerned 
with political action, encouraging opposition to authority, and emphasizing the 
transformative power of human agency.” Hamilakis and Duke’s volume (2007) 
published in the wake of the 5
th
 World Archaeological Congress made the 
political engagement of archaeologists a salient ethical and professional issue.  
Archaeology and Community in Practice 
Whatever their source of theoretical inspiration, post-processual 
archaeologists have moved the profession toward new-found concern to engage 
with contemporary people while exploring their pasts (Cripps et al. 1995).  
Communities have an interest in that process, all the more so in indigenous 
communities where what is heritage to the archaeologist may be active cultural 
space to those who occupy it. Moreover, in some quarters it has engendered new 
ethical obligations for archaeologists to engage with communities (see page 62), 
and encouraged some in the profession to become deeply involved in community 
development (see page 92).  Those sorts of entanglements are the subject of the 
following sections. 
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Indigenous rights  
The first area of archaeological practice to be explored in this chapter 
involves the impact of indigenous rights on the practical actions and ethical 
obligations of archaeologists. It has been a fundamental force behind 
engagement by archaeologists in economic development. 
 The concept of “indigenous” is widely contested on political and social 
grounds. Worn as a badge of pride in some nations, in some, such as Peru, 
indigenous is a little used term that that the government at one time sought to 
eliminate from the lexicon (Bauer et al. 2007, 51) and one that Quechua-
speaking Peruvians have seen to retard their integration into society (Garcia 
2005). Funari (2001, 240) has highlighted the degree to which indigenous people 
have been politically and economically marginalized throughout Latin America. 
Diaz-Andreu notes that the importance attributed to the indigenous past in varies 
greatly among Latin American countries depending upon the power of the 
indigenismo movement in each, and that the indigenous heritage being celebrated 
“related more to an idealized past than to an appreciation of the country’s 
contemporary indigenous communities” (2013, 227-228). This thesis is not the 
place to explore the social or political implications of “indigeneity,” other than to 
acknowledge that such implications exist.  
What is important in the present context are the political claims made by 
indigenous descendants, however they chose to identify themselves, for the right 
to participate in, if not outright control, the interpretation of the artefacts and 
histories of their ancestors.  Indigenous peoples’ battles have often focused on 
gaining control over lands and heritage artefacts of cultural importance—the 
very stuff of archaeology. As new nations were forged from the European 
colonial empires, archaeologists working in many of those countries have had to 
wrestle with the ethical and practical implications of their work in this new 
context.  Self-consciousness over archaeology’s historical complicity in 
colonialism, by underwriting imperialist ideologies with historical “facts,” 
merged with the emergence of post-processual theories, particularly 
multivocality and the demands for indigenous rights, to reshape the political 
perspectives, field practice and the professional ethics of archaeology in the 20
th
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Century (see Meskell 2009).  The engagement with indigenous peoples that has 
most informed these developments in archaeology has occurred in North 
America and in Australia/New Zealand during the later 20
th
 Century. 
Prior to World War II,  archaeological teams often operated in isolation 
from local communities, often in enclaves that disrespected local customs, 
disregarded communication with local residents, and denigrated both local 
knowledge and the capabilities of locals to be anything more than inexpensive 
field labour (Ucko 1983). Not surprisingly, indigenous people were alienated and 
mistrustful, and academic archaeologists were unprepared for the challenges they 
faced in this new era. In North America, Australia and New Zealand, where the 
indigenous populations had been overwhelmed by immigration, tensions began 
to rise between “first peoples” and European newcomers. Elsewhere in countries 
newly formed from former colonies, some indigenous people overnight became 
the masters of their own nations, countries demarcated in Europe without regard 
to traditional boundaries or relations to territory. Outside of Europe, in other 
words, indigenous people emerged as political actors with sharply different and 
often antagonistic views of the practices and prejudices of archaeology and 
anthropology.  Ucko, describing his Australian experience, observes: 
Urban Aboriginal attacks on academics included the accusation that all 
Aboriginal studies concentrated on highlighting the differences between 
traditional and urban Aborigines, and were part of a white (imperialist) 
plot to divide (and rule) the Aboriginal minority population of Australia. 
Urban Aborigines also had, for a considerable time, objected to the 
excavation of human skeletal material, claiming that the disturbance of 
the dead violated traditional Aboriginal religious mores. They were also 
against the treatment of Aborigines, past and present, as objects of 
display for whites. By 1974 anthropologists and archaeologists in 
universities had begun to run for cover. As already noted archaeologists 
(and physical anthropologists) had seldom if ever carried out meaningful 
consultation with traditional Aborigines and were by and large 
unprepared to interact with urban Aborigines. (1983, 14-15) 
Similar tales are told of the relations between archaeologists and 
indigenous peoples in the United States (Gonzalez et al. 2006; Tsosie 1997; 
Zimmerman 2001). Though the beliefs of the world’s varied indigenous peoples 
are far too complex and nuanced to categorize glibly, some disputes are common 
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to many indigenous people’s arguments with archaeologists. For example, the 
Western division of time into a past that is distinct from the present is at variance 
with some cultures in the Pacific and North America that view ancestors to be 
immanent in current life (Tsosie 1997; Zimmerman 2001). The Western 
tendency to separate physical objects from spiritual matters leads to profound 
disputes over the importance of objects and landscapes that are, in some 
indigenous worldviews, endowed with living spirituality and significance (Allen 
et al. 2002; Ucko 1983). Indigenous people in both the Pacific and North 
American regions were frankly sceptical of the Western scientific approach to 
knowledge (Wylie 1996, 181-184; Zimmerman 2001). As Zimmerman puts it: 
Though the past is recognized as important, its relevance to the present is 
determined by what is happening now. The mechanism for knowing the 
past is oral tradition, which recounts the mythic and makes the past and 
the present the same.  Oral tradition therefore takes precedence over any 
other kind of knowledge about the past/present, including that generated 
by Euro-American historical or archaeological techniques. Simply stated, 
the past and the present are essentially the same in content and meaning, 
though details may differ. As a tradition-oriented Native American, if you 
know the oral history of your people, you need no other mechanisms for 
‘discovering your people’s past.’ (2001, 172-173) 
Finally, as Ucko came to realize in Australia, these issues have direct 
political consequences for indigenous people. Affirmation of the spiritual 
importance of lands or objects by the non-indigenous forms the basis for 
indigenous legal claims to property ownership that can shift the balance of 
economic and political power in former colonies (Ucko 1983).  Langford’s 
critique of archaeology from the indigenous Tasmanian perspective offers this 
stark perspective: 
The issue is control. You seek to say that as scientists you have a right to 
obtain and study information of our culture. You seek to say that because 
you are Australians you have a right to study and explore our heritage 
because it is a heritage to be shared by all Australians, white and black. 
From our point of view we say you have come as invaders, you have tried 
to destroy our culture, you have built your fortunes upon the lands and 
bodies of our people and now, having said sorry, want a share in picking 
out the bones of what you regard as a dead past. We say that it is our past, 
our culture and heritage, and forms part of our present life. As such it is 
Page | 48  
 
ours to control and it is ours to share on our terms. That is the central 
issue in this debate. (1983, 2) 
The indigenous challenge to archaeology has compelled archaeologists to 
face the consequences of their projects for indigenous peoples. Conservation has 
been one point of contention.  In Europe, the concept of conserving heritage 
resources has gained wide acceptance since the 18
th
 Century (Stubbs 2009, 25-
30), but this is not a universally-shared value.  Lowenthal (1997, 20) notes the 
emphasis throughout Asia on preserving craft skills and other intangible heritage 
rather than ruins. Kigango and Reid’s (2011) discussion of the Kasubi tombs 
explores the problems of conservation of native flora building materials in 
Africa, where rebuilding has been common. In some cases, indigenous peoples 
may place values on culturally meaningful landscapes that can stand in 
opposition to other uses (Prangnell et al. 2010; Sen et al. 2006).  Conflicts have 
arisen over the “management” of rock art displays that pit historically important 
ancient inscriptions against contemporary indigenous people’s desire to engage 
them (by repainting) in current religious ceremony (Mowaljarlai et al. 1988).  
The most important articulation of the indigenous peoples’ rights relating 
to places and their conservation is the Burra Charter (Australia ICOMOS 1999), 
which sets out standards for the identification, maintenance and conservation of 
places of cultural significance. That charter resulted from indigenous rights 
controversies in Australia. Furthermore, the heritage world has come 
increasingly to acknowledge that “intangible” heritage—from customs and 
rituals to rights over indigenous knowledge of potential new drugs—are 
legitimate concerns and objects for inclusion in the realm of heritage 
management (Brown 2003; Colley 2002).   
Control over excavations and artefacts, and their interpretation, has been 
the larger field of contest. Beginning in the 1970s, political activity by 
indigenous groups, particularly in democratic countries, has led to their 
acquisition of substantial powers to control their heritage. In the United States, 
the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) 
and its predecessor, the National Historic Preservation Act, mandated 
consultation with Native America communities in matters relating to heritage 
and affirmed (with numerous caveats) the rights of officially recognized  tribes to 
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demand the return and complete the reburial of both human remains and 
associated artefacts, despite the prodigious objections of many in the field of 
archaeology (Gonzalez et al. 2006; Trope and Echo-Hawk 2000).  Indigenous 
peoples in Australia and New Zealand have fought for and won similar rights. 
While the political rights and economic opportunities of indigenous people in 
other regions, including much of Central and South America, are less clearly 
articulated or observed (Atalay 2011; Baud and Ypeij 2009a; Tilley 2005), the 
broader discourse within the discipline around indigenous issues has shaped 
professional standards, study design and field practice within archaeology (see 
page 62) in ways that assign leading roles to indigenous communities (Allen et 
al. 2002; Clarke 2002; Crosby 2002; Moser et al. 2002; Zimmerman 2001).   
Holtorf (2009) observes that archaeology’s emphasis on indigenous rights 
may contradict egalitarian and democratic principles prevalent in Europe and 
North America and may be increasingly irrelevant in a world that is growing 
more diverse as a consequence of immigration, but such concerns appear to be a 
minority perspective in archaeology today.  Moreover, the articulation and 
establishment of the rights of indigenous peoples to control their heritage 
coincided with, and to some degree drove, the emergence of multi-vocal 
theorizing (see page 40) about the meaning and interpretation of archaeological 
remains.  Theory and practice thus come together strongly in the field of 
indigenous archaeology, with both elements propelling deeper engagement with 
local communities.   
Cultural resource management 
The second realm of practice important to the role of communities in 
archaeology was the establishment of cultural resource management (CRM), 
called “cultural heritage management” in some countries, as a distinct academic, 
governmental and corporate field within archaeology that is focused on the 
preservation of material archaeological remains.  CRM brought government into 
a leading role both funding and regulating archaeological activity and gave 
archaeologists a new and powerful voice in matters of heritage exploration and 
preservation.  The expansion of archaeological activity in the post-war era 
resulting from CRM, especially in Europe, North America and the Pacific, 
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brought archaeologists closer than ever to communities through much more 
frequent interactions with growing numbers of sites.  
Concern for the protection of old places and things is neither an ancient 
nor a universal value (Chamberlin 1979; Lowenthal 1997; Stubbs 2009: 72 and 
Ch.12; Trigger 2006).  While the past has long been used for political purposes, 
to reinforce claims of legitimacy for royal lines or to validate claims for territory 
(Trigger 2006: 49), concern for the physical manifestations of the past were 
principally driven by what economists and historians today would call “use 
value” (see page 68). In the Middle Ages buildings without current use were 
routinely salvaged for stone to be reused in new construction, a practice not 
unheard of today in the developing world and one that is hardly surprising given 
the cost at the time to excavate and finish raw stones (Chamberlin 1979, 37-41; 
Trigger 2006, 48-54).   
By the start of the 18
th
 Century, interest in the material remains of the 
past was influenced by the emerging rationalist and humanist philosophy and the 
concepts of time and history that became important elements of Enlightenment 
philosophy (Stubbs 2009: 25, 71-77), although practice with regard to buildings 
themselves was neither systematic nor scientific. Buildings that were saved were 
unquestionably important monuments, although maintenance and restoration 
practices of the time would in later days be abhorred (Chamberlin 1979: 53; 
Morris 1877; Trigger 2006: 60).  By the 19
th
 Century, however, intellectuals and 
critics like John Ruskin and William Morris in England were arguing for the first 
time for new standards of preservation.  In his Manifesto associated with the 
founding of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, Morris (1877), 
articulated a doctrine of minimal intervention and threw down the gauntlet for 
imposing controls on the process of conservation and preservation.  Debates over 
whether to repair and restore buildings, and if so to what degree, raged 
throughout the final years of the 19
th
 Century, debates that were dissected by 
Alois Riegl in his discourse of 1928 on the “Modern Cult of Monuments” (1982 
(1928)).   
Governments in Europe and North America began to become involved in 
the 19
th
 Century.  In 1830 France created an “Inspectorate General of Ancient 
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Monuments” and much of the rest of Europe followed suit by century’s end 
(Chamberlin 1979: 55).  The first UK legislation, the Ancient Monuments 
Protection Act, was approved in 1892 and The National Trust, now the UKs 
leading building preservation group and the country’s second largest landowner, 
was formed as a voluntary group in 1895 (Stubbs 2009, 225).  In 1906 the United 
States placed controls on archaeological excavations and protected 
archaeological sites through the Antiquities Act, which was followed in 1916 by 
the creation of the National Park Service (Jameson 2004, 25-26).   The idea of 
“preservation” was being cemented into national policy at least among nations 
bracketing the northern Atlantic Ocean. By the mid-20
th
 Century, under the 
influence of the post-processualist widening of archaeology’s vision, a 
completely different concept—the management of cultural resources—had 
emerged (Whitley 1998a, 20). 
As one example of the process, Jameson (2004) chronicles the expansion 
of the American government’s role in archaeology in his chapter in Merriman’s 
Public Archaeology (2004).   Although the United States claims its third 
President, Thomas Jefferson, as its first archaeologist, governmental interest in 
the nation’s heritage was modest until the 20th Century.  As noted above, 
President Theodore Roosevelt focused the Federal government on natural 
heritage, creating an unparalleled network of managed national parks that also 
incorporated archaeological monuments.  When Franklin Roosevelt became 
President, in the midst of the Great Depression, heritage documentation and 
preservation became another job-creating opportunity for Washington.  Modest 
surveys and salvage programmes before World War II presaged huge 
programmes immediately after the war designed to manage large scale water 
resource projects such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, which exposed many 
archaeological sites to damage.  Jameson locates the origins of CRM in the USA 
to this period (2004, 28-29). 
Those surveys were followed in the 1960s and 1970s by new laws, 
relating to both heritage and environmental protection, cumulating in a “virtual 
flood of compliance-related cultural resource investigations” (Jameson 2004, 36)  
that produced a huge increase in government-funded archaeological work, 
largely for archaeological impact assessments and remediation for government-
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funded projects such as highways and dams.  Jameson notes that changes in 
archaeological theories, first to scientific processualism and subsequently to 
critical post-processualism, impacted these salvage interventions by converting 
them from mere data gathering to complex interpretive endeavours (2004, 37). 
Colley and Smith each describe a parallel process that occurred in 
Australia (Colley 2002, 50-58; Smith 2001), Everill (2007) describes the post-
war emergence of commercial rescue archaeology under government regulation 
in the UK,  and Fojut summarizes the philosophical and practical changes that 
occurred at the same time in Europe’s approach to heritage management (Fojut 
2009). Henry Cleere’s (1989a) early collection of essays and Messenger and 
Smith’s (2010) more recent volume both describe the official heritage 
management regimes in Europe, North and South America, Asia and Africa.  By 
the start of the 20
th
 Century, both within what was considered the “developed 
world” and in many “developing” countries, government had assumed a leading 
role for controlling the discovery, use and preservation of tangible heritage, in 
particular the built heritage.  The model of national control extended to Europe’s 
colonies, sometimes well before independence, as in the case of Belize (see page 
218) and several countries in Africa (Breen and Rhodes 2010, Chapter 4).  Some 
countries such as Peru, actually established heritage protection laws prior to their 
independence and elaborated them throughout the 19
th
 Century (see page 176) 
(Heaney 2010; Silva 2010). 
The idea of managing heritage, which carried with it an implication that 
heritage was in some measure a “public trust”—what will come to be labelled a 
public good in Chapter 4—thus embedded the output of archaeology (ruins, 
artefacts, identified cultural features, etc., both  tangible and intangible) solidly 
in the public domain.  It also spawned new fields for archaeological work, 
ranging from managing excavation and conservation on archaeological reserves 
to “rescue” archaeology, mandated by law, to secure archaeological resources 
threatened by development.  Corporate archaeology, businesses that contracted 
with governments or corporations to complete archaeological work, was born. 
As Laurajane Smith, an early critic of the role of archaeologists in 
heritage management (Smith 1994), observes, this development has been a 
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double-edged sword for archaeology.  With the credibility established by 
processual “science” and their legal mandate, archaeologists have been 
empowered with a “seat at the policy table” and been given a measure of control 
over the subject of their study.  However, that seat also has generated conflicts, 
especially those between professionals and indigenous communities, that were 
explored above (see page 45 )  (Smith 2001). 
Public archaeology 
The third and very important connection between archaeology and 
community is the emergence of public archaeology and its close cousin, 
community archaeology (see page 57).   
Archaeology first turned its face toward the public through museums.  
Later, with the growing role of government in CRM and increasing interactions 
with indigenous and other public groups, archaeologists came to embrace a very 
broad definition of the public’s role in archaeology outside the corridors of 
academia.  The result was, first, the identification of public archaeology as an 
area of practice and ethical responsibility for archaeologists, followed by the 
emergence of community archaeology as an outward expression of the 
discipline’s emerging focus on community.  In turn, community archaeology has 
spawned two forms of practice, an education and public opinion-oriented form 
prominent in Europe and the United States, and a form that subordinates the 
archaeologist to the community that has appeared in Australia / New Zealand and 
other locales with substantial indigenous populations that claim rights over the 
heritage under study.  This section and the next will explore all of these forms of 
public engagement by archaeologists. 
 During the middle ages, there was little concern for public education, 
and the concept of a museum for the general public was unknown and 
incomprehensible (Hudson 1975: 3-4).  However, by the mid-18
th
 Century, 
systematic excavation of archaeological sites had emerged in Italy in the later 
excavations of Pompeii and Herculaneum (Trigger 2006, 58); Napoleon’s 
exhibitions of booty from his foreign conquests had legitimized the public 
presentation of monuments and antiquities (Siegel 2008, 6); and vast quantities 
of material had begun to accumulate in what would come to be known as 
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“encyclopaedic” museums (Cuno 2008).  This turn to the public was influenced 
in part by enlightenment thinking on education and morality and in part by 
practical political realities:   
The pressing political claims that manifested themselves not only 
violently in the course of the French Revolution and in the threatened and 
actual uprisings throughout the century that followed but also in 
important legislative changes in Great Britain and elsewhere were 
unmistakable evidence of the emerging social and political force of an 
ever more powerful mass public.  A new level of general culture was 
called for, whether to accompany and mollify the effects of 
enfranchisement or to shape the taste of the artisan involved in mass 
production.  The fear of the crowd and the resulting desire to educate it 
into a grouping of responsible and productive subjects free from the 
dangerous passions of the mob are central influences on nineteenth-
century social institutions.  (Siegel 2008: 4) 
Public art galleries were opened in Rome in 1734, in Paris at the 
Luxembourg Palace in 1750, in Vienna in 1770, and in 1773 in Charleston, 
South Carolina, the first of a long tradition of public museums in the new United 
States (Hudson 1975; McClellan 1994; Siegel 2008).  With a gift from Sir Hans 
Sloane, the British Museum was founded in 1753 with the express wish that it be 
open to the public, a gift that ultimately spawned Britain’s Library and South 
Kensington museums (now the Natural History Museum and the Victoria and 
Albert Museum) (Wilson 1989).  Finally, in 1793, the Louvre, begun at mid-
century as a public testimonial to the glory of France and the Sun King, opened 
as a triumphant statement of Enlightenment principles (McClellan 1994).  In 
England, the number of museums expanded from a handful in 1820 to more than 
400 by the start of World War I  (Siegel 2008: vii).  Museums thus brought the 
public into archaeology. However, archaeologists hardly welcomed the public.  
Shackel (2002, 157) recounts a sign he encountered at the site of a 1970’s 
excavation in the United States:  
Yes—we are archaeologists 
Yes—we are doing archaeology 
Please Do Not Disturb Us. 
That times have changed since then is reflected in the creation of a new 
field called “Public Archaeology,” a term generally attributed to Charles 
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McGimsey (1972).  Merriman notes that today there are two distinct concepts of 
“public” at play in “public archaeology”:  The sense of public as actions of the 
state “in the public interest,” which is embodied in legislation relating to CRM 
(see page 49) and the more inchoate sense of a “general public” that has opinions 
and differences that all who interact with it must take into account (2004, 1-2).  
Both were intertwined in the origins of public archaeology. 
McGimsey’s book, for example, was largely a call for government legal 
intervention to protect archaeological resources from destruction by encroaching 
commercial and infrastructure development in the post-World War II United 
States.  He made that call together with an early recognition of the need to 
“professionalize” archaeology and to encourage archaeologists to include the 
public in archaeological activities.  His reasons were dual:  He sought both to 
expand the skilled work force available for excavations and to build public 
support for government actions on behalf of the archaeological enterprise 
(McGimsey 1972, 18-19). 
 In introducing one of the first journal issues dedicated to the subject, 
Schadla-Hall offered a more expansive definition of public archaeology.  He 
argued that the field “was concerned with any area of archaeological activity that 
interacted or had the potential to interact with the public” (Schadla-Hall 1999, 
147). Schadla-Hall effectively expanded McGimsey’s phrase to incorporate 
within the ambit of public archaeology everything from public presentations to 
curatorial techniques in museums, and from the role of members of the public in 
excavations to archaeologists’ interactions with government agencies.   
 Following McGimsey’s lead, Schadla-Hall specifically acknowledged 
that public interaction and interpretation to encourage preservation of 
archaeological sites was an important rationale for public archaeology.  He 
argued more strongly that public archaeology can build support among the 
general public, which is crucial to encouraging governments to continue to 
underwrite the work of archaeologists (Schadla-Hall 1999, 152).  Merriman, in 
introducing his volume on the subject, noted that a broad definition of “public 
archaeology” will embrace 
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Not just archaeological products (such as educational programmes, 
museum displays and site tours) but […] the debates which open up 
between the official provision of archaeology on behalf of the public and 
the differing publics which have a stake in archaeology. (2004, 5) 
Thus, he inserted into public archaeology disputes among actors, such as 
those that arose around the issue of indigenous rights (see page 45). 
In the years since McGimsey and Schadla-Hall wrote, public archaeology 
has expanded beyond its European and North American roots into a variegated 
practice that has touched archaeology in virtually every region (Okamura and 
Matsuda 2012). While some authors betray a certain self-consciousness about the 
work of archaeologists, when they seek to articulate the “public benefits of 
archaeology” (Little 2002) as a way to justify the time and money spent on 
archaeological investigations, this new field of academic study and practical 
action directly enchained archaeology in the broadest sense of the term with the 
public. Stottman (2010, Chapter 1) narrates the progression of archaeology from 
a source of historical information and employment opportunities for local 
communities into an engaged, “activist” model in which archaeologists confront 
questions of social, political or economic justice that arise from their work.  
Public archaeology also been endorsed in an international context 
through the numerous international declarations, treaties and conventions 
sponsored by UNESCO, The International Council on Monuments and Sites 
(ICOMOS) and related entities.  Since World War II, archaeologists, 
conservation specialists and heritage professionals have enjoyed remarkable 
success in introducing the issues of heritage and conservation to the global 
agenda, including appeals to the public aspects of archaeology.  For example, 
The Getty Museum’s Conservation Institute has compiled a list of 82 major 
international conventions since Morris’ 1877 SPAB Manifesto, a list that 
highlights the acceleration of attention to heritage on the global agenda in the 
late 20
th
 Century (Getty Conservation Institute 2013).  Appendix 5 presents 
abstracts from the Getty of the provisions of those conventions.  Of those 82 
international conventions, agreements and declarations identified by the Getty, 
nearly one half (39) were finalized since 1990 and 25 more were approved in the 
prior two decades. Eighteen of the charters on the list call for some form of 
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public education about the substance and importance of archaeology and 
heritage, often expressly in the context of seeking to build public support to 
protect heritage sites.  Five charters expressly call for citizen involvement in 
decision making about heritage in their towns, cities or historical landscapes.  
Eight directly address economic development, including five that deal with 
heritage tourism, often in the context of sustainable development or of 
attempting to balance the economic benefits of tourism with the costs to society 
and to heritage resources of tourism around archaeological sites.  
Too much can be made of these charters, as most  have no binding legal 
standing and many are statements of aspiration not government policy. These 
charters and agreements can be criticized for inadequacies (Schaafsma 1989), do 
not resolve all conflicts and inconsistencies (Herrmann 1989), involve critical 
terms such as “outstanding universal value” that are subject to manipulation and 
misinterpretation (Labadi 2013; Rodwell 2012), and are difficult to enforce (case 
studies in McManamon and Hatton 2000; O'Keefe 2010).  Nonetheless, they 
constitute a body of international standards and aspirations that speak to the 
influence on the discipline and on the global diplomatic discourse of the ideas 
articulated by public archaeologists. As statements of the priorities of 
archaeologists and of policy makers engaged with archaeology and heritage 
management, these charters indicate the growing level of interest within the field 
to incorporate public considerations, including economic development issues, 
into the global heritage agenda.   
  Furthermore, archaeology is now clearly on the agenda of international 
development assistance organisations because of the potential that heritage offers 
to move living conditions forward in many poor countries (Fleming and 
Campbell 2010; Jansen II 2010; Rojas 1998).  At the World Bank, for example, 
recognition of the potential economic importance of the archaeological record 
has lifted “archaeological impact” to the same level of importance as 
environmental impact (Breen and Rhodes 2010; Duer 1999; Fleming 2012, 99).  
Community archaeology 
“Community archaeology,” a field of activity that has emerged as a sub-
category of public archaeology, brings this discussion closer to questions of 
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engagement with economic development by archaeologists.  At least two streams 
of practice in community archaeology may be discerned.  The first, particularly 
evident in the United Kingdom and the United States, involves projects that 
actively include volunteer members of the public as workers in excavations, 
post-excavation processing, site interpretation, and other activities designed to 
educate participants and stimulate interest in and support for archaeological 
practice (Moshenska and Dhanjal 2013).  The second thread has antipodean roots 
and grew out of what were at first ethical but later became legal obligations of 
archaeologists in Australia to share or even cede control over archaeological 
projects to the local communities in which they work (Smith and Waterton 
2009).  This latter practice has extended into North America, where indigenous 
groups also have acquired significant new rights, and is evident in Africa and 
South America.  This section will examine both forms of community 
archaeology. 
Originally, archaeological engagement with communities had relatively 
modest aspirations.  For example, Healy offers a perspective that is typical of 
archaeologists in the 1980s.  Calling community engagement “a common 
courtesy,” he suggests that: 
Although it may take some extra effort, it is essential to take time out 
from normal project operations to organize a controlled (if small) 
exhibition of findings or to deliver a public presentation to the 
community in which the project is based [… and goes on to note that this 
“common courtesy” can help manage…] hostile local suspicions about 
smuggling, drug running, and undercover intelligence activities, and has 
improved local relations so as to considerably facilitate daily activities.  
Several archaeologists have noted that such ‘talks’ to local groups 
invariably brought forth site data, volunteer guides, artefacts, and a 
genuine wealth of archaeological interest. They might even make the 
labours of local grave robbers more difficult. (1984, 129) 
So many community archaeology projects along these lines have 
occurred throughout the world that this form of public interaction, stressing 
educational presentations, is part of most ethical codes in the profession (see 
page 62).  For example, a well-known project in Quseir, Egypt led by Stephanie 
Moser produced a seven-step programme of communication, training, public 
presentation, creation of interview and photo archives, and community 
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merchandising (Moser et al. 2002).  The Quseir model encapsulates many of the 
elements of archaeology’s current relationship to the public.  Tully (2007) 
subsequently extended Moser et al’s model through a study of six additional 
projects.  She offers a somewhat more encompassing catalogue of methods and 
standards for creating and evaluating this sort of community-centred archaeology 
project (see Figure 1). Of particular interest in the present context is item 7 in 
Figure 1, which originally appeared in Moser’s analysis.  Item 7 calls for 
community control over the various souvenirs sold to tourists at their sites.  This 
is one of the earliest published examples of archaeological project reports that 
specifically recognize both the importance of tourism to the local community and 
the importance of community control over the tourist experience if the benefits 
of tourism are to accrue locally. 
Seven Key Elements of a Community Archaeology Project 
(Tully 2007) 
 
1. Communication and collaboration between the archaeological / 
museological team and the local community at all stages of research. 
2. Employment, training and volunteering of local people in all areas of the 
project. 
3. Public presentation, a vital element in the passing on of information to the 
wider community and other non-indigenous / non-community members. 
4. Interview and oral history to see how local people respond to the 
archaeological excavation and the objects discovered / being presented to see 
how this links into the communities traditional ideas about the past. 
5. Educational resources to introduce people from all generations to the 
cultural heritage. 
6. Photographic and video archive to create a record of the archaeological 
work and experiences of the project, to enhance the visual element of local 
authority and knowledge production in site interpretation and for the 
development of exhibition centres. 
7. Community controlled merchandising considering the tourist market and 
offering quality alternatives to the typical, stereotyped souvenirs on offer. 
Figure 1: Seven elements of a community archaeology project, after Tully  (Tully 2007, 176-
180) 
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Projects incorporating at least some elements of this approach to 
community engagement with archaeology can be identified in every region of the 
world, from Australia (Mitchell et al. 2013) to the West Indies (Ryzewski and 
Cherry 2012), Africa (Barillet et al. 2006; Chirikure et al. 2010) to the United 
Kingdom (Hodges and Watson 2000; Moshenska and Dhanjal 2013; Moshenska 
et al. 2011), and from Latin America (Chávez 2008; Funari et al. 2013; Funari 
and Robrahn-Gonzalez 2010; Haber et al. 2010) to the United States (Austin 
2011; Hart 2011)  to the long-running project at Ҫatalhöyük in Turkey (Atalay 
2010). As Galla’s (2012) volume for UNESCO illustrates, many community 
engagement projects associated with World Heritage Sites bear the hallmarks of 
this form of community archaeology, often associated with capacity-building, 
promotion of indigenous commercial or tourist businesses, co-management 
arrangements with local governments, and other project elements related to 
economic development. In their recent volume on global public archaeology, 
Okamura and Matsuda (2012) present numerous community archaeology 
projects from around the world.  The impact of these types of projects is open to 
question, for they have been evaluated only rarely (Simpson 2009; Simpson and 
Williams 2008) and then using methods that were ethnographic rather than 
statistical in nature, making it difficult to calibrate the sceptical conclusions they 
reach.  
Nonetheless, whether due to empathy for or demands from local 
communities, some archaeologists have pursued an even more expansive vision 
for community archaeology that has more overtly politicized content. Colwell-
Chanthaphonh and Ferguson’s edited volume (2008) describes a spectrum of 
collaborative archaeology projects involving indigenous groups in the United 
States, Australia, Brazil and South Africa that reflect the ethical and practical 
consequences of multivocality and indigenous rights in archaeology projects that 
fully engage with communities. Hererra-Wasilowsky’s (2013) compilation of 
case studies from Latin America features numerous examples of efforts to 
engage indigenous communities with the archaeological process, all adopting a 
critical stance with regard to the objectives of the modern State and the damage 
inflicted by colonialism on indigenous populations.  Papers in Little and 
Shackel’s volume (2007) make numerous concrete linkages between the practice 
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of community archaeology and the quest for social justice. Some authors have 
made the case that even the conventional forms of community engagement—
interpretation, communication or education—can have an activist, politicized 
content (Little and Shackel 2007; Stottman 2010).  
Reflecting her experience with conflicts over indigenous peoples’ rights 
(see page 45), Marshall (2002, 211) moves beyond all of these models to 
redefine “community archaeology” as a process of research that involves 
incorporating full or partial control of a research project by members of the local 
community. In their volume laying out a similarly ambitious programme for 
community archaeology, Smith and Waterton (2009) fault the sorts of projects 
described by Healy, Moser, and Tully on two grounds.  They quarrel first with 
the “case-by-case” approach that fails to recognize the need for community-
based work to be central to the archaeological undertaking. Second, they object 
to the one-way flow of knowledge from “expert” archaeologist to passive public.  
Instead, like Marshall, Smith and Waterton take inspiration from work in 
Australia, New Zealand and North America with indigenous communities where 
control over the archaeological process is shared with, if not ceded to, the local 
inhabitants.  Nicholas and Hollowell (2007, 73) highlight the “complex 
questions” of political authority and benefit sharing that are surfaced in this 
model of community archaeology.  Breen and Rhodes (2010, 133-135) and 
Wilcox (1994) cite approvingly in the African context Arnstein’s eight-rung 
ladder of community engagement that culminates in “Citizen Control” of 
archaeological projects. 
The intense community partnerships that Marshall, Smith and Waterton 
advocate may be discerned in projects reported by other archaeologists. Clarke’s 
(2002)  description of the transformation of her project on Groote Island, 
Australia; McDavid’s (2002) discussion of the Levi Jordan Plantation Web Site 
Project; Prangnell et al’s (2010) project on North Stradbroke Island in Australia; 
the community-commissioned project on Fiji reported by Crosby (2002); 
Faulkner’s (2009) description of the project at Sedgeford in the UK; numerous 
projects described in Hendry’s (2005) discussion of indigenous community 
archaeology; or Loring’s (2001) work with the Smithsonian Arctic Studies 
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Centre each exhibit aspects of community engagement and project control that 
go well beyond the Moser/Tully model.    
Greer offers an assessment of community archaeology’s future as 
“interactive” with and “empowering” of communities under study (Greer et al. 
2002).  Arenas and Sanoja (1999, 71) argue for an engaged form of community 
educational effort that reflects a Marxist orientation to the political structure of 
present society (see page 38). Community empowerment concepts have begun to 
extend to the construction of community museums, such as those established in 
the Yucatan in Mexico (Ardren 2002; Hoobler 2006), and to archaeology and 
heritage projects such as that conducted by Leventhal et al (2012) in a Maya 
village in Mexico. Chirikure et al (2010), in a review of participatory community 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa, express the concern that the mixed results from 
community projects they reviewed may be due to problems with the definition of 
the relevant community and to “half-hearted” execution that they say are 
underplayed in the literature, but nonetheless the authors see such participatory 
projects as essential . 
Archaeology’s public face, in other words, has at least one complexion 
that is highly activist with respect to engagement with the individuals who live in 
communities endowed with archaeological resources.  Some of that engagement 
remains at the level of education and information exchanges. Some involves 
negotiation and collaboration with local residents. Some, such as with Moser and 
Tully’s calls for attention to community employment, training or control over 
merchandising, border on a mandate for the archaeologist to engage in economic 
development activities.    
Professionalization and ethics 
Many of these threads come together in the fifth important topic, the 
emergence of ethical standards for archaeologists.  These standards make 
engagement with the public an expected, even required, part of archaeological 
practice.  The concept of the archaeologist as a “professional” and the 
expectation that he or she should adhere to codes of ethical conduct is relatively 
new to archaeology, but it is becoming profoundly important to the field in 
practice. 
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Wildesen explains that until the 20
th
 Century archaeology was essentially 
a “calling” engaged in by practitioners without formal training or accreditation 
(1984: 3). A typical example of the breed was Hiram Bingham of Yale 
University, the “discoverer” of Machu Picchu in Peru (Heaney 2010).  Indeed, 
Wildesen says: 
Until at least the late 1960’s, peer pressure and the ‘grapevine’ were 
sufficient to distinguish a ‘real’ archaeologist from various imposters.  
Departments were in essence self-accredited, on the basis of the quality 
of research and publications that faculty and students ultimately 
produced. No clients, and therefore no competition were involved.  
(1984: 7)   
In other words, even at the end of World War II archaeology was a 
scholarly discipline, not yet a profession like medicine or law.  However, as 
noted above (see page 53), governments after World War II increasingly took on 
the leading role in directly funding archaeological work or requiring that 
commercial companies do so.  Much of this excavation work was to “rescue” 
sites in the path of major public works or commercial development (Jameson 
2004).  As a consequence, during the last few decades of the 20
th
 Century there 
emerged in much of Europe and the United States a new “professional” 
archaeologist, not affiliated with universities but working for governments or 
consulting firms.  The professional archaeologist often was dedicated neither to 
academic research nor to teaching, but often did engage directly with members 
of the public in ways that were novel for archaeology (McGimsey 2003).  Unlike 
the world Wildesen describes, by the 1980’s one half or more of all 
archaeologists in the United States were working outside of academia with many 
and varied “clients” to whom they were accountable for budgets, reports and 
results (McGimsey 1995, 11). 
Disciplines such as law and medicine, faced with accountability to clients 
and patients, had begun the process of sorting “quacks” and “charlatans” from 
expert practitioners during the 19
th
 Century or earlier.  Doctors, for example, 
founded associations to establish standards and credentials for their fields as 
early as 1832 in Britain (British Medical Association 2013) and 1847 in the 
United States (American Medical Association 2013), largely in order to identify 
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and validate skilled practitioners to their clients. Prior to World War II, 
archaeology had taken very few steps in that direction. In the United States the 
Society of Professional Archaeology was formed in 1934 as an initial effort to 
bring the discipline in line with other professions, but no parallel effort was 
mounted in Europe and the Society’s influence was limited (McGimsey 1995). 
Lynott notes that the increasing role of government, driving both the excavation 
agenda and the employment of archaeologists in the 1940s and 1950s, was one of 
the early stimuli in the United States for the drive to professionalize archaeology 
through the creation of standards and codes for emerging new segments of the 
discipline (Lynott 2002, 248).   
In the post-war period, the effort to rationalize, integrate and reinforce the 
professional standards of the academic and commercial sides of the discipline 
through technical standards and codes of ethics and professional conduct became 
a major priority for archaeology (Jameson 2004, 38).  Wylie (1996), who 
eventually co-led a rewrite of the Society for American Archaeology’s ethics 
code, identified two core conflicts:  One between professionalism and 
commercial interests, the other between archaeologists and non-archaeological 
interests groups, particularly indigenous peoples. Díaz-Andreu (2013, 228) links 
the emergence of these codes in Latin America directly to the political 
awakening of the profession and the emergence of the indigenous rights 
movements (see page 38 and page 45 above). Codes and standards to provide 
guidance on managing such conflicts, and to set standards for training of the 
growing cadre of working heritage professionals, emerged as the discipline’s 
chosen solution.  This process is not without its critics.  Hamilakis labels this 
process the “bureaucratisation and instrumentalisation of ethics [that has] 
resulted in the depoliticisation of ethical debate in archaeology” (2007, 20).  
Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson (2006) question whether ethical codes have 
become too literally interpreted, stifling deep reflection about complex ethical 
questions.  Nonetheless, the process of codifying ethical standards for 
archaeology is now global. 
The first statements on ethics in the United States, by the Society for 
American Archaeology (SAA) in 1948, simply proscribed seeking personal gain 
from excavations or artefacts (Garza and Powell 2001).  In 1961 the SAA’s 
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Committee on Ethics and Standards published “Four Statements for 
Archaeology” (Champe et al. 1961), an initial attempt to describe obligations 
and proscribe behaviours by archaeologists, the hallmarks of professionalization 
of any field. The four statements defined the field of archaeology itself, 
identified appropriate methods, discussed training for archaeologists and set forth 
a statement of ethics for the profession.  That statement read largely as a set of 
guidelines for academics.  Other than censure for dealing in illicit antiquities, the 
ethical issues identified in the Four Statements related to various professional 
obligations--making data available to colleagues, reporting findings to 
colleagues,  neither destroying nor falsifying data, and not ‘poaching’ on another 
archaeologist’s site.  Wylie (1996) has observed that much of the focus at this 
time was on training and qualification standards for the profession, which 
previously had not existed, a project that eventually led in the United States to 
the creation of the Society of Professional Archaeologists, now the Registry of 
Professional Archaeologists.  However, the current SAA ethics code gives 
substantial weight to archaeologists responsibilities to the public (Society for 
American Archaeology 1996).   
Most codes of ethics today (see Figure 2 and Appendix 4) emphasize the 
archaeologist’s professional and academic obligations, such as obligations to use 
correct methods and qualified personnel, to provide adequate storage for 
artefacts and archives, and to include plans for conservation and publication in a 
timely fashion (see, e.g., Archaeological Institute of America 2008 ). Codes 
frequently mention the obligation to protect and conserve the archaeological 
record against destruction from looting and land development, the concept of 
“stewardship.” Although some argue that stewardship may be more concerned 
with preserving the raw material for archaeology as a profession than for 
preserving ancient monuments and objects per se (Lipe 1974), the idea of  
“stewardship” of the archaeological record has become a core concept that 
appears in numerous codes of ethics and integrates various segments of the 
profession worldwide (Wylie 2005). Associations whose members are 
predominantly commercial archaeologists, not academic, have created their own 
codes.  These include groups such as the Institute For Archaeologists (United  
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Figure 2: Summary provisions of major archaeological association codes of ethics and 
practice  (See Appendix 4 for sources) 
  
Organization Professional 
and Scholarly 
Obligations Stewardship
Commercial 
Obligations
Public 
Education, 
Consultation or 
Communication
Indigenous 
Rights / 
Community 
Rights
American Anthropological 
Association  
Archaeological Institute of 
America Code of Professional 
Standards   
Australian Archaeological 
Association  
Australian Association of 
Consulting Archaeologists  
Australian Association of 
Maritime Archaeology    
Canadian Archaeological 
Association Principles of Ethical 
Conduct    
European Assocation of 
Archaeologists   
ICOMOS (US)    
Institute of Archaeologists of 
Ireland 
Institute For Archaeologists, UK    
New Zealand Archaeological 
Association Principles of 
Archaeological Ethics     
Register of Professional 
Archaeologists, USA   
Society for American 
Archaeology Code of Ethics   
The Society for Historical 
Archaeology   
World Archaeological Congress  
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Kingdom), the Register of Professional Archaeologists (United States) or the 
European Association of Archaeologists. These codes, perhaps not surprisingly, 
put less emphasis on public aspects of the profession and more on balancing the 
obligations of the profession to clients and to peers. 
However, many of the ethics codes written in the past few years do 
include an explicit obligation to engage with the public.  Some codes go so far as 
to include explicit recognition of the rights of indigenous people, although most 
codes that stress these obligations arise from associations in countries with 
substantial indigenous populations (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, Canada or the 
United States). Figure 2 illustrates the important place many organisations have 
given to imposing an ethical obligation on archaeologists to engage with the 
public.  The details of these responsibilities differ but the emphasis is clear.  The 
most comprehensive and globally-influential such statement, due to the group’s 
global membership, is from the World Archaeological Congress (WAC).    
The tumultuous story of what became the first World Archaeological 
Congress has been well told (Ucko 1987). In 1986, with the anti-apartheid 
movement at its peak, archaeologist Peter Ucko was asked by the International 
Union for Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences to organize an archaeological 
congress. Ucko, fresh from a controversial tenure as archaeological 
commissioner in Australia, envisioned a meeting that would involve 
archaeologists and anthropologists from around the world, both indigenous and 
non-indigenous, addressing new issues in a professional forum for the first time. 
However, when Ucko and his colleagues decided to exclude participants from 
South Africa from the Congress (in order to protest South Africa’s apartheid 
policy and to avoid a boycott by indigenous peoples), this explosive issue in the 
profession caused a schism that led to the formation of the WAC. That first 
WAC meeting placed on the discipline’s table an agenda of issues that pre-
occupies elements of archaeology to this day. The WAC code of ethics has 
eschewed most standard code contents such as stewardship or professional 
obligations in favour of an exclusive focus on indigenous rights, reflecting the 
WAC’s controversy-laden beginnings.   
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As Figure 2 suggests, the codes are not universal in emphasizing an 
obligation to the public.  But a large proportion of the archaeologists in the world 
do work within contexts where the public and community engagement are now 
part of the professional archaeologist’s every-day context and obligations, and 
many work under professional strictures that give priority to the rights of the 
indigenous people with whom they work. 
Heritage as an asset 
Earlier sections of this chapter have reviewed changes in the roles of 
archaeology and archaeologists vis-à-vis the public in general and specifically 
vis-à-vis communities associated with heritage projects. Simultaneously in the 
late 20
th
 Century, particularly as CRM gained in importance and the tourism 
industry began its startling growth in regions rich in heritage assets, economists 
began to take a different view of heritage. They came to see it, in economists’ 
jargon, as a “capital asset.”  CRM, after all, involves the management of cultural 
resources, putting tangible and intangible heritage on the same plane as timber, 
minerals or oil. Furthermore, CRM introduced government funding as a central 
element in archaeological practice, one that compelled archaeologists to engage 
with government budgeting and learn to discuss and justify their work in terms 
legislators and bureaucrats could understand.  Often, these terms were monetary 
in nature. Although a minor side-stream in the field of economics, cultural 
economics emerged as an effort to apply the methods and theory of neo-classical 
economics to this new type of asset.  
From the cultural economist’s perspective, heritage may be viewed as a 
tangible or intangible property right that is capable of generating a flow of 
economic benefits to its owner, who may be either the public at large or a private 
party.  At a time when a vast industry, tourism has come to rely heavily on 
heritage (see page 79), and when heritage practitioners are competing with other 
supplicants for government funding, discerning the “value” of the heritage asset 
and its “return” to society has increasingly become a priority for archaeology.  
The idea that the benefits that flow from the exploitation of heritage resources 
can be valued, subjected to cost-benefit analyses, and otherwise analysed as an 
economic commodity is now alive in the discipline even though it is far from 
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universally accepted (see page 84). The articulation of this concept, however, is 
the first extension of economic reasoning to heritage resources, and thus is a 
precedent for the research presented in this thesis.  
What is a heritage asset? In the common parlance, a bond that generates a 
flow of interest payments or a machine in a factory that produces a flow of 
products would be considered “capital assets.” That is, the investment to acquire 
them (capital) is eventually returned (ideally with a profit) through the flow of 
income received. Because of this flow of investments and income, capital assets 
may be valued in a strictly monetary sense. Although one may argue that Pope 
Gregory was recognizing asset value when he avoided the costs of new materials 
by mining Roman ruins for marble to build St. Peter’s Cathedral (Trigger 2006, 
54), the notion of heritage as an asset with value in the modern sense is relatively 
recent and not straightforward.   
The effort to define the “value” of heritage is rooted in the 19th Century. 
Although Morris did not use the word “value” in his Manifesto, his plea for a 
different approach to conservation and his condemnation of past practices that 
are “deaf to the claims of poetry and history in the highest sense of the words” 
(Morris 1877, 2) echo modern concepts of aesthetic, authenticity, and other types 
of value.  By the early 20
th
 Century,  Alois Riegl identified several types of 
value, including “art value,” “commemorative value” and “historical value,” for 
works of special merit but offered no techniques for measuring these values 
(Riegl 1982 (1928), 21-23).   
Today, heritage analysts and economists would agree that there are 
numerous valid conceptions of the “value” of heritage assets (de la Torre and 
Mason 1998; O'Brien 2010; Throsby 2001). To most archaeologists, it is intrinsic 
value that is paramount; that is, they prioritize the value placed upon a building, 
object, place or practice due to its inherent qualities. David Throsby identifies a 
number of bases for intrinsic, or cultural, value, including aesthetic, spiritual, 
social, historical, and authenticity characteristics (Throsby 2001, 28-29).  
Intrinsic value, however, is expressly personal and not subject to measurement in 
a way that would identify the economic value of the “asset” (Holden 2006).  
Economists instead identify a range of other values for which they have 
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developed techniques for expressing these values in monetary terms (Bakhshi et 
al. 2009; Heritage 2005; Keaney 2006; Licciardi and Amiritahmasebi 2012; 
Mason 2005; O'Brien 2010).  Among the most commonly cited types of value for 
heritage assets are: 
 Use Value, or the value a market may place on a heritage asset as a 
consequence of its potential usefulness today.  For example, an historic 
building refurbished into a modern office block has use value. 
 Option Value, or the value individuals may place on preserving a heritage 
asset in order to have the option to visit or use it in the future. 
 Existence Value, or the value that individuals may place on a heritage 
asset simply to know it exists, even if they will never visit it. The 
UNESCO World Heritage concept of “Outstanding Universal Value” 
may be viewed in part in this light—an investment is made by people far 
away to preserve an asset because it is important, even if it is too distant 
to visit. 
 Bequest Value, or the value individuals may place on a heritage asset in 
order to ensure that it may be available to future generations. 
Though they are frequently controversial, economists have developed 
techniques such as contingent valuation studies or choice modelling to 
accumulate individuals’ appraisals of these types of values, in monetary or at 
least quantitative terms, in order to estimate the economic “value” to society of 
heritage assets (see Licciardi and Amiritahmasebi 2012; for a non-technical 
overview of techniques and their issues, see O'Brien 2010). If those valuations 
are stated as flows of funds, they may be accumulated and discounted to 
approximate a notional stock of capital assets related to heritage. Throsby (2001; 
2009) has addressed the problem of value at length and defined a notion of 
“cultural capital,” an idea earlier associated with Bourdieu (1972) but presented 
in this case in a form that is amenable at least in part to direct economic analysis. 
Other case studies have implemented valuation techniques in order to estimate 
economic values in specific situations (Peacock 1997; Rizzo and Throsby 2006; 
Rizzo and Towse 2002; Rypkema et al. 2011).   
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The perspective that heritage is “valuable” is not without critics who take 
umbrage at the idea of placing a value on cultural property (Carman 2005) or 
who warn about the inherent problems involved in placing monetary values on 
matters that cannot be subject to actual markets (Mason 2008). Furthermore, 
dissents from the idea that the value of heritage assets can be fully quantified in 
conventional economic terms have been voiced (Klamer 2002).  Increasingly, 
though, there is widespread agreement that heritage shares some characteristics 
of conventional capital assets that can generate monetisable value, and the 
dominant perspective is that “value” expressible in monetary terms is an 
essential part of the discourse about heritage in the modern era.  
To a significant degree, this is a result of the role taken by governments 
in managing and funding heritage. As Throsby (2010) explores in detail, 
governments have numerous tools to direct the flow of resources to heritage-
related activities, and  government spending and regulatory decisions are heavily 
influenced by estimates of their economic impact on individuals and on society. 
Government officials regularly attempt to assemble a “cost-benefit” appraisal of 
a proposed spending programme. That is, they measure the “benefit” to society 
from a given project and compare it to the government’s cost to implement it. To 
generate such an assessment, benefits must be stated in monetary or other 
quantifiable terms in order to prioritize spending on heritage-related matters or to 
justify regulations that limit the use of heritage assets held in private hands. 
Spending on archaeological parks or regulations governing changes to historic 
structures are just two examples. The task of economists who work in the 
cultural sphere today is to provide such data, which is essential to the practice of 
cultural resource management in the 21
st
 Century. 
Sustainable heritage management and heritage tourism (see page 79) are 
just two of the topics that flow from the recognition that there is value to be 
generated when heritage is conceived of in economic, terms.  One question is, 
value for whom? The answer varies depending upon the type of “value” in 
question and the political-economic context within which the asset exists. 
However, the archaeologists who engage in community economic development 
have been motivated by a desire to direct as much as possible of the value of 
heritage assets into the hands of the local communities in which the assets are 
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found.  The research undertaken in this thesis is an investigation into one 
possible means to accomplish that objective. 
Conclusion 
Public and community engagement increasingly are mainstream activities 
for archaeologists in much of the world. This chapter has recited developments 
in both theory and practice that have made this so.  Activism has been induced 
by Marxist theorizing and encounters with indigenous peoples.  New models of 
knowledge, especially multivocality, have altered the relationship between 
archaeologist and descendent peoples.  Theoretical debates over agency in 
archaeology further focused the discipline on the potential for individuals to alter 
their circumstances, with ethical implications for the profession’s engagement 
with communities. These matters have manifested themselves in the practice of 
public, and subsequently community archaeology; in the expression of codes of 
conduct and ethics for the profession; and in the execution of community 
resource management projects and government legislation in many parts of the 
world.    
 This chapter has argued that due to these developments, communities 
and the individuals who make them up have acquired new importance in the 
practice of archaeology since World War II. Among the consequences has been a 
fluorescence of “public” archaeological activities—education, heritage 
presentations, local museums, and public participation in excavations, and even 
community involvement in the design and execution of archaeological projects.  
Furthermore, the chapter suggests that matters are moving beyond mere 
engagement with local communities. Global politics have evolved to deny 
archaeologists the colonialist droit du seigneur to excavate where they please 
without consideration for those whose lives they disrupt. Along with using 
archaeological data, innovative museology and intense community interaction to 
educate and even to build community identity, some archaeologists are 
beginning to give priority to contributing economically to the local communities 
from which they extract their data (Pyburn 2009;Silverman 2006a;Smith & 
Waterton 2009). This relationship of archaeologists to economic development is 
the subject of the next chapter.   
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Chapter 3: Archaeology and Economic 
Development 
Introduction 
The prior chapter argued for the importance to archaeology of 
engagement with communities, both in theory and in practice. This chapter 
addresses archaeologists’ engagement with the process of economic 
development. 
The chapter unfolds in six sections.  It begins with a brief discussion of 
the challenge of economic development as seen from the perspective of 
economists and policy makers. This is not an effort to delve deeply into the 
theory or practice of development economics, for that is well beyond the scope 
of this thesis. The principal point made is that over the six decades or so that 
development has been on the international agenda, the problem has proven 
difficult, standard theories have been challenged in application, and some of the 
great successes in national economic growth have occurred in contexts that 
theory would not have predicted. In short, economic development remains a 
continuing challenge. 
The chapter then turns to a discussion of the important role played by 
tourism, especially heritage tourism, in the developed and the developing world. 
This second section of the chapter documents the growth and importance of 
tourism, which has become among the fastest growing and largest industries 
worldwide due to the rising wealth and leisure time that has resulted from 
economic growth in many parts of the world. This section points out that heritage 
resources—archaeological sites, preserved monuments, ancient cities, even 
manifestations of intangible heritage such as cultural festivals—all underpin 
much of the tourism industry and are especially critical in the developing world. 
However, archaeologists have a tortured relationship with tourism. The third 
section of the chapter addresses the issues raised by critics of heritage tourism 
under three broad headings: commodification of heritage, political and economic 
conflicts induced by heritage tourism, and the question of sustainability, 
especially of the built heritage. 
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The chapter’s fourth section critically evaluates the conventional 
approach to the problems of tourism at the community level, the sort of 
stakeholder engagement that was called for by community archaeology 
advocates following the Moser/Tully model discussed above (see page 57).  
Section five discusses various archaeologists and archaeological organisations 
that have moved beyond community archaeology to engage directly with the 
problem of development.  These include individual archaeologists, government-
sponsored groups and non-governmental organisations (NGO) pursuing 
community-based projects that have economic development as a fundamental 
objective.  These projects constitute the leading edge of the archaeological 
programme of action to which this thesis constitutes a theoretical and empirical 
contribution. 
The final section of the chapter addresses the notion central to this thesis, 
the proposition that the theory and practice associated with the management of 
common pool resources may present archaeologists with a valuable model to use 
in working with local communities on economic development matters.  It does so 
by considering the conditions under which archaeological and heritage resources 
may legitimately be considered CPRs.  That discussion sets the stage for the 
following two chapters, which will introduce the economic theories relevant to 
understanding common pool resource governance, describe the analytical 
methods used to characterize CPR governance regimes,  and state the hypotheses 
that will be tested using the results from the fieldwork conducted for this study, 
discussion of which comprises the remainder of the thesis. 
The Problem of Economic Development 
Economists have been concerned with the nature of economic progress at 
least since Adam Smith (Smith 1937 (1776)) and the problem gained attention 
among economists in Europe, Asia and Australia early in the 20
th
 Century (Arndt 
1981). However, economic development as a formal sub-field of economics 
emerged only in the post-World War II era (Sen 1983).  Economists’ concern for 
development was propelled by many of the same changes that impacted 
archaeological theory and practice after the War. The final breakup of the 
European colonial empires produced a massive increase in the number of 
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independent countries in the world. Membership in the United Nations (UN) 
grew rapidly from the 51 national signatories at its founding in 1945 (United 
Nations 2013b).  Most of these new nations were in “less developed” regions in 
Central and South America, Africa and Asia. With their independence came 
awareness that widespread poverty and its consequences were no longer issues 
for colonial overlords but were problems of global concern.  
The United Nations has played a leading role in placing issues of poverty 
and economic advancement on the international agenda through its specialized 
agencies such as those relating to industrial development, agricultural 
improvement or labour relations.  In the field of cultural heritage, the UN formed 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
in 1946 (United Nations 2013a).  Simultaneously, the post-war era also produced 
the two major international development-oriented economic institutions, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now part of the 
successor World Bank Group, and its sister organisation the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), both conceived at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 
and formally established in December 1945 (World Bank 2006b, 1-2). These 
organisations were dedicated initially to the reconstruction of Europe and war-
torn Asian countries after World War II, but their missions shifted toward global 
poverty alleviation as a consequence of the emergence of the new post-colonial 
countries (Harrison 2000, xvii). As the decolonization process unfolded, 
specialized regional development banks were formed in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa.  Advanced country governments, particularly in the United States and 
Europe, and later Japan, also became major donors of development assistance, 
both in the form of cash grants and in-kind donations of expertise and material. 
Altogether, promotion of economic development through loans and grants 
became a major activity on the world stage by the end of the 20
th
 Century. 
These international organisations were formed at a time when neo-
classical micro-economic theories and interventionist Keynesian theories of the 
macro-economy were emerging as dominant models (Sen 1983) (see page 102).  
By the mid-1960’s, economists generally called for growth policies based on 
free-trade and free-market capitalist development combined with policies 
intended to restrain government spending and money creation.  Subsidies, 
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targeted taxes and other strategic market interventions were seen as the way to 
address educational or technical deficiencies and cultural differences (see, for 
example, Bhagwati 1969; Myint 1971).  Loans from the IMF and grants from the 
World Bank were applied throughout the world to address problems of 
infrastructure, such as roads or water supplies, and to encourage industrial or 
commercial development.  The goal was to generate capacity in these recovering 
and emerging countries to expand domestic economic activity and participate in 
the world economy. A prominent model at the time anticipated that countries 
would proceed through “stages of growth” in an orderly and predictable fashion 
that would lead, ultimately, to the convergence of these countries into mature 
capitalist economies (Rostow 1960).   
The neo-classical agenda was promoted through the development banks, 
which often conditioned their aid on market-liberalizing policy actions to be 
taken by recipient governments, and through international treaty organisations 
dedicated to reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade.  The 
principal market opening organisation was the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organisation.  Bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements, many sponsored by the United States or the European Union, 
also were intended to exchange increased access for developing countries to 
developed country markets for reduction in protectionist policies by developing 
countries. This collection of free-market policies, established and enforced by 
numerous international financial, aid and trade organisations, eventually came to 
be known as the “Washington Consensus” (Rodrik 2007, Chapter 1). 
As noted at the outset, this thesis is not the place to engage in a 
comprehensive analysis of the history and impact of these economic 
development efforts. It is also important to acknowledge the successes of 
development efforts, which have extended human lifespans and lifted literally 
billions of people from abject poverty over the past few decades (Deaton 2013).  
However, disappointment with the limitations of development economics to 
solve the problems of emerging countries was evident as early as the 1980’s (Sen 
1983). Moreover, while tremendous gains have been made in many countries, 
widespread poverty remains intractable in many regions of the world and income 
inequality is severe (Collier 2007).  Although still entrenched within the IMF, 
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doubt about the Washington Consensus and the potential for conventional 
economic approaches to promote economic development is widespread (Easterly 
and Levine 2001; Rodrik 2007; Stiglitz 2003). Some blame shortcomings in 
national cultures for those nations failure to exploit development opportunities  
(Harrison and Huntington 2000). Others propose that development requires a 
globally-coordinated set of economic policies addressing macro-policies, trade 
and investment, financial regulation, and support for science, technology and 
innovation (OECD 2011a), and some call for dramatic changes in the governance 
of international economic institutions in order to reduce the power of developed 
countries (Stiglitz 2006).   
Development professionals are among the most severe critics of the 
world’s efforts to promote economic development.  Calderisi (2006), a long-time 
World Bank official in Africa, has written about the problems of weak 
democratic institutions, official corruption, waste, lack of managerial capacity 
and conflicts among official aid programmes of the UN and the World Bank as 
sources of the failure of development programmes in Africa.  Collier (2007)   has 
described several “traps” constraining the growth of emerging economies, 
including weak democratic governance, the consequences of violent clashes or 
corrupt interventions to control and gain the spoils of natural resources or other 
national assets, and the failure of conventional trade policies to bring marginal 
developing countries successfully into the world economy. Foreign aid as a tool 
for promoting development is sharply criticized for bureaucratic obstacles and 
deficiencies in its design, such as aid tied to purchases from particular donor 
countries (Collier 2007; Easterly 2006; Stiglitz 2003), and for the adverse effects 
it has had on the integrity of government officials, individual initiative and 
market institutions (Deaton 2013; Moyo 2009).  The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has expressed concerns that the present 
dynamics of globalization, which have shifted comparative advantage to China, 
India and a few other countries, is leading to “premature deindustrialization” and 
jobless growth in much of the world at the same time that growing income 
inequality is undermining social cohesion (2011b, 66-119). 
Rodrik (2007) is particularly critical of the Washington Consensus, 
noting that some of the most successful developing nations (e.g. Korea, Taiwan 
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or China) have pursued economic and trade policies sharply at variance with the 
conventional wisdom of the discipline. Cohen and Easterly, the latter a former 
World Bank Chief Economist, summarize the disappointment concisely: 
The development policy discussion has been dominated to an astonishing 
degree by wishful thinking, baseless assertions, and logical and statistical 
failures. Equally amazing, development efforts keep trying the same 
thing over and over again despite a long record of previous failures. 
(2009, location 523) 
Economists remain committed to structural economic reforms that 
improve the functioning of domestic markets, expand access to international 
markets, and eliminate corruption and bureaucratic obstacles to economic 
growth, as well as investments in education and infrastructure (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya 2013; Cohen and Easterly 2009; Rodrik 2007; Sachs 2005).  
However, there is increasing recognition that policies must be tailored closely to 
local conditions.   
As Sen (1983) has pointed out, one consequence of the emergence of 
economic development as a field has been the growth of formal government 
planning in non-socialist economies.  Money from global institutions was 
funnelled through national government bodies based upon plans designed in 
national capitals.  Development in the 20
th
 Century was very much a “top-down” 
process, and therein lies one of the roots of disappointment in the outcome. 
Indeed, the argument has been made that official development aid, by 
entrenching and enriching ruling forces in developing countries, has in fact 
worked to the disadvantage of the impoverished people development projects 
were intended to help  (Deaton 2013, Chapter 7; Ferguson 1990). 
If top-down development programmes have faltered in many 
circumstances, it is natural to ask whether alternative schemes from the “bottom 
up” may have better prospects.  In a round-table discussion at the Getty 
Conservation Institute some years ago, in response to a question about how best 
to move heritage conservation back to the grass roots where values other than 
those of the market can be considered, the cultural economist Arjo Klamer 
remarked: 
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Sometimes the best design has local citizens taking charge, and the best 
strategy might be for the government to withdraw and give way to local 
initiative. At least, that’s what we observe to be how it usually works. (in 
de la Torre and Mason 1998, 22)   
This thesis addresses Klamer’s notion, in the context of archaeology, by 
considering whether, and if so how, community-level development projects may 
prove successful. 
Tourism, Heritage and Economic Development  
There are a few archaeologists who have argued that the discipline may 
be able to make contributions directly to economic development through the 
application of archaeological knowledge about past practices. This is particularly 
the case where past practices involve agricultural crops, farming techniques or 
irrigation systems (Erickson 1992; Guttmann-Bond 2010; Kendall 2005). 
Primarily, however, archaeology enters the economic development discussion in 
two ways, through heritage revitalization, principally in urban centres, and 
through tourism.   
Enormous investments have been made in the redevelopment of historic 
urban centres as a means to promote conservation of the built heritage, expand 
the local economy and, in some cases, create opportunities for local residents (for 
both theory and case studies, see Aga Khan Trust for Culture 2005; Cernea 2001; 
de la Torre and Mason 1998; Licciardi and Amiritahmasebi 2012; Mälkki et al. 
2008; Nypan 2006; Rypkema et al. 2011; Stubbs 2009, Parts II and IV).   Urban 
development projects represent a substantial portion of the funds invested in 
heritage development to promote tourism, and they are made worldwide not just 
in developing countries. Furthermore, some of these projects at least attempt to 
address community issues as part of larger redevelopment efforts (Aga Khan 
Trust for Culture 2005). In general, however, the issues surrounding the renewal 
and reuse of the urban built heritage are focused away from community and 
toward exploitation of monuments and old buildings for their current use values 
or for urban tourist development, and usually the structures themselves are 
owned either by governments or private parties.  To delve deeply into these 
policies would be a diversion from the focus of this study, which is on 
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community-led ventures, and for that reason discussion of urban redevelopment, 
however important, is not included in this thesis.  Rather it is through the second 
vector, tourism, that tangible and intangible heritage assume importance in the 
context of community-led economic development.   
Heritage is unique in world commerce. It cannot be traded 
internationally, it cannot be duplicated authentically at lower cost in China, it 
cannot be undercut by low wages in Bangladesh, and it cannot be 
disintermediated by technology. The product is uniquely local, and the labour 
force needed to support tourists coming to visit a heritage site generally will be 
procured locally. Consumers of heritage are willing, even eager, to travel long 
distances at great expense to experience it. “Authentic” heritage, however 
manipulated for political reasons or commercialized for economic motivations, is 
tied inextricably to the people, history and culture of specific places. As such, 
heritage is immune from many of the threats posed by the globalization of 
commerce that undermines the competitive posture of most other products and 
services.  However, heritage is also deeply enmeshed in global economic, social 
and political processes, primarily through the global tourism industry. 
The growth of tourism has been one of the most outstanding features of 
the post-World War II global economy.  It is both a reflection of rising global 
prosperity and is a transmitter as well as a consequence of the globalization 
process. The United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) reports 
that worldwide foreign tourist arrivals for the first time exceeded 1 billion people 
in 2012, increasing at more than a 6 per cent rate annually over the past six 
decades from a mere 25.3 million arrivals in 1950 (UNWTO 2013).  Taking all 
of its impacts into account, the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) 
estimates that tourism contributed 9.3 per cent to world gross domestic product 
in 2012 and directly accounted for more than 125 million jobs worldwide, 
generating US$1.24 trillion in export value to the global economy (WTTC 
2013c). The WTTC estimates that tourism as an industry is larger than the global 
automotive and chemical manufacturing industries, making it one of the largest 
sources of economic activity in the world, and that travel and tourism sustain 
more jobs than the financial services, communications or mining industries in 
every region of the world (WTTC 2013a). Not only are three developing 
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countries (China, Brazil and Mexico) among the top ten tourism destinations in 
terms of the contribution to GDP from tourism, but eight of the ten top countries 
for tourism employment are emerging economies and all of the fastest growing 
destinations for tourist travel are in the developing world (WTTC 2013d).  
Moreover, these statistics capture only international travellers, not domestic 
tourism.  
The literature evaluating the impact of tourism on economic growth is 
generally upbeat. Ivanov and Webster (2011), for example, discuss 30 studies of 
the economic impact of tourism in a wide range of primarily developing 
countries and conclude that most find a positive impact on growth from tourism.  
They go on to present their own analysis of the contribution of tourism to GDP 
in 174 countries, by region, for the period 2000-2010.  They conclude that 
tourism contributed most strongly to GDP growth in Africa, Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean.  Del P. Pablo-Romero and Molina (2013) comprehensively 
review the econometric literature devoted to testing the relationship between 
tourism and economic growth and conclude inter alia that tourism’s impact on 
growth is greater where countries have specialized in tourism as an economic 
sector, a result echoed by Arezki et al (2009).  Seetanah et al (2011) summarize 
the ways tourism impacts the economy, citing tourist spending as an alternative 
form of exports and therefore a source of foreign exchange that can be used to 
import capital goods needed for growth, as a source of tax revenues to 
underwrite government operations, and as a source of generally labour-intensive 
employment. Tourism may not yield growth at the rapid rates of the Asian Tigers 
(Arezki et al. 2009, 16) but it can make a meaningful contribution to growth, 
especially in countries with few alternatives for export-oriented industry. 
Not only is tourism a large and rapidly growing sector of disproportionate 
benefit to developing countries, but heritage is a well-recognized driver of 
tourism throughout the world.  Consider, for example, that:  
 In 2003 a Canadian study found that 17 per cent of American adults, or 
34.5 million people, are “Heritage Tourism Enthusiasts” (Research 
Resolutions & Consulting Ltd. 2003).  
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 1999 Data from Australia showed that 37 per cent of all travellers visited 
heritage sites, 30 per cent visited museums or art galleries, and 15 per 
cent experienced Aboriginal art, craft and cultural displays (Cultural 
Ministers Council 2001). 
 Of all leisure visitors to the United States in 2010, 47.9 per cent said they 
wanted to visit historical places, 28.6 per cent planned to visit cultural or 
heritage sites, 9.3 per cent planned to visit either ethnic heritage sites or 
Native American communities (Office of Travel and Tourism Industries 
2012). For the years 2004 to 2010, the share of all overseas visitors who 
came to visit any cultural heritage venue ranged from 58.9 per cent to 
82.9 per cent (Office of Travel and Tourism Industries 2011). 
 The Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) supports a vast program of funding for 
preservation and presentation of heritage in the UK with explicit 
economic development and tourism objectives.  In a study of the impact 
in 2010 of internal and external tourism on the UK economy, HLF 
estimated that historical and archaeological heritage (excluding natural 
heritage) directly accounted for just over £5 billion of GDP and 134,000 
jobs. Taking both indirect and induced effects into account, the totals 
reach £14 billion and 393,000 jobs (Oxford Economics 2013).  
While these data relate primarily to advanced economies, they underscore 
the importance of heritage as a motivation for global travel. Adams (2010, 105) 
has pointed out that the greatest untapped potential growth areas for tourism 
worldwide are in the former colonial regions of South America, Africa and the 
Asia-Pacific, and that the top five fastest growing developing country tourism 
locations in the 1990s were all countries that offered substantial cultural and 
archaeological attractions for tourists. As but one example, Agurcia (2004) 
describes the dramatic increase in tourism to the monumental Mayan city of 
Copan, Guatemala, between 1977 and 1996.  Tourism growth produced large 
improvements in living standards in the adjacent village driven by an investment 
from the government of only US$4 million, which was returned in entrance fees 
to the archaeological park within four years. The scramble by nations worldwide 
to obtain World Heritage Status from UNESCO underscores the perceived value 
of that brand to gaining a share of the global tourism dollar (Rebanks Consulting 
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and Trends Business Research 2010).  Altman and Finlayson review the potential 
economic gains to aboriginal groups in Australia uniquely available through 
tourism (Altman and Finlayson 1992) 
Archaeologists and others have recognized the potential contribution of 
tourism to heritage management. Cleere (1989a, 8-9) made promotion of tourism 
one of four reasons to advance cultural resource management, along with the 
promotion of awareness of cultural identity, education and protection of the 
archaeological record.  Cleere’s reasons were pragmatic and echoed McGimsey’s 
(1972) rationale for public archaeology.  That is, archaeologists can use tourism, 
like other forms of public engagement, as a vehicle for generating positive public 
attitudes toward, and thus support for, archaeology. More recently, three 
members of the Society of American Archaeology’s Public Education 
Committee, have focused on the need for archaeologists to engage with heritage 
tourism and for training for archaeologists in heritage tourism management 
(Hoffman et al. 2002). They cite the threat tourism can pose to sustaining 
heritage resources, the potential for constructive partnerships at the local level 
through tourism promotion, and the opportunity to provide more diverse career 
options to archaeology PhDs. Mabulla (2000) also takes the stance with respect 
to CRM in Africa that tourism can be a source of funding for heritage 
conservation.  
ICOMOS (2011) acknowledged the importance of heritage tourism in the 
Paris Declaration on Heritage as a Driver of Development in December 2011. In 
that statement, the 17
th
 General Assembly of ICOMOS addressed 
comprehensively the tension between the value of heritage as a driver of 
economic development and the challenge of sustaining heritage conservation 
under the pressure of mass tourism. Ultimately, ICOMOS urges local 
communities to “take ownership of heritage and tourism development” through 
educational programmes and direct engagement in the cultural and heritage 
sectors (ICOMOS 2011, 5). 
Although in 1980 the World Bank abandoned lending to tourism projects, 
including cultural heritage (Cernea 2001, 3), those policies have been relaxed. 
By 1999, Duer (1999, 8), in her study of the World Bank’s lending programmes 
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to support culture as a component of its lending policy, was able to write that 
most World Bank programmes that support conservation of heritage sites are 
justified on tourism grounds. Barillet et al, writing for UNESCO, describe the 
potential for cultural heritage to contribute to local development in Africa, 
underscoring that “heritage has today become a powerful instrument in the 
economic and territorial development of a community, when properly valorised 
and promoted, often in the context of tourism related activities” (2006, 26). In 
2013 the European Union funded a programme in concert with the Belize 
Tourism Board entitled “Making Tourism Benefit Communities Adjacent to 
Archaeological Sites” (Belize Tourism Board 2013). The linkage between 
tourism, particularly heritage tourism, and archaeology is becoming firmer year-
by-year. 
Archaeologists’ Critique 
Nonetheless, archaeologists have a profoundly ambivalent relationship 
with economic development (Herbert 1995, 201), one that raises significant 
ethical issues within the discipline (Díaz-Andreu 2013). Underlying many 
critiques are “disciplinary attitudes towards economics, wherein the modern 
juggernaut of late capitalism is seen as despoiling and commoditizing the pristine 
past” (Lafrenz-Samuels 2009, 70). The root of many archaeologists’ objections 
to tourism lie in their reservations about the impact of economic and cultural 
globalization on the political and economic life in emerging countries and on the 
tangible archaeological record and intangible heritage (Benavides 2008; 
Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 2006; Labadi and Long 2010). As Silberman (2007, 186) 
has put it, “Are we in danger of transforming the past into a theme park and the 
site into an outlet for McArchaeology?”  There is scepticism even about the 
capacity of tourism to support archaeology.  Timothy and Nyaupane (2009, 20-
33)  point out numerous risks in depending on volatile tourism revenues to fund 
heritage sites and Aas et al (2005) demonstrate that without political will such 
funding is unlikely to materialize.  Castañeda and Mathews (2013) characterize 
as “scandalous” Alfred Kidder’s remark in 1930 suggesting that archaeology is 
dependent upon tourism for its financial support yet conclude that “archaeology 
has always needed and increasingly depended upon tourism for ideological and 
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economic reasons” (2013, 52). Archaeologists’ reservations about tourism may 
be assembled into three broad categories: commodification, political and 
economic conflicts, and sustainability. 
Commodification 
Said (1978) and Lowenthal (1985) from different perspectives have 
identified the tendency in tourism and broader discourses to present a caricatured 
imagining of unfamiliar places and people, images that reflect assumed power 
relations that can be both alienating and ultimately condescending. Some 
archaeologists and scholars of heritage tourism are deeply troubled by the 
exploitation of the “otherness” of indigenous peoples, other archaeologists object 
to compromises in authenticity and the exploitation of archaeological sites for 
the benefit of foreign tourists.  All these complaints may be subsumed under the 
general rubric of “commodification,” those processes that establish a value in the 
market economy for cultural heritage (Díaz-Andreu 2013, 226; Layton and 
Wallace 2006, 46).  Commodification is often criticized for presenting an 
artificial, staged reality that undermines the integrity of the objects and the 
individuals who are objects of the “tourist’s gaze”  (see several papers in Baud 
and Ypeij 2009b; Breen and Rhodes 2010; Herbert 1995; Herrera 2013; Meethan 
2001; Middleton 2009, 113-116; Rowan and Baram 2004; Timothy and 
Nyaupane 2009, 60-63).  
Where pasts are layered upon one another, as in Europe, the Middle East 
or in post-colonial settings in the Americas, the commercial benefits of tourism 
or the economic or political imperatives of contemporary governments may 
override traditional relationships of communities to their sites (Parks 2010), or 
result in severe distortions to the presentation of local “heritage” (Gruffud 1995; 
Johnson 1999b; Joyce 2013; Timothy and Nyaupane 2009, 42-51). Ruins and 
antiquities, however important, may be the residue of past cultures to which 
contemporary residents may assert no direct attachment (Breglia 2009; Grydehøj 
2010).  The willingness of local inhabitants to exploit or neglect heritage 
resources to achieve contemporary economic objectives troubles many 
archaeologists (Dijkgraaf 2003; Hollowell 2009; Jacobs and Porter 2009, 87), 
while some archaeologists appear chagrined that their work may be abetting the 
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artifices that underlie the tourism industry (Mortenson 2009).  Moreover, the 
commodification process creates numerous points of conflict among individuals, 
communities and external actors, pitting traditional views of rights to use land or 
tangible and intangible heritage against market-based concepts of private 
property ownership rights (Layton and Wallace 2006). 
Arguments against commodification in part reflect understandable 
intellectual concerns for the loss of historical accuracy that comes with 
producing heritage in a form digestible by a relatively uninformed visitor.  But it 
also reflects the antipathy felt by many in the discipline to globalizing capitalist 
development and the despoiling of the past referred to by Lafrentz-Samuels. This 
tension between preserving sites and celebrating heritage, respecting local 
communities, and enduring distortions inherent in the tourism experience has no 
easy resolution for the discipline (McKercher and du Cross 2002).  
Political conflict and economic inequities 
Tourism engenders a variety of conflicts between political and economic 
elites and people who live in heritage settings. One problem is geographic.  
Governments generally isolate archaeological sites in “parks,” both to secure 
them from damage or looting and to create uncluttered, appealing spaces for 
tourists. This process leads often to decisions to exclude residents from 
archaeological and natural heritage sites that traditionally may have been used 
for farming or other purposes, or may have been sacred landscapes with 
continuing importance to living residents. The social and political consequences 
of this process can be pernicious (Castañeda 2009; Maxwell and Ypeij 2009; 
Meskell and Van Damme 2008; Timothy and Nyaupane 2009, 61).  Furthermore, 
success in developing a heritage venue, particularly in urban centres, can lead to 
a form of gentrification that increases property values and costs to the extent that 
original inhabitants no longer can afford to live in their home towns (Reeves 
2008). 
Even if people are not excluded directly, they may be marginalized in 
government planning and find themselves relegated to peripheral participation in 
the tourist economy, often in the informal sector (Hampton 2005; Herrera 2013). 
Often that informal sector of street merchants and unregulated businesses 
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becomes an embarrassment to governments and is itself subject to restrictions or 
dissolution (Middleton 2009; Steel 2009). These tensions even can lead to 
physical conflict between local inhabitants and government archaeological 
officials (Castañeda 2009).  
Adams (2010) argues, based on an assessment of a variety of case studies 
of World Heritage Sites, that the benefits of heritage tourism accrue 
disproportionately to local elites who are able to wield the financial or political 
power necessary to capture the benefits from tourism opportunities.  The unequal 
distribution of the benefits of tourism, particularly to the disadvantage of 
adjacent communities, has been criticized frequently (Adams 2010; Britton 1983; 
Colwell-Chanthaphonh 1999; Joppe 1996), and some critics see the dynamics of 
the industry as a form of economic domination that has superseded colonialism 
(Mowforth and Munt 2009, Chapter 3). Providing opportunities to local 
communities to participate may be particularly challenging in countries where 
authority is highly centralized (Aas et al. 2005). The contest between the 
nationalist and development objectives of the state, the lingering social damage 
attributed to colonialism, and the desire of archaeologists to improve social 
conditions for indigenous peoples is visibly evident in critical archaeological 
writings on development in Latin American (Herrera Wassilowsky 2013). 
A lack of capacity at the local level, both in terms of access to financial 
capital and possession of relevant skills may account for these problems (see, for 
example, Altman and Finlayson 1992).  The need for financial capital and 
organisational and management skills to conduct tourist operations on a globally 
competitive basis induces government tourism planners to look outside of local 
communities, and often outside of national borders, to identify business partners. 
Tourist hotels and resorts frequently are owned and managed by foreigners, and 
transportation of tourists into and out of the country is usually provided by 
foreign flag carriers.  Employment for nationals is largely in lower-wage, low-
skilled positions.   
The consequence is that the economic benefits from tourism leak away 
from local communities in two ways.  First there are leakages from the local 
community to parties in national centres who have the access to the capital, 
Page | 88  
 
skills, domestic political elites and foreign relationships that are necessary to 
launch competitive international tourist operations. Second leakages occur from 
the nation itself to corporate interests from Europe, North America or other 
developed regions of the world because the ownership of hotels, transportation 
companies, even restaurant chains, typically reposes in the developed world (see 
Hampton 2005, 745-747).  As a result, the benefits of tourism in developing 
countries accrue disproportionately to national elites and international interests, 
not to communities in which the heritage itself resides.  
Sustainability 
Sustainability received its classic definition in the well-known 
Brundtland Report:  
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that 
it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. (WCED 1987, paragraph 27).  
Agenda 21, the report emanating from the Earth Summit in 1992, 
elaborated on Brundtland with a call for holistic planning, preservation of the 
environment and diversity, and economic growth that can be sustained over the 
long-term (Landorf 2009, 54). In subsequent years, definitions of the term have 
proliferated across numerous fields (Marshall and Toffel 2005), and the concept 
of sustainability has migrated from one applied to the environment to one related 
to the sustenance of any perishable resource, including tangible and intangible 
heritage and the tourism related to them.  Often the linkage of heritage to 
sustainability is made by analogy, based on the perishability of both heritage and 
the environment, or through arguments that human culture and its artefacts are 
inseparable from the environmental context that exists today after millennia of 
human occupation (Feria 2012). 
Mass tourism, in particular, is often seen by archaeologists as a severe 
threat to the sustainability of heritage sites into the future. Timothy and 
Nyaupane (2009, 56-60) recite a litany of the problems: wear and tear to the 
physical environment from tourist activity that has imperilled World Heritage 
Sites such as Stonehenge, Machu Picchu, Angkor Wat and many others that are  
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overwhelmed by mass tourism; litter and garbage produced by visitors to 
sensitive and unprepared environments; air pollution; vandalism and looting. 
Based on his detailed assessment of the impact of mass tourism on the site of 
Petra in Jordan prepared for the International Committee on Archaeological 
Heritage Management (ICAHM), Comer (2012a; 2012b) notes the urgent need 
for best practices to prevent the destruction of highly-trafficked sites.  He 
identifies not only destructive natural forces, but also the abrasive impact of 
tourist activity and the consequences of restructuring the surrounding landscape 
with parking lots, buildings, roads and other construction activity, all of which 
can contribute to damaging run-off of salt and chemical-laden water.  Comer 
calls for urgent attention to implementing practices for tourism management that 
will mitigate the impact of heritage tourism on the heritage itself.  Breen (2007) 
makes a similar call for better management of World Heritage Sites in Africa. 
Dijkgraaf (2003), in a study of four threatened World Heritage Sites, identifies in 
particular the lack of financial resources available to developing countries to 
conserve and protect their heritage. In 2006, the World Bank (2006a) issued 
guidelines for its borrowers that included two key requirements: 
 A requirement that borrowers’ plans included specific measures to 
identify and protect Physical Cultural Resources, including possible 
relocation; and 
 A requirement for public consultations to document the presence of 
Physical Cultural Resources, establish their significance, and devise 
protective measures.  
As the World Bank has recognized in recent years (Duer 1999), culture is 
a critical resource of poor residents of developing countries and can be 
developed through tourism to advance local economic development. Like the 
World Bank, UNESCO is a vigorous proponent of community-based 
programmes for heritage tourism (de Merode et al. 2003).  The challenge is to 
identify the most sustainable path for doing so. Most often the proposed policies 
involve some form of collaboration or consultation with local communities. 
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Stakeholder involvement / collaboration 
Stakeholder consultation, which echoes the approach to community 
archaeology presented in the Moser-Tully model (see page 57), is the 
conventional approach in the tourism literature to solving the problems created 
for communities when they seek to realize the benefits of tourism.  Landorf 
(2009) notes that stakeholder collaboration and community empowerment are 
today typically included in most models of sustainable development.  Welford et 
al (1999) point out that all tourism is potentially damaging to the physical or 
aesthetic conditions that give rise to the site’s original attraction and call on 
tourism operators to consult with and protect the interests of communities as they 
develop projects. 
There are numerous problems with the ideal of community collaboration 
in heritage tourism planning. Joppe (1996) makes the point that mere 
consultation is unlikely to achieve improved outcomes in community projects 
due to the greater power of governmental and business elites to control the 
process compared to that of the general population.  Foremost, local tourism is 
highly fragmented with numerous large and small businesses, government 
entities, and communities involved in or impacted by tourist activity.  As a result, 
collaborative planning is complex and fraught with conflicts (Jamal and Getz 
1995).  Aas et al (2005) stress that the power imbalances in a location with 
potential for heritage tourism can result in the business sector acting as 
representatives of the community as a whole, with consequent biases to the 
outcome, or otherwise acting to marginalize residents and other community 
interests from the collaboration process. Those challenges are illustrated in Díaz-
Andreu’s (2013) description of the community struggle for control over 
archaeology at San Pedro de Atacama in Chile.   Finally, Binswanger-Mkhize et 
al (2003; 2010) explore the many financial, institutional, operational and 
community-specific obstacles to scaling up successful community development 
projects to reach many more communities. 
Nonetheless, some advocates for more aggressive community-centred 
programmes are emerging. Mitchell and Eagles (2001), in their study of two 
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community-based projects in the Peruvian Andes, conclude that moving beyond 
mere consultation to establishing community influence and even control over the 
heritage tourism project produced enhanced socio-economic benefits. Grimwade 
and Carter (2001), in their analysis of heritage projects in small communities, 
argue that both preservation objectives and economic development goals can be 
achieved by empowering local communities to curate, maintain and operate 
small local heritage sites.   Nicanor (2001), writing about a pro-poor community-
based tourism organisation in Namibia, describes government policies that 
promote extensive management and other training and assistance to increase the 
number and capacity of locally-owned tourism businesses at the community 
level, as well as national programmes to support community-based enterprises in 
their relations with outside businesses and with promotional efforts. 
Hampton, who is generally critical of the inequitable implementation of 
heritage tourism projects, nonetheless concludes by arguing for deeper 
engagement with local communities: 
If ‘empowerment’ of local people is to become more than just a 
buzzword or hopeful sentiment, it clearly requires the participation of 
local communities in partnership with the state, its agencies, and the large 
operators rather than being a passive ‘host’ community that happens to 
have a major attraction on its doorstep. (2005, 754)  
This is the logic that has inspired some in archaeology to begin working 
directly with local communities on projects to create local value from their 
heritage resources. The track record of such projects is only sketchily 
documented, but generally conforms to the experience of failure reported by 
Scham (2009) for numerous crafts-revitalization projects in Palestine and Jordan.  
And even to pursue such limited efforts requires archaeologists to step far 
outside their traditional zones of professional and even ethical comfort.  As 
Giraudo and Porter point out: 
A review of the community archaeology literature reveals a default 
position that is either uncomfortable with, even critical of, economic 
development or ignores the issue altogether.  When community members 
want to profit economically from archaeological resources through 
tourism, archaeologists must reflect on their role in local and regional 
political economies as their practices are utilized for development. 
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Ultimately, archaeologists find themselves caught between communities’ 
needs to build sustainable economies around locally available resource 
and the ethical entanglement of participating in the global tourism 
economy that they might disparage.  (2010, 7) 
Archaeologists Doing Economic Development 
While by no means a universal impulse among archaeologists and 
notwithstanding the reservations noted above by Giraudo and Porter, some in the 
field are actively engaging in projects that keep one eye on heritage conservation 
and one eye on economic development. Although not a unique insight, this thesis 
has argued in Chapter 2 that the roots of this impulse lie in the theoretical 
developments in the late 20
th
 Century (Durrans 1989) as they interacted with 
related developments in archaeological practice.  These include the impact of 
indigenous people’s rights on archaeological thought and practice, the emergence 
of Cultural Resource Management and public and community archaeology, the 
development of ethical codes that call for public engagement, and the increasing 
realization that heritage, in the broadest sense, is not only culturally valuable but 
also is a valuable economic resource.   
  Much of the initiative for archaeologists working on economic 
development comes from those who work directly with indigenous communities. 
At the practical level, collaboration with and, in some circumstances, 
subordination to indigenous interests is standard practice and often mandated 
(Ferguson 1996; Nicholas 1999; Whitley 2007). At a minimum, the 
establishment of trust between researcher and community is now fundamental 
(McGuire 1999; Nicholas 1999), especially in communities that may view 
archaeologists as potential enemies (Loubser 2007).  For others, engagement by 
archaeologists with development is a means to challenge conventional wisdom 
about development strategies that may undermine indigenous populations 
(Honeychurch 2010).  Even where there is no clear linkage between the heritage 
and the resident community, as in underwater remains, potential for local 
development has been identified (Lucia 2002). Finally, living conditions and 
employment opportunities in indigenous communities and those adjacent to 
heritage sites frequently lag dramatically behind those in cities and wealthier 
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nations, even if their cultural context remains robust. As Nicholas and Andrews 
observe in the context of the Native American situation: 
Archaeologists cannot use the familiar refrain:  ‘if you don’t save the 
sites they will be gone for future generations,’ for the response from the 
Native community may be, ‘if we don’t address our social and economic 
problems, there will be no future generations.’ (Quoted in Nicholas 1999, 
15) 
In her book on Archaeological Site Museums in Latin America, 
Silverman notes that “active” public archaeology expressly addresses six of the 
eight ethical principles laid down by the SAA for its members (Silverman 2006, 
7).  Some scholars are hopeful that education and economic uplift will contribute 
to reduced looting (Brodie et al. 2000) and preservation of the archaeological 
record, but Silverman points out that the record is ambiguous on this point 
(Silverman 2006, 7-10).  Instead, she gives priority to the development 
opportunity: 
The issue is not just the conundrum of indigenous people in a 
postcolonial small-scale community seizing on the Western-in-origin 
concept of a museum as a sign of their engagement with modernity and 
as a facilitator of their construction of identity, it is that museums actually 
can generate revenue and development through their insertion into the 
global economy.  Indeed, developing countries present their museums to 
diplomats and visiting foreign entrepreneurs as an assurance of their 
political stability, cultural worth and amenable climate for investment.  
Visiting tourists pay entrance fees, need guides, consume soda and chips 
sold in kiosks by residents, have their vehicles washed by local teenage 
boys after the dusty ride, adventurously stay in family-run local lodgings, 
eat in a local restaurant and want souvenirs. (2006, 11)  
The evidence that Silverman’s view is gaining traction in the profession 
is widespread.  Her book cites numerous museum projects, many of which were 
designed to have an economic impact, including a chapter in which Hoobler 
(2006) documents the creation of a network of community museums in the  
Oaxaca region of Mexico that were motivated by a desire to develop both the 
identities and the economies of villages involved.   Leventhal et al (2012) are at 
work on a similar project in the Yucatan region of Mexico relating to the 19
th
 
Century Mayan Caste War.  Chirikure and Pwiti (2008) describe economic gains 
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and local empowerment associated with community engagement with 
archaeological site presentation. 
An intensive effort at local development has been undertaken by 
archaeologists leading the scientific exploration of the Huaca de la Luna and the 
Huaca del Sol in Trujillo, Peru (Gamarra 2010). The archaeologists leading the 
project obtained funding not only to develop the site as a tourist attraction and to 
build a modern site museum nearby, but also for underwriting training for local 
artisans and food vendors who were positioned to provide tourists with locally-
made quality crafts and meals they could eat with confidence (J.Marshall, pers 
comm, 12/7/2011).  An effort by archaeologist Ricardo Frankovich to preserve 
the medieval mining town of Rocca San Silvestro in Tuscany led to the creation 
in the 1980’s of the Parque della Val di Cornia, now a multi-park system 
incorporating beach and nature parks; Etruscan, Medieval, and Roman 
archaeological sites; plus two museums.  The Parque has become essential to the 
tourist economy around the coastal city of Piombino (Paterlini and Gould 2013; 
Semplici 2011, 8-14).  In fact, abandoned mining operations have been popular 
locations for economic development projects throughout Europe and South 
America  (Orche 2010). 
Peter Davis’ documentation of eco-museums around the world, most of 
which are related to natural or cultural heritage and many of which are 
community based, adds hundreds more such projects to the list (Davis 2011; Lira 
et al. 2012). The Butrint Foundation has led a multi-year effort to work with the 
local community at the Roman/Greek city of Butrint (Hodges 2012).  Sánchez-
Palencia et al (2002) describe their project in rural Spain, while the numerous 
case studies in De Merode et al’s (2003) report for UNESCO document a global 
effort by archaeologists to engage, either personally or in conjunction with 
government agencies, in economic development. Based on her work in Central 
America and Kazakhstan, Anne Pyburn has articulated 19 “Principles of 
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Economic Development for Archaeologists and Communities” (K.Anne Pyburn, 
pers comm, 14/9/2012).
1
   
Furthermore, community-level economic development projects have 
begun to garner support, albeit at small scale, from a number of non-
governmental organisations (NGO).  Among the best known are: 
 The Global Heritage Fund (GHF) which, although primarily an 
archaeological conservation organisation that works at major sites around 
the world, gives particular prominence to its work in community 
economic development. GHF’s metrics emphasize training for local 
residents, increased levels of employment and the creation of new 
businesses in the local community, and increased tourism to the venues 
they support. Typically, these are all jobs and businesses related to 
tourism (GHF 2009). (www.ghf.org) 
 
 Heritage Watch, an NGO that works primarily in Cambodia on 
community projects designed to enhance local benefits from tourism to 
Angkor Wat (O'Reilly 2012). Heritage Watch’s projects have been 
focused on capacity building, ranging from literacy training to business 
development, among the communities bordering the World Heritage Site. 
(www.heritagewatch.org) 
                                                 
1In preparation for the research underlying this thesis, the author conducted a search for 
projects that were community-based and had economic development as a principal objective (see 
page 158).  Although the survey itself was neither scientific nor comprehensive, heritage 
professionals who responded identified 72 projects associated with archaeology and heritage, 
located in 25 countries distributed across Asia, Australia, the United States, Latin America and 
Africa. Each placed at least some emphasis on economic development for the local community 
(See Appendix 2).  Examples visited by the author in preparation for the thesis include, in the 
UK, the Allenheads Community Trust, a tourism project exploiting the mining history of a small 
village in the Pennines region; Eilean Easdale, a community-owned museum on Easdale Island in 
Scotland that attracts visitors interested in the island’s history as a slate quarry; and the Kilmartin 
House Museum in Scotland, located in the centre of a landscape of burial tumuli and ritual sites 
of Scottish kings from the 6th century onward. In each case, these are projects were conceived by 
local residents and are managed locally.  In Peru, in addition to the project in Raqchi (see Chapter 
7), the author visited a community artisan’s cooperative at the adobe pyramid complex built by 
the Lambayeque people in the second millennium CE at Túcume; the artisans’ cooperative at the 
Moche sites of Huaca de la Luna and Huaca del Sol near Trujillo; and the ceramics atelier at the 
Moche graveyard site at San Jose de Moro.  These three are among many examples in Peru of 
archaeologist-inspired artisans’ cooperatives, several of which have been initiated by the 
Sustainable Preservation Initiative. 
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 The Sustainable Preservation Initiative2 (SPI) which has established 
three development-driven projects in Peru and is actively evaluating 
projects in Guatemala and Belize.  SPI’s approach depends critically on 
the identification of entrepreneurial artisans capable of spawning a 
cottage crafts industry in their communities.  It is, in effect, a venture 
capital incubator and funder underwriting individual tourism businesses. 
The Archaeological Institute of America was a founding backer of SPI, in 
partnership with the Cotsen Institute of Archaeology at the University of 
California at Los Angeles. (www.sustainablepreservation.org) 
 
 ArchaeoLink is a non-governmental organisation founded in 2011 under 
the aegis of the archaeology department at the University of Cambridge.  
ArchaeoLink seeks to work with archaeologists, museums and local 
communities to provide services that include capacity-building training 
and marketing assistance relating to helping communities to realize 
education, social and economic benefits from their archaeological sites. 
(www.ArchaeoLink.org) 
 
 The World Monument Fund, which has a nearly 50-year history in 
conservation of major archaeological sites, also has increasing interest in 
the potential for cultural heritage to play a significant economic 
development role.  This is best evidenced in a September 2009 concept 
paper that outlines this potential (The World Monument Fund 2009).  The 
fund has yet to engage directly in community development programmes, 
but is actively considering doing so (L.Ackerman, pers comm, 
13/5/2013). (www.wmf.org) 
 
 The Trust for African Rock Art (TARA) is an example of efforts by 
archaeologists and related NGOs that focus on specific regions.  TARA’s 
                                                 
2 Disclosure: The author is a founding member of the Board of Directors of the 
Sustainable Preservation Initiative. 
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mission is the identification and conservation of rock art in Africa.  
However, it  has sponsored community development projects in Kenya in 
an effort to generate increased tourism to obscure rock art sites that will 
create economic benefits for the local community and encourage 
community members to protect and conserve the sites (Little and Borona 
2012). (www.africanrockart.org) 
The potential for the discipline to make material contributions to the 
communities in which they work is quite substantial.  However, if archaeologists 
are to realize that potential, they must address a reality identified by Anne 
Pyburn:  
What this means is that there is something of a crisis emerging in 
archaeology […] In effect, quite a few archaeologists are attempting to 
do economic development projects or cultural recovery projects with 
no applied training and no local knowledge, beyond seat-of-the–pants 
attempts to promote ‘preservation’ and ‘entrepreneurship.’ (2009, 168) 
The premise of this thesis is that archaeology needs to look outside the 
boundaries of conventional heritage management and community archaeology to 
identify the most theoretically sound and operationally effective models to apply 
when pursing economic development objectives.  Tourism scholars have 
identified collaboration within networks of stakeholders as essential to successful 
tourism outcomes (Halme 2001; Jamal and Getz 1995; Scott et al. 2008; Zach 
and Racherla 2011), but those models tend to address larger-scale tourism 
projects in which the stakeholders are government entities and private 
companies, situations that are quite different from the small community-based 
projects that archaeologists and their NGOs often support.  In those latter cases, a 
better source for operational models may be those developed by economists, 
political scientists and others who have studied the problem of managing another 
sort of small scale and local economic development organisations, those that 
manage common pool resources (CPR).  Therefore, a threshold question must be, 
can archaeology be conceived of as a common pool resource? 
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Is Archaeology a Common Pool Resource? 
Common Pool Resource (CPR) was given an initial definition in Chapter 
1 (see page 27), and Chapters 4 and 5 will provide more detailed technical 
discussion of the definition and nature of CPRs.  The paradigmatic example of a 
CPR, of course, is the common grazing land found in many nations of the world.  
CPRs are relevant to this thesis because those that are successfully managed by 
their communities constitute a class of economic management organisations that 
meet at least four objectives of archaeologists working on community 
development: (1) Community institutions and values are embedded in the 
practice of CPR governance, (2) community members themselves control the 
commons (at times with the involvement of outsiders), (3) the benefits of the 
CPR accrue substantially if not totally to the community itself and economic 
leakages to individuals or organisations outside of the community are minimized, 
and (4) political empowerment of community members with respect to the CPR 
is absolute or nearly so. 
As will be seen in Chapter 4, the conditions for self-management of a 
commons are far from trivial to establish, and there exist significant theoretical 
and practical difficulties involved in seeking to employ CPR self-management 
techniques in real-world contexts.  In order to proceed to that discussion, 
however, it is first necessary to address a threshold question: Can archaeology, 
archaeological sites or community matters associated with archaeological sites 
appropriately be interpreted as common pool resources? 
Some examples that arise in the literature make the case unequivocally. 
For example, the “subsistence diggers” of bone and ivory on St. Lawrence Island 
in Canada (Hollowell 2009; Staley 1993) are exploiting a community-owned 
reservoir of whale ivory both for traditional carving and for sale to the global 
market using community-developed rules to manage the ivory resource.   The 
ancient irrigation system brought back into use in Cusichaca, Peru (Kendall 
2005) represent a class of resource, irrigation systems, that has been widely 
studied in the CPR literature (e.g., Ostrom 1991).  Duer (1999, 18) notes that the 
Ugandan government has delegated to local tribal communities the management 
of their community museums, a frequent project undertaken by archaeologists.  
Page | 99  
 
The community museums developed in the Oaxaca region of Mexico (Hoobler 
2006) are further examples. Ruiz-Ballesteros (2011) describes the community-
managed tourism business associated with the Ecuadorian archaeological site at 
Agua Blanca that has much in common with the projects studied for this thesis. 
Community-managed tourist businesses in Namibia that frequently incorporate 
both environmental heritage and rock art sites offer fascinating models of 
community management of a collectively owned or  collectively managed 
resource (Halstead 2003; Newsham 2004).  Furthermore, the heritage of whole 
communities may legitimately be viewed as a common resource in cases where 
indigenous peoples have been assigned leading roles or co-management 
responsibilities in managing heritage resources, such as in Australia, New 
Zealand or in the United States under NAGPRA (see page 45).  
In recent years, scholars have taken an increasingly broad view of what 
constitutes a commons (Bertacchini et al. 2012b; Hess 2008; Hess 2012), in 
some cases extending the notion of common pool resources uncomfortably 
beyond the boundaries of the theory, as will be discussed below (see page 139).  
However, the extension of the concept to the discussion of heritage tourist 
destinations does seem appropriate.  At a minimum, the tourists themselves may 
be viewed as the collective resource to be managed as a CPR.  This is because 
the “schools” of tourists who flow through heritage sites and their associated 
streams of cash transactions may appropriately be considered to be the functional 
equivalent of fishing grounds that frequently are managed as conventional CPRs 
(see page 125).  As will be discussed in Chapter 7, Asociacíon Inkallaqta, the 
tourist vendors’ organisation studied for this thesis in Raqchi, Peru, presents a 
solution to the management of collective access to tourist flows parallel to 
solutions to the management of near-shore fishery CPRs. Similarly Castañeda 
(2009), in his case study of crafts vendors outside of Chichén Itzá in the Yucatan, 
has described the difficulties that can result from a failure to manage collective 
access to tourist flows effectively.  From that point of view, the flow of tourists, 
from heritage sites, whether in small villages or World Heritage Sites, can 
qualify those sites as CPRs.  As will be seen as the thesis proceeds, other 
conditions also must be satisfied.  But there does exist a sufficient basis to 
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consider at least some archaeological and heritage sites as potential common 
pool resources.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated extensive interest in and engagement with 
economic development by archaeologists.  The political, social and economic 
difficulties experienced by archaeologists when executing such projects in 
collaboration with communities have been well documented (Faulkner 2009; 
Hoobler 2006; Little and Borona 2012; McEwen et al. 2006; Medina 2000; 
Morris 2012; Nicholas et al. 2011; O'Reilly 2012; Perkin 2010), but most 
projects have not been subjected to rigorous study of their impact or the reasons 
for their success.  There are no well-documented, statistically-oriented studies of 
long-surviving community heritage projects to draw upon, no proven models to 
work from.  
  This chapter, taken in conjunction with the prior chapter, has argued that 
archaeologists should be, and increasingly are, deeply engaged in working with 
communities, even on economic development projects.  But as Pyburn points 
out, archaeologists ordinarily are not schooled in the theoretical or practical 
knowledge needed to organize such projects successfully.  Ideally, of course, 
archaeologists would merely reach across the campus to their colleagues in 
economics or other fields to be delivered a text book of policies and practices to 
address the lack of knowledge within this discipline.  However, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter (see page 74), models for this sort of development effort 
are not readily at hand.  One potentially relevant exception may lie in the 
extensive theoretical and field-study research into the institutional structure of 
successful, long-surviving common pool resource regimes. The final portion of 
this chapter has proposed that at least certain types of archaeological resources, 
including flows of tourists through archaeological sites, may legitimately be 
considered CPRs.  The thesis now turns to the economic theory behind common 
pool resource studies and then to the models developed by scholars of CPRs that 
will be applied in the case studies presented in this thesis.  
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Chapter 4: The Problem of Collective Action 
Introduction 
The theoretical underpinning of this thesis lies in Elinor Ostrom’s multi-
disciplinary project over several decades to understand the conditions under 
which individuals will chose to collaborate to achieve a common objective, and 
the conditions under which those efforts will prove to be sustainable over a long 
period of time.  This is the so-called “problem of collective action.”  The three 
case studies conducted for this thesis explore that problem in the specific and 
limited context of collaborations by individuals in very small communities that 
are adjacent to archaeological and heritage sites, but the problem of successful 
collaboration has a more general character.  
In order to address the potential role of common pool resource (CPR) 
theory in the practice of archaeology and community economic development, it 
is first necessary to position that body of theory within the broader corpus of 
contemporary economic theories. This is because common pool resource 
research was born as a response to logical conclusions drawn from neo-classical 
theories with regard to the likelihood that individuals will cooperate to achieve 
mutually beneficial ends.  As will be seen, CPR theories have their roots in 
critiques of neo-classical economics, notably institutional and behavioural 
economics.  Furthermore, it is that very research that has defined many of the 
conditions that Ostrom appropriated to form her own model for CPR governance. 
It is this extensive theoretical and empirical work that lies behind common pool 
resource theory that makes the concept in general and Ostrom’s formulation in 
particular compelling as a theoretical platform to transfer to archaeology.   
This chapter therefore lays the groundwork for the discussion of common 
pool resource governance presented in Chapter 5.  It begins with a review of 
relevant neo-classical economic theory, in particular the field of public-goods 
economics that is directly related to common pool analysis and to the problem of 
collective action.  The second section describes the problem of collective action 
itself, as it emerged in the literature of economics and environmental and 
political science in the 1980’s. In the third section, the chapter discusses some of 
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the limitations of the neoclassical baseline through reference to the insights of 
institutional economists who were instrumental in shaping the views of Ostrom 
in particular.   
The fourth section of the chapter examines the results of experimental 
explorations into collective behaviour initiated by institutional and behavioural 
economists that have tested the results of hypotheses, largely developed from 
game theory, against actual behaviour of human subjects in laboratory settings.  
The section explores four aspects of the experimental testing of game theorists’ 
results that are essential to the CPR theories: rational decision making; trust, 
reciprocity and fairness; communications; and the importance of monitoring and 
sanctions. Ostrom and her colleagues, as will be seen, were among the leaders in 
these laboratory experiments, however she and other researchers have reinforced 
their theoretical and laboratory results through field studies of a substantial 
number of actual common pool resource systems from around the world.  The 
field research results will be discussed in Chapter 5 (see page 125).   
The present chapter concludes with a discussion of the current state of 
knowledge relating to the feasibility of collective action.  The conclusion is that, 
based on theoretical and experimental results, there is reason to be optimistic 
about the prospects for collective action in well-defined circumstances.   While it 
may seem to the archaeologist that this exploration of economic theories is 
excessive, one argument in this thesis (see page 139) is that the idea of the 
commons and CPRs has been misapplied in archaeology because those using the 
concepts do not fully comprehend the theorizing behind Ostrom’s conclusions.  
To the extent that theories begin to be applied in practice in another discipline, 
failure to understand the roots and limitations of theories is a recipe for 
unsuccessful or even counter-productive outcomes.   
Neo-Classical Foundations 
Neo-classical microeconomics presents the conditions, generally labelled 
“perfect competition,” under which producers and consumers interact in a market 
to achieve optimal outcomes in which competition has pushed prices to the 
lowest feasible level, productive resources are allocated as efficiently as possible, 
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and consumers are all as well off as they can be without adversely affecting the 
position of others (a condition known as Pareto Optimality).   
For markets to work in this fashion, numerous assumptions must hold 
true: private property rights must be clear and secure; products must be identical 
(homogeneous); factors of production (capital and labour, generally) must be 
fully mobile and non-specific;  transactions must be costless; there must be many 
buyers and many sellers each of whom is independent and none of whom has 
power to affect the market by themselves; information in the marketplace must 
be “perfect” (i.e. all participants know everything they need to know about 
current and prospective market conditions, costs, and risks);  market participants’ 
decisions should be rational; their preferences should be transitively consistent; 
and all market participants should be motivated by a desire to maximize their 
personal economic welfare.  
Under these presumed conditions, economists can demonstrate 
mathematically and diagrammatically that markets can achieve an optimal 
allocation of resources.  Economists have long recognized that these strict 
conditions are rarely found in real life.  However, if any of these very strict 
conditions is not true in the market place the predictive power of the model and 
its usefulness in policy making can be severely undermined (Baumol 1965; 
Keynes 2004 (1926); Lipsey and Lancaster 1956; Rakowski 1980).  Nonetheless, 
because this so-called “neo-classical” economic model has made satisfactory 
predictions about many aspects of real-world life, it remains widely applied in 
numerous fields including economic development. 
Among the most restrictive aspects of the neo-classical model is the 
requirement that all goods and market participants be independent. This 
restriction plainly does not apply to certain types of goods that either must be 
produced by or will be consumed by more than one individual. This problem of 
joint production or consumption is not new to economics.  David Hume and his 
compatriot Adam Smith both identified the problem of goods held in common, 
as did John Stuart Mill and Vilfredo Pareto (Hardin 2013)   However, the first 
analytical exposition relating to the provision of expenditures on collective 
consumption goods, or “public goods,” is generally credited to Samuelson (1954; 
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1955).  Pure public goods typically are distinct from private goods in three key 
respects (Brown and Jackson 1990, 34-36; Stiglitz 2000a, 127-136):  The use of 
the goods by one person does not diminish another’s ability to use the resource 
(non-rivalry to an economist), it is impossible or unacceptably costly to exclude 
individuals from consuming the good (non-excludability), and there is no cost to 
admitting an additional person to use of the resource (zero marginal cost). 
National defence, the example cited by Adam Smith, exhibits all three 
characteristics.   
Samuelson articulated the fundamental problem in the provision of public 
goods (1954, 388-389). He noted that there is no market price-driven solution 
that optimizes the provision of a public good.  The reason is that individuals, 
calculating only according to their own interests, are likely to signal less 
willingness to participate in producing or sustaining a common good than would 
be in their best interest if everyone participated. This tendency of market 
participants to under-provide or over-use a public good, known as the “free rider 
problem,” implies that cooperative action through the market place will not result 
in sufficient production of public goods—voluntary provision of a sufficient 
national defence is the classic example. Moreover, once provided it is impossible 
to exclude individuals from the use of a public good, which may lead to over-
consumption. Over-consumption of clean air by polluters who face no private 
costs for doing so is an example.  Thus, a government entity seeking to maximize 
conditions for the entire society typically will produce or protect these sorts of 
public goods through targeted subsidies, taxes, regulations, mandates or similar 
measures. 
The Problem of Collective Action 
The specification of the characteristics of “public goods” has given rise to 
the recognition that numerous types of “goods” exist.  At one extreme stand pure 
private goods, those that consumers and firms naturally would produce and trade 
efficiently in a conventional market. Public goods, at the opposite extreme, are 
goods that only governments can and will supply.  In between there lies a 
continuum of types of goods, of which two types are generally cited. First, are 
club (or toll) goods, those which a cooperative group of persons may provide, 
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consume and control access to, such as a private golf club (Buchanan 1965). 
Second are common pool resources, goods that are owned collectively and 
consumption of which may be shared by all members of the collective group and 
is difficult to control.  The management of community irrigation systems or the 
exploitation of open-sea fisheries or collectively-owned forest lands are typical 
types of resources analysed in the literature on CPRs. 
Frequently, these various types of goods are classified according to the 
degree of difficulty with which other consumers may be excluded from their use 
(excludability) and the degree to which the use of one person subtracts from the 
ability of another to use the good (subtractability, or rival consumption) (Brown 
and Jackson 1990, 42; Stiglitz 2000a, 132-133).  These four types of goods 
frequently are arrayed in a two-axis matrix such as this: 
 
Figure 3: Four basic types of goods (derived from Ostrom 2005, 24) 
Although this presentation oversimplifies the complex and varying nature 
of “goods” and their classification, it helpfully positions goods held collectively 
as intermediate between the purely public and the purely private.  The important 
feature of club goods or common pool resources is that they require individuals 
to cooperate to provide or sustain them.   
The seminal work on the topic of cooperation is “The Logic of Collective 
Action” by Mancur Olsen (1965). In his book, Olsen applies neoclassical theory 
to an in-depth consideration of the obstacles to collaborative behaviour.  His 
analysis, which follows the logic of market economics and the neo-classical 
model of human behaviour, led to the disturbing observation that cooperation 
among individuals is extremely unlikely to occur and virtually impossible 
outside of very small groups, and only in small groups if the marginal 
benefit/cost assessment of each individual in the group is the same (Olsen 1965, 
30).  Based on the expectation that individuals will seek to maximize their own 
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welfare, Olsen found that activities requiring group cooperation will generally be 
undermined by individuals to whom free-riding is the rational behaviour.  Absent 
selective incentives or external coercion, Olsen was entirely pessimistic about 
the likelihood that a collective good will be supplied even if its provision is 
clearly in the interests of all individuals involved: 
The rational individual in the large group in a socio-political context will 
not be willing to make any sacrifices to achieve the objectives he shares 
with others.  There is accordingly no presumption that large groups will 
organize to act in their common interest.  Only when groups are small, or 
when they are fortunate enough to have an independent source of 
selective incentives, will they organize or act to achieve their objectives. 
(1965, 166-167) 
If Olsen’s analysis were not enough, Garrett Hardin shortly afterwards 
attacked the one exception Olsen reserved from his pessimistic analysis: the 
behaviour of small groups. Hardin was not an economist.  Rather, he was a 
biologist and was addressing problems of environmental destruction and 
excessive population growth.  For his analytical reference point, he employed a 
thought experiment to reach an even more devastating conclusion, which he 
labelled “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968).   Unlike Olsen, Hardin’s 
reasoning was metaphorical rather than technical, but the message was powerful.  
He imagined a grazing commons that is used by a population no longer 
controlled by “tribal wars, poaching and disease (to) keep the numbers of both 
man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land,” and deduces that: 
the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to 
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and 
another…But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational 
herdsman sharing a commons.  Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-
in a world that is limited.  Ruin is the destination toward which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. (1968, 1244) 
In the late-1960’s, Hardin’s pessimism about the commons converged 
with Olsen’s theoretically-reasoned pessimism about the capacity of groups to 
cooperate to generate a consensus within and without economics that collective 
action to solve social problems or manage collectively-held resources is unlikely 
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to occur without external intervention.  As Acheson and Ostrom have pointed 
out, this gave rise to theories in economics that called for privatization or 
intervention by a government as the only policy options available to address 
collective social needs (Acheson 1994, 11; for a technical discussion, see Baland 
and Platteau 1996, chapters 3 and 8; Ostrom 1990).  In light of the failures of 
both market-oriented approaches and top-down, government-mandated 
development programmes discussed above (see page 74), the prospects for 
economic development would be severely limited if indeed the success of more 
decentralized approaches to development also is improbable.   
The conventional wisdom that cooperation was impossible, however, also 
became the straw-man against which empirically-oriented scholars and theorists 
battled in the decades to follow. Common-pool resource theory is an integral part 
of this counter attack, to which this thesis will return (see page 111).  First other 
economic theories related to cooperation need to be explained to put CPR 
theories in context.  
Institutional Economics and Behaviour 
Olsen’s analysis of the behaviour of individuals facing collaborative 
situations (see above) was strictly a deduction from the neo-classical micro-
economic model of markets and human behaviour.  As the second half of the 20
th
 
Century progressed, however, this theory of behaviour and its economic 
implications came under increasing sceptical scrutiny.  As noted above (see page 
102), since the 1950’s and even before theorists had raised questions about 
policy conclusions driven by neoclassical theory.   
In the neoclassical model, the market is an efficient and costless self-
governing mechanism made up of producers and consumers. It is premised on 
strong private property rights and the various assumptions described above (see 
page 102).  Taken literally, many aspects of the real world do not fit the theory.  
As MacKay has pointed out, the theory does not explain the existence or creation 
of collective goods, it unrealistically assumes that all transactions are costless, it 
assumes perfect information in a world of substantial uncertainty, and it does not 
explain imperfect competition such as monopolies or oligopolies (cited in 
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Acheson 1994, 8).  The theory does not explain why firms, not only prices, exist 
to coordinate economic activity (Coase 1937) or why other institutions of the 
economy such as contracts or corporate hierarchies exist or are required 
(Williamson 1996).  Firms, contracts and other economic structures not captured 
in neoclassical theory are ubiquitous in the real world and the conditions 
assumed in theory are extremely rare outside of public financial and commodity 
markets.  These shortcomings, which pose severe theoretical quandaries for the 
standard neoclassical model, gave rise to a new steam of theorizing by 
economists interested in these “institutions” that plainly exist in the economy. 
Interest in institutions is not new to economics.  Since the 18
th
 Century 
economists have been interested in the role of government and other institutions 
in the economy, and in the late 19th and early 20
th
 Centuries European and 
American economists, notably Thorsten Veblen and John Commons in the 
U.S.A., were exploring their importance (Acheson 1994; Commons 1961 (1934); 
Hodgson 2009; Kaufman 2003).  By the 1980’s, a “new” institutional economics 
(NIE) was emerging that offered a partial response to the shortcomings of the 
neo-classical model.   
Institutions in this case are not organisations or buildings.  North (1990, 
4) defines institutions as the “rules of the game” while Acheson labels them “sets 
of formal rules that can be enforced” (1994, 8).  Institutions may be narrow 
organisational manifestations of economic life—markets, firms, contracts, and 
the like.  However, North (1994) and others take a broader view that incorporates 
all manner of political, social and cultural practices within the concept of 
“institution” (Hodgson 2009).  Williamson (1996, 4-5) explains that institutions 
may be statements of rights, restrictions, sanctions or incentives.  They may be 
codified in law or rule, or they may be informal and even traditional.  Rules may 
be as simple as the right to property or as complex as contractual arrangements; 
they may be permanent or they may be temporary like a patent, formal as a law 
or informal as a taboo.  This broad notion of “institutions” as the formal and 
informal parameters within which individuals organize their economic 
relationships was central to Ostrom’s inquiry into CPRs and it has been adopted 
in this thesis to document the “rules of the game” of the three community 
projects reported on here. 
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The breadth of issues addressed by the New Institutional Economics 
extends well beyond the purview of this thesis (for a detailed overview, see 
Brousseau and Glachant 2008).  Rather, the focus here will be on a few critical 
understandings of the NIE that relate directly to common pool resource theory. 
Theorists led by Douglass North (1990) and Oliver Williamson (1990; 1996; 
1998; 2000) have sought to explain why “institutions” came into existence in the 
economy and how the institutions of the economy govern economic activity 
(Williamson 1996, 5).  
Central to institutional economics is the concept of “transaction cost.”  
There are costs to transactions in the economy—buying, selling, hiring workers, 
and managing economic activity all require investments of time and money to 
accomplish.  Neoclassical theory assumes these activities are costless. 
Institutional economists argue that institutions are established to minimize those 
transaction costs. Institutions also exist to address the cost of managing risks.  
For example, contracts that establish obligations and liabilities for contracting 
parties are designed to mitigate risks that generally are assumed away with the 
neoclassical presumption of perfect information. Williamson particularly 
emphasized two sources of risk relevant to the problem of collective action, 
bounded rationality and opportunism  (Williamson 1998, 76). 
Bounded rationality is the notion, unlike the assumption in neo-classical 
theory, that individual actors in the market act rationally but do not possess 
perfect information and are psychologically limited in their capacity to formulate 
and solve complex problems or  process information (Kahneman 2003; Simon 
1957 cited in Williamson 1981, 553). Numerous experiments described below 
(see page 111), attest to the validity of the bounded rationality assumption.  
Depending on circumstances, bounded rationality introduces risks into decision 
making because it can violate three core assumptions of the conventional theory: 
unqualified rational choice, perfect information, and ordered preferences that are 
transitive (A is always preferred to B which is always preferred to C, and A is 
always preferred to C).  
Similarly, Williamson’s (1996, 6)  concept of opportunism (“self-interest 
seeking with guile”) introduces the potential for business-partner risks (one 
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cannot know if one’s business partner will cheat) that also violates the premise of 
perfect information.  Opportunism thus introduces into the theoretical discussion 
the concepts of trust, monitoring of agreements, and sanctions, all of which will 
emerge as important in the experimental research discussed below (see pages 
113 to 121). 
Although not directly relevant to collective action problems, 
Williamson’s third key assumption, asset specificity—the notion that 
investments may have special purposes and may not be fully interchangeable—
violates the neoclassical principles of mobile and homogeneous factors of 
production and introduces risks relating to shortfalls in the supply and demand 
for the products of those specialized assets.  Together, bounded rationality, 
opportunism and inflexible assets create risks and costs for business transactions 
—both actual and potential—and increase the likelihood that market failures will 
occur (Acheson 1994, 8).  People create institutions such as corporations, 
contracts, laws and penalties to manage these costs and risks both within and 
without the organisation. This collection of institutions that regulate market 
activities are known as instruments of governance. 
Two matters make the NIE theories central to this discussion of collective 
action. First, the NIE provided a framework for examining governance and the 
operation of formal and informal institutions in real-world economic activity, a 
framework Ostrom explicitly adopts as her own (Ostrom 1990, 22-23).  While 
couched in language that addresses capitalist business enterprises, the problems 
facing actors seeking to undertake economic transactions in complex and 
uncertain situations are also relevant in CPR-related settings (Ostrom 1990, 33). 
Ostrom and others studying common pool resources responded to the insights of 
the NIE with deep probing of the institutions governing collaborative behaviour 
in actual commons settings.  
  Second, the NIE assumptions about individual behaviour, particularly 
the emphasis on bounded rationality and opportunism, raised questions about 
how people actually behave. If people do not behave as Olsen and Hardin 
assumed, is it then possible that the cooperation they argued was precluded under 
neoclassical economic assumptions may be possible in certain circumstances? 
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Those questions have been addressed by experiments conducted by CPR scholars 
and by behavioural experts, producing results that are fundamental to 
understanding the circumstances under which CPR theories may work.  The next 
section turns to the experimental results, followed by a discussion in Chapter 5 of 
Ostrom’s findings in the field. 
Games, Experiments and Behaviour 
Early in his essay Hardin referred to game theory (1968, 1243), a branch 
of mathematics that is often used to capture the problem of collective action, 
frequently in versions of the game called the “prisoner’s dilemma.”  Baland and 
Platteau provide an example of a prisoner’s dilemma keyed to Hardin’s imagined 
tragedy, which they call the “herdsman’s game” (1996, 29). They assume two 
herdsmen have the option to place either one or two head of cattle on a common 
range.  If each places only one head, the return to each is $5; if either places one 
and the other two head the payoff is $3 for the first and $6 for the second 
herdsman; however, if both place two head, the cattle are less well fed and the 
return is only $4 dollars to each.  The dilemma is often portrayed in a “payoff 
matrix” in which the first herdsman receives the payoff indicated in the first 
number of each cell and the second herdsman the payoff in the second number, 
depending on the strategy chosen by each herdsman:  
 
Figure 4: Herdsman's game payoff matrix (Baland and Platteau 1996, 29) 
The implication of this game is that while both herdsmen are better off 
with only one head each, neither will make that calculation.  Rather, Herdsman 1 
sees that he is disadvantaged if he places one head on the common and 
Herdsman 2 places 2 head, and that he is better off if he places two head on the 
common regardless of the strategy chosen by Herdsman 2; Herdsman 2 sees the 
One Head Two Head
Herdsman 2 
Strategy
One Head 5,5 6,3
Two Head 3,6 4,4
Herdsman 1 Strategy
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same potential outcomes.  As a result, both will place two head on the common 
field and suffer the reduction in income relative to placing one head each. In 
game theory, their final position is known as a Nash equilibrium, a condition in 
which each player follows his best strategy given the strategy of the other.  This 
is precisely the logic Hardin projected in his paper, and is very much at the heart 
of Olsen’s pessimistic conclusions. 
Following on the insights of institutional economists, experimentalists in 
psychology, economics and political science have challenged the neoclassical 
behavioural assumptions on which Olsen and Hardin rely.  In general, these 
experiments take the form of “games” conducted in laboratory settings with real 
people who have been placed in situations, often called cooperation dilemmas, 
which call for decisions that explicitly test neoclassical assumptions or call for 
decisions of the sort encountered by individuals working toward collective goals.   
This is not the forum for a comprehensive review of game theory or the 
related field of behavioural economics.
3
 However, certain findings in these fields 
that relate to features of the neo-classical model are essential to understanding 
why optimism about collaboration, in the right conditions, is warranted.  
Therefore, the focus here will be on illustrating those results from laboratory 
experiments based on game theory analysis that shed light on the possibility that 
                                                 
3 For a technical but comprehensive review of the experimental results relating to CPRs, 
see BALAND, J.-M. & PLATTEAU, J.-P. 1996. Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is 
there a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization and 
Clarendon Press.  Ostrom’s key experimental work is summarized in two separate volumes 
OSTROM, E., GARDNER, R. & WALKER, J. 1994. Rules, Games and Common Pool 
Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, OSTROM, E. & WALKER, J. (eds.) 2003. 
Trust and Reciprocity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  Kahneman presents a 
comprehensive layman’s view of behavioural findings relating to economics in KAHNEMAN, 
D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. For a more technical 
discussion, see CAMERER, C. F. & LOEWENSTEIN, G. 2004. Behavioral economics: Past, 
present, future. In: CAMERER, C. F., LOWENSTEIN, G. & RABIN, M. (eds.) Advances in 
Behavioral Economics. New York, Princeton and Oxford: Russell Sage Foundation and 
Princeton University Press, 2-51. Also see PESENDORFER, W. 2006. Behavioral economics 
comes of age: A review essay on "Advances in Behavioral Economics". Journal of Economic 
Literature 44, 712-721.  For the implications for economic theory and policy of behavioural 
findings see THALER, R. H. & SUNSTEIN, C. R. 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth and Happiness. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.  Other aspects of 
the emerging counter to neoclassical psychological and institutional assumptions may be found in 
AKERLOF, G. A. & SCHILLER, R. J. 2009. Animal Spirits:  How Human Psychology Drives 
the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
(Kindle Edition, Retrieved from Amazon.com). 
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collaboration is more feasible than Olsen and Hardin predicted. The discussion 
will focus on findings in four interrelated topics:  rationality; trust, reciprocity 
and fairness; communication; and monitoring and sanctions. 
Rational Decisions 
Rational choices have been defined as those in which individuals possess 
as much information about situations as is available, in which individuals value 
the potential outcomes of the situation through a consistent, complete linear 
function of the decision maker’s net payoff, and in which decision makers’ 
ultimate choices maximize their own net benefits given what others are expected 
to do (Ostrom 2005, 101).  Behavioural experiments call these assumptions into 
question.  Two psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky were prime 
movers in this analysis (after Tversky’s death, Kahneman was awarded the 2002 
Nobel Prize in Economic Science).  Their findings were based on laboratory 
experiments that posed situations designed to test this core economic principle of 
rational decision making.  Among their most important early findings that 
stimulated the development of behavioural economics:  
 Individuals faced with decisions involving risk underweight outcomes 
that are “merely probable” compared with sure outcomes, and  
overweight low probabilities relative to higher probability outcomes 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  The biases in decision making that result 
include a generalized aversion to losses and a tendency to prefer sure-
things to equivalent or better outcomes if they are expressed in 
probability (i.e., risky) terms. 
 Individuals use heuristics (shortcuts or rules of thumb) that lead to 
systematic errors, underweight prior probabilities (Bayesian 
probabilities), fail to consider the implications of small sample size for 
error, overestimate their own capacity to predict outcomes, and 
underestimate the likelihood of regression to the mean in favour of 
predicting repetition of statistically outlying performance (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974).  Independent of how much information is available, the 
use of heuristics means that decisions will not be purely rational. 
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 Perceptions of facts in decision making undermine theoretical 
assumptions that individual’s preferences are invariant, ordered and 
transitive.  Experiments have found, for example, that different framing 
of propositions with the same economic outcome yielded variable 
preferences, and that responses to questions could be “primed” or 
“anchored” by suggestive framing of questions (Kahneman and Tversky 
1984; Kahneman and Tversky 1986).  In other words, an individual may 
assign more or less value to an outcome depending on how questions are 
framed. 
These findings and many follow-on studies have been evaluated in the 
context of traditional economics (Gintis 2000; Pesendorfer 2006), behavioural 
economics (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004; Thaler and Sunstein 2008) and 
institutional economics (Pressman 2006).  In a sense, the psychological findings 
of behavioural economists and psychologists have defined some of the “bounds” 
in bounded rationality: not only may information be incomplete but decision 
making may not be purely “rational.”  This introduces the possibility that even 
individuals seeking to make rational self-interested decisions will resort to the 
use of heuristics (Ostrom and Walker 2003, 40) and can make “mistakes” from a 
rational choice point of view (Ostrom 2005, 118).  These conditions constitute 
risks that may call for institutional solutions.   
Trust, Reciprocity and Fairness 
Williamson’s notion of opportunistic behaviour places the problem of 
trust directly on the institutionalist agenda.  A direct implication of neoclassical 
analysis is that individuals’ self-interest should “unremittingly” drive behaviours 
that give no weight to fairness and cannot sustain trust among players (Baland 
and Platteau 1996, 67).  The sub-optimal Nash equilibrium in the hunters’ game 
is a classic illustration of this result.  The hunter’s game, however, is a “one-
shot” game in which participants make single, simultaneous and independent 
decisions on which strategy maximizes their welfare.  In theory, the Nash 
equilibrium position for all players in these prisoners’ dilemma games is the 
same—they should always defect from cooperation because seen from the 
standpoint of personal interest that is their best option.   
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In fact, however, some people do cooperate even in prisoner’s-dilemma 
situations; indeed, under certain conditions as many as 40 to 60 per cent of 
players do so (Ostrom and Walker 2003, 27-28).  For example, Ahn et al (2003) 
report on a one-shot game in which each player is given $5 and must make 
simultaneous decisions—without communicating between themselves.  Each 
player has the option to keep his $5 or give it to the other player, in which case 
the receiving player receives an additional $10.  If neither donates (the predicted 
outcome), both have $5, but if both donate each ends up with $10.  This type of 
game simulates the decision to contribute to a common pool resource (for 
example, building an irrigation system) in which collaboration leads to higher 
pay-outs for all participants.  Surprisingly from a theoretical standpoint, 36 per 
cent of the participants gave up their $5, trusting their counter-parts to 
reciprocate. When decisions are made sequentially (player 1 decides then player 
2 acts in full knowledge of player 1’s decision), 56 per cent of the first players 
gave up their $5 and 61 per cent of the second players who received funds 
reciprocated. Baland and Platteau (1996, 144) report similar results in one-shot 
games, and Ahn et al (2003, 324-325) conducted studies in Korea and Japan with 
similar outcomes.  Ostrom (2005, 70-75) reports on laboratory experiments 
similar to the Ahn et al game and on simulated labour negotiations in which 
parallel results were obtained.  
When games are repeated (i.e., participants make numerous sequential 
investment decisions based upon prior play by their partners but without 
communication), trust outcomes also occur, but their magnitude and duration 
depend upon the rules of the game.   Games that have a finite number of moves 
(i.e., a known end point) tend to demonstrate higher levels of cooperation until 
the last moves, when cooperation deteriorates markedly (Ostrom and Walker 
2003, 27-28).  When participants are unaware of the point at which the game will 
end, cooperation tends to be sustained at higher levels (Baland and Platteau 
1996; Ostrom et al. 1994; Ostrom and Walker 2003, 344).  While cooperation is 
far from universal, these limited studies demonstrate that cooperation is feasible 
(Baland and Platteau 1996, 138-140).  In other words, if the relationship is likely 
to continue for a long, and especially for an unknown, duration, the likelihood of 
cooperation rises dramatically. 
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The impulse to cooperate need not be universally present in game 
participants.  Cook and Cooper (2003) report on the characteristics of individuals 
that may incline them to be “high trusters” in situations calling for cooperation, 
citing attitudinal, behavioural and cognitive reasons that have been identified in 
various studies for such behaviour. They conclude: “High trusters have a more 
fine-grained and accurate set of expectations about others.  In addition, because 
high-trusters make more accurate predictions, they tend to cooperate more than 
low-trusters” (2003, 221).  McCabe (2003) makes parallel arguments in an 
article proposing that individuals possess a “mental accounting” capacity that 
encourages reciprocation based on trusting behaviour by others. Like the studies 
reported by Ahn et al (2003) these studies suggest that some individuals are 
inclined to reciprocate trust with trust and in practice they are rewarded for it. As 
will be shown in the following sections, cooperation requires only that some 
individuals be trusting, not all. 
Trusting and reciprocal behaviour may have deeper roots.  There is some 
evidence that individuals begin with a normative value to behave in a “fair” and 
self-sacrificing manner towards others.  Baland and Platteau report on studies in 
New York City in which 45 per cent of “lost” wallets were returned, and others 
in which distressed but inebriated individuals on subways (i.e. those with self-
inflicted problems) received aid from strangers (1996, 146-147).  Ostrom et al 
report that in monitored discussions, game players “stressed that they wanted to 
obtain a fair outcome where everyone received the same outcome” (Ostrom et al. 
1994, 201).  Hackett et al identify a possible fairness-based behavioural 
foundation for the sharing rules identified in field studies of CPRs (1995, 120).  
The behavioural economist Robert Sugden proposes a theory of the voluntary 
sector of the economy that is 
based on the assumption that most people believe free riding to be morally 
wrong […] the individual has obligations, not to ‘society’, but to any 
group of individuals from whose efforts he derives benefits. (1984, 775) 
Akerloff and Schilling, reviewing various behavioural experiments, 
conclude that “considerations of fairness can override rational economic 
motivation” (2009, location 326).  The notion that fairness may be a core value 
of at least some individuals is well accepted in the literature and forms a 
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potential underpinning for the finding, both in simulated and real-world 
situations, that individuals respond to one another with trust and reciprocate that 
trust. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe observe that “reciprocity exists as a basic 
element of human behaviour and that this is accounted for in the trust extended 
to an anonymous counterpart” (quoted in Cook and Cooper 2003, 223). These 
results are only enhanced in laboratory settings when game players are permitted 
to communicate. 
Communication 
Although the results of games involving no communication yield more 
trusting outcomes than the Olsen / Hardin analysis anticipated, they are 
nonetheless discouraging.  Ostrom and her colleagues developed games without 
communication among the participants that tested the willingness of individuals 
to cooperate to create a common property and found that across five different 
experimental designs, all produced results that were less than 37 per cent of the 
optimal outcome for the players; some cooperation occurred in these 
experiments, but in many cases the simulated CPR is destroyed (Ostrom et al. 
1994, 139-143). Results are different, in some cases dramatically so, when an 
institutional change is made to the game and communication among the 
participants is permitted. 
Ostrom et al (1994, Chapter 7) report on a series of experiments that 
included varying degrees of permitted communications (from a single instance to 
multiple face-to-face sessions) concerning simulated “CPRs” that were both high 
and low in endowment (the quantity of the available resource).  They found that 
players used the opportunity to communicate to develop joint strategies, reach 
agreements on behaviour, and address subsequent non-conforming behaviour 
through verbal chastisement even where the person who actually defected is not 
named (Ostrom et al. 1994, 154).    Although, depending on the structure of the 
game, defections did occur and the theoretically optimal outcome was never 
achieved, cooperation raised the average percentage of optimality achieved by 
the groups over the course of the experiments by between 42 per cent and 80 per 
cent (Ostrom et al. 1994, 167-168). Cooperation was lower in high endowment 
situations, where economic theory suggests that cooperation is discouraged by 
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lower marginal benefits from cooperation compared to situations where the 
common resource is scare. Those authors report on other studies by themselves 
and other scholars that reach parallel results, and Ostrom and Walker report on 
studies by Isaac and Walker that achieved dramatic and sustained gains in 
cooperation from communication (Ostrom and Walker 2003, 29-34).  
Communication served two purposes in these games.  First, it was a 
vehicle for the players to determine a joint strategy to optimize outcomes.  
Second, the authors found that much of the communication after the strategy was 
established was used to build trust among the players and to chastise those 
(generally unknown) players who deviated from the strategy (Ostrom et al. 1994, 
197).  Experiments by other scholars have underscored the importance of face-
to-face communication, rather than anonymous electronic communication, in 
reaching and enforcing agreements (Hackett et al. 1995, 119; Ostrom 2005, 93).  
Cook and Cooper (2003, 232-3) reported on results that emphasize the 
importance of repeated face-to-face communications in the development of trust 
in business settings.  Baland and Platteau (1996, 141) cite experiments that 
suggest that the greater the level of communication among players the lower the 
frequency with which defections occur. 
While communication improves outcomes in experimental situations, it is 
not sufficient to achieve sustainable outcomes.  As Ostrom et al point out: 
The evidence from these experiments should not be interpreted as 
supporting arguments that communication alone is sufficient to overcome 
repeated dilemma problems in general.  While many endogenous 
arrangements appear to evolve in experimental and field settings to 
overcome CPR dilemmas, many endogenous efforts have failed as well. 
[…] When the actions of one or a few individuals can be a strong 
disequilibriating force or frequent opportunities for communication are 
not feasible, individuals who have the capacity to agree to sanction one 
another as well as communicate with one another might well want to add 
the sword to a covenant. (1994, 169) 
It is to the subject of monitoring and sanctions that this discussion now 
turns. 
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Monitoring and Sanctions 
Baland and Platteau (1996, 57-58) point out that it is possible to generate 
cooperative outcomes when games involve repeated interactions among players 
and the length of the game is infinite. This is because these conditions permit the 
establishment of conditional cooperation and punishment.  Direct 
communication is not necessary for this to occur under these theoretical 
assumptions, only knowledge of the opposing player’s actions.  The strategy 
known as “tit for tat” illustrates the point. 
In a tit-for-tat game, player 1 initially cooperates with player 2.  
Thereafter, player 1 emulates player 2’s prior move.  Defection is met with 
defection, cooperation with cooperation.  Baland and Platteau (1996, 59-61) 
show that there are numerous Nash equilibriums in a tit-for-tat game, including 
sustained cooperation induced by the cost incurred by player 2 when player 1 
penalizes  player 2’s defections.  Axelrod (1984), in a famous competition 
among algorithms designed to win protracted prisoners’ dilemma games, has 
argued not only that tit-for-tat is the best strategy available for a player, but also 
that in an infinitely long game it will converge on cooperation as a stable 
equilibrium.  In other words, in simulated contexts, targeted sanctions induce 
cooperative behaviour. 
Ostrom et al report on a series of human experiments with varying 
degrees of communication conducted by themselves and others and conclude: 
Subjects who use the opportunity to communicate to agree to a joint 
strategy and choose their own sanctioning mechanism achieve close to 
optimal results based entirely on the promise they make, their own efforts 
to monitor, and their own investments in sanctioning. (1994, 193)  
Indeed, in such situations those authors report that cooperative behaviour 
produces a net yield of 90 per cent of the optimum in the game.  Moreover, 
sanctions need not be draconian.  In experiments, Ostrom et al (1994, 215-220) 
found that when defections were encountered, limited sanctions such as verbal 
reprimands or modest cash penalties were most effective at sustaining 
agreements, except in situations of major deviations from the agreed strategy.  
Although some games involved “grim trigger” sanctions that meet any defections 
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with punishment for the duration of the game, these were rarely used by game 
participants (Ostrom and Walker 2003, 52-53).  Indeed, Ostrom (2005, 76-77) 
reports elsewhere that “trust game” experiments by Fehr and Rockenbach found 
that positive incentives generated higher returns than sanctions, perhaps because 
sanctions were seen as hostile acts that reduced cooperation. 
The source of the rules and sanctions is important.  As noted above (see 
page 104), pessimistic conclusions drawn particularly from one-shot prisoners’ 
dilemma games suggest that rules imposed and enforced by external sources may 
be the only effective rules.  Field studies and experimental results contest that 
conclusion.  Ostrom (2005, 95) cites Bruno Frey’s hypothesis that external rules 
can crowd out intrinsic motivation in groups and lead to worse outcomes than 
would be reached through voluntary agreements, and goes on to report results 
from field studies that found groups who followed self-generated and self-
enforced roles achieved a greater return than groups working with rules imposed 
on them.  The reasons for this result range from corruption or ineptitude in the 
enforcement body to a lack of knowledge about complex local conditions that 
leads regulator to promulgate rules inappropriate to the particular environment in 
question.  
In short, monitoring of compliance with agreements, combined with 
sanctions for those who defect from agreements, is essential to the construction 
of solutions to commons dilemmas.   Indeed, Ostrom concludes: 
In the field, sanctions are much more likely to emerge from an 
endogenous process of crafting their own rules, including the 
punishments that should be imposed if these rules are broken. Spending 
time and effort in a linked collective-choice situation designing rules 
creates a public good for all of those involved. Crafting rules for an 
operational situation is thus a second-level dilemma that theorists have 
argued is no more likely be solved than the original commons 
dilemma…Since self-organized rules are found in many local common-
pool resource situations, it appears that participants frequently do design 
their own rules contrary to the theoretical prediction. (2005, 92) 
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Conclusion: The Feasibility of Collective Action 
Ostrom is fond of citing Hobbes (1958 (1651)) as the original theorist on 
the failure of collective action.  Hobbes’ grim view of the consequences of 
human passions and intellectual shortcomings led him to postulate the need for a 
sovereign power to enforce the covenants that bind people together into a 
functioning commonwealth.  Hobbes’ solution, absolute monarchy, is hardly 
consistent with market economics, but his perspectives on human nature parallel 
in many respects the pessimism expressed by Olsen and Hardin, which was built 
on neoclassical economic assumptions about human psychology and motivation. 
At least in certain well-defined circumstances, however, such grim conclusions 
have been belied by the recent game theory experiments and psychological 
experiments recounted in this chapter.   
Admittedly, those results find that many people are disinclined to trust or 
cooperate--but not all people are so disinclined, and in some experiments most 
people are not.  The results suggest that where interactions among individuals are 
likely to be continuing, as in infinitely repeated games or real-world community 
organisations, regular communication substantially enhances the prospects for 
successful collaboration.  When groups are permitted to set their own rules and 
devise appropriate sanctions for transgressors, those institutional features are 
more likely to be successful, especially if they are able to monitor and administer 
the sanctions themselves.  As Ostrom et al concluded: 
The results from these experimental designs replicate a core part of our 
essential findings from the field.  When substantial benefits can be gained 
by arriving at a joint plan of action for a series of future interactions, 
individuals may have in their repertoire of heuristics simple sharing rules 
to propose, backed up by a presumption that others will use something 
like a measured response.  If in addition, individuals have learned how a 
monitoring and sanctioning system enhances the likelihood that 
agreements will be sustained, they are capable of setting up and operating 
their own enforcement mechanism. (1994, 220) 
Baland and Platteau (1996, 125) attribute the emergence of cooperation 
to the prevalence of moral norms in society, as does North (1994).  The notion 
that close interactions generate trust and mutual obligations leading to 
cooperation has been echoed in Putnam’s study of political cooperation in Italy 
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and his ensuing construction of the concept of “Social Capital”  (Putnam 2000; 
Putnam et al. 1993). Ostrom has regularly turned to the concept of social capital 
(see page 131) in order to differentiate “sparse” environments, in which 
individuals do not know one another and so have not established norms and 
rules, from “richer” environments in which the constant interactions of 
individuals give rise to the relationships and trust necessary for collaboration 
(Ostrom 1995; Ostrom et al. 1994, Chapter 15).  Baland and Platteau conclude 
that 
It is not sufficient that a significant majority of people prefer universal 
co-operation, but it must also be the case that these people feel confident 
enough that their willingness to cooperate is shared by many others too. 
(1996, 110)  
Building and maintaining a stock of social capital may be an essential 
pre-requisite for collaboration. Although most of the experimental studies 
reported thus far involve small groups of individuals, theorists generally take the 
view that collaboration is possible even in very large groups if critical conditions 
are satisfied. Among these is a requirement that the boundaries of the CPR be 
clear.  Isaac and Walker report that group size did not affect provision of the 
CPR in experiments as long as the marginal per capita return from the CPR to 
individuals was high enough (reported in Ostrom et al. 1994, 123-125).  Perhaps 
most important is the institutional setting within which the group operates. 
Where local institutions are “nested” within structures that support collective 
action at the lowest possible level, issues of group size are substantially 
mitigated (Snidal 1995). 
Furthermore, issues of very heterogeneous groups, although challenging, 
can be overcome.  Heterogeneity introduces to the collaboration problem 
individuals who have very different values, norms and economic or political 
power.  Snidal (1995) examines this issue in detail and reaches the conclusion 
that the institutional arrangements in place can mitigate, or exacerbate, 
heterogeneity in a group.  Ostrom herself (1995) reinforced this conclusion in a 
review of very different outcomes from irrigation projects in which participants 
have different power relations. Other scholars have concluded that 
disproportionate power need not prevent the resolution of commons dilemmas if 
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the powerful players are self-interested to do so (Mitchell 1995; Oye and 
Maxwell 1995) .  
Nothing in this chapter should suggest that the formation of collaborative 
ventures to solve common pool-type problems is easy.  The various conditions 
for successful collaboration identified in this chapter are complex and highly 
dependent on specific conditions.  Failures are common (Ostrom 1990, Chapter 
5), and actors frequently dissipate the economic rents of the resource before 
finally forging collaborative agreements (Liebcap 2005). Baland and Platteau 
(1996, Chapters 10-12) summarize an extensive literature explaining both 
cultural obstacles to collaborative behaviour and, in particular, the need for 
significant economic incentives (i.e. benefits from cooperation) to induce 
impoverished people, in particular, to participate in collaborative activities. 
 Nonetheless, this chapter does argue that there are sound empirical and 
theoretical reasons to reject the across-the-board adoption of the Olsen / Hardin 
pessimism.  Even Wade, whose study of Indian CPRs identified a host of 
cultural, economic and political obstacles to successful collaboration, concluded:  
A sweeping pessimism is ill-founded, both empirically and analytically. 
[…] We also observe, in contexts beyond natural resource management, a 
good deal of voluntary contribution to public goods which is difficult to 
explain in terms of selective inducements. (1988, 199) 
The next chapter takes up the research process led by Ostrom and her 
colleagues at the University of Indiana, a process that has put some specificity 
into the conditions under which collaboration may occur, results that resonate 
clearly with the theoretical and experimental results described in this chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Collective Action on Common 
Pool Resources 
Introduction 
The discussion in Chapter 3 argued that, at least under certain 
circumstances, archaeological resources or the flow of tourists visiting 
archaeological sites may be considered as potential common pool resources (see 
page 98).  Chapter 4 has explored the theoretical and experimental arguments 
supporting the potential for collective action to manage common pool resources, 
and argued that, again in certain circumstances, people are capable of and even 
likely to collaborate to achieve mutually beneficial ends.  This fifth chapter 
begins the transition to the case studies of community institutions conducted for 
this thesis.  
The chapter begins with a brief overview of Ostrom’s studies of CPR 
governance in various corners of the world.  It also reports on work by other 
scholars who have evaluated CPR regimes or community ventures, generally 
environmentally-related, that have many features in common with CPRs.  The 
chapter then turns to a discussion of Ostrom’s high-level model for evaluating 
CPR governance regimes in the field, labelled the Institutional Analysis and 
Design (IAD) methodology.  The IAD model is not a specific set of analytical 
techniques.  Rather it is a conceptual model of how various elements of the 
environment, the CPR and the community interact in long-surviving CPR 
regimes. This section of the chapter describes the IAD model and explains how it 
is employed to frame the present study.  The section that follows discusses the 
concept of social capital, an important aspect of the context in which 
communities form and manage CPR regimes and one that figures in the 
application of the IAD model to the research undertaken for this thesis. With 
these overview comments in hand, the chapter then turns to a review of the eight 
governance principles identified by Ostrom. These principles are derived from 
her group’s field investigations of long-surviving common pool regimes across 
varying resource, geographic and size considerations.  This section will 
highlight, as Ostrom herself does in many volumes, how these principles are 
strongly reinforced by the experimental results cited in Chapter 4. 
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 The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the limited number of 
authors who, in recent years, have sought to apply Ostrom’s theorizing to the 
field of archaeology.  Not only are these few in number but, the discussion will 
argue, those few scholars have failed to grasp the essential elements of CPR 
theories and instead conflated the design principles for CPRs with precepts of 
community archaeology described above (see page 57).  In the process, they 
have misunderstood the institutional pre-requisites for the survival of CPR 
regimes, and in so doing failed to appreciate the difficulties an archaeologist will 
face applying CPR principles in the field. 
Field Research into Common Pool Governance Institutions 
Elinor Ostrom’s research into CPRs, for which she was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 2009, originated at a 1985 conference on 
Common Property Resource Management sponsored by the National Research 
Council (Poteete et al. 2010).   At that conference, Ostrom and others realized 
that there were numerous case studies of CPRs in which the “tragedy of the 
commons” predicted by Garrett Hardin ( see page 104) had not occurred. 
Eventually, in a seeming paradox, over 1000 case studies soon had been 
extracted from PhD theses, papers, published articles and books (Poteete et al. 
2010, 91).  The question then became: Why, in so many cases, had the seemingly 
inevitable “tragedy” been averted?   
To answer that question, under Ostrom’s intellectual and often literal 
leadership, scholars began a multi-decade quest to infer from these and many 
subsequent studies a set of common features associated with sustained collective 
management of CPRs. That research process depended upon a multi-method, 
interdisciplinary approach to analysis. Ostrom’s own programme was conducted 
at the University of Indiana’s Centre for the Study of Institutions, Population and 
Environmental Change (CSIPEC) (http://www.indiana.edu/~cipec).  This study 
programme encompassed three elements: (1) quantitative and qualitative case 
studies of exiting long-surviving CPR regimes around the world, (2) formally 
structured meta-analyses of those case studies, and (3) the experimental exercises 
reported in Chapter 5.   In the process, Ostrom and her colleagues developed 
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highly detailed and standardized methodology for approaching the analysis of 
CPR cases, the IAD model (see page 128 below).   
Forming the foundation of this entire scholarly enterprise have been over 
9000 case studies and other scholarly articles concerning long-surviving CPRs
4
, 
too many to attempt to summarize in this thesis. The objective of these studies 
has been, first, to document the institutional features of these varied CPRs in 
order to analyse why they have been successful (success being defined generally 
in the CPR literature as survival of the CPR and its governance regime over 
many years) and, second, to seek to understand how these CPR regimes came to 
have the institutional characteristics in existence at the time of study.  The 
process through which the field studies were identified, analysed and digested 
into Ostrom’s governance principles has been detailed by Poteete et al  (2010). 
In her oft-cited study of commons governance, Ostrom (1990), reported 
on field studies of the institutional structures underlying communal management 
of CPRs such as grazing lands in the Swiss Alps, common lands in villages in 
Japan, irrigation systems in Spain and in the Philippines, fishery and irrigation 
management projects in Sri Lanka, and the structure for groundwater 
management among agricultural users in the Los Angeles, California, region.  
Ostrom’s project also has spawned studies of communally-managed forest tracts 
(ejidos) in Mexico (Gibson et al. 2000) and of African range lands (Mwangi and 
Ostrom 2000).  In total, several hundred cases formed the basis for Ostrom’s 
meta-analysis (Poteete et al. 2010).  Most of Ostrom’s books, even those that are 
focused on game-theory-related experiments or other technical matters, are 
replete with case study material (Ostrom 2005; Ostrom et al. 1993; Ostrom and 
Walker 2003).  The result of her enterprise has been the widely-referenced set of 
eight governance principles for long surviving common pool resource regimes 
discussed below (see page 134). 
Other scholars have been at work as well.  For example, Wade (1988) 
reports on a study of 31 irrigation systems in 31 villages in the Andhra Pradesh 
                                                 
4 For a full record of the case studies in Ostrom’s program, see the Digital Library of the 
Commons website at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/browse?type=dateissued (viewed 11/23/2013) 
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region of India.  Although his book focuses primarily on a limited subset of those 
systems, he does articulate a list of criteria associated with long-surviving CPRs 
drawn from his overall study.  Baland and Platteau (1996) report on numbers of 
case studies conducted by other authors in diverse regions of the world and also 
suggest a set of structural characteristics associated with long-surviving CPR 
management at the local level.  Kadekodi (2004) analyses grazing, irrigation and 
forest CPRs in Europe and India, although with a less systematic approach to 
identifying institutional features.   
More recently, the OECD, in an assessment of the potential for collective 
action to manage public goods in agricultural contexts, identifies a list of “key 
factors” for successful collective action (OECD 2013, 13). In an earlier study, 
the OECD also addressed more generally the governance of development efforts 
at the local level and identified several principles for decentralized programmes 
that parallel Ostrom’s (Greffe 2005, 47). Furthermore, beyond the literature 
focused specifically on local development or CPR governance regimes, studies 
of community-owned or -managed environmental tourism projects also have 
generated conclusions about governance structure that largely parallel those of 
Ostrom and the other scholars (Halstead 2003; Jordan and Duval 2009; Murphy 
and Halstead 2003; Newsham 2004; Winter 1998).   
A characteristic example of the content of these case studies, one relevant 
to this thesis in particular, is a study by Berkes that describes the practices used 
to manage near-shore fisheries by five different groups of fishermen living in 
coastal Turkey.  One group he describes (1986, 221-225) is an association of 
about 100 fisherman who live near the coastal village of Alanya, Turkey.  This 
group operates 45 small inboard-motored boats that fish with nets using two-man 
crews.  They fish for migratory species at a limited number of fishing sites 
located along the nearby coastline.  Each September, when the migration season 
begins, the members of the cooperative agree to a list of available fishing sites, 
agree to the nature of fishing tackle and net-casting methods to be employed, and 
agree to a system of daily rotation among the agreed-upon sites that is designed 
to give each fisherman an equal opportunity to fish the best locations.  Because 
the fishermen are in the area daily, monitoring for compliance with the rules is 
carried out by the group members themselves. This management regime, which 
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evolved over 15 years, has both avoided the over-fishing that had plagued the 
fishery in the past and prevented potentially destructive and dangerous 
competition among fishermen for the prime spots.  Ostrom has frequently cited 
the Berkes study, including in Governing the Commons (Ostrom 1990, 19).  In 
the rules in use identified by Berkes in this study one may detect both elements 
of the experimental results from collaboration experiments cited in the previous 
chapter and many of Ostrom’s design principles discussed below (see page 134).  
This particular case study also will appear relevant to the analysis in Chapter 7 of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta. 
Agarwal (2001, 1651) raises important criticisms of Ostrom’s 
methodology. He argues that the advances in game theory and economic analysis 
that underlie much of the CPR literature have not gelled into a generalized theory 
of governance for CPRs.  In particular, he argues that the theory itself is 
incomplete, noting that the various authors, citing different case studies, have 
identified numerous overlapping or additional criteria for the success of long-
enduring CPR regimes.  Agarwal suggests that Ostrom, Baland and Platteau and 
Wade together have identified as many as 35 different governance principles that 
have been associated with long-surviving community-based regimes for 
managing common pool resources (2001, 49-50). He argues instead for an 
approach focused on determining causative relationships between long-survival 
and various discrete factors.  Agarwal’s critique notwithstanding, Ostrom’s 
approach is adopted for the present study because it is uniquely rooted in an 
integrated body of theoretical, experimental and empirical research, a 
comprehensive foundation not found in the other studies except to the extent that 
they incorporate much of the research originally led by Ostrom. 
Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Design Model  
As should be clear from the preceding chapter, Ostrom is among the 
leading experimental theorists working in this field and has accounted for a 
disproportionate number of the experiments reported in Chapter 4. Ostrom brings 
to her structuring of governance principles a deep understanding of the economic 
and behavioural theories that underlie her conclusions.   
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Moreover, Ostrom’s project utilized a well-articulated analytical 
framework which, while abstract, focuses analysis on situational variables and 
actions by actors involved in the CPR. In this way, she and her colleagues were 
able to devise a set of criteria from a systematic, if broad, methodology.  Ostrom 
has described the Institutional Analysis and Design methodology in several 
volumes (Ostrom 1990, 55-57; Ostrom 2005, Part I; Poteete et al. 2010, 39-45).   
Figure 5 illustrates the essential logic of the Institutional Analysis and 
Design model.  First, it defines the conditions present in the community (bio-
physical in the case of environmental CPRs, but also the social, political, cultural 
and economic attributes of the community) and seeks to document the rules in 
use by the community to regulate its establishment, maintenance and 
consumption of resources from the CPR.  Utilizing this model, analysts would 
observe the members of the community as they interact with one another and 
with outside forces relating to the CPR.  Such observation would enable them to 
understand both how the actors evaluate the costs and benefits of potential 
actions and how institutions are brought into existence or transformed as a result 
of these interactions (for a discussion of Ostrom's methodology, see CSIPEC 
2011). 
 
Figure 5: The Institutional Analysis and Design framework (Ostrom 2005, 15) 
Field studies have found that the distribution of political and economic 
power within a community are highly relevant to the success of CPR governance 
regimes.  For example, irrigation systems in which head-end (top of the channel) 
landowners have disproportionate economic strength relative to tail-enders are 
harder to manage successfully than systems where there is better balance 
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(Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 1995, 157-173).  Similarly, although government 
assistance in the creation of community-based irrigation systems can be valuable, 
in cases in which officials external to the irrigation systems have imposed rules 
or controls over irrigation systems the success of those systems has been 
compromised (Ostrom 1991).  In the cases considered in this thesis, which 
involve community groups seeking to benefit from a local heritage resource, the 
nature of the resource, its location vis-à-vis tourist traffic routes, the relationship 
of the site to local, regional and national governmental units, and the role of 
NGOs or international or national organisations all will be seen to affect the 
feasibility of local collaborations and the institutional form that they take. 
Ostrom’s IAD methodology incorporates one element that is not directly 
relevant to the present study: the focus on bio-physical conditions.  However, 
“environmental conditions” in a broader sense, in particular the characteristics of 
the heritage resource in question and the context in which it is located, can be 
critically important to the design of governance institutions and can easily be 
analogized to the biophysical conditions of an environmental resource.  
Certainly, each community endowed with a CPR exists within a political, social 
and economic context that constitutes “the attributes of community” in which the 
CPR management regime must function.  The rules in use generally are well 
understood by community members engaged with a CPR; indeed, in all three 
cases studied for this research most rules were available in writing. 
The IAD model provided the framework for constructing the fieldwork 
questionnaire for this thesis.  The fieldwork for the three case studies researched 
the nature of the heritage resource associated with the community and the 
character of the commons-like asset presumed to be a CPR.  The author queried 
the political, economic and social attributes of each community, and the rules in 
use in each project were defined. However, this study has been conducted at a 
single point in time, providing no direct opportunity to explore the interaction of 
these factors with particular “action situations.”  Instead, an effort was made 
through the interviews to elicit a history of the organisation with particular 
emphasis on conflicts or other problems that may have shaped, or re-shaped, the 
institutional form of the organisation as the environmental conditions, 
community attributes and organisational rules interacted with specific situations. 
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 Each of the projects studied is physically associated with an important 
heritage destination: an environmental reserve in Belize, an archaeological site in 
Peru, and an open-access archaeological landscape in Ireland.  In no case does 
the community manage the heritage itself.  Rather, governmental bodies control 
all or part of each, in Belize in conjunction with an NGO and in Ireland with 
much of the archaeological heritage located on private lands. Governments have 
established rules that directly influence the community group, as have the NGO 
and private owners.  Each group was developed within a pre-existing 
community, with pre-existing political structures, economic relationships, and 
social interactions.  As will be discussed in the final five chapters of this thesis, 
the unique context in each village has interacted with the economic objectives 
that led the communities to form the groups under study, and the rules in use in 
each community group clearly reflect these unique local contexts. 
Social Capital 
Social capital is a concept important to Ostrom’s work (Ostrom 2000; 
Ostrom and Ahn 2003), one that she has argued is essential to the construction of 
bottom-up institutions to manage CPRs (Ostrom et al. 1993, Chapter 9).   
Although the concept itself has been in use in social science for almost a century 
(Fukuyama 2000, 100), the notion of social capital was popularized by Robert 
Putnam (Putnam et al. 1993), who first examined it in the context of a study of 
the comparative success, or lack thereof, of democratic political processes in the 
northern and southern regions of Italy. Putnam explains that  
‘Social capital’ calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most 
powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social 
relations […] social connections are also important for the rules of 
conduct that they sustain […] Networks of community engagement foster 
sturdy norms of reciprocity […] A society characterized by generalized 
reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society. (2000, 19-21) 
Putnam suggests that social capital can either “bridge” different groups in 
a physical community, building relationships across lines of division, or “bond” 
together homogeneous communities (such as families or ethnic groups) in ways 
that undermine collaborative behaviour across group lines (Putnam 2000, 
Chapter 1).  His concepts of reciprocity in relationships and the construction of 
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trust echo the findings in the game theory experiments reported in Chapter 4 (see 
page 111), which found that trust based on reciprocal obligations was an 
essential element in successful collaboration.   
Social capital has become a controversial concept in the ensuing years. 
Some archaeologists have embraced Putnam’s concepts as a foundation for 
community archaeology projects (see Chapters 1,3 4, 5,8 and 10  in Little and 
Shackel 2007). However, economists object to the use of the term on the grounds 
that it is not true “capital,” a stock of value produced by some form of 
investment in anticipation of a future benefit (Arrow 2000), or on the grounds 
that it is inherently immeasurable and may merely reflect social or behavioural 
norms that may, or may not, actually impact economic behaviour (Solow 2000).  
Stiglitz (2000b) has raised three objections to the concept: (1) social capital can 
be disruptive as well as constructive to efficient cooperation (an idea explicit in 
Putnam’s notion of bonding social capital), (2) it may merely be another way to 
label a transaction-cost reducing behaviour (e.g., investing in reputation), and (3) 
the creation, nature and durability of social capital are path-dependent 
(determined by historical prior actions) and thus it is not apparent how to 
integrate the concept into public policy. 
Nonetheless, the concept has become an analytical tool used by 
international economic development organisations.  The World Bank, for 
example, has recognized the importance of social norms and institutions to the 
success of anti-poverty lending programmes.  The bank has engaged in 
considerable analysis of the relevance of social capital, especially as expressed in 
networks of relationships in economic settings, and the iterative relationship 
among social capital, institutional formats, and economic outcomes (Dasgupta 
2000).  The World Bank also initiated a “Social Capital Initiative” intended to 
address the problems of measurability and definition involved in the concept 
(Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002).   The application of the World Bank’s 
survey methodology to this thesis will be discussed below (see page 162).  The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2011b, 53-
54) uses what it believes is a more expansive concept of “social cohesion” to 
express both the individual connections and trust identified by Putnam as social 
capital and broader measures of social inclusiveness, mobility and well-being. 
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Ostrom has frequently made reference to social capital in her writings.  
As she defines the term,  “social capital is the shared knowledge, understandings, 
norms, and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals 
bring to a recurrent activity”  (2000, 176).  She argues that the establishment of 
trust necessary to facilitate cooperation and willingness to limit one’s own 
options in return for the better collective outcome may be best accomplished 
through the evolution or construction of behaviour-defining rules that come to 
constitute social capital.  Clearly, social capital is an ambiguously and variously 
defined concept with numerous detractors that raises numerous technical issues. 
It is also a concept that economists have found difficult to dismiss entirely 
because the notion of relationship networks, established norms of behaviour, 
trust and the resulting collective behaviour are visible throughout the economy. 
The universality of these concepts across a broad range of varying cultures has 
not been widely examined, but one study of trust and cooperation did find broad 
agreement between experimental findings in the United States and those in Japan 
after certain cultural preferences were acknowledged (Yamagishi 2003).  
Kenneth Arrow likened the fate of Putnam’s concept to that of Weber’s notion of 
the Protestant Ethic: “specific tests fail, yet the overall impression remains that 
there is something to it” (2000, 4). 
From the perspective of the IAD model, the “social capital” within a 
community is one “community attribute” that will shape, in an interactive 
fashion, the nature of the community’s institutions. For that reason an attempt 
has been made in this thesis to measure the social capital in each community 
under study.  One potential implication of such an analysis is that communities 
with low social capital, especially of the bridging variety, are unlikely to succeed 
at forming successful collaborative ventures.  Because this thesis studies 
community projects that have succeeded, an alternative hypothesis considered 
here is that where long-surviving collaborative ventures have arisen in contexts 
of low social capital, one would expect to find governance institutions that in 
some fashion manage to keep the conflicts in the community from undermining 
community institutions.  
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Design Principles for Long-Surviving Common Pool Resource 
Governance Regimes 
In addition to employing Ostrom’s IAD framework, this thesis 
specifically employs Ostrom’s design criteria for long-surviving CPR regimes to 
formulate the governance model tested in the case studies.  Ostrom’s model is 
the most thoroughly researched and methodologically consistent representation 
of the type.  This is not to ignore Agarwal’s criticism (see page 125) that the 
theory is incomplete.  Rather, the objective of this thesis simply is to explore 
whether a model such as Ostrom’s has relevance to analysing situations relating 
to archaeological site-based economic development projects.  The platform for 
initiating such a study of CPRs in archaeology needs to be the most solid 
available.  This and the previous chapter present evidence that Ostrom’s criteria, 
as articulated in Governing the Commons (Ostrom 1990) and subsequent 
volumes (Ostrom 1991; Ostrom 2005; Poteete et al. 2010), meet that test.   
As previously noted, Ostrom adopts a simple measure of success for CPR 
governance regimes: long survival (1990,58-61).  CPR analysts generally 
recognize that in both experimental outcomes and field studies, results never 
achieve theoretical optima.  In the real world, with numerous economic, political 
and social pressures on any community project and with changes in the legal, 
political or environmental context of the CPR occurring continuously, a robust 
governance mechanism will be one that can manage problems and adapt to 
change in ways that result in the ability of the community to sustain its use of the 
CPR for many years.  Following Ostrom, this thesis adopts the same simple 
success measure and, as discussed in Chapter 6, evaluates three community-
based projects that have survived from 14 to more than 40 years for their 
conformance to her governance principles. 
Those principles are one important output of Ostrom’s research into 
CPRs, which she has expressed in a set of  eight “design criteria for long-
surviving common pool resource regimes” that were first presented in Governing 
the Commons (Ostrom 1990, 88-102) (see also Figure 6). The principles were 
drawn from field study of numerous actual commons governance regimes whose 
institutions she describes in detail. She continued to work on a system for  
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Figure 6: Design criteria for long-surviving common pool resource regimes (Ostrom 1990, 
90) 
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analysing CPRs in subsequent years and reported on a more elaborate model in 
2009 (Ostrom 2009). Nonetheless, she repeatedly returned to her original points 
in numerous publications and these are the design criteria most often cited when 
referring to Ostrom’s work.  The following discussion will discuss those 
principles in turn.  
Principle 1, the establishment of “clearly defined boundaries” for 
participation in the CPR is central to the analysis.  First, by definition, a CPR is a 
physical entity from which exclusion of people seeking to appropriate resources 
must be, in Ostrom’s terms, difficult but not impossible. Without clear 
boundaries, those who are allowed to participate in the CPR cannot be 
unambiguously defined. Second, clear boundaries set up the conditions for 
identifying those individuals who must communicate and collaborate in order to 
manage the CPR.  None of the institutional governance features identified in 
Chapter 4 (see page 111) can be realized with assurance if the boundaries are 
vague. 
Principle 2, “congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions,” is related to Principle 1.  Clear boundaries establish the limits 
of the political, cultural and economic environment within which rules must be 
established.  Principle 2 emphasizes that ultimately the rules in use within the 
CPR for appropriation (making use of the common resource for personal benefit) 
or provision (taking required actions to create or maintain the common resource) 
must be traceable to conditions in the community itself.  We will see that the 
issue of appropriation and provision will loom large in the final analysis of the 
results of this study.  
The next three principles are inter-related.  The laboratory experiments 
described in Chapter 4 (see pages 111 to 121) underscore the importance of 
communication, monitoring and sanctions for generating the trust and reciprocity 
necessary to sustain cooperation in settings such as CPRs. Ostrom’s Principle 3 
(“collective choice arrangements”) relates both to the matter of ensuring 
communication, a critical criteria in the theoretical work, and to the evidence that 
those rules work best that are devised by the participants themselves. Principle 4 
(“monitoring”) and Principle 5 (“graduated sanctions”) derive directly from 
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institutional structures observed in the field, supported strongly by experimental 
results.  Like the results from field studies, sanctions have been found in 
experiments to be very important to successful cooperation.  However, players in 
experiments generally have not been willing to invoke draconian sanctions in 
order to obtain compliance.  Instead, limited sanctions, or even incentives, have 
been found to be more effective at soliciting cooperation than more severe 
sanctions.  Moreover, cooperation has been shown to be most successful when 
group members were able to monitor and discipline defections by other 
members.  Thus self-governance to define, monitor and manage controls over the 
CPR in a graduated fashion represents the approach that both field studies and 
experimental work suggest will have the most durable outcome.   
Field studies and experimental outcomes support Principle 6, the need for 
conflict resolution mechanisms internal to the CPR community. Human beings 
will disagree, and sometimes they will defect from agreements.  Whether in the 
experimental laboratory testing the behaviour of students, or in the real world 
managing the contested interests of fisherman, farmers and irrigators, successful 
collective action seems to require a governance environment that provides for 
self-policed, self-managed organisations following rules established by group 
members.  Rules will be broken, or new conditions will arise that generate 
conflicts among participants in the CPR.  Principle 6 reflects findings from field 
studies that suggest the institutional structure of the CPR regime must provide 
mechanisms for resolving differences among participants within the rules of the 
organisation. Ruiz-Ballesteros (2011), in his study of Agua Blanca, described 
this sort of feature, using  the language and concepts of complexity theory, as 
“resilience.” 
Principle 7, “minimal recognition of rights to organize,” reflects an 
environmental requirement embedded in the IAD analytical framework.  Where 
external forces, either governmental or non-governmental, can undermine, 
interfere with or override decisions made locally regarding the CPR, field 
evidence has found that governance of CPRs is likely to be unsuccessful (Baland 
and Platteau 1996, 235-262).  While there may be contending forces that 
communities must take into account when designing the rules for a CPR, the 
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resulting governance regime must have sufficient legitimacy and authority to 
self-regulate to enforce the rules.  Principle 7 reflects this reality. 
Ostrom’s point 8, “nested enterprises,” again relates to the external 
context in which the CPR finds itself.  Specifically, the principle of nested 
enterprises invokes an argument that for a large-scale CPR regime to survive, as 
many of the decisions as possible must be handled in accordance with Principles 
2 through 6 at the lowest possible operational level of the organisation.  Ostrom 
further concludes that higher-level management of a large-scale CPR must 
incorporate those principles through representative structures and delegation of 
authority.  One illustration of this point is Ostrom’s description of the 
mechanisms used to manage irrigation water in the Los Angeles, California, 
region (1990, Chapter 4).  From the obverse perspective, Baland and Platteau 
(1996, 244-262), drawing on various case studies, are highly critical of  the 
“outright failure” of centralized government-driven management of CPRs due to 
inadequate information, ineffective enforcement, corruption, antagonistic 
government-local relations, and insufficient budgeted resources. “Nested 
enterprises” is an expression of preference for “bottom-up” execution of CPR 
management even in complex settings. 
As will become clear from the case studies to follow, it is important to 
acknowledge that these design principles are merely principles—carefully 
identified topical headings under which myriad specific institutional forms may 
be encountered depending upon the circumstances facing the actual community 
and CPR.  Ostrom herself regularly issued the proviso to her own structural 
principles that they could not be used as “blueprints” for institutional design 
(Ostrom 2005, 257; Ostrom et al. 1993, 191).  The complexity of real-world 
conditions precluded, in her view, the use of these principles in a cookbook-like 
manner.  These complexities become exponentially greater as the number of 
participants and the geographic scale of the CPR grow, and the form in which 
each principle is realized will differ depending upon the political context (power 
structure, corruption, etc.) and the economic context (wealth distribution, 
property rights regime, etc.) in which the CPR is lodged.  Ostrom’s (1991) own 
attempt to present a guidebook, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing 
Irrigation Systems, is replete with political, economic, legal and practical 
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caveats.  The objective of the present research is to analyse these issues in the 
simplest of contexts—potential CPRs based in small relatively homogeneous 
villages in rural settings—in order to establish whether such broadly defined 
principles, however firmly supported by theory and data, can be transferred 
across disciplinary lines to advance the efforts of archaeologists.  In part this 
approach is taken for analytical clarity and in part because these are the 
circumstances in which one encounters most present-day economic development 
projects undertaken by archaeologists. 
Other Applications of CPR Research in Archaeology 
Chapter 6 of this thesis describes the methodology used to incorporate 
Ostrom’s principles into the design of the present study and articulates the 
specific hypotheses related to these principles that are tested through the surveys 
conducted at the three case study sites.  Before moving to that discussion and 
then onward to the findings of the research for this thesis, however, it is 
appropriate to evaluate any precedents for this study that exist within the 
archaeological literature.    
In fact, Ostrom’s work has not been widely applied in the literature 
related to archaeology.  One encounters occasional references to common pool 
resources in the literature related to sustainable tourism (Beritelli 2011; 
Briassoulis 2002) but, aside from the present author’s  previous use of the work 
(Gould 2010), only three other authors have directly incorporated the common 
pool literature, and specifically Ostrom’s work, into studies in archaeology. 
First, in a dissertation for her Master’s degree at Cambridge University in 
2010 that was subsequently published as a working paper (Zhang 2010) and in 
slightly revised form as a book chapter (Zhang 2012), Zhang incorporated some 
of Ostrom’s principles into a literature review which concluded that those 
principles may be applicable to the management of heritage resources.  Her paper 
briefly compares several projects in East Asia following the “Lijiang Model” of 
stakeholder cooperation to the Ostrom principles. Although the parallels are 
interesting, the projects described by Zhang describe programmes for stakeholder 
engagement under government-managed processes at government-managed 
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sites. They are a form of community archaeology (see page 57) under official 
aegis, quite different from the community-organized, community managed CPR 
regimes studied by Ostrom.   
Zhang’s assertion that Ostrom’s principles apply in these cases is an 
example, seen also in the work by Carman discussed below, of failing to 
perceive that the essence of the common pool literature concerns self-
organisation and self-governance of commons resources. Zhang omits from her 
analysis three of Ostrom’s key principles (Principle 3, collective-choice 
arrangements; Principle 4, monitoring; and Principle 5, graduated sanctions), 
presumably because the government-controlled cases she evaluates do not 
provide for direct community management of the sites.  Yet, as has been argued 
in Chapters 4 and 5, those three principles are central to the CPR governance 
model.  They are the requirements identified in the field and in experiments as 
essential to a sustainable self-managed governance regime. By confusing 
stakeholder involvement under government control, which really is a form of 
conventional community archaeology, with self-organized efforts to self-manage 
heritage resources, Zhang draws conclusions about the relevance of Ostrom’s 
principles that are unsupported by the very cases she evaluates.  
One version of Zhang’s paper appears in the second example, a new book 
on the Cultural Commons (Bertacchini et al. 2012a).  The introduction to this 
book (Bertacchini et al. 2012b) states clearly that the editors seek to separate the  
cultural “commons” from common pool resource theory.  In their first sentence, 
they write “cultural commons refers to cultures expressed and shared by a 
community,” likening it to an evolution of the traditional notion of a “cultural 
district” (Bertacchini et al. 2012b, 3-4).  Thus, they seek to extrapolate the 
concept of the “commons” to a broad array of non-environmental cultural 
categories.  Among the book’s contributors is one of Ostrom’s former 
collaborators who has been among the leaders in arguing for a broader meaning 
for the “new commons” (see Hess 2008; Hess 2012).   
It is true that the “commons” may be analytically distinguished from a 
common pool resource.  Fashion design, digital content, virtual content such as 
shared gaming, music or French gastronomy, all examples studied in this book, 
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are in some sense a common intellectual property that is shared among people 
who may form an imagined if not a physical, community (Anderson 2006).  
Bertacchini et al assert that the commons in their sense is a public good that 
suffers from characteristic problems of under-provision and free-ridership 
(2012a, 6) (see page 102). Despite their efforts to distinguish their notion of the 
“commons” from CPRs, the book’s editors reach the conclusion, based on 
Zhang’s paper, that “the design principles developed by Ostrom (1990) to set up 
an effective self-governing method can easily be transported into the context of 
cultural heritage management” (Bertacchini et al. 2012a, 247). The book does 
not address the problem of sustainable governance structures for CPRs and does 
not comprehend the problems with Zhang’s paper described above.  As this 
thesis ultimately will argue, Ostrom’s principles may in certain circumstances be 
applied to heritage contexts, but there is nothing “easy” about doing so.  
Finally, in his book Against Cultural Property,  John Carman (2005) 
seeks to argue that viewing archaeology as common property could mitigate the 
problems he sees in placing tangible values on cultural resources.  He too cites 
Ostrom’s principles and captures the point that transaction costs are a key 
element in the design of CPR regimes.  He is led astray, however, when he 
argues that there are multiple stakeholders associated with any archaeological 
resource (thereby violating the key condition of well-defined boundaries) and 
that they need to be bound together by a vaguely-defined “community of interest 
among co-owners” (Carman 2005, 83).  The project examples mentioned by 
Carman are all of the character of community archaeology projects cited in 
earlier in this thesis (see page 57), specifically including those at Sedgeford 
(Faulkner 2009), the Levi-Jordan Plantation (McDavid 2002), and Moser et al’s 
Quseir project (Moser et al. 2002). His ultimate recommendation (Carman 2005, 
94-99) involves granting intellectual property rights in archaeology to self-
defining community interests who would then establish rules to govern the 
management of research and related activities—but with monitoring 
responsibility assigned to project archaeologists or outside authorities.   
Carman’s model directly contradicts several key tenets of the CPR 
literature.  He fails to recognize that the boundaries of “communities” engaged 
with CPRs must be precisely defined or the CPR will collapse due to free-riding 
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intrusions that that cannot be restricted and monitored (see, e.g., Ostrom 1990, 
91).  His definition of the common resource itself is a vaguely-defined 
intellectual property right which likely will clash with actual property rights of 
landowners and governments over tangible heritage, and with the rights of much 
broader (e.g. tribal) communities over intangible heritage. Finally, Carman 
proposes to lodge responsibility to monitor these projects with archaeologists or 
others outside of the community, again violating the essence of the self-
management concepts articulated by Ostrom and others.   
In other words, Carman like Zhang fails to distinguish community 
archaeology projects from community-managed commons regimes that are the 
actual subject of the CPR literature.  Community archaeology projects may 
feature community-based involvement and may even grant considerable 
authority over excavations to well-defined communities. They are not, however, 
common pools subject to collective ownership, self-governance and 
appropriation by local communities.  More typically, the community project 
takes place on private property or government-owned property and the extent of 
community control is limited to participation in decision making over 
excavations and interpretation.  CPRs are common property that are governed 
and managed by the community or a subset of a community (such as local 
irrigators or artisans), and they are most successful when communities have full 
control over access to the commons and full rights to set and enforce regulations 
concerning use.  
As a result, Zhang and Carman,  like others in the relatively sparse 
literature on the commons in heritage (see Bertacchini et al. 2012a), tend to 
adopt romanticized and vague concepts of “community” and “commons” in 
order to call for ill-defined cooperative approaches to heritage management.  
They may even rely on government oversight for management control.  CPR 
theory is actually about conflicts over economic interests and about how those 
conflicts are managed by the individuals directly involved through bottom-up 
governance institutions that achieve outcomes as nearly optimal as possible for 
all parties at acceptable personal and social costs.  This author has argued, in a 
paper presented at the 7
th
 World Archaeological Congress, that any discussion of 
the commons in archaeology that fails to comprehend the central role played by 
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self-governance of conflicting interests in CPRs misses the essential meaning of 
CPRs to archaeology (Gould 2013).   
Conclusion 
This and the previous chapter, read together, offer theoretical, 
experimental and field research evidence to support the application of Ostrom’s 
principles for the governance of common pool resources to economic 
development projects undertaken by archaeologists. The argument presented thus 
far is not idealized.  People do not cooperate out of generosity of spirit; they 
cooperate because it is in their interest to do so.  But the evidence strongly 
supports the proposition that people may cooperate if the ends are sufficiently 
important to them and they are empowered to create the institutions necessary to 
control the resource at hand.  Experimental research, however, makes it clear that 
not all people will cooperate, and that they do so only under certain conditions—
when there is a structure that builds trust and encourages reciprocity, when it is 
deemed fair, when there is face-to-face communication to encourage 
cooperation, and when those who wish to cooperate have the ability to monitor 
compliance and impose appropriate sanctions on defectors.   
We turn now to the author’s field research for this thesis, which was 
designed to test the proposition that long-surviving archaeologically-related 
community development projects have many governance features in common 
and that those features will, by and large, reflect the principles articulated by 
Ostrom. The next chapter explicates the methodology applied in that research.  
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Chapter 6: Methodology 
Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis explores two central research questions: 
1. Do long-surviving, community-based heritage projects focused on local 
economic development demonstrate consistent institutional features and, 
if so,  
2. To what degree do those features map onto a framework derived from the 
theoretical and empirically-based model that emerges from research into 
the governance of common pool resources? 
The research to address these questions involved three steps: 
First, the author documented the governance features of three long-
surviving community-managed projects centred on archaeological or heritage 
sites.   
Second, the researcher investigated whether such projects demonstrate 
consistent features in their governance institutions.  
Third, to the extent that commonalities in governance institutions have 
been identified, the researcher evaluated the degree to which those common 
features map onto a framework of Model Institutional Features (MIFs) built on 
the principles of common pool resource governance described in Chapter 5. 
This chapter will discuss in detail the methodology used to conduct the 
research. 
An essential inspiration for the research approach was the methodology 
used to conduct and evaluate case studies by Ostrom’s project at the University 
of Indiana. That research was conducted under the auspices of Center for the 
Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change (CSIPEC) and has 
been documented by Ostrom and her colleagues (CSIPEC 2011; Poteete et al. 
2010).  The chapter begins with a discussion of that methodology and some 
issues associated with it, and then explores how the methods developed at 
CSIPEC might be applied to archaeology.  
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 Case study research presents many pitfalls, however, and issues of case 
study design are discussed in the second section of this chapter.  This thesis 
incorporates methodological insights from international relations scholars related 
to case study selection and design that are intended to achieve the maximum 
possible significance, in both the general and the statistical sense, for the cases 
studied. The international relations literature argues that research into one or a 
few case studies can be most valuable if it incorporates hypotheses that can be 
tested in a qualitative or quantitative manner through surveys of a reasonable 
population of interviewees.   
The third section of the chapter summarizes the eight hypotheses, 
denoted here as “Model Institutional Features” (MIFs), that are evaluated in this 
study. Seven of these MIFs are derived directly from Ostrom’s design principles.  
Most of these MIFs should be associated with each project under study if the 
second research question above is to receive an affirmative response.   The next 
sections of the chapter describe how the structure of MIFs and subordinate 
hypotheses, denoted here as “testable implications,” were translated into the 
questionnaire that guided the interviews at all three studied sites.  The goal of the 
questionnaire was to accumulate qualitative and quantitative data about each 
project’s institutions and the attitudes of project members in order to address the 
research questions by directly testing various hypotheses.      
The chapter then turns to the process undertaken by the author to identify 
potential case study projects, the process used to winnow that list to a small 
number of potential candidates, and the reasons for selecting the sites ultimately 
chosen.  The following section discusses the analytical tools selected to manage, 
in particular, the statistical data reported in this thesis.  It is followed in turn by a 
section that describes how one subset of the questionnaire data has been 
compiled into an index of social capital that is used in Chapter 10 to compare the 
projects.  The chapter then discusses various ethical considerations that are 
relevant to the design and conduct of the research, while the final section 
highlights for the reader various limitations of the study that should be 
understood before advancing to the chapters that report on the actual fieldwork 
results.  
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Methods in Common Pool Resource Research 
As noted in Chapter 5, Elinor Ostrom’s research into CPRs originated at 
a 1985 conference on Common Property Resource Management sponsored by 
the National Research Council (Poteete et al. 2010). Central to her research was 
the collection and evaluation of numerous field studies (see page 125) that 
predominantly involved a small number of cases.  Between 1990 and 2004, 65.5 
per cent of published case studies into CPRs involved 3 or fewer cases, and 79 
per cent of studies were of fewer than 30 cases, the number that Ostrom’s team 
considered the minimum level for statistical validity under the Central Limit 
Theorem (Poteete et al. 2010, 69).  In other words, the vast majority of studies 
were “small-n” studies subject to substantial issues of statistical and 
methodological validity.   
In order to move forward theoretically, the CPR project aggregated the 
results of these case studies through the technique of “meta-analysis,” or analysis 
of analyses, in this case, analysis of the many CPR case studies.  On the 
assumption that a large numbers of cases together may constitute a random 
sample from the total population of global CPRs, Ostrom and her colleagues 
argued that this approach established a statistically valid basis for inferences 
drawn from this synthetic “large n” study.  It is from that data, aggregated on that 
basis, that Ostrom developed the governance principles for CPR institutions 
discussed in Chapter 5 (see page 134).   
At the same time, however, Ostrom and her colleagues observed with 
regard to meta-analysis, that: 
For new fields of study in which relatively little research has been 
conducted, new primary analysis, whether quantitative or qualitative, 
must be conducted before meta-analysis even becomes possible. (Poteete 
et al. 2010, 87) 
This is the circumstance in which any effort to apply CPR models to the 
field of archaeology finds itself.   
Agarwal (2008) argues that the better way to pursue the study of CPR 
institutions may be through purposely-selected case studies (i.e. case studies 
Page | 147  
 
selected expressly to control for or test specific variables).  Ideally from his 
perspective, such research would test hypotheses seeking to demonstrate 
causation between institutional features and project survival.  The present study 
does pursue the purposive case study approach, as explained below, and it seeks 
to do so through a hypothesis testing method suggested by Geddes and King et al 
(see the next section).  However, the present study has eschewed causation 
analysis as premature for archaeology until the validity of CPR analysis to the 
problems confronted in archaeology has been demonstrated. 
Case Study Design Concepts 
If, of necessity, the number of case studies examined for this research is 
limited, considerations of case-study design must be addressed in order to 
achieve acceptable levels of validity for any conclusions that emerge from the 
research. 
  A central objective of the approach used in the present research is to 
achieve internal validity (i.e. meaningful results, ideally in a statistical sense, 
within each case) through the use of both open-ended and close-ended interview 
methods on a sufficiently large sample of interviewees to satisfy minimal 
statistical standards.  Also, the study seeks to achieve external validity (i.e. a 
reasonable likelihood that the results are valid more generally and not just for the 
cases studied) through the use of multiple case studies presenting parallel 
characteristics but situated in substantially different social, legal and cultural 
contexts.  The problem of external validity has received increased attention in 
economics (Cohen and Easterly 2009; Duflo et al. 2007) due to the prominence 
in that discipline in recent years of experimental field research into economic 
development policy options. 
The issues relating to case study design are not routinely encountered in 
archaeology. As Carman and Sørenson (2009) have noted, the development of a 
coherent methodological approach for Heritage Studies as a discipline is a work 
in progress. The methods addressed in their book on the subject (Sørenson and 
Carman 2009) include ethnography, textual analysis, interview techniques, and 
technical tools such as Global Information Systems, some of which offer useful 
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insights into the activity of research, but none of which exactly match the 
methodological issues raised in the present research. 
Archaeological field methodology addresses technical and procedural 
matters relating to the activity of archaeological research, such as the 
management and correct execution of excavations (Drewett 1999; Peregrine et 
al. 2002; Renfrew and Bahn 2007).  While theoreticians may dispute the 
interpretation of the resulting archaeological record (see page 40), even the most 
sceptical post-processualists insist on scrupulous field practice (Shanks and 
Tilley 1987). Moreover, beyond considerations of randomness, avoidance of 
bias, survey sample size, and so forth typical of any survey research situation, 
statistics texts specifically devoted to archaeology (Buck et al. 1996; Drennan 
2010; Shennan 1997; VanPool and Leonard 2011) do not deal specifically with 
problems of study design encountered by researchers pursuing case studies in 
public archaeology.  However, CPR studies emerged as a subfield of two 
empirical traditions in Political Science (International Relations and Political 
Development). Those disciplines do have a legacy of interdisciplinary and 
eclectic scholarship on methodology (Geddes 2003; King et al. 1994; Sil and 
Doherty 2000; Sil and Katzenstein 2010), and this study has adopted insights 
from those fields to structure the case study research.   
Several political scientists have pointed out that the definition of a “case” 
is a matter of debate in the social sciences (Geddes 2003; King et al. 1994; 
Poteete et al. 2010).  Citing Eckstein, King et al (1994, 52) distinguish between a 
“case” and an “observation,” citing as an example a case study of six separate 
elections (observations (n) = 6) from a case study of all six elections taken as a 
whole (observations (n) =1). In other words, a “case” may or may not contain 
multiple observations depending upon how the research question is framed and 
the study structured.   A study involving  one or a few cases, for example a study 
of one or a few archaeological sites, will yield statistically meaningless results 
(i.e. low significance) if each “case” consists of only a single “observation.”     
King et al propose that case studies investigating theoretical hypotheses 
need to be structured in a manner that reinforces the scholar’s ability to make 
valid inferences, in a logical if not always a statistical sense, about a hypothesis.   
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Geddes and King et al both explore ways in which research questions can be 
structured to generate valid interpretations from “small-n” case studies or from 
studies subject to “selection on the dependent variable.”  The latter situation 
arises when, as in the present study (see page 166 below), the cases selected for 
study all reflect the same result in the dependent variable (which in the present 
study is the long survival of the projects under study). 
  In general, where the number of “cases” in a study is too small for 
conventional statistical inference or the cases have been selected on the 
dependent variable, then the study should be restructured.  In such cases, both  
Geddes and King et al suggest defining hypotheses that are implications of the 
more general theory under study, which in turn may be studied using data that 
can generate more observations within a single “case” from which to test 
propositions (Geddes 2003; King et al. 1994).  If the research validates these 
derivative hypotheses, the study would support, though not specifically confirm, 
the more general theory under discussion.  This is the approach taken in the case 
study research for this thesis. 
To derive the maximum inferential value from a limited number of actual 
project “cases” despite selection on the dependent variable, the present research 
will use the case studies to test a series of hypotheses derived from the Model 
Institutional Features described below (see page 150).  Each of these hypotheses 
should be valid if the underlying theoretical proposition is valid.  In the present 
research those hypotheses are referred to as “testable implications.” 
For example, a testable implication about community attitudes toward a 
study project could be articulated and then evaluated through a survey of a 
sufficient number of individuals (each an “observation”).  If more than one 
community (or “case”) is subjected to the same survey, and if the cases 
themselves are selected to reflect differing contexts and to minimize other biases, 
then robust inferences should be possible about each MIF even in a “small-n” set 
of case studies.  Further, if a sufficient number of MIFs can be tested in this 
manner, even in a small number of carefully chosen cases, robust conclusions 
about the underlying theoretical model may be defended.   In this manner, a 
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degree of both internal and external validity of the present research may be 
achieved.  This is the approach adopted in this thesis. 
Model Institutional Features 
Ostrom’s eight “design principles” for long-surviving common pool 
resource regimes were described above (see page 134).  With one replacement, 
this thesis adopts those principles as Model Institutional Features (MIF) that 
should be evident if in fact Ostrom’s design principles can be correlated with 
long-surviving community-based projects associated with archaeological sites.  
The objective of the research, in essence, is to test whether evidence that the 
MIFs are present can be discerned in each location. 
The first seven of Ostrom’s principles are adopted without modification 
as Model Institutional Features: 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions 
3. Collective-choice arrangements 
4. Monitoring 
5. Graduated sanctions 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
Ostrom’s eighth design principle, nested enterprises, is not evaluated in 
this study because the present research has been concentrated on three very small 
villages and does not include any projects that involve multiple layers of 
governance (see page 134 above).  Three small rural village projects were chosen 
in order to generate a homogenous group of case studies in which to conduct this 
study.  Once projects scale up beyond the village level, numerous complications 
arise that would have introduced an unmanageable number of new variables into 
the present study (for examples, see Chapter 4 in Ostrom 1990;  or discussion in 
Paterlini and Gould 2013). 
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Instead, an eighth MIF has been added to Ostrom’s first seven principles: 
meaningful economic value to the community.  Common Pool Resources are, by 
definition, economic assets of the community, each sufficiently valuable and 
scarce to incentivise community members to develop collaborative measures to 
manage them.  Much of the discussion about community archaeology, however, 
anticipates that engagement with archaeology and heritage will have educational, 
social and other benefits exclusive of any tangible economic return (see page 
57).  For archaeologists, many of whom are deeply suspicious of the perverse 
consequences that can arise if they engage “capitalist” economic incentives in 
matters of heritage (see page 84), the role of economic motivations is important 
to investigate in the context of this study.   
Research into community-managed environmental projects argues 
strongly  that tangible and near-term economic returns are essential to motivate 
collaboration (see, for example, Halstead 2003).  The study by Wade (1988) of 
commons management in South India and the broader literature survey by 
Baland and Platteau (1996) both identify the importance of economic incentives 
to collaboration.  In general, all these studies have found that scarcity of the CPR 
resource increases collaborative-behaviour, and that community participants 
must see sufficient economic returns from collaboration to induce them to make 
the investments of time and personal resources necessary for self-governance of 
CPRs. Therefore, the present study anticipates that members of projects and the 
community around them will derive meaningful economic value from a long-
surviving project.  The presence of such motivations would not prove projects 
could not be conducted without economic motivators, but the absence of 
perceived or measureable economic value in these three studies would be telling. 
Questionnaire and Data Design Methodology 
Following Ostrom (1990), this thesis designated the long-endurance of 
the organisations to be studied as the dependent variable.  The thesis adopts 
Ostrom’s design principles for long-surviving CPR regimes, with two 
modifications discussed in the previous section, as Model Institutional Features 
that may be considered to be independent (or explanatory) variables in the 
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research.   The research process at each site included extensive interviews with 
project leaders, participants and others intended to: 
 identify the institutional features of the project in detail;  
 understand the cultural and historical context of the project, including 
changes over time in mission, activities, institutional rules and 
leadership; and  
 develop data on the presence and degree of influence of each of the 
Model Institutional Features at each project by evaluating numerous 
testable implications of the MIFs. 
The questionnaire used in the present research has been structured to test 
for evidence of the presence of the Model Institutional Features at each project 
location. The data generated for this evaluation was obtained through a 
combination of document reviews, open-ended interviews with leaders and 
participants in the projects, and a series of structured questions administered to 
project members designed to provide quantitative data to test specific 
implications of the MIFs. This approach was intended to provide both 
statistically comparable data across sites and the more detailed qualitative and 
quantitative information necessary to position each community institution within 
its cultural, economic, social and political context.   
Central to this effort was the identification of hypotheses related to each 
Model Institutional Feature that could be evaluated objectively and, whenever 
possible, statistically.  Therefore, for each MIF the author has articulated testable 
implications one should expect to be able to prove or disprove through research 
into the institutional features and social, economic and political contexts of the 
projects under study. The research method was to evaluate each MIF by 
collecting data to evaluate each testable implication, each of which should be 
true if the MIF explanatory variable is in fact associated with the long-endurance 
of the project under study.   
Not every institutional feature suggested here should be expected to be 
present to the same degree in every project, and the form in which that feature is 
realized, as is implied by the IAD model (see page 128), will likely differ 
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dramatically depending on the specific local context in which the project has 
been undertaken.  Nonetheless, the over-arching hypothesis here is that, 
assuming each project exhibits common features (Research Question 1), then for 
Research Question 2 to receive an affirmative answer each MIF should play a 
role in achieving balance among the actors engaged in the project.  
Relating the Questionnaire to the Model Institutional Features 
The actual survey questionnaire is presented at Appendix 1 in the English 
and Spanish-language formats.  The survey questionnaire consists of 6 sections 
directed towards members of each organisation and three sets of questions 
intended for leaders of the organisation or for individuals from government, 
NGO, or business organisations that have worked with the organisation, if any. 
The mapping of testable implications to the Model Institutional Features is 
presented in this section. 
Generally speaking, two types of data were collected in interviews.  The 
first consists of factual or interpretive data collected from open-ended questions 
asked of interviewees.  Examples include: 
 Question 6.6: How are the procedures, rules and programmes of the 
organisation decided upon? Changed? Do any other groups or authorities 
have the right to review or approve the changes?  
 Question 6.8:  What benefits does the [name of organisation] bring to the 
community (probe economic and non-economic benefits)? 
 Question 6.14: Does the organisation make decisions through formal 
mechanisms, such as voting, or through an informal consensus process? 
The second type of question solicited opinions from interviewees on their 
attitudes toward the culture of the community and the operation of the 
organisation.  These questions were in the form of statements to which the 
interviewee was asked to Agree Strongly, Agree, Disagree or Disagree Strongly.  
Examples include: 
 Question 5.1.0: Most people in this community are basically honest and 
trustworthy. 
Page | 154  
 
 Question 6.13.2: I trust the [name of organisation] leaders when they 
handle money. 
 Question 6.14.3: Members have direct influence on the plans and 
activities of the [name of organisation]. 
Although the large majority of the questions in the questionnaire were 
developed by the researcher, publicly available questions from two sources have 
been quoted directly or adapted for this research.  First, the book Understanding 
and Measuring Social Capital (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002), which 
presents results from the World Bank’s Social Capital Initiative, includes a 
toolkit of public domain questionnaires and study techniques that may be used to 
describe communities and evaluate social capital within communities.   These 
questions have been utilized by the Social Capital Initiative of the World Bank in 
numerous studies around the world and therefore represent “road-tested” forms 
of questions.  Therefore, most questions in sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the 
questionnaire (those relating to community description and social capital) have 
been quoted directly or paraphrased from the World Bank’s Social Capital 
Assessment Tool (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002, Annex 1). Second, the 
structure of the questionnaire and the effort to map particular questions to the 
hypotheses tested in this study was heavily influenced by the project overview 
developed by the Common Pool Resources Project of the University of Indiana’s 
Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change, 
which has been the operational centre of Elinor Ostrom’s CPR project (CSIPEC 
2011).   
Following is a specific mapping of questions on the questionnaire to each 
“testable implication” evaluated in this research, each of which is in turn mapped 
to one of the eight Model Institutional Features.  Not every question was relevant 
in all of the sites studied.  However, the mapping of the questions here represents 
the universe of responses from which the data reported in Chapters 7-10 is 
drawn.   
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The Model Institutional Features and their testable implications are:  
MIF 1: Clearly defined boundaries.   
Testable implication: 
 Interviewees should be able to articulate the physical boundaries that 
determine who may or may not become a member of the organisation. 
Question 3.1. 
MIF 2: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions.    
Testable implications: 
 The rules of the organisation governing who may extract benefit from the 
project should be clearly derived from relevant legal authority and/or 
traditional practices, or their legitimacy should be traceable to conditions 
in the community, including traditional legal structures, social norms, 
governance practices, and the degree of social capital in evidence in the 
community.  Questions 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.8, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 4.4, 6.3, 
6.6, 6.7, 6.11, 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.8, 7.9, 7.16. 
 Indicators of social capital and trust should be consistent with the 
institutional elements of the organisation related to appropriation and 
provision.  That is, one would expect greater protections or more 
complex arrangements to be associated with lower levels of trust and 
social capital, and vice versa).  Questions 3.5, 4.1-4.6, 5.1.0-5.2, 6.13.1, 
6.13.2 
MIF 3: Collective choice arrangements   
Testable implications: 
 Projects will be organized, either as formal legal entities or informally, in 
a manner that empowers community members (either personally or 
through community-selected representatives) to participate directly in the 
governance of the project. Questions 6.3, 6.6, 6.10, 6.11, 6.13.4, 6.13.5, 
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6.13.8, 6.14.2, 6.14.3, 6.14.6, 6.14.7, 6.14.8, 6.14.9, 6.14.10, 6.15, 6.17, 
7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.16. 
 Government officials or supporting NGOs should perceive the project as 
“owned” or “controlled” by the community or at least by project 
members.  Questions section 8. 
 Legal documentation associated with the project, if any, should provide 
for individuals in the immediate community to “own” or “control” the 
project.  Questions 7.2, 7.3, 7.9, 7.16, 8.3. 
 Leadership of the project at the community level should have changed in 
an orderly fashion since its founding.  Question 6.3, 6.6, 6.11, 7.10. 
 Interviews should reveal changes in mission, addition of new businesses 
and/or adjustment of the business model in response to experience or to 
changes in external conditions.  Questions 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.11, 
6.16, 6.18, 6.19, 7.2, 7.10. 
 Project members should support propositions similar to “Members have 
direct influence on the plans and activities of the association.” Questions 
6.13.4, 6.13.5, 6.14.2, 6.14.3, 6.14.8 
MIF 4: Active monitoring 
Testable implications: 
 Audited or unaudited financial records of the group should be made 
available to project members with regularity.  Questions 6.5, 7.6, 7.7. 
 Participants should support propositions similar to “I feel well informed 
about the activities of the organisation,” “The association leaders are fair 
and honest,” “I trust the association leaders when they handle money,” 
etc.  Questions 6.13.1, 6.13.2, 6.13.9, 6.14.1, 6.14.2, 6.14.3, 6.14.6, 
6.14.7, 6.17, 6.19, 7.2, 7.7, 7.8. 
 MIF 5: Graduated sanctions 
 Testable implications: 
 Formal or informal mechanisms should exist to enable project members 
to regulate participant compliance with obligations to the project.  
Questions 6.3, 6.6, 6.17, 7.2, 7.3, 7.8, 7.9. 
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 A system of sanctions and penalties should exist and reflect “punishment 
to suit the infraction” or the discretionary imposition of sanctions.  
Questions 6.3, 6.6, 6.17, 7.2, 7.3, 7.8, 7.9. 
 Evidence of effective monitoring and enforcement activity should be 
identifiable.   Questions 6.3, 6.6, 6.14.4, 6.14.5, 6.17, 7.2, 7.3, 7.8, 7.9. 
MIF 6: Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Testable implications: 
 Project members should be able to articulate circumstances in which 
conflicts have arisen and the process through which they were resolved.  
Questions 6.3, 6.6, 6.7, 6.11, 6.14.5, 6.16, 6.18. 
 The conflict resolution process described in interviews should be 
managed within the institutional structure of the project. Questions 6.3, 
6.6, 6.7, 6.11, 6.16, 6.18. 
 The conflict resolution process described in interviews should be 
perceived to be fair and efficient.  Questions 6.14.10, 6.14.11. 
MIF 7: Minimal recognition of rights to organize  
Testable implications: 
 Where the entity is subject to incorporation requirements, those laws and 
regulations enable and affirm local control of the project.  Questions 7.1, 
7.2, 7.3, 7.9, 7.13, 7.16. 
 Where the entity is not subject to incorporation requirements, 
Government officials, associated archaeologists, supporting NGOs, and 
others should perceive the project as “owned” or “controlled” by the 
community through project members.  Question 8.3. 
MIF 8: Meaningful economic value to the community 
Testable implications: 
 Economic data collected by government enterprises should reveal 
economic benefit to the community residents.  Questions 7.6, 7.11, 8.7. 
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 Financial records of the project should demonstrate income generation to 
the members of the group and/or to the community as a whole (e.g. 
through distributions of revenues, dividends, etc.).  Question 7.6. 
 Businesses and others in the community when surveyed should report 
direct economic benefit due to the project.  Questions 6.8, 6.13.3, 6.13.7, 
6.13.10, 6.13.12. 
 Project members when surveyed should state that economic benefits 
accrue to them from the project.  Questions 6.2, 6.8, 6.13.3, 6.13.7, 
6.13.10, 6.13.12. 
Subsequent chapters will explore in detail the results at each case study 
project and in the aggregate, in order to respond to the research questions posed 
above (see page 144).  
Case Study Selection  
This thesis presents three case studies drawn from a larger universe of 
relevant projects identified through a survey conducted in early 2011 of 
archaeologists at a wide range of academic and other institutions and from other 
sources.  The goal of this process was to ensure that the cases selected embodied 
as much variation as possible on dimensions relevant to explaining the 
institutional structure of each project with as little variation as possible on other 
dimensions.   
In early 2011, the author commenced a survey project to identify 
“Heritage Common Pool Resource” (“HCPR”) projects anywhere in the world 
that might serve as appropriate case study subjects for this thesis.  A 
questionnaire was developed, utilizing the University College London on-line 
survey tool, in order to elicit information on potential HCPRs including location, 
history, and contact information.  For this purpose, an HCPR was defined to be: 
 any archaeological or heritage site, series of sites, or park or preserve, or  
 any project associated with an archaeological or heritage site, such as a 
museum, crafts retail or tour guiding activity;  
which in either case is: 
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 under the management or control of a community-based organisation or 
community group, including an indigenous community governmental 
organisation; and 
 has, as an important (though not necessarily sole) objective, the economic 
advancement of the relevant community; 
 whether or not the project is continuing in operation. 
Invitations to participate in the survey were distributed through e-mail 
solicitations directly to faculty and students at University College London, 
Brown University, The University of California at Los Angeles and the 
University of Pennsylvania, all universities at which the author had relationships.  
It was also distributed widely via internet mailing lists managed by Professor 
Daniel Sandweiss of the University of Maine and Professor George Smith of 
Florida State University, and to a list developed by the author from bibliographic 
research of more than 30 archaeologists and heritage professionals active in 
community archaeology projects around the world. Responses to these inquiries 
identified 72 projects in 25 countries which, in the view of respondents, satisfied 
the criteria for an HCPR.  The list is presented in Appendix 2.  This list 
constituted the universe from which the eventual case study projects were drawn.   
Candidate sites initially were sifted for appropriateness based on 
descriptions of the projects from survey responses and, where available, internet 
site materials. This process produced a list of candidates which the author further 
investigated through e-mail correspondence with project contacts.  Ultimately, a 
shorter list was identified for in-depth evaluation.  After determining those 
projects that appeared potentially appropriate, the author’s language capacity 
became a determining variable in the selection of projects for site visits.  In 
October and November, 2011, the author visited nine project locations in the 
United Kingdom and in Ireland, including the Burren Centre, to interview project 
members and evaluate the appropriateness of the projects for in-depth study.  In 
July 2011, the author also visited four projects in Peru, including Raqchi, that 
potentially satisfied the definitions of HCPR and might be suitable for study. In 
addition, through internet research or discussion by telephone or in person with 
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project members, the author evaluated projects in the United States, Australia, 
Vietnam and Kenya for potential inclusion among the final research sites. 
The selection of the final three locations for in-depth study was based on 
a combination of criteria related to the appropriateness of the project for study 
and practical considerations.  Specifically, 
 Numerous projects, including projects in Australia, Canada, Taiwan, the 
United States and many other countries, were rejected for study because 
on further examination they were found to be, in effect, projects of local 
indigenous governments rather than autonomous community 
organisations, which are the focus of the present study. 
 Of the four sites in Peru, two failed to demonstrate the substantial 
longevity required for this analysis and one was insufficiently under 
community control to satisfy the HCPR definition.  The fourth, which did 
meet the criteria and which was ultimately selected for this research, was 
the Asociacíon Inkallaqta in the village of Raqchi, near Cusco, in the 
Andes Mountains of Peru. 
 Several of the projects reviewed in the United Kingdom and Ireland 
demonstrated considerable longevity and interesting institutional 
structures. The Burren Centre, largely because it was the longest 
surviving organisation in the group, emerged as the project chosen for 
study.   
 The author identified other potentially appropriate projects in Kenya, 
Cambodia, Taiwan, Fiji, Italy and Vietnam.  Matters of practicality 
intervened, however.  The study of Asociacíon Inkallaqta in Peru 
required the author to learn the Spanish language with sufficient facility 
to conduct in-depth interviewing in a village in which no resident spoke 
English.  The time required to learn Spanish precluded learning another 
language for a second non-English speaking location.  The author 
believes that the complexity of the institutional research involved in this 
study is such that conducting interviews through a translator is 
impractical and likely to generate inaccurate results. The project in Kenya 
ultimately was disqualified for language (a tribal tongue was predominant 
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in the community) and safety reasons, as the timing for the research 
coincided with the heavily contested and occasionally violent Presidential 
election of 2013. 
 Ultimately, the author decided to complete the study by re-visiting the 
Maya Centre Women’s Group’s cooperative venture in Maya Centre, 
Belize.  This project, which the author had first studied during 2009-10 as 
part of a dissertation prepared for the master’s degree from the University 
of Pennsylvania, presents an extensive history as a community-controlled 
enterprise in a third cultural context but in a location where language 
would pose no insuperable obstacle to the research since the vast majority 
of residents speak English.  
Thus the three sites finally selected were the Burren Centre in Kilfenora, 
Ireland; the Asociacíon Inkallaqta in Raqchi, Peru; and the Maya Centre 
Women’s Group in Maya Centre, Belize.  All three projects are controlled and 
managed by members of the local community, all three are located in small 
villages (circa 300-450 residents), and all three demonstrated a minimum of 14 
years of continuous operation as community-based projects intended to promote 
local economic development based on the exploitation of heritage and 
archaeological resources.  The three reflect very different cultural contexts: 
English/Irish cultural and legal traditions in Ireland, Maya culture and British 
colonial rule in Belize, and Quechua culture and Spanish colonial rule in Peru.  
The limitations of these selections are explored in the final section of the present 
chapter. 
Analytical Tools Applied 
After data was gathered on the institutional design features at each of the 
three projects, the three projects’ results were compared and analysed.  The 
computer program SPSS has been used for any statistical analysis conducted on 
the data.  The program Nvivo was evaluated to determine whether it would 
contribute to the analysis of non-statistical interview data but ultimately was 
rejected in favour of coding qualitative responses and other non-numerical data 
into numerical formats for processing and analysis using SPSS.  Those codings 
are presented in Appendix 7.  
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Specific statistical procedures to be applied to the study data are limited.  
In general, the small number of cases and lack of variability in the dependent 
variable in this study rule out regression techniques and other attempts to infer 
relationships or causation through statistical analysis.  Thus, the search in this 
study was for meaningful relationships among survey responses that could be 
used either to support or reject specific hypotheses about the project under study.  
Measures such as Chi Squared statistics were applied in the comparison among 
the three study sites (see page 308) but only with limited meaning owing to the 
nature of the study and the data limitations discussed below. 
Social Capital Index 
The importance of social capital to this study was explored above (see 
page 131).  The level of trust and social capital in each community is likely to be 
closely associated with the structure of the institutions in each organisation.  
Sections 4 and 5 of the questionnaire were developed to provide measures of 
trust and social capital based on the responses of individual interviewees to 
specific attitudinal questions regarding the community. Each of these questions 
was asked on a 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree) scale. Individuals’ 
responses to several of these questions were consolidated into an index, 
computed for each individual.  Individual scores subsequently were consolidated, 
averaged, and compared for each community.   
By design, lower index scores are interpreted to suggest that a greater 
level of social capital is present.  In order not to bias responses, some questions 
were posed in a manner that associates high social capital with a “positive” 
response, while others are posed to record higher levels of social capital through 
“negative” responses. To compute the index, the values of the “negative” form 
questions have been inverted to associate lower values with higher social capital.  
That is, disagreement with a “negative” question, originally recorded as a “3” or 
“4” response, is converted to a “2” or “1” value, respectively, in computing the 
index.  Figure 7 illustrates which questions were used to compile the index and 
Figure 8 illustrates how these original scores have been manipulated, specifically 
with respect to the responses to “negative” questions 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, to compile 
the index value for each individual interviewee.  Individual index scores were 
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then compiled for all members of each group for comparison between the 
groups.     
 
Figure 7: Questions used in the social capital index 
 
Figure 8: Illustration of the computation of the social capital index for one respondent  
Raw values of the index for all individuals ranged from 9 to 21.  
Although counter-arguments have been made, it is generally accepted that 
statistically valid chi squared computations require that the expected frequency 
be at least five observations in least 80 per cent of the cells in the distribution 
(VanPool and Leonard 2011, 249). This was not the case with the original 
distribution, and it became necessary to combine values in a manner that reduced 
the number of cells with fewer than five observations to below 20 per cent of the 
Str Agree Agree Disagree Str Disag
Question relating to social capital
5.1.0 Most people in this community are honest and 
trustworthy
1 2 3 4
5.1.1
People are always interested only in their own 
welfare.
4 3 2 1
5.1.2 In this community one has to be alert or someone 
is likely to take advantage of you.
4 3 2 1
5.1.3 If I have a problem there is always someone to 
help me.
1 2 3 4
5.1.4 The opinions of others in the community matter to 
me.
1 2 3 4
5.1.5 I believe I am accepted as a member of this 
community.
1 2 3 4
5.1.6
If you drop your purse in the community someone 
will see it and return it to you.
1 2 3 4
 Possible Responses
Example: Computation of one Respondent's Social Capital Index Score
Question: 5.1.0 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 5.1.6 Index Score
Actual 
Score
2 3 4 1 3 2 2
Score Used 
in Index
2 2 1 1 3 2 2 13
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total.  This was accomplished by determining the quintile-breaks in the index 
distribution, using SPSS, and assigning each individual’s value to the appropriate 
quintile.  Thus, for example, index values for individuals with an index score of 
12 or less were re-coded as “1” indicating they were in the first quintile.    
A compression also was applied to all of the questions involving the 
“Strongly Agree ... Strongly Disagree” spectrum in order to reduce small-count 
cells and improve statistical significance.  In every case, “Strongly Agree” and 
“Agree” responses were consolidated into “Agree,” while “Strongly Disagree” 
and “Disagree” responses were consolidated into “Disagree.” 
An index has been used in the case of the social capital questions in order 
to mitigate the problems of interpreting individual questions regarding trust (see 
Beugelsdijk and Maseland 2011, 215-225) by grouping together responses that 
may be expected to be highly correlated (see Beugelsdijk and Maseland 2011, 
138-149).  Following the approach in the IAD model, the purpose of the social 
capital index, like the questions on divisions in the community (questions 3.5 and 
4.3), is to contextualize the factors behind the observed rules in use in order to 
explore the interaction between the political / cultural context and the 
institutional structure of the organisation.   
Each site studied will be analysed separately in Chapters 7-10.   In these 
case-level analyses, the presence or absence of the Model Institutional Features 
will be evaluated for each project based on the degree to which the testable 
implications described above (see page 150) are supported by the data.  The 
criteria for evaluating whether MIFs are, in fact, common to the three sites will 
be based upon these project-by-project evaluations.  Each project will be 
evaluated separately for its conformity to the MIFs, then a comparison of the 
three projects under study and discussion of the ultimate response to the two 
research questions will be presented in Chapter 10. 
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Ethical Considerations 
Participant profiles 
Participants in the study were uniformly members of the adult population.  
No individual younger than 18 years of age was interviewed.   No upper 
limitation was placed on the age of interviewees as participants in the 
organisation included members of every adult age cohort in each community.  
Women as well as men were interviewed in each village in settings preferred by 
the individual interviewee.  As a result, some interviews were conducted in the 
privacy of homes while others were conducted in public settings.  To the best of 
the author’s knowledge, no individual interviewed was vulnerable in any way to 
adverse consequences arising from participation in the study. 
Confidentiality 
Prior to the commencement of each interview, a preamble statement was 
read to each individual that described the purpose of the study and the 
confidential nature of the interview contents and recordings.  The consent of 
each individual interviewee to participate on this basis was solicited.  In most 
cases, this preamble and the associated consent were recorded as part of the 
interview process.  The commitment made to each individual was that no names 
or other means of identification would be used in the thesis or otherwise without 
explicit permission.  The author has retained written records and recorded copies 
of the interviews that include attribution to particular individuals.  The interview 
list presented at Appendix 3, however, includes no names.  Age and gender 
distribution data are presented for each site in Appendix 8 as cross tabulations of 
the variables ivueage and ivuegen, the first two cross tabulation tables in the 
appendix. 
Data collection, storage and presentation 
Each interview is coded with an identifying number consisting of the year 
and the ordinal number of the interview (for example, 2012-023).  The name and 
profile details of the interviewee are linked to the interview number.  Virtually 
all interviews were recorded using the Livescribe system, which digitally links 
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written notes to recorded audio, providing an integrated audio and written record 
for each interview.  In addition, whenever feasible, a separate conventional 
digital recording was made of each interview.  Written summaries of the 
interviews, in English, also were created in Raqchi in order to ensure accuracy of 
translation from the Spanish.  Statistical data has been collated for analysis using 
SPSS. That data has no personal identifiers associated with it beyond the 
interview number. 
Due to the logistical impossibility of retaining data on UCL computers 
while conducting the study and writing the thesis from outside of the UK, all 
data has been retained on a personal computer as well as multiple back-ups to 
prevent the loss of data. Upon acceptance of the thesis, source data will be 
archived or destroyed in accordance with UCL policy.  
 In the text of this thesis, in order to preserve the commitment to 
confidentiality, quotations or other data attributed to a particular interviewee will 
be sourced to the interview (“IVU”) number (for example, IVU 2013-032) as it is 
recorded in the list in Appendix 3.  Consistent with the recorded commitment 
made to each interviewee, no individual will be cited by name without 
permission. 
Limitations of the Study 
Selection on the dependent variable 
This study focuses only on “successful” or long-surviving projects.  This 
approach introduces a significant potential source of bias because the cases 
selected do not vary in the outcome of the dependent variable (long-term 
success) (Geddes 2003; King et al. 1994).  In principle, the study of a failed 
project would add a comparative dimension to the research.  “Failed” projects 
are difficult to study, however: records are lost, participants scattered and 
troubled projects are rarely published (for exceptions, see Díaz-Andreu 2013, 
232-234; Morris 2012; O'Reilly 2012)   
Most importantly, even if a survey of a “failed” project were possible, the 
reliability of that analysis is open to question.  Not only may participants and 
Page | 167  
 
records be scattered, in the absence of confirming physical evidence memories 
cannot be relied upon to accurately characterize either the facts of a past situation 
or attitudes at the time toward the situation.  Lowenthal observed that “on the 
whole, we place unjustified confidence in our own memories…but we realize 
that other people generally remember less than they think.” (Lowenthal 1985, 
200)  Psychologists in recent years have confirmed that insight, recognizing, for 
example, that memories are  “reconsolidated,” or altered in important respects, 
every time an individual recalls a past event (Alberini 2005; Lee 2009; Schiller 
and Phelps 2011).   Reliance on the recollections of individuals some years after 
the fact thus would not establish a consistent basis for comparing failed projects 
with currently on-going “successful” projects.   
Nonetheless, by studying only projects deemed to be successful, the 
present study is vulnerable to the criticism that cases were selected on the 
dependent variable (longevity of survival).   Selection on the dependent variable 
not only precludes certain types of statistical analysis, such as regression but, as 
discussed above (see page 147), requires the form of hypotheses testing utilized 
in this study in order to generate useful information from case study data. 
Democratic political cultures only 
Each project studied is located in a country that has a long-standing 
tradition of democratic self-governance.  Thus, as varied as the underlying 
village contexts may be, Ireland, Belize and Peru share traditions of self-
governing practices and expectations.  While others who have studied 
environmental common pool resource regimes have examined projects in 
countries with authoritarian or other non-democratic governance traditions, this 
particular study can make no claims for generalization to projects operating 
under non-democratic political regimes. 
Similarly, every effort was made to vary the cultural and historical 
contexts of the projects included in this study, but inevitably certain important 
contexts are not included.  No project operating in the context of Islamic 
traditions is included, for example. Nor are projects that operate within the 
context of tribal chieftaincies such as may be found among indigenous groups in 
Africa, Latin America, North America, Australia/New Zealand or certain parts of 
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Asia.  Therefore, this particular study can make no claims for generalization to 
projects operating in cultural contexts of traditional authority.   Indeed, evidence 
from the economic literature suggests that trust, as a proxy for social capital, may 
be difficult to build in non-democratic contexts (Beugelsdijk and Maseland 2011, 
193-201)  
Deviations from the questionnaire  
Where survey respondents were members of the organisation under study 
the questions in section 4 (structural social capital), section 5 (cognitive social 
capital), and 6.13 and 6.14 were asked of every respondent.  However, in all 
three cases once the facts of the history of the organisation were ascertained and 
the rules in use clearly understood, many of the questions relevant to those 
matters were dropped from the surveys in the interest of conserving 
interviewee’s time.  Furthermore, some questions proved not to be relevant in 
some locations.  For example, questions 4.1 and 4.2 were not useful in Maya 
Centre because the only “membership-based” group in the village was the 
Women’s Group. Thus several sections of the questionnaire evolved during the 
course of the interviews in each location from a strict protocol into guidelines for 
the interview. 
Furthermore, the engagement of outside groups in these three 
organisations varied widely.  In Kilfenora, for example, nearly every business 
owner was also a shareholder in the Burren Centre.  In Raqchi none of the 
business owners in town were members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  In Maya 
Centre, competition with the Women’s Group was a reason for expulsion and 
there were no linkages between the Women’s Group and local businesses other 
than the local taxi drivers or guides whom the Women’s Group would call to 
transport visitors to the Coxcomb Basin Wildlife Sanctuary.  Numerous 
government organisations and NGOs have worked with the Maya Centre 
Women’s Group and the Burren Centre, whereas there was no involvement in 
the Asociacíon Inkallaqta by NGO or government entities.  Therefore, questions 
directed at NGO or government officials were not relevant in Raqchi.   Thus in 
practice the extensive detailed questions on these matters became guides for the 
interviews and were adapted in use to the circumstances of the project. 
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Non-random participant selection / sample size 
Owing to unique conditions at each project location, truly random 
selection of interviewees was not possible.  Interviewees were drawn from the 
relevant population on as unbiased a basis as possible and every effort was made 
to achieve a representative sample of the community and membership in the 
organisations, but no claims to absolute random selection of interviewees can be 
made in this study. Not only were the relevant populations small but the need to 
include project leaders in order to obtain information on the institutional 
structure and history of the organisations created at least a modest bias in the 
data toward project leadership.  Each community posed additional unique 
challenges to randomization of interviewee selection (see page 170).  Thirty or 
more individual members of each organisation were interviewed in each 
location.  Depending on the location, this number of individuals constituted from 
about 10 per cent (in Kilfenora) to about 75 per cent (in Maya Centre) of the 
group’s membership.  However, even though large proportions of the 
membership of each organisation were interviewed, application of standard 
sample size formulas for small, defined populations would have required 
interviewing virtually the entire population of each group under study to achieve 
95 per cent confidence in the results of each case study (Morris 2013). This was 
an impractical objective for this study. Moreover, some interviewees chose not to 
answer every question, further reducing the number of responses in some cases. 
Present-day bias 
The surveys conducted for this study relate only to present-day 
institutional rules in use and to the present-day opinions of members and other 
community members of the organisations under study.   An effort has been made 
to reconstruct the history of each organisation, to identify changes in institutional 
rules, if any, and to identify any conflicts within the organisation in the past.  
Nonetheless, this study speaks only to present-day attitudes toward present-day 
institutions and the possibility exists that study of the same organisations over a 
number of years might have yielded different results.   For example, it is entirely 
likely that questions relating to interviewees’ attitudes toward the management 
and administration of their projects are influenced by the performance of current 
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or recent office holders and could be more or less favourable were the survey 
conducted at a time when different individuals held official positions.  Moreover, 
there has been an attempt to capture the history of each organisation through 
interviews, and the objections to the reliability of memories cited above (see 
page 166) may equally apply to the historical information collected in this study.  
Where this has been a risk, the author has attempted to identify documentary 
evidence to support interviewees’ recollections, or has sought multiple 
interviewees’ recollections to substantiate important claims of historical fact. 
Site-Specific Considerations 
The Burren Centre, Kilfenora, Ireland 
In the Kilfenora study, 43 recorded interviews were conducted  on site in 
October 2011 and over six weeks in March and April, 2012, including interviews 
with 31 shareholders of the cooperative (about 10 per cent of shareholders) and 
13 government, NGO or private sector individuals who work with the Burren 
Centre as partners or funders.  An attempt was made to use the shareholder list of 
the cooperative to randomly select candidates for interview.  However, the 
shareholder list had not been updated for many years and numerous deceased 
shareholders remained on the list (sometimes at the request of descendants).  As 
a result the list constituted a basis but not a definitive source for a randomized 
sample of shareholders.  The owners of virtually all businesses in Kilfenora were 
interviewed; however most also are shareholders of the Burren Centre and so 
were included in, rather than standing independent of, the shareholder group.  
Interviews were conducted with founders of the organisation, officers, and others 
with important insights into the formal and informal operation of the 
organisation.  All interviews were conducted in English and the author made an 
effort to ensure that the sample included a sufficient number of men and women 
and persons of different ages to be representative of the local population and 
shareholder group.   
Responses to many attitudinal questions from Kilfenora residents were 
remarkably homogeneous.  Moreover, many failed to distinguish materially 
between “Agree or Disagree” and “Firmly Agree” or “Firmly Disagree.”  As a 
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result, as noted above (see page 162) , most responses clustered in the “Agree” or 
“Disagree” categories, effectively collapsing the two positive and two negative 
responses.  Although there is the possibility that the homogeneous responses 
reflected some unwillingness to disagree with the author, respondents generally 
were thoughtful and reflective in answering questions and the greater likelihood 
in this small community is that views on the particular questions asked were 
indeed highly similar. 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta, Raqchi, Peru 
A total of 45 individuals were interviewed in Raqchi over four weeks in 
February and March, 2013, including 33 members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta plus 
3 Raqchi residents who are not members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, and 9 owners 
of shops in Raqchi, the director of the Raqchi archaeological park, and one 
vendor selling crafts to the Raqchi artisans, none of whom were members of the 
association.  A total of 55 households, roughly one-half of the total in Raqchi, 
are active members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, and another roughly eight to ten 
households are “passive” or inactive members.   Thus, one member from about 
60 per cent of the active household membership of Asociacíon Inkallaqta was 
interviewed for the study.   
 Membership in Asociacíon Inkallaqta is on a family basis, and a total of 
14 male and 19 female members of the association were interviewed.  Care was 
taken to ensure that only one member of a household was interviewed. A 
membership list was not made available to the author by Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  
Members were easily identified as they each managed their own sale tables in the 
marketplace in the central Raqchi plaza, but no systematic randomization of the 
interview targets was possible.  Because individuals typically were reluctant to 
be interviewed in their homes and women work disproportionately in the plaza 
marketplace where most interviews occurred, the author had to undertake 
particular efforts to identify and recruit men for the research.  All interviews 
were conducted in Spanish, which introduced bias into the population of 
interviewees as the some of the oldest residents of Raqchi speak primarily or 
only Quechua.  Nonetheless, a significant spread of interviewees was achieved 
including three interviewees who were more than 70 years of age.     
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Because the questionnaire for this study was conceptualized in English 
and translated into Spanish, translation issues may have influenced results in 
ways not perceived by the author.  For example, early in the interview process it 
became clear that the word “member,” which had been translated as “miembro”, 
might better have been translated as “socio” in the questionnaire.  In Raqchi 
“miembro” implied to some (but not all) interviewees a person who was an 
officer of the Asociacíon Inkallaqta rather than a regular “member” in the sense 
of the word in English.   Once the problem was identified, the questions were 
retranslated using the word “socio.”  Similarly, questions relating to the benefits 
of Asociacíon Inkallaqta to the “comunidad” were frequently interpreted as 
relating to the Asemblía Comunidad, the local government entity, rather than to 
the “community of Raqchi” in a more general sense.  Although this too was 
compensated for in interviews once the problem was recognized, the possibility 
remains that other similar problems of translation occurred of which the author 
was and is unaware. 
Unlike the Burren Centre or the Maya Centre Women’s Group, 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta manages only a small amount of money (typically about 
S/500 soles
5
 by one estimate) and has no record of the sales of individual 
members of the association.  Small-scale artisans are exempt from taxation in 
Peru, and those in Raqchi do not retain records and are reluctant to discuss the 
income from their trading in the plaza.  As a result no financial data exists with 
respect to the economic impact of Asociacíon Inkallaqta at either the local or 
higher levels of government.   In the case of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, the economic 
impact of the organisation therefore has been inferred from interviewees’ 
responses to other questions and to the salience of Asociacíon Inkallaqta in the 
system of sanctions in Raqchi (see page 186). 
Finally, as in Kilfenora, responses to many attitude questions were 
remarkably homogeneous in Raqchi and in Raqchi as in Kilfenora, most attitude 
questions were effectively answered “Agree” or “Disagree”.  Ultimately, as with 
the Burren Centre data, the four possible responses were collapsed for statistical 
reasons into a simple agree / disagree dualism. Finally, the homogeneity of most 
                                                 
5 1 Peruvian Nuevo Sole (S/1) equals approximately US$0.35, or £0.22  
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attitude questions might again be attributed to interviewees’ reluctance to 
disagree with the author although, as in Kilfenora, the Raqchi respondents were 
thoughtful and careful in responding to questions.  Moreover, virtually every 
respondent disagreed with at least one question asked, suggesting stated 
agreements were genuine rather than a matter of politeness. 
Maya Centre Women’s Group, Maya Centre, Belize 
Primary research in Maya Centre took place over four weeks in May and 
June, 2013, which followed earlier research in January and February, 2010.  The 
2010 research included 13 interviews with community leaders, Maya Centre 
Women’s Group (MCWG) members and officials of NGOs associated with the 
project. Interviews in 2013 followed the questionnaire protocol developed for 
this thesis.  Those interviews verified or updated material developed in 2010 and 
augmented that information with the statistical elements of the questionnaire.  
The questionnaire instrument was used to interview 30 MCWG members, or 
about 75 per cent of the total membership. The 2010 interviews were an 
important resource on the history of the project, although that history was 
verified in the 2013 interviews.  The 2010 interviews also were used to identify 
changes in the activities and institutional features of the project that had occurred 
since the earlier research.  The founder of the Maya Centre Women’s Group and 
one NGO official were re-interviewed in 2013, as was the woman who had 
served as the ChairLady of the Women’s Group in 2010.   
  Interviewees in 2013 included virtually every woman working at the 
centre during the residence period in Maya Centre (one person declined to be 
interviewed and one spoke no English).   The selection of interviewees was 
determined primarily by the members rotational work schedule at the centre, 
which resulted in a selection largely unbiased by the researcher, although a few 
inactive (elderly) members of the group and others who did not work at the 
centre during the dates of the research were sought out for interviews in their 
homes.  Interviews were conducted in English, which all respondents spoke and 
most read.  As in the other two sites, close-ended responses were reduced in 
Maya Centre to an Agree / Disagree dualism for statistical reasons. 
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The principal bias encountered in the Maya Centre survey, a consequence 
of the Women’s Group membership, is that all of the statistical data is derived 
from a sample made up entirely of women.  While some men in the village were 
interviewed for historical or other background information, the Women’s Group 
itself has no male members.  This may introduce a gender bias into questions 
relating to social capital and other attitudes in the village.  Furthermore, largely 
reflecting the observed demographics of the village, members of the MCWG are 
clustered in the 20-60 age range.  However, women in their 50’s are considered 
“old” in Maya Centre,  and six “older” members (several in their 50’s) have been 
relieved of duty in the shop even though they are permitted to sell crafts and 
participate in the Group’s annual bonus scheme.  Since 2010 two elderly 
members have died. 
The 2013 interviews were conducted immediately after a highly 
contentious local election in which power, for the first time in about 30 years, 
shifted from one party faction in the village to another.  Some respondents who 
expressed the view that village life is “disagreeable” said that the election 
influenced their views to some degree. Thus the extreme disharmony revealed in 
the village through the 2013 interviews may somewhat overstate the magnitude 
of the disagreements in the village. However, the 2010 interviews also revealed 
considerable disharmony in the village over family, political and religious issues, 
the same points of contention identified in the 2013 study. 
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Chapter 7: The Asociacíon Inkallaqta, 
Raqchi, Peru 
Introduction 
This will be the first of three similarly structured chapters describing the 
findings from the field work conducted for this thesis.  The parallel structure of 
each chapter is designed to facilitate comparison of the three projects against one 
another and against the Model Institutional Features (MIF) described in Chapter 
6.  Following these three individual project expositions, Chapter 10 will present a 
comparison of the three cases and address the two research questions motivating 
this research.   
This chapter and each of the two to follow begins with a brief overview 
of the country in which the study site is located that will provide background on 
the history, economy and heritage management regimes of each nation as those 
features relate to the project under study. The focus of the chapter, the discussion 
of each field work project, begins with an overview of the village in which the 
project is situated, including its recent history, governance systems, and political 
and social context as defined in part by the social capital index (see page 162) 
and other data gleaned from the survey questionnaire.  The history of the project 
under study is presented next, using information derived from open-ended 
interview questions and, where available, review of documentary evidence.   
There then follows a detailed description of the institutional structure and 
rules in use of the organisation that is the subject of the field work.  This 
material, like the history of the organisation, is derived from responses to the 
relevant questions posed in interviews (see page 153) and review of documentary 
evidence where that was made available.  The final section of the chapter 
compares the findings of the field work for the project in question to the 
hypotheses articulated in Chapter 6.  The data presented in this last section of 
each chapter are in part reflected in the prior discussion of the institutional 
features and history of the organisation and in part derived from statistical 
evidence gathered from the closed-end questions asked of interviewees. The 
concluding section of each case-study chapter will present data relevant to 
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evaluating the degree to which each project’s features coincide with those 
hypothesized in Chapter 6.  The objective of these three chapters is to set the 
stage for the discussion in Chapter 10.  
Overview: Peru’s History, Economy and Heritage Management 
Peru’s 1.285 million square kilometres, an area slightly smaller than the 
US State of Alaska, make it the 20
th
 largest country in the world.  It is a nation of 
extremes, with a long sea-level coastline on the Pacific Ocean yet some of the 
highest mountains in the world in the Andean range.  Expanses of desert on the 
western coastal areas are interspersed with verdant irrigated farmlands, and the 
whole gives way to dense rainforest jungle on the eastern slopes of the Andes 
and into the Amazon River, which finds its ultimate source in Peru’s Nevado 
Mismi Mountain.  Peru has a population of 29.8 million people, nearly half of 
whom are under the age of 25.  Over three-quarters of the population lived in 
urban areas in 2010. (All data from Central Intelligence Agency 2013.) 
The region now known as Peru has an ancient history that has left a vast 
monumental heritage.  The Andean region likely was occupied by humans at 
least 9000 years ago and sections of the region have been ruled by a succession 
of powerful polities since before the introduction of ceramics around 1800 BCE 
(Davies 1997, 2-5).  Figure 9 presents an outline of the major polities that 
controlled portions of Peru, along with a suggestion of some of the monumental 
sites associated with each culture. Each culture has left a legacy of structures, 
burials, ceramics and other artefacts that archaeologists have been unearthing 
steadily for well over a century.  Dates on such a list inevitably gloss over pre-
cursor and residual societies that existed in each region, and oversimplify 
complex interactions among cultures that were coterminous in time or 
geography. It does serve, however, to suggest the vast array of cultural heritage 
that covers the length and breadth of Peru and serves as the foundation for the 
country’s tourism industry. 
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Figure 9: Principal cultures of the Peruvian region. (Davies 1997; Rosas 2010; Schwartz 
1970) 
Only one culture unified all of the Peruvian lands and those well beyond: 
the Inca, who built the temple at Raqchi that is the foundation of the economic 
opportunity for the members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta. The Incan empire was 
centred in what is now the city of Cuzco in the Andean highlands.  Although the 
antecedents of the group that became known as the Inca are imprecisely known, 
it is generally accepted that by about 1200 CE the Incas had conquered the Lake 
Titicaca region.  Over the following three centuries, the Incan people expanded 
their territory through conquest or absorption of other groups until, by the time 
Spanish Conquistadores arrived in the region, the realm of the Inca extended 
3000 kilometres on the Pacific coast, from the northern extreme of today’s 
Ecuador to the centre of Chile.  This vast empire was linked by a network of 
roads, administrative centres and religious sites constructed with corvée labour.  
Principal Cultures of the Peruvian Region
Time Frame Culture Region Principal Monuments
 to 1800 BCE Pre-Ceramic
Southern Central Coast, 
Coastal Highlands Aspero, El Pariso, Kotosh
1800 BCE to 900 BCE Initial Period Northern Central Coast Sechin Complex
900 BCE to 200 BCE Chavin
Central Coast / Western 
Highlands Chavin
Pacopampa Northern Coast Kuntur Wasi, 
200 BCE to 600 CE Moche Northern Coast
Cerro Blanco, San Jose 
de Moro, Sipan, Huaca 
del Sol, Huaca de la Luna
Nazca
Inland from the 
Southern Central Coast Nazca Lines
600 CE to 1000 CE Tiahuanaco Lake Titicaca region Tiahuanaco (in Bolivia)
Wari Central Andes Wari
850 CE to 1470 CE Chimu
Northern Coast 
expanding to Lima
Chan Chan, Sican, 
Chotuna
1200 CE to 1535 CE Inca
Ultimately, Eastern 
South America from 
Ecuador to Central 
Chile
Cuzco, Machu Picchu, 
the Sacred Valley sites, 
Raqchi
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Although the Incas had no writing system, they had sophisticated accounting 
mechanisms and were capable of precise and intricately cut stone work despite 
the fact that iron, let alone steel, was unknown in Peru until the conquest.  As 
rapidly as the Incas ascended, however, their fall was more precipitous.  Between 
1533 and 1536, Spanish conquistadores decisively routed the vast Incan armies 
and seized control of the region, and by the late 16
th
 Century the last holdouts 
among the Incan leadership were defeated (Davies 1997, 186-198). 
The impressive legacy of the Incan empire is evident throughout the 
realm of the former empire.  Figure 9 only hints at the tremendous number of 
Inca sites of significance, with even more of only passing importance, that 
stretch south from Ecuador through Peru to Bolivia and Chile.  In the 21
st
 
Century, however, it is the Incan capital of Cuzco and archaeological sites within 
a day’s bus trip that constitute the Incan heritage experienced by most visitors to 
Peru.  As will be seen below, those tourists are a critical contributor to Peruvian 
economic development.  
Peru’s economy is diversified but concentrated in service industries and 
primary industries.  GDP in 2012 was S/526 billion
6
, of which 7.5 per cent 
originated in agriculture or fishing, 4.7 per cent in mining and hydrocarbons, 
14.1 per cent in manufacturing, 7.1 per cent in construction, and the remainder in 
services, net exports, and import duties.  The country’s export industries, driven 
by mining and hydrocarbons, have achieved trade surpluses for the past decade 
although the current account has been in deficit for five years. (All data Banco 
Central de Reserva de Peru 2012.)  Service Industries, including tourism and 
commercial work, employed 57.2 per cent of Peru’s workers in 2011, while 27.1 
per cent were engaged in agriculture, fishing or mining and only 15.8 per cent in 
manufacturing and construction (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2012).    
The distribution of income in Peru is more equal than in most countries—
it ranks 34
th
 in the world on this score—but still 27.8 per cent of the population 
lived below the poverty line in 2010 (Central Intelligence Agency 2013).  
According to the Peruvian government, extreme poverty is measured as income 
                                                 
6 1 Peruvian Nuevo Sole (S/1) equals approximately US$0.35, or £0.22 
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of S/151 per person per month, while the poverty line is S/284 per person per 
month.  Poverty has dropped dramatically in recent years, from 42.4 per cent of 
the population in 2007 to 25.8 per cent of the population in 2012, concentrated 
largely among workers in agriculture, fishing and mining in rural areas.  The 
poverty rate in the Cusco region is about 22 per cent. (All data from Sistema 
Estadísticas Nacional 2013.)  Economic growth has been a key to the 
improvement in poverty statistics in Peru, and tourism has been a leading factor 
in that growth. 
As the 1980’s conflict with the Sindero Luminoso (Shining Path) 
guerrillas eased following the arrest of its leader, Abimael Guzmán, in 1992 
(Rosas 2010, 305), the Peruvian Government began to focus on developing 
Peru’s heritage as a driver of economic development and heritage preservation in 
country as a whole (Instituto Nacional de Cultura 2002).  The programme has 
been immensely successful. Figure 10 shows that tourist arrivals into Peru have 
risen 167 per cent in the decade 2002-2012, reaching a peak of 2,845,623 foreign 
visitors in 2012 (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo 2013).   
 
Figure 10: Tourist arrivals to Peru, 2002-2012. (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo 
2013) 
The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) estimate that tourism’s 
direct contribution to Peru’s GDP in 2012 was S/18 billion, or 3.4 per cent of 
total GDP.  Taking multiplier effects into account, the WTTC estimates that the 
contribution of tourism amounted to 8.9 per cent of GDP and close to 1 million 
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jobs, 7.4 per cent of total employment.  The WTTC projects national income 
from tourism to grow at around 6 per cent annually for the next decade. Income 
from tourism accounted for 7.4 per cent of Peru’s total exports in 2012. On these 
measures, Peru is similar to other countries in the Americas, but somewhat less 
dependent on tourism than the average.  (All statistics WTTC 2013b) 
Silva (2010) has documented Peru’s extensive history with heritage 
protection.  Attempts to control and protect heritage in the region date to 1574, 
when the Spanish conquerors issued the first order prohibiting looting.  In the 
early years of Peru’s independence in the 19th Century a succession of laws were 
passed to protect built heritage and prohibit looting, although they were of 
limited effect.  By the early 20
th
 Century, requirements were put in place to 
require permitting of excavations, which could only be conducted by degreed 
archaeologists.  In the 1970’s the Instituto Nacional de Cultura (INC) was 
created in the Department of Education to manage archaeological parks and 
conservation, archaeological research, site museums and related cultural 
activities. 
Today, heritage management in Peru is under the control of the Ministry 
of Culture, which includes the INC.  The Ministry is the agency responsible for 
administration of archaeological sites including the Parque Arqueológico de 
Raqchi.  The Director of the Raqchi park is responsible for the Viracocha temple 
complex in Raqchi and for a number of smaller parks and archaeological sites in 
the vicinity of Raqchi.  A paper developed by the current park superintendent, 
Pedro Luna Hullica, has summarized the history of archaeological interventions 
at the Viracocha temple site in Raqchi (Hullica 2012, 58-59).  Excavations and 
research at the site of the park have been conducted with some regularity since 
the 1930’s, and the INC took charge of the monument for conservation purposes 
in 1973. 
Raqchi’s relationship with the INC has at times been tortured. In 
interviews, several respondents identified frictions between the community as a 
whole and the INC as the primary source of “disharmony” in the Raqchi.   
Problems arose most notably in the early 2000’s, when the INC proposed to 
demolish houses and stores facing the village plaza in order to open up a vista to 
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the temple for tourists.  The community coalesced in opposition to this move, 
which also might have destroyed the plaza marketplace, and the INC was forced 
to retreat.  The INC has pushed the community to restrict building heights and 
require tile roofs in order to preserve the community’s rustic appearance and 
these requirements are incorporated into the community regulations (Comunidad 
de Raqchi 2009) although they are not always observed in practice, especially in 
housing far from the village centre.  
The Village of Raqchi, Peru 
Raqchi is a 265 hectare village of tile-roofed, adobe-walled house 
compounds located roughly 3500 metres above sea level and 117 kilometres 
south of Cusco (see Figure 11) on the highway that connects Cusco to Puno, the 
Lake Titicaca area and then onwards to Arequipa (Hullica 2012, 14).  It is 
bordered by the Vilcanota River to the southwest and is surrounded by several 
smaller villages.  The valley of the Vilcanota River is surrounded by low 
mountains including the volcano Kinsach’ata, which had religious significance in 
pre-Inca and Incan times, and which is the source of volcanic stone used in the 
village for construction of walls and some buildings. Legally, the Comunidad 
Campesina de Raqchi is a subdivision of the district headquartered in nearby San 
Pedro in the province of Canchis, Department of Cusco. 
The lands in the vicinity of present-day Raqchi, which had been under the 
control of the Canas and Canchis people for several centuries, were conquered 
and absorbed into the Incan empire during the 15th Century (Hullica 2012; Sillar 
2013).  Under the Incas, Raqchi became a major ceremonial centre located 
astride the Inca highway that connected the northern-most to the southern-most 
reaches of the empire.  Portions of the Inca road remain and are still used as 
footpaths in the village today, as are terraces and a small irrigation system that 
are incorporated into the village’s communally-owned pasture lands.  However, 
early in the colonial period that followed the Spanish conquest of the Inca’s, the 
temple site and much of the region around it was abandoned and was not 
repopulated until the 19
th
 Century, at the start of the republican era (Hullica 
2012, 51).   
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Figure 11: Map locating the village of Raqchi in Peru  (© Google Maps) 
 
 
 
 Figure 12: Ruins of the Viracocha Temple, Raqchi, Peru  (Photo: P. Gould) 
Raqchi 
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Figure 13: The Viracocha temple complex and the Hanan Saya sector of the village of 
Raqchi, Peru (Photo P. Gould) 
  At one edge of the village stands the central wall of the Incan temple to 
the principal god of the Incas, Viracocha.  The Raqchi ruins (Figure 12 and 
Figure 13) are the remains of one of the largest known roofed structures in the 
Incan empire. The massive temple structure (92.2 m long by 25.25 m wide by 12 
m tall) consists of the ruins of the central supporting wall, which features a 
carved stone base and adobe brick superstructure, and the stone foundations of 
the round pillar supports on which roof beams rested. Stone for the temple was 
sourced locally although worked using Incan technology, but the wood beams for 
this structure were imported to Raqchi by the Incas from long distances (Sillar 
2013,40- 42).  
The original town site is surrounded by a roughly 5 km long wall erected 
during Incan times. What may be the remains of a ritual bathing site sit astride a 
stream that feeds an artificial lagoon at one end of the temple.  Nearby stands an 
Ushnu ritual space and the ruins of other buildings. Adjacent to the temple are 
about a dozen essentially identical buildings that provided housing for those 
affiliated with the temple, and about 150 Qolqas, or food storage buildings.  
Some archaeologists believe the Qolqas may date to an earlier period and were 
used as a site for labour camps when the Wari empire dominated the region 
(Sillar et al. 2013).  There is no doubt that the vicinity of present-day Raqchi has 
served as an important ritual centre for centuries. According to Hullica, artefacts 
discovered in the park date human habitation in the area to at least 1000 BCE 
(2012, 46) . 
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Raqchi in 2013 was a village of 353 residents living in about 130 
households (IVU 2013-010).  As Figure 14 illustrates, the village is divided into 
three sectors (Hullica 2012, 19).  The older sector, Hanan Saya, is adjacent to the 
temple ruins.  It is home to about 40 per cent of the families in Raqchi and 
includes the archaeological park, the village Catholic church, and the town plaza 
that is the location for the Asociacíon Inkallaqta market.  Surrounding the plaza 
are the village elementary school, several buildings that serve as storerooms for 
the Asociacíon Inkallaqta members when the market is closed, and eight shops 
or bodegas that primarily serve the tourist trade.  The elementary school serves 
the town’s youngest children, but older children must travel about 15 minutes 
north by public bus to Tinto for middle school and, in later years, about 30 
minutes south by bus to Sicuani for high school. The shops on the plaza, several 
of which are managed by individuals who do not live in Raqchi, sell jewellery, 
llama-pelt clothing and accessories, weavings, knit-wear, and a limited array of 
tourist souvenirs.  The three bodegas on the plaza sell water, beer, candy, fruit, 
personal care items and a miscellany of other products for tourists and, to a lesser 
degree, for locals. 
 
Figure 14: Aerial photo of Raqchi, Peru, indicating the site of the temple ruins, the major 
sectors of the village, and the bordering Vilcanota River  (© Google Earth) 
Urin Saya, the largest sector of the village, is a short distance to the 
northwest and separated from the rest of the village by a stream.  Urin Saya 
Urin Saya 
Hanan Saya 
and the Plaza 
Temple 
Complex 
Qollana ayllu 
Vilcanota R. 
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consists exclusively of residences (except for one small bodega). This part of 
town is the primary location in which construction of new buildings continues 
today.  The third sector, Qollana ayllu, is a small assemblage of houses to the 
south and east of the temple complex alongside the highway. 
Houses and the walls that surround residential compounds are largely of 
adobe, frequently with volcanic stone foundations. Field walls throughout the 
village are constructed of volcanic stones, which are abundant due to the 
proximity to Kinsach’ata volcano. Electricity is available to all residents, 
although there was no running water in the village until 2010 and in 2013 there 
remains no sewage system.  A few houses, owned by members of the 
organisation Turismo Vivencial en Raqchi (Turismo Vivencial), which hosts 
overnight tourists in the village, are equipped with full bathrooms that rely on 
septic systems.  Most other houses are not so equipped.   
Employment opportunities within the village are sparse.  There are two 
small bodegas located on the central plaza to serve tourists and one on each side 
of the village offering staples to local residents.  The bodegas are family-owned 
and generally employ family members.  Each family has an allotment from the 
communal farm lands on which to grow crops or graze sheep, pigs or cattle.  
Agriculture is a primary occupation for men who remain in the village, but most 
leave the village during the day for work, and often go further afield for days at a 
time to work elsewhere.  Although the men’s earnings are critical to families in 
the village, tourism has become a mainstay of the Raqchi economy and the 
primary source of employment for local women.  The community’s most 
significant collective project (all residents are required to participate) is an 
annual festival on the third Sunday in June that brings about 25,000 individuals 
from about 40 communities into the village for a day of traditional dance, food, 
and revelry (Hullica 2012, 35-36). 
Figure 15 illustrates the dramatic increase in tourist visitations to Raqchi 
since 1996, the first year for which visitation to Raqchi was measured by the 
Peruvian Government.  From under 500 visitors in the years through 1998, 
visitation grew at a steady pace after 1999, exceeding 100,000 visitors per year 
for the first time in 2010. In 2012, 86.2 per cent of the 110,140 visitors to Raqchi 
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were foreign tourists. By 2008 it had become one of Peru’s top ten most visited 
archaeological sites (All data Government of Peru 2013, 19). 
Much of Peru’s growth in tourism has occurred in the Cusco region, 
which is the gateway to Machu Picchu and the Sacred Valley Incan sites.  Raqchi 
has benefited from this national tourist boom.  With a dramatic archaeological 
site, a location on the main highway that delivers tourists to the Puno / Lake 
Titicaca region, and the presence of  clean, modern toilet facilities on the main 
plaza, Raqchi became a natural stopping-off point for any tourist making the 4 
hour drive to or from Cusco. As Peru’s tourism industry grew in the early years 
of the 21
st
 Century, Raqchi’s world-class attraction and location positioned it to 
be among the fastest-growing tourist destination in the country. 
 
Figure 15: Visitors to the Raqchi archaeological park, 1996-2012 (Government of Peru 
2013) 
Social / Political Context in Raqchi 
Raqchi’s present-day history as a legal entity begins on June 7, 1964, 
when the village was officially recognized by the national government as a 
comunidad campesino, a separate community within the larger polity of San 
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Pedro (IVU 2013-010).  The village is governed by a community assembly 
(Asemblía Comunidad) that consists of one member from each family in the 
village.  The community assembly is led by a committee of six officers, headed 
by a President, who are elected to two-year terms (Comunidad de Raqchi 2009).   
The village is technically a subdivision of the nearby community of San Pedro, 
where the Alcalde is responsible for several small villages like Raqchi.  
However, matters within the financial capacity and borders of Raqchi are largely 
left to the residents themselves, working through the community assembly and 
the various specialized associations in the village.  The governmental structure in 
Raqchi is typical of the communities that surround it in all respects, but Raqchi is 
the only community in the region with community groups such as Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta  (Hullica 2012, 41-43).   
All community groups in Peru, such as Asociacíon Inkallaqta, are 
required to register with the Superintendencia Nacional de los Registros 
Públicos (SUNARP). Under the rules of the community of Raqchi (see  below in 
this section), community organisations of any substance must both be legally 
recognized by the national government, through registration with SUNARP, and 
must then be approved by the community assembly. In addition to Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta, residents generally identify two other tourism-related organisations as 
the other major organisation in the village. Turismo Vivencial is a cooperative of 
22 families, 13 of whose homes currently are equipped to offer meals and simple 
rooms to tourists. The other group, Las Vendadores de Folletos, is a recently 
formed organisation with about 50 members that prints and sells to tourists a 
four-colour brochure describing the ruins and the village.   
There also is a group dedicated to serving mothers of young children 
(Vaso de Leche), a small group of four residents who are raising guinea pigs 
commercially (Creadores de Cuy), a largely dormant organisation for ceramicists 
(Los Incas de Raqchi), a women’s group that prepares meals for the elderly 
(Comite de Las Mujeres),  a public health committee that manages the village 
water system (Jura Administrative de Saneamiento y Salud), and three separate 
football teams, one each for youths, for men ages 18-40, and for men over 40 
(IVU 2013-040).  The newest organisation in the village, Asociacíon Qapaq 
Sunqu Ayllu, (Qapaq Sunqu) has yet to receive approval from the community 
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assembly but already has more than 20 members and active support from NGO 
and government sources outside of Raqchi in its project to create a competitor to 
Turismo Vivencial. 
The public lavatories on the plaza are administered by a two-person 
committee responsible for ensuring they are maintained and cleaned. Visitors to 
the village are charged S/1 to use the lavatories, generating more than S/31,000 
per year for the community (IVU 2013-032). Each village resident has the 
opportunity, but not the obligation, to work for three days collecting the entrance 
fees to the lavatories, for which they are paid S/50 (IVU 2013-047). The 
voluntary nature of the position at the public lavatory is an exception to a 
structure of obligations and sanctions that generally drive life in Raqchi, where 
participation in civic activity is very much conducted under mandates.   
Governance of the village itself is through meetings of the community 
assembly, which occur with considerable frequency based upon the issues facing 
the community.  Village rules are documented and approved every four years 
(Comunidad de Raqchi 2009). Meetings can be long as community members 
freely debate issues put before the assembly (during the author’s field work in 
Raqchi, one community assembly meeting ran 5-1/2 hours and another 2 hours, 
both in the same week). Although there are exceptions for newly-weds and 
elderly people, attendance by one member of each family is otherwise 
mandatory.  Failure to attend results in a fine (multa) of S/5.  Men in the family 
are the preferred persons to attend, which is encouraged through a multa of S/2.5 
levied on women who attend instead of their husbands.  Failure to attend a 
community assembly meeting, as will be explained below, also results in 
temporary exclusion from the economic activity in the plaza.  While community 
assembly meetings are long and vocal affairs, questions, no matter how 
contentious, are settled by a vote, typically by raised hand.  The majority carries 
the day and the voting process generally puts the issue to rest.  The legacy of this 
mandatory participation in democratic procedures is felt keenly in the operation 
of other organisations in Raqchi, particularly Asociacíon Inkallaqta. 
Other community activities operate under similar combinations of 
mandate and sanction (Comunidad de Raqchi 2009; IVU 2013-047; IVU 2013-
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040).  Community work days (faenas) are called by the President of the 
community for standard or emergency maintenance and are mandatory for adults 
until men reach age 70 and women age 65.  During the author’s residence in 
Raqchi, for example, a culvert under the main entrance road to the community 
collapsed, closing off access to the plaza for bus tourists.  An emergency faena 
was called for the next two days during which men and women hauled several 
truckloads of stone and clay by hand to repair the culvert and to fill pot-holes in 
the entrance road and other major pathways in the village.  Attendance by one 
member of each family at a faena is mandatory.  Men are again encouraged by a 
S/5 multa levied on married women who attend instead of their husbands 
(widows are treated as men). Families that fail to attend at all are subject to a 
S/10 fine and exclusion for 1 day from economic activity in the plaza, including 
selling both with Asociacíon Inkallaqta and with Los Vendadores de Folletos.  
Even the adult football teams in Raqchi are mandatory events.  Men are required 
to play on their appropriate teams, or to attend the games if they are unable to 
play. If they fail to do so, the men are required to pay a S/5 or S/10 multa 
(depending on the team) and their families are suspended from economic activity 
in the marketplace for one week. Fines are ultimately levied at the discretion of 
the community assembly, which has the ability under the community regulations 
to mitigate or increase the multas and other sanctions depending on the severity 
of the violation (Comunidad de Raqchi 2009).  In a sense, these arrangements 
formalize at the community level a long-standing tradition in Raqchi of mutual 
interdependence at the personal level based upon reciprocal obligations to 
provide service to one’s neighbours (Sillar 2013). 
Aside from issues with the INC, residents of Raqchi who were 
interviewed stated most frequently (43.8 per cent) that there were no major 
factional or other divisions in the community.  Those interviewees who identified 
divisions other than with the INC pointed to disputes over money and political 
differences during election seasons.  Overall, the community presents a cohesive 
face to the interviewer: 69.7 per cent of interviewees said relations in the 
community were in general harmonious (“agradable”) and only 6.1 per cent said 
outright that relations in the community were disagreeable (“desagradable”).   
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Much of this communal cohesion is based on a sceptical “trust but verify” 
approach to fellow villagers.  Although, when asked  about the level of 
contributions by individuals to the community, 66.6 per cent of respondents said 
residents gave either time, money or both, when they were asked to describe the 
“spirit of cooperation” in the community, only 32.3 per cent of interviewees said 
it was “good” (“bueno”) or “very good” (“muy bueno”).  The mean “social 
capital index” score in Raqchi was 2.97, close to the mid-point of the 5-point 
scale.  While 90.9 per cent of respondents agreed that “most people in this 
community are honest and trustworthy,” 78.8 per cent agreed that “people are 
always interested only in their own welfare” and 78.1 per cent agreed that “in 
this community, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of 
you.” The dense system of community obligations and sanctions in Raqchi may 
be a major factor in the collective behaviour of Raqchi’s residents. 
Furthermore, disputes over the distribution of the benefits of tourism in 
the community are evident.  Tourism is Raqchi’s primary source of employment, 
including 9 residents who work at the archaeological park (IVU 2013-045) and 
the many who are vendors in the plaza or provide homestays for the 12 to 16 
overnight visitors in the village each month (IVU 2013-021).  In June 2012, 
Qapaq Sunqu was formed to compete with Turismo Vivencial.   Of the 24 
members of Qapaq Sunqu, 70 per cent are younger residents of the community 
who are unable to afford the S/800 entrance fee levied on prospective members 
of Turismo Vivencial (IVU 2013-028, IVU 2013-030). Qapaq Sunqu, which is 
receiving support from an indigenous-culture NGO in Cusco, is seeking to 
establish both a competing network of homestays for overnight visitors to Raqchi 
and to focus the homestay experience on traditional food, medicines, dance and 
crafts, which the group plans to offer to tourists at each homestay.  In an 
interview, the current President of Turismo Vivencial  dismissed Qapaq Sunqu as 
a competitor and expected to expand the Turismo Vivencial  network of tourist-
quality houses by nine homes by 2014 (IVU 2013-021). However, at the time of 
the field research, others in the community foresaw a major conflict coming over 
the village’s relatively small number of overnight visitors.  Indeed, an open 
breech between Qapaq Sunqu and Turismo Vivencial had become a major 
problem in the village by August of 2013 (R. Durband, pers comm, 6/9/2013).    
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Asociacíon Inkallaqta  
Asociacíon Inkallaqta was registered with SUNARP on March 2, 1999 
and commenced selling in the plaza of Raqchi at a festival on May 2, 1999.  
Raqchi has a long history as a major ceramics production centre in Andean Peru.  
In the late 1990’s, however, production in the village was exclusively for resale 
to retail vendors and ceramics decorators in major tourist cities such as Cusco 
and Pisac, both to the north of Raqchi closer to the Sacred Valley and the tourist 
centre of Machu Picchu.  Founders of Asociacíon Inkallaqta report that, at the 
time, retail prices in those cities were substantially higher than the price Raqchi 
ceramicists could obtain for their product as intermediary producers (IVU 2013-
006, IVU 2013-018). 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta was conceived in late 1998, when a small group of 
crafts people in Raqchi were convened by a village resident, Enrique Leon Cusi 
Mamani, to discuss creating a local retail activity to try to capture some of that 
extra price margin locally (IVU 2013-006).  Tourism at that time was sparse—no 
more than a handful of visitors per day and fewer than 1000 in all of 1999 (see 
Figure 15).  But with the Sindero Luminoso rebellion winding down and the 
Peruvian government turning to tourism as a potential impetus to economic 
growth, prospects for increased visitation to Raqchi appeared promising.  Cusi 
Mamani’s group gradually increased in size until, by March of 1999, a total of 20 
artisans were part of the founding group that registered with SUNARP and 
sought approval from the community assembly. Cusi Mamani, the first Secretary 
General of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, served for two years and then stepped down.  
Subsequently there have been 6 elections for new leadership of Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta.   
While both the Burren Centre and the MCWG had far more intricate 
birthing processes, this simple process of village self-organisation seems to be 
typical in Raqchi.  For example, Qapaq Sunqu has been formed in 2012 in 
almost exactly the same fashion: a small group began with an idea, recruited 
others to the project, and then reached the critical mass of members to file with 
SUNARP and begin to solicit approval from the community assembly.  No 
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contention over the start-up of Asociacíon Inkallaqta was reported by any 
“founding” member interviewed in this study.  
Initially, the market in Raqchi’s plaza was open only one day per week, 
but the number of selling days grew along with tourist traffic and the number of 
households in Raqchi active in Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  By 2000, the group had 
decided to require that all vendors wear similar traditional attire, and by 2003 it 
had defined the traditional outfits currently worn by men and women, which 
were based on clothing styles worn by village elders (IVU 2013-006).  Those 
costumes must be worn whenever selling in the central plaza.  Today in Raqchi 
those same outfits are worn for all traditional activities in the village, including 
festivals and meetings of other community groups, such as the Qapaq Sunqu 
meeting attended by the author.   
In 2013, the market operates seven days per week.  There are 55 
households active in Asociacíon Inkallaqta, including 51 who sell product in the 
plaza, one weaver who sets up her back-strap loom in the plaza every day, and 3 
vendors of food or drink.  In addition, there are about 10 “passive” members of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta, generally elderly original members who are eligible to 
sell in the plaza but no longer choose to do so.  The market place itself is 
disassembled every evening and reassembled every morning. Each vendor owns 
his or her own merchandise and has built the table on which it is displayed.  The 
wooden tables are generally uniform in dimensions, though designs differ 
slightly.  Each vendor also has an umbrella, sewn together from bags of potatoes 
or rice, that is stretched over a collapsible metal frame to protect merchandise 
from sunlight and rain.  Umbrella tops serve double-duty as covers that are 
stretched over the tables at night when they are stored away in one of four 
buildings near the plaza.   
Figure 16 summarizes a typical day in the marketplace as observed by the 
author in November 2012.  Activity may begin early, with a cleaning of the plaza 
by one member of Asociacíon Inkallaqta (see page 202 below), but tables do not 
appear until around 9 a.m.  Vendors are required to be in place by 10 a.m. in 
order to hold their assigned place in the plaza for that day.  Figure 17 through 
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Figure 24 photographically illustrate the course of a typical day in the Plaza 
marketplace. 
 
Figure 16: Summary of a typical day, Asociacíon Inkallaqta, Raqchi, Peru 
The tourist traffic through Raqchi is dominated by bus tourists en route 
from Cusco to Puno and Lake Titicaca, or returning to Cusco.  South-bound 
buses arrive in the village after 10 a.m. and before noon; northbound buses begin 
to arrive after lunch around 1 p.m. and generally finish arriving by 3 p.m. 
Tourists generally are given a few minutes to visit the public lavatories 
operated by the village in a building facing onto the plaza and the marketplace, 
A Day in the Life
Asociacíon Inkallaqta 
Raqchi, Peru
Observed November 13, 2012
7:00 a.m. Plaza cleaning
8:30 a.m. First tables on the plaza, bodegas begin to open
9:15 a.m. Shop owners begin to move displays onto the plaza
9:55 a.m. 24 tables on the plaza; first bus arrives
10:00 a.m. WC facilites for tourists open for business
11:00 a.m. 29 tables on plaza; first bus loads emerging from temple site
11:15 a.m. All morning buses departed;  some vendors head home for lunch
1:00 p.m. Afternoon buses begin to arrive
1:30 p.m. Tourists emerge from ruins to shop the market
3:20 p.m. Last bus of the day leaves Raqchi
3:30 p.m. Shops begin to close up and breakdown of market begins
4:45 p.m. All but 9 tables stored; last bodega closes for the day
6:00 p.m. Plaza cleared of all tables; all shops shuttered
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then they are hustled off to a tour of the temple site.  Tours tend to last about 45 
minutes, and tourists exit the temple site directly into the marketplace.  Although 
stays vary, few buses permit tourists to stop in the market for more than 15 
minutes or so, after which the tourists are loaded onto buses for the trip to nearby 
Sicuani and lunch.  Activity slows at mid-day, when the local food vendors tend 
to sell lunch to those members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta who stay in the plaza. 
Activity resumes about 1 p.m. with the first north-bound buses.  North-bound 
tourist traffic continues to arrive until about 3 p.m., after which vendors begin 
the process of closing their tables and clearing the plaza.  Generally by 6 p.m. the 
plaza is completely empty. Throughout the day, individual tourists arrive by 
public bus or private car, but bus traffic accounts for the largest portion of 
visitors.  During the two field-work visits to Raqchi in 2012 and early 2013, the 
largest number of buses observed in one day was 12, accounting for close to 
1000 visitors in that day.   
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ASOCIACÍON INKALLAQTA, RAQCHI, PERU: ILLUSTRATIONS 
All photos by P. Gould 
 
 
Figure 17: The first tables appear on the plaza around 8 a.m. 
 
Figure 18: Vendors arranging their tables and assembling umbrellas at the start of the day 
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Figure 19: The market in full operation in late morning  
 
 
Figure 20: Tourists arriving in the plaza of Raqchi.  Bus parking is to the rear.   
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Figure 21: A typical vendor, in traditional dress, and a typical assortment of goods for sale 
 
Figure 22: Tourists exit the archaeological park into the Raqchi marketplace  
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Figure 23: The plaza in the afternoon, showing the town weaver, a vendor dispensing 
lunches from a wheelbarrow, and tourist shops arrayed on the far edge of the plaza 
 
Figure 24: At day’s end, vendors cover their tables and goods with the umbrella covers and 
carry them to one of four storage rooms adjacent to the plaza  
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Institutional Structure of the Asociacíon Inkallaqta 
This section of the chapter summarizes the essential institutional 
characteristics of Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  The results presented here are derived 
from two sources:  First, documentary evidence was made available to the 
author, principally the minute books of Asociacíon Inkallaqta (2013) and the 
official regulations of the Comunidad de Raqchi (2009).  Second, responses to 
open-ended interview questions provided additional information on the structure 
and procedures of Asociacíon Inkallaqta in practice.  In the interest of clear 
communication of the substance of these results, the results of this information 
have been distilled by the author into a summary format.   
Where documentary resources are the basis for statements, those sources 
are cited. Otherwise, data contained in this section is derived from the interviews 
in Raqchi in November 2012 and in February and March 2013. Statistical data 
reported here is derived from the closed-end responses, mostly questions that 
asked interviewees to “Agree” or “Disagree” with specific statements.  
Responses may be reviewed in detail in Appendix 8.  As noted in Chapter 6 (see 
page 162), the Agree / Disagree dimension in all these questions has been 
collapsed from the original four-box scale (including “Strongly Agree” and 
“Strongly Disagree”) because the insufficient number of “Strongly” responses 
undermined the statistical significance of the data. 
In the interest of readability, question numbers are omitted but the 
substance of each question is presented here in English.  The mapping of 
questionnaire items by number to the Model Institutional Features is presented in 
Chapter 6 (see page 153). 
Legal Structure 
All community groups in Peru, such as Asociacíon Inkallaqta, are 
required to register with the Superintendencia Nacional de los Registros 
Públicos (SUNARP).  In addition, in Raqchi under the community rules of 
Raqchi, new associations must receive approval from the community assembly.  
Asociacíon Inkallaqta acquired both of these approvals in March 1999.  The 
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association is required to renew its registration with SUNARP every two years 
by paying a fee of S/150 at the SUNARP office in Sicuani. 
Membership eligibility; voting eligibility 
Only legal residents of the community of Raqchi are eligible for 
membership in Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  In Peru, voting is mandatory for adults 
ages 18 and over, and each adult is registered through the census to a particular 
community.  To participate in community affairs, including membership in 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta, an individual must be identified in the census as a 
resident of Raqchi.  Although women predominantly work as vendors in the 
plaza marketplace, husbands and children also can work in their place if 
necessary, and one man maintains a full-time presence as a vendor.  Each 
registered adult in Raqchi is eligible to join Asociacíon Inkallaqta and sell in the 
plaza marketplace, although membership is at the household level.  To do so, the 
family must pay an initiation fee of S/30 to the community assembly and S/30  to 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  In 2013 there were 55 active members of Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta and about 10 “passive” members. Each family that works actively in 
the plaza, whether as vendors, artisans or food vendors, is eligible for one vote in 
the assembly of Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  One member of each family is obligated 
to attend the meetings of Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  All voting is by hand in the 
open meeting.  
Selection of Leaders 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta has a roster of 11 officer positions which together 
comprise the leadership of the organisation.  The executive group consists of a 
Secretario General / President and Secretarios des Actes (recording secretary), 
de Economia (treasurer), de Organización (organisation), de Prense Propoganda 
(marketing), de Arte Folklorico (traditional crafts), de Producíon (a 
procurement-related office), de Relaciones Exteriores (public relations), de 
Disciplina (discipline, something of a Sergeant-at-Arms), and two 
Coordinadores del Mercado who work alternate days managing the affairs of the 
marketplace.   
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All of the leaders are elected by the general assembly of Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta for terms of two years, except for the Coordinadores de Mercado 
whose terms are for 3 months only.  Candidates for office are nominated from 
the floor by other members of the group. Typically, there are two candidates for 
each office and a majority vote, by raised hand, determines the election.  
Coordinadore positions are rotated among the members and are not elected. 
Executive Committee Role 
The Junta, or officer group of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, plays an operational 
role but not a decision-making role in the organisation.  Decisions on all matters 
are brought before a general assembly of Asociacíon Inkallaqta and there appear 
to be no special rights or responsibilities delegated to the Junta.  Rather, 
individual officers have obligations associated with their offices. Specified 
officers are responsible for managing day-to-day operations in the marketplace, 
for routine disciplinary actions, and for interfacing with various publics 
including the community assembly. Many of the officers’ positions seem to have 
no clear responsibilities or relate to tasks rarely if ever performed.  No 
interviewee in Raqchi described the Junta as a body with any autonomous 
capacity to act for Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  All executive functions are instead in 
the hands of the members through the general assembly.  The Junta does not 
meet formally in meetings outside of the General Assembly of Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta. 
Decision-Making / Conflict Resolution Mechanics 
Meetings of the general assembly of Asociacíon Inkallaqta are called by 
the Secretary General quarterly, in January, April, July and October, and 
otherwise as necessary.  All issues, ranging from matters of policy to disputes 
between members or disciplinary matters, are brought before the general 
assembly for discussion and, if necessary, a public vote.   Verbal reports on the 
association’s finances are made at each meeting and full minutes of the meeting 
are maintained by the Secretario des Actes.  At the conclusion of each meeting, 
each member signs the minute book, a practice also followed at meetings of the 
community assembly and in other community groups.  Minute books are 
available for review by members at or between meetings. 
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Conflicts within the organisation are resolved within a general assembly 
through a process of debate and, if necessary, democratic vote.  Members 
uniformly (96.8 per cent of respondents) report that “participation at the 
meetings is active,” and the same proportion agreed that “the organisation is 
open to broad debate, including opposing opinions.”  The author was able to 
attend one Asociacíon Inkallaqta general assembly meeting during the field 
work.  It was held in the central plaza at night, was well attended, and involved 
considerable give-and-take among the participants.  Interestingly, however, and 
perhaps reflecting the scepticism about current Asociacíon Inkallaqta leadership 
discussed elsewhere in this section (see page 211), only 77.4 per cent of 
members report that “attendance at meetings is strong” despite the fact that 
attendance is mandatory and, as noted below (see page 203), those who miss 
meetings are subject to sanctions. 
Rules in Use 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta has recorded in its official minute books the broad 
range of rules that apply to all members (Asociacíon Inkallaqta 2013).  These 
include:  
 Each member is entitled to a single table, of standard dimensions, on 
which any member of the family may display for sale crafts items made 
by the family or purchased from sources within or beyond Raqchi.  Some 
but not all crafts must be locally produced.  Today, the locally-produced 
items often are ceramics painted locally but manufactured elsewhere. 
 Members are obliged to clean the plaza, on a rotational basis among all 
members and the shopkeepers with tourist shops on the plaza.  Thus, 
approximately once in every two months each member has the obligation 
to ensure that the plaza is swept and clear of debris before and during the 
day.  
 Attendance at all meetings of the general assembly of Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta is mandatory for one member from each family.   
 There is an accord among vendors on the pricing of craft items offered in 
the marketplace and it is an infraction of the rules to sell below the agreed 
price. 
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 Members must agree to participate in the scheme for rotating tables 
among the 51 potential locations in the plaza.  Each day, each member’s 
table location moves one spot around a circuit designed to share among 
the members access to the more choice locations, which are closer to the 
exit door from the temple ruins or closer to the public lavatory at the 
opposite side of the plaza. 
 Figure 25 presents a map of the table locations followed in the rotational 
scheme.  Members must be in the marketplace by 10 a.m. to hold their 
assigned spot for the day.  After 10 a.m., the Coordinadores rearrange 
tables to eliminate unused spaces and present a uniform market to 
tourists.  The one exception observed was that the prime spot by the exit 
from the park, number 1 on Figure 25, would be left open in case that 
day’s assigned table-owner arrived late. 
 Members are obliged to respect and follow the directions of members of 
the Junta and to respect other members of the association. 
 Members may not bring children to the general assembly meetings. 
 The coordinator of the market is obliged to manage affairs in the 
marketplace on assigned days.     
 Members of the Junta are expressly charged with not abusing their 
authority. 
 Asociacíon Inkallaqta regulations require all members to attend meetings 
of the community assembly.  The integration of Asociacíon Inkallaqta 
and the community assembly is discussed below (see page 216) and in 
the next section. 
Sanctions and Enforcement  
The sanctions regime applied by Asociacíon Inkallaqta (Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta 2013) is complex, with discrete penalties associated with each type of 
breach of the rules.  Specifically: 
 
 
Page | 204  
 
 
 
Figure 25: Map of table locations in the plaza market, Raqchi, Peru (Drawing: P. Gould)  
Ta
b
le
 L
o
ca
ti
o
n
s 
in
 t
h
e
 P
la
za
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
A
SO
C
IA
C
ÍO
N
 IN
K
A
LL
A
Q
TA
R
aq
ch
i,
 P
e
ru
(T
ab
le
 lo
ca
ti
o
n
s 
n
u
m
b
e
re
d
 b
y 
ro
ta
ti
o
n
 o
rd
e
r)
29
28
11
10
45
30
27
12
9
44
31
26
13
8
43
32
25
14
7
N
IC
H
 O
ff
ic
e
 a
n
d
 
M
u
se
u
m
 
(C
lo
se
d
)
42
33
24
15
6
41
34
23
16
5
40
35
22
17
4
39
38
37
36
21
20
19
18
3
2
1
46
47
48
49
50
51
P
R
IV
A
TE
 S
H
O
P
S 
A
N
D
 B
O
D
EG
A
S
Ex
it
 f
ro
m
 
Te
m
p
le
 
G
ro
u
n
d
s
En
tr
an
ce
 
to
 W
C
s
St
o
re
 
R
o
o
m
s 
fo
r 
V
e
n
d
o
rs
C
at
h
o
li
c 
C
h
u
rc
h
Page | 205  
 
 Members who fail to fulfil their obligation to clean the plaza may be 
barred from selling in the plaza for three days.  Such failure also may 
subject the Asociacíon Inkallaqta to a S/10 fine from the community 
assembly. 
 Members who fail to attend meetings of the Asociacíon Inkallaqta are 
subject to a 2 day suspension from selling. Members who bring children 
to the Asociacíon Inkallaqta general assembly may be suspended for 1 
day. 
 Members who sell products below agreed prices are subject to a 2 day 
suspension. 
 Members who fail to respect or follow directions of Junta members or 
who fail to respect other members may be suspended for 1 day. 
 Coordinadores who fail to perform their duties may be suspended for 1 
day. 
 Junta members who abuse their authority may be suspended for 2 days. 
Interestingly, no sanction is identified in the association’s minute books, 
nor was one ever articulated by a member during an interview, in the event that a 
member of Asociacíon Inkallaqta appeared in the plaza to sell but failed to wear 
traditional attire.  However, in the several weeks the author spent in the plaza 
conducting field work, on no occasion did any individual work at a table in the 
marketplace for more than a few minutes without the traditional clothing.  The 
only exceptions tended to be husbands filling in momentarily for their wives. 
Even children selling for their mothers appeared in the proper attire (several 
teenagers came every day as the field work coincided with a school vacation).  
The sanctions regimes of the community assembly and Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta are integrated in certain cases, indicating the value that community 
members place on the ability to sell in the plaza marketplace. The official 
regulations of the community of Raqchi (Comunidad de Raqchi 2009) provide 
for both cash fines and exclusion from selling activities in the plaza marketplace 
for a variety of infractions, including failure to attend community meetings and 
work days or failure to participate on community football teams.  The rules of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta contain a parallel provision obligating its members to 
Page | 206  
 
attend community meetings (Asociacíon Inkallaqta 2013). Furthermore, the 
community uses the threat of exclusion from the marketplace to enforce other 
town regulations.  Community members who fail to properly dispose of trash or 
participate in the neighbourhood watch, or who use the name of the community 
without authority of the community assembly, are subject to suspension from the 
plaza marketplace for one week, among other penalties, and any person who 
usurps the functions of the community assembly is suspended from sales in the 
plaza for 3 days, plus a cash sanction. 
These statutory sanctions are subject to modification either by the 
assembly of Asociacíon Inkallaqta or the community assembly, depending on the 
particular infraction.  Sanctions may be increased or reduced based on the 
severity of the infraction and other circumstances.  In general, sanctions of the 
community assembly that involve suspensions from activity in the plaza apply to 
members of both the Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the Vendadores de Folletos. 
The sanctions applied to members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta in their 
community-and association-related activities are numerous and specific.  Of all 
members interviewed, 76.7 per cent agreed that the organisation follows its 
procedures and policies faithfully (including sanction enforcement).  A 
significant minority disagreed, and a few specifically said that the current 
leadership of Asociacíon Inkallaqta is, as one person put it, is “interested solely 
in selling” (IVU 2013-045).  Furthermore, the succession of interviews with 
members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta and community leaders revealed considerable 
confusion over the actual levels of sanctions for different infractions.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that rules and sanctions are universally understood to 
exist in the village, widely believed to be important, and are critical to the 
continuing effectiveness of many activities and organisations in Raqchi.  
Sources of Finance and Financial Management  
Asociacíon Inkallaqta is in a practical sense a mechanism for the 
community to manage the access of individual entrepreneurs to the tourists who 
visit the village every day.  The association collects no data on the amounts 
invested by individual members in the products they sell nor does it collect data 
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on the earnings of its members, either individually or collectively.  As noted 
above (see page 171), individual members are reluctant to discuss their incomes, 
perhaps because small-scale entrepreneurial businesses (microempresas) in Peru 
are subject to no or reduced taxation (Servicio de Impuestos Internos 2013), 
creating an incentive for individuals to keep a veil of secrecy over their actual 
earnings from vending in Raqchi. 
The treasurer of the Asociacíon Inkallaqta maintains a small cash reserve, 
at most a few hundred Soles at any one time.  The funds are accumulated through 
a levy on the members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, decided upon at an assembly 
meeting each year and paid quarterly.  Typically, payments amount to no more 
than S/20 per member (IVU 2013-014), or roughly S/1100 annually for the 
group.  This cash is used to fund the group’s biennial re-registration with 
SUNARP, to pay its annual S/200 contribution to the community assembly of 
Raqchi, to contribute to fiestas or other cash needs of the community, and to pay 
for the annual anniversary celebration for Asociacíon Inkallaqta, held each 
March 2, which is an evening party of games, dances and drinking in the plaza 
that involves the entire community. 
Comparing Asociacíon Inkallaqta to the Model Institutional 
Features 
This section of the chapter will present the findings of the study of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta as they relate to the hypotheses set forth in Chapter 6 (see 
page 153).  Some of the data relevant to the conclusions drawn in this section 
were presented in the prior section describing the institutional features of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta, however other data, primarily of a statistical nature and 
drawn from the closed-end questions asked of respondents, is presented here for 
the first time.   
MIF 1: Clearly defined boundaries 
Testable implication: 
 Interviewees should be able to articulate the physical boundaries that 
determine who may or may not become a member of the organisation. 
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In Raqchi, the boundaries of the community and eligibility to join any 
community organisations, including Asociacíon Inkallaqta, are established in the 
regulations of the community.  In this way, access to the tourists who visit 
Raqchi, whether for crafts or booklet sales or for homestays, is effectively 
restricted to legal residents only.  The only exceptions are the few shops on the 
plaza that are owned by outside artisans.  The boundaries affecting Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta thus are unambiguous. 
MIF 2: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions 
Testable Implications: 
 The rules of the organisation should be clearly derived from relevant 
legal authority and/or traditional practices, or their legitimacy should be 
traceable to conditions in the community, including traditional legal 
structures, social norms, governance practices, and the degree of social 
capital in evidence in the community.   
According to the oldest man interviewed in this study, a former 
community President, the community assembly’s democratic rules were 
established when the village was officially recognized in 1964 (IVU 2013-008).  
Survey respondents were clear that all organisations in Raqchi operate on the 
model of the community assembly.  Democratic decision-making in assemblies 
of members is the norm in Raqchi, participation in meetings is active and usually 
mandatory, and decisions normally are made by raised-hand vote.  These 
procedures are mirrored in the operation of Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  Of those 
members interviewed, 96.8 per cent agreed with the statement “Participation in 
decision making in the organisation is strong.”  Frequently they would go on to 
describe meetings in which members felt free to express differing opinions.  
Asociacíon Inkallaqta clearly manages its affairs within both the written rules 
and traditional open-debate format evident in the governance traditions of 
Raqchi. 
 Indicators of social capital and trust should be consistent with the 
institutional elements of the organisation (i.e. greater protections 
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associated with lower levels of trust and social capital as identified and 
vice versa). 
The impact of the social capital and trust indicators on structure is best 
comprehended by comparison of each of the three case-studies, which will be 
addressed in Chapter 10. 
MIF 3: Collective choice arrangements 
Testable implications: 
 Projects will be organized, either as formal legal entities or informally, 
in a manner that empowers community members (either personally or 
through community-selected representatives) to participate directly in the 
governance of the project.  
Asociacíon Inkallaqta is an entity formally registered with the Peruvian 
government, recognized by the Raqchi community assembly and operating 
pursuant to the community’s internal regulations.  The general assembly of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta is the entity through which all decisions on policy, rules 
and sanctions are made by the organisation.  Direct participation in democratic 
decision making is the norm in Raqchi and is clearly evident in the institutional 
structure of Asociacíon Inkallaqta. 
 Government officials and supporting NGOs should perceive the project 
as “owned” or “controlled” by the community or at least by project 
members. 
 There are no government officials or NGO’s involved directly 
with Asociacíon Inkallaqta in Raqchi.  Separately, the author briefly interviewed 
the owners of the bodegas and shops located on the plaza, several of whom do 
not live in Raqchi.  All shop-owners recognized that Asociacíon Inkallaqta was 
owned by the community as a whole. 
 Legal documentation associated with the project, if any, should provide 
for individuals in the immediate community to “own” or “control” the 
project. 
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The community regulations (Comunidad de Raqchi 2009) clearly 
authorize the community assembly to create organisations such as Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta under the community’s authority and control, and the minute books of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta (Asociacíon Inkallaqta 2013) are clear in the mechanisms 
for the association to self-manage its affairs.  The legal standing of Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta and its right to manage its own affairs is unambiguous. 
 Leadership of the project at the community level should have changed in 
an orderly fashion since its founding. 
The original officers of Asociacíon Inkallaqta were established at its 
foundation in 1999.  Subsequently, the slate of officer holders has changed in a 
routine fashion every two years.  
 Interviews should reveal changes in mission, addition of new businesses 
and/or adjustment of the business model in response to experience or to 
changes in external conditions. 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta has had neither a change in mission nor any 
changes in its activities since it was formed.  The composition of materials sold 
has changed, largely reflecting the decline in the number of active ceramics 
producers in the village, some of whom are reported to have stopped producing 
ceramics in favour of selling products made by others.  As a result, the goods 
offered in Raqchi come predominantly from crafts people in other cities.  The 
founding mission of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, to offer a marketplace for crafts to 
visitors to the archaeological park, has not changed. 
 Project members should support propositions similar to “Members have 
a direct influence on the plans and activities of the organisation.” 
Survey respondents were highly supportive of these sorts of propositions.  
In all, 93.8 per cent of interviewees agreed that “Without exception, the members 
of the association control the association;” 100 per cent agreed that “The 
association members set their own rules and enforce them;” 93.5 per cent 
concurred that “Members have direct influence on the plans and activities of the 
association;” and 96.8 per cent of interviewees agreed that “The organisation is 
open to broad debate, including opposing opinions. 
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MIF 4: Active monitoring 
Testable Implications: 
 Audited or unaudited financial records of the group are made available 
to project members with regularity. 
No audits or other written reports are prepared on the finances of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  Only about 24.1 per cent of interviewees responded that 
they received financial reports of any sort.  Officers, however, report that verbal 
reports are made at meetings of the group and recorded in the minutes of the 
association (IVU 2013-014; IVU 2013-016).  Thus, interviewee’s responses may 
be due to confusion over language.  The structure of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, of 
course, mitigates this issue.  Cash handled by the organisation itself is 
“pocotito,” or very small, amounting to a few hundred Soles at any time.  Each 
vendadore is in effect an independent business and no collective financial books 
are maintained or needed.  Perhaps because the amounts are so low, 90.3 per cent 
of interviewees concurred with the statement “I trust the association leaders 
when they handle money.”  
 Participants should support propositions similar to “I feel well informed 
about the activities of the organisation,” “The association leaders are 
fair and honest,” or “I trust the association leaders when they handle 
money.” 
 A large majority (87.5 per cent) of respondents supported the 
proposition that “The association leaders are fair and honest,” slightly fewer than 
the number who expressed confidence in the leaders when they handle money.  
Only 77.4 per cent agreed with the statement “The leaders of the association are 
effective at their jobs.”  Of all interviewees, 96.8 per cent agreed with “I feel 
well informed about the activities of the organisation;” 93.3 per cent agreed that 
“Members have a high level of knowledge of the procedures and policies” of the 
association; but only 76.7 per cent agreed that “The association follows its 
policies and procedures faithfully.” A significant minority of the organisation is 
doubtful about the current leadership of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, although cross 
tabulations revealed no systematic basis for that scepticism.  Nonetheless, the 
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vast majority of members support propositions that confirm a positive attitude 
toward the organisation and its administration. 
MIF 5: Graduated sanctions 
Testable Implications: 
 Formal or informal mechanisms should exist to enable project members 
to regulate participant compliance with obligations to the project. 
Preceding sections described the rules in use in Asociacíon Inkallaqta and 
the sanctions imposed upon members committing infractions.  Given the open-
air nature of the marketplace, many infractions of the rules would take place 
under the eyes of the membership.  Other matters, such as attendance at 
meetings, can be monitored easily as each member in attendance is required to 
sign the minute book at the conclusion of each meeting.  Failure to contribute to 
the organisation on demand can be easily monitored by the treasurer of 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  Furthermore, transgressions of community rules that also 
prohibit individuals from participation in the plaza market would be monitored 
by community members in general and by the leadership of Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta.  There are, in short, numerous mechanisms in place in Raqchi for 
members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta to monitor compliance with the rules of the 
organisation. 
 A system of sanctions and penalties should exist and reflect “punishment 
to suit the infraction” or discretionary sanction imposition. 
As described above (see page 203), the comprehensive set of sanctions 
developed by Asociacíon Inkallaqta to address infractions of the rules scale from 
exclusion from the market for a single day to exclusion for several days at a time.  
The assembly of Asociacíon Inkallaqta has the authority to adjust the sanctions if 
conditions warrant a penalty that is greater or lesser than the standard.    
 Evidence of effective monitoring/enforcement activity should be 
identifiable. 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta maintains no records of disciplinary actions.  
Despite the doubts expressed by a minority of the members about the degree of 
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enforcement by present Asociacíon Inkallaqta leaders, the most substantial 
evidence for the effectiveness of the sanctions regime is the fact that more than 
three-quarters of members interviewed concurred that “The association follows 
its policies and procedures faithfully.” 
MIF 6: Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Testable Implications: 
 Conflicts in the organisation should be resolved through institutional 
structures in ways that do not undermine the continued viability of the 
organisation.   
Members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta universally identified the general 
assembly of the association as the forum for resolving differences among the 
members.  When pressed in interviews, the members described meetings in 
which numerous differing opinions are expressed, after which questions are 
settled by open voting in which the majority view prevails. 
 Project members should be able to articulate circumstances in which 
conflicts have arisen and the process through which they were resolved. 
No member articulated a major “conflict” within Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  
As in the village generally, differences of opinion—which are common and often 
vigorous—are distinguished from “conflicts” in Raqchi.  The legitimacy of 
democratic voting as a means to resolve differences in Raqchi translates into 
very few persistent “conflicts” being reported in the community.  As one 
member put it, “Conflicts are momentary; they are not eternal” (IVU 2013-026). 
 The conflict resolution process described in interviews should be 
managed within the institutional structure of the project. 
By managing any disagreements through open discussion and democratic 
procedures within the general assembly of Asociacíon Inkallaqta, the dispute 
resolution process is entirely within the normal institutional structure of the 
organisation.  
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 The conflict resolution process described in interviews should be 
perceived to be fair and efficient. 
Of all members, 93.3 per cent agreed with the statement that “Conflicts 
within the organisation are resolved effectively and fairly.” 
MIF 7: Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
Testable Implications: 
 Where the entity is subject to incorporation requirements, those laws and 
regulations enable and affirm local control of the project. 
Within the Peruvian system, the community of Raqchi, as a “comunidad 
campesina,” is authorized to establish or recognize organisations, such as 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta, which are entirely locally controlled (Comunidad de 
Raqchi 2009). 
 Where the entity is not subject to incorporation requirements, 
Government officials, associated archaeologists, supporting NGOs, and 
others should perceive the project as “owned” or “controlled” by the 
community through project members. 
This situation does not apply in Raqchi. 
MIF 8: Meaningful economic value to the community 
Testable Implications: 
 Economic data collected by government enterprises should reveal 
economic benefit to the community residents. 
No economic data generated by the government addresses the economic 
impact of Asociacíon Inkallaqta on the Raqchi community.   
 Financial Records of the project should demonstrate income generation 
to the community (e.g. through distributions of revenues, dividends, etc.). 
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Asociacíon Inkallaqta maintains no financial records, and individual 
members do not disclose their personal incomes from their independent crafts 
businesses in the marketplace.   
 Businesses and others in the community when surveyed should report 
direct economic benefit due to the project. 
A survey of business owners with shops on the plaza did not support the 
importance of Asociacíon Inkallaqta to other businesses in the village.  Five out 
of seven owners of shops on the plaza expressed the view that their businesses 
would be the same or better if Asociacíon Inkallaqta ceased to operate the crafts 
marketplace.  This reflects the fact that the large majority of product offerings in 
the plaza shops do not compete directly with the vendors in the plaza market, and 
that the tourists who constitute the customer base for the shops come to visit the 
archaeological park, not the crafts market. 
 Project members when surveyed should state that economic benefits 
accrue to them from the project. 
The dearth of statistical information in Raqchi is compensated for by 
broad support among the members for the economic value of the Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta marketplace.  All interviewees agreed that “Membership in the 
organisation has benefitted my family financially” and 90.6 per cent agreed that 
“The association has been of benefit to the local community.”  Further, those 
who dissented from the latter statement tended to interpret the word 
“community” to mean the community assembly and to deny any specific impact 
of Asociacíon Inkallaqta on the official community body beyond the S/200 it 
pays annually to the village government.  As noted in Chapter 6 (see page 171) 
the concept of the economy of the “community as a whole” was absent generally 
in Raqchi and the Asociacíon Inkallaqta marketplace was frequently identified as 
“for the members” not for the “community.”  The broad support for Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta’s impact on individual families likely reflects the dearth of 
employment opportunities in the village.  As one young mother and vendor put 
it, “there is no other work…that is the importance of Inkallaqta” (IVU 2013-
020). 
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Conclusion 
This first chapter of three on the data gathered from the field work 
presents the findings from the study of Asociacíon Inkallaqta in Raqchi, Peru.  
Asociacíon Inkallaqta was organized by members of the local community, with 
no direct assistance from government or non-governmental organisations, in 
response to the increasing interest in expanding Peru’s tourism market in the 
post-Sindero Luminoso (Shining Path) period that started in the early 1990’s.  As 
Peru’s reputation for domestic peace grew and the government’s promotional 
efforts took hold, tourism rose rapidly in Raqchi, taking it from a virtually 
ignored site to one of the top ten most-visited heritage sites in Peru by 2008. 
The governance rules and practices of Asociacíon Inkallaqta derived 
directly from those of the community assembly in Raqchi, which engages all 
families in the village in active participation in democratic decision making. The 
legitimacy of majoritarian decision rules in Raqchi is critical to every aspect of 
the village’s life, and particularly to the operation of Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  
Similarly, the village’s intense reliance on mandatory obligations of citizenship 
and defined sanctions for those who defect from their obligations is reflected in 
the rules of Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  Perhaps the best testimony to the importance 
of Asociacíon Inkallaqta to the economic life of Raqchi is the degree to which 
the community assembly has included sanctions from selling in the plaza into its 
own regulations, such as for attendance at meetings and faenas, or participation 
in football matches with other villages. 
Raqchi also presents the most direct case illustrating the argument made 
above (see page 98) that the ultimate common pool resource being exploited by 
these projects is the flow of tourists and their spending. The table-rotation 
scheme devised by the members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta mimics precisely the 
approach taken by the Turkish fisherman in the case study by Berkes cited earlier 
(see page 125).  The table rotation achieves the similar objectives: competition 
for prime spaces near the park exit and public toilets (see Figure 25) is 
eliminated while contention among the members is minimized.  The author 
observed a similar solution adopted by the artisans group at the Huaca del Sol / 
Huaca de la Luna archaeological site near Trujillo on the north coast of Peru.  
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Community control over the harvesting of dollars from tourists, similar to the 
process of harvesting schools of fish, can be managed as a common pool 
resource regime.   
With respect to Raqchi, at this stage, one can say that there is substantial 
conformity of the institutions of Asociacíon Inkallaqta with the principles and 
contextual expectations that arise from a close reading the CPR literature.  The 
following two chapters will summarize the other two case-study sites and present 
their institutional features and relationship to the MIFs.    
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Chapter 8: The Maya Centre Women’s 
Group, Maya Centre, Belize 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the study conducted in Maya Centre, 
Belize, of the Maya Centre Women’s Group (MCWG).  This is the second of the 
three case studies prepared for this thesis.  As with the previous chapter, the 
starting point for this report is an overview of the history, economy and cultural 
heritage management regime of Belize, the former colony of British Honduras in 
Central America.  The third section of the chapter describes the history of the 
village of Maya Centre, home of the MCWG, and the Coxcomb Basin Wildlife 
Sanctuary (CBWS) that has played a central role in the history of the village and 
the MCWG for the past three decades.  This is followed by the fourth section of 
the chapter that describes the background of the Maya Centre Women’s Group 
itself.  The fifth section describes in detail the institutional structure of the Maya 
Centre Women’s Group, which is followed by a sixth section that compares the 
findings of the study, both qualitative and quantitative, to the Model Institutional 
Features and the testable implications articulated in Chapter 6.  
Overview: Belize’s History, Economy and Heritage Management 
Formerly the colony of British Honduras, Belize is nestled on the 
Caribbean coast of the Central American isthmus (see Figure 26) between 
Mexico to the north and Guatemala to the West and South.   The country is 
among the smallest independent countries in the world land, with a land area of 
22,966 square kilometres, 152
nd
 in size among all nations  (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2013)  and a population estimated at 338,900 (Central Bank of Belize 
2013b).  Much of Belize is undeveloped forest land or savannah. 
The region that is now Belize was a peripheral though not insignificant 
territory within the region controlled by the great Maya urban centres that 
flourished during the first millennium of the current era.  Trading routes ran up 
Belize’s river valleys from the earliest period of Maya civilization in the region, 
and by the late classic Maya period (circa 600-800 CE) important ceremonial and 
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administrative centres, as well as numerous smaller cities, were distributed 
throughout the watersheds of Belize’s major river systems, on small Caribbean 
islands, and along the coast (McKillop 2004, 44). 
 
Figure 26: Map of Belize showing the location of Maya Centre.  (Gray and Leslie 2008, 23) 
 At the Maya civilization’s peak, during the classic period, populations 
were substantially higher than in subsequent centuries.  The population in the 
Caracol region, close to today’s Guatemalan border, alone may have exceeded 
100,000 in the late classic period (Sharer and Traxler 2006, 364), twenty-five 
times the colony’s population in the early 1800’s (Shoman 1994, 96) and almost 
two-thirds the size of the entire population of Belize at the time of independence 
in 1981 (Iyo and Duval 2006, 16).   Although estimates of the total population in 
Maya times are notably difficult (McKillop 2004, 162-166), the total population 
of Belize in the Maya era clearly exceeded today’s population by a wide margin.   
Maya Centre, 
 Belize 
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The heritage of the Maya, sites such as Caracol, Xunantunich, Altun Ha, Cahal 
Pech and various cave burial locations, have endowed Belize with a rich 
archaeological heritage resource of substantial importance today as tourist 
destinations.   
Furthermore Belize, like most of Central America, is rich in flora and 
fauna that evolved on the isthmus as a consequence of its position as a land 
bridge between the North and South American continents.  The country is host to 
87 distinct terrestrial and marine ecosystems (Belize Audubon Society 2008). 
Birds, mammals, reptiles and plants originating to the north and to the south of 
Central America met together here, creating both extraordinary diversity and 
numerous specialized species indigenous to the region  (Nations 2006; Primack 
et al. 1998).  The ecological and economic value of Belize’s environmental 
heritage was recognized during the colonial period, as a result of which Belize 
features an extensive network of nearly 50 nature preserves in addition to the 
numerous archaeological sites that have “protected area” status.  Together, these 
preserves constitute a vast 36.4 per cent of Belize’s land and 13.6 per cent of its 
coastal sea area (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 2005, 16).   
The nation’s history after the Maya collapse around 900 AD has been 
unusual among Central American countries (Foster 2007; Krohn and Salam 
2004; Shoman 1987; Shoman 1994; Wilk and Chapin 1990).  With the 
depopulation that followed the Maya collapse, Belize languished as a largely 
under-populated region with a coastline at once treacherous and enticing.  
Spanish explorers and missionaries penetrated the region during the 16
th
 Century 
and until 1840 the region was nominally under the protection the Spanish 
(Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 34; Shoman 1994, 15-34). 
England became interested in the region through the activities of 
privateers raiding Spanish properties in the mid-17
th
 Century. After 1670, British 
adventurers established settlements on the mainland for logging operations in the 
coastal forest regions, originally for logwood, a source of dyes for Britain’s 
textile mills, and later in the 18
th
 Century for mahogany.  In the 19
th
 Century, the 
wood trade gave way to sugar production (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 
2012). One consequence of the British presence from its inception was the 
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introduction of African slaves who worked in the logging and sugar operations 
(Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 47-52) and gradually intermarried 
with British settlers to form a Creole population. Throughout the early decades 
of the 19
th
 Century, the British embedded themselves in the area and usurped 
both colonial control from Spain and the authority over the local land-owning 
elite, who were free Creole and European slave owners who dominated the 
economy.  In 1862 the UK formally annexed the region as the colony of British 
Honduras  (Shoman 1994, 90). 
The mid-19
th
 Century saw a resurgence in the region’s Maya population 
that contributed materially to the political complexities of modern-day Belize 
(Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 65; Shoman 1994, 81-89).  Starting 
in 1847, with the outbreak of the protracted Mayan Caste War in Mexico’s 
Yucatan region to the north, Mayan refugees streamed into northern Belize.  At 
the same time, from the south and west came Maya refugees fleeing coerced 
labour and land expropriation in Guatemala.  These emigrants to the region 
encountered not only the Creole population, both free and slave, but also, on the 
central coast, the Garifuna, a group descended from shipwrecked African 
captives from the French island of St. Vincents whose Afro-Caribbean culture is 
quite independent of the Creoles (Shoman 1994, 76). In the 20
th
 Century, 
Mennonite farmers moved into Belize from Mexico and the United States, 
seeking land and religious freedom.  The most recent wave of immigration into 
Belize occurred in the late 20
th
 Century when Spanish-speaking refugees, many 
of Maya extraction, fled war and genocide in Guatemala by moving into adjacent 
areas in Western Belize. 
A consequence of this history is that Belize today is a mélange of ethnic 
groups coexisting in a largely unpopulated country.  To the north and west of the 
country the population consists of Spanish-speaking Guatemalan immigrants, 
Kekchi Maya whose roots are in the Verapaz region of Guatemala, and Creole 
populations.  Mayan, English- and Kriole-speaking Creoles populate much of the 
central region of the country, although this is also the seat of the Garifuna 
population.  In the southern half of the country live Mopan and some Kekchi 
Maya. Creoles, though numerically a minority, are the dominant political force in 
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the country while all the groups coexist uneasily (Howard 2009; Shoman 1994, 
chapter 7).   
A second distinguishing consequence of the British control over the 
country is that the road to Belize’s independence was largely non-violent and 
came in the 1960’s and 1970’s, a time when Britain’s empire was waning.   
Although a history of resistance to British rule and protest over specific policies 
certainly characterized the colonial period (Shoman 1994), there were no armed 
insurrections.  Rather, democratic government and party politics emerged in the 
1950s on the heels of active labour movements. Belize elected its first legislature 
in 1961 and it was substantially self-governing by 1964 (Shoman 1994, Chapter 
9).  Thus, when independence was granted within the British Commonwealth in 
1981, Belize succeeded to a parliamentary democracy with political contention 
channelled into two established political parties (Shoman 1987; Shoman 1994).  
Despite the complex demography and deep divisions of the new nation, Belize 
avoided the military dictatorships and civil wars that bedevilled its neighbours in 
Central America into the late 20
th
 Century.    
After independence, Belize’s economy was built on exports of 
commodities, primarily sugar, bananas, citrus and shrimp, which at 
independence constituted two-thirds of Belize’s exports (Bulmer-Thomas and 
Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 142-143).   Belize’s position in these markets declined 
dramatically over the ensuing decades, although exports still include volatile 
agricultural commodities, many of which are competitive only due to trade 
preferences in the US and EU markets (Balboni and Palacio 2007,71; Central 
Bank of Belize 2013a).  By 2010, about 60 per cent of exports stemmed from 
two sources:  oil discovered in the south of the country and, most importantly, 
tourism.  Belize’s economy is highly dependent on the tourist dollar.   
Propelled by 727,878 cruise ship visitors, tourist arrivals in Belize 
totalled 978,141 in 2011 (see Figure 27), among the best years in the past decade 
(Belize Tourism Board 2012, 2) and generated  BZ$138 million
7
 in hotel 
revenues alone (Belize Tourism Board 2012).   Archaeological sites attracted 
                                                 
7 BZ$2 = US$1, trading at a pegged exchange rate.  BZ$1 = approximately £0.31. 
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229,768 visitors in 2011, 42 per cent of the total, roughly the same percentage 
that visited national parks or reserves and the offshore islands of Belize (Belize 
Tourism Board 2012, 52 and 74).   Overnight visitors in 2011 spent an average 
of BZ$121.53 per day.  In 2005 (the most recent study available), tourist 
expenditures amounted to 15.8 per cent of GDP, at BZ$349.5 million the largest 
segment of the economy and the country’s most important foreign exchange 
producer (Balboni and Palacio 2007, 27).   
 
Figure 27: Belize Tourist arrivals  2001-2011 (Belize Tourism Board 2012,2) 
  With a small and globally uncompetitive manufacturing sector, the 
demand for manufactured goods of all kinds, as well as energy products and 
many food items, must be met through imports (Balboni and Palacio 2007, 61).  
Moreover,  Belize labours under an extraordinarily heavy public sector debt load 
of around US$1,017.8 million, 64.4 per cent of  GDP in 2012, requiring US$79 
million (BZ$ 158 million) in external debt service payments in 2012  (Central 
Bank of Belize 2013b).  Tourism thus is an essential source of foreign currency 
inflows. Tourism generated inflows of BZ$299 million in 2012 against a trade 
deficit of BZ$209.9 million and current account deficit of BZ$ 28.6 million  
(Central Bank of Belize 2013b).     
GDP per capita was about BZ$9319 in 2012 (Central Bank of Belize 
2013b), but it is highly skewed toward the wealthy.   One quarter or more of the 
population in every region of the country lives in poverty (Balboni & Palacio: 
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34). In 2009, 31 per cent of all households and 41.3 per cent of the country’s 
population were living in poverty, with another roughly 13 per cent vulnerable to 
poverty (Halcrow Group Limited et al. 2010, 53). The government is under 
continuing pressure to bring development opportunities to its citizens, efforts that 
are compromised by the country’s heavy dependence on external debt and an 
image for corruption:  in 2005, the last year it was ranked, Belize was ranked 
62
nd
 in the world with a score of 3.7 on a scale of 1 (highest corruption) to 10 
(lowest corruption) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
(Balboni and Palacio 2007, 47).  In 2010 the World Bank ranked Belize in the 
56
th
 per centile, below average, in the control of corruption (Transparency 
International 2010).   Party politics have embedded patronage and favouritism 
into the fabric of government at every level. 
Heritage tourism—both archaeological and environmental—is at the 
centre of Belize’s economy.  Not surprisingly, the preservation of heritage 
assets—environmental and archaeological—has been a priority of the 
government since independence.  Prior to and since independence, Belize has 
made a gradual transition from colonial policies to a broad-based legal platform 
for creating protective reserves. The Crown Land Ordinance of 1817 granted all 
unclaimed land to the Crown (and thus eventually to the Belizean government) 
(Bristowe and Wright 1888, 78-80).  In 1894 the colony enacted the Ancient 
Monuments Protection Act to bring archaeological sites under government 
purview (Awe 2012, 69).   
The twentieth century involved a feverish pace of heritage protection.  In 
1924 the Ancient Monument and Relics Ordinance set rules governing 
archaeological research in Belize; in 1928 control of the trade in antiquities was 
established through the Antiquities Ordinance (Awe 2012, 71-72); and in 1927 
the Forest Ordinance created the Forest Department and established the legal 
basis for protected areas of any sort (Balboni and Palacio 2007, 123-124). The 
first wildlife protected area, Half Moon Caye Preserve, was created in 1928 and, 
by the time of independence, 15 forest reserves, constituting almost 20 per cent 
of Belize’s land area, were in existence (Balboni and Palacio 2007, 125).  Since 
1952, archaeological management has been an activity of the government. Since 
2003,  that responsibility has been lodged with the Institute of Archaeology, a 
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division of the National Institute of Culture and History (NICH) (Awe 2012, 71-
72). 
The National Parks Systems Act and the Wildlife Protection Act were 
passed shortly after independence in 1981 (Balboni and Palacio 2007, 102).  
Subsequent laws have included the Fisheries Act (to establish marine protected 
areas), the National Lands Act (setting aside buffer zones along waterways),  the 
Forest Act (to create forest reserves), and the Ancient Monuments and 
Antiquities Act (authorizing archaeological preserves). This body of laws has 
enabled Belize to create one of the most extensive systems of reserves, as a share 
of total territory, in the world.  One third of the nation’s land area is under 
official conservation protection either for resource exploitation, environmental 
preservation or archaeological purposes.   
With over 2.6 million acres under protection in 105 protected areas in 
2008 (Protected Areas Conservation Trust 2008, Appendix 2.1), Belize’s 
investment in heritage asset preservation is substantial.  It encompasses 12 sites 
with important Maya ruins (in addition to others protected separately within 
other preserves), an extensive system of marine reserves to protect the second 
largest barrier reef system in the world, and various wildlife and natural area 
reserves.  Although the government has been challenged for cavalier if not 
corrupt decisions relating to environmental matters, most visibly during the 
battle over nesting places of the Scarlet Macaw threatened by the construction of 
the Chalillo Dam (Barcott 2008), Belize’s commitment to historic asset 
preservation for its own merit and as an engine of economic growth through 
tourism has been sustained since independence. 
Belize has a long tradition of involving outside groups and communities 
in the management of environmental assets (Finch 2002, 30).  Foremost among 
these groups is the Belize Audubon Society (BAS), founded in 1969 (Balboni 
and Palacio 2007, 126), which formally co-manages with government agencies a 
total of 11 reserves around the country, including the Coxcomb Basin Wildlife 
Sanctuary near Maya Centre (IVU 2010-025).   The Protected Areas 
Conservation Trust (PACT) is an NGO created in 1995 to provide grant funding 
to community groups, NGOs and others involved in protected areas (Protected 
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Areas Conservation Trust 2012).  Funding for PACT grants is derived from the 
country’s tourist taxes ($39.25 for each tourist leaving the country by air and 
$7.00 per passenger on each cruise ship passenger arriving in the country 
(Department of State 2013).  Other funding and technical assistance for tourist-
related projects in Belize is available from government agencies and the Belize 
Young Men’s and Women’s Christian Association (YMWCA), an active source 
of capacity building programmes at the community level.  Finally, the European 
Union administers grant programmes to build capacity and improve facilities in 
poor communities, including communities adjacent to protected areas such as 
Cockscomb Basin.  The United Nations Development Programme, through its 
Global Environment Facility, has also contributed substantially to Belize’s 
development. 
The Belize government’s role in the protection of archaeological heritage 
assets has generally been absolute.  NICH controls virtually all excavated and 
unexcavated Maya sites in the country and administers the 12 archaeological 
reserves.  However, NICH has involved communities in various aspects of 
archaeological work, including them as employees and as contractors for 
archaeologists, and it has underwritten facilities to support community retail 
operations at major sites such as Altun Ha and Xunantunich. NICH 
archaeologists train tour guides throughout the country and the leaders of the 
Institute of Archaeology have expressed strong interest in further community-
related projects related to archaeological sites (IVU 2013-079). 
Since the early 1980’s, coinciding with the founding of the Maya Centre 
Women’s Group, Belize has been at the forefront of community-based 
preservation efforts worldwide (Balboni and Palacio 2007, 130).  Belize has 
developed a highly favourable environment to foster successful community-
based heritage preservation projects.  However, even in the context of Belize’s 
generally supportive environment, the long survival of the MCWG stands out. 
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The Village of Maya Centre, Belize
8
 
 
Figure 28:  Typical housing, Maya Centre, including a shop (lower photo) (Photos: P. 
Gould) 
During the 1970’s, several Mayan families moved from lands on the 
southern border near Guatemala into the region of central Belize bordering 
Cockscomb Mountain in the Maya Mountain range.   Long a region with little 
habitation, little agriculture and much unexplored semi-mountainous territory, 
most of the Coxcomb Basin was owned by the government as Crown Lands and 
hence potentially available for resource exploitation and settlement.  In 1976 a 
small number of families left one of those new villages, Maya Mopan, after a 
village dispute that, according to descendants, led the families to believe their 
lives were in danger (IVU 2013-080).  Most of the group settled a few miles 
away on the main north/south road in the region and built a village they named 
Maya Centre, which at the time of its founding straddled the access road to a 
moribund logging operations 6 miles inland at Quam Bank (IVU 2013-080). 
                                                 
8 Elements of the following sections will appear in GOULD, P. Forthcoming 2014. A 
tale of two villages: Institutional structure and sustainable community organizations. Public 
Archaeology. 
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A smaller contingent of 11 families moved further into the jungle 
adjacent to the saw mill operation at Quam Bank.  Heavily logged in the late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries, the Coxcomb basin, including the logging operation, 
was devastated in 1961 by Hurricane Hattie and had begun to revert to jungle.  
The logging operations themselves were fitful and generally unsuccessful, and 
the last logging concession in the region closed in 1981, shortly after Maya 
Centre was founded (Emmons and Horwitch 1996, IVU 2013-080).   
Maya Centre today is a village of about 400 people (IVU 2013-063) 
verging on what is now Belize’s Southern Highway—a dirt road in 1976 but now 
fully paved down to the Guatemalan border.  The village is bisected by a stream 
flowing out of Coxcomb Basin.  The stream provided the village’s water until the 
1990’s, when a potable water system was installed as part of Belize’s aggressive 
effort to provide clean water (IVU 2013-080).  The stream is still the place each 
morning where most women in the village clean their dirty dishes and laundry 
(there are only a few washing machines and no dryers in the village).  Sewage is 
handled in septic systems in a few houses, but most homes include outhouses in 
the yard.  Maya Centre, like Raqchi, is not a wealthy place. 
The village is divided into two segments.  North of the Coxcomb access 
road lies the original village site.  A matrix of three east-west and five north-
south roads, all rutted and unpaved, has been divided into a total of 40 
residences, three of which include small shops for provisions and/or sell crafts in 
competition with the MCWG.  Two homesteads offer simple cottages for the use 
of backpackers, birders and other visitors to the Coxcomb preserve, one of which 
has a restaurant.  One family has constructed a “Maya Museum” next door to the 
MCWG’s building that is frequently visited by tourists to the CBWS.  A small, 
infrequently open “health post,” the village elementary school (nominally Roman 
Catholic but now largely government funded), and three churches—Catholic, 
Nazarene and Baptist—complete the north side of the village. 
Most of the land on the south side of the access road was obtained from 
the Government of Belize by the Village Council after 2000 (IVU 2013-080).   A 
matrix of two east-west and three north-south roads divides the south side tract 
into plots that in 2013 contained 21 residences, four houses under construction, 
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and a number of privately-owned but still undeveloped lots. One additional shop 
/ restaurant / internet café is located on the Southern Highway adjacent to the 
creek. 
The original lands on the North Side of the village were allocated in the 
1970’s to those families who chose to reside in Maya Centre.  Most of those 
individuals also received 35 acre plots to the east across the Southern Highway 
for their use as farms to grow corn and other crops for personal consumption.  A 
few other families maintained milpa (slash and burn) farmsteads further west in 
the Coxcomb forest, while the families in Quam Bank subsisted through milpa 
farming and hunting wild game in the Coxcomb basin jungle (IVU 2010-011 and 
IVU 2010-022). 
In 1980, shortly after Maya Centre was formed, an American biologist, 
Alan Rabinowitz, began a research project into the habits of the jaguars residing 
in the Coxcomb region.  His research identified Coxcomb as home to a 
substantial number of jaguars and a potentially important transit point in the 
migration of jaguars, which range throughout Central and South America in 
ever-dwindling numbers as deforestation eliminates the extensive habitat each 
animal requires for survival and as conflicts with humans result in jaguar deaths.  
After lobbying by Rabinowitz and his employer, the Wildlife Conservation 
Society of New York, a small portion of the area known as the Cockscomb Basin 
was declared a National Forest Reserve/Jaguar Preserve in 1984 (Rabinowitz 
1986). The reserve was gradually extended until, in 1995, the area by then 
known as the Cockscomb Basin Wildlife Sanctuary (CBWS) encompassed 
122,000 acres (see Figure 29), a vast range of rivers and valleys bounded by the 
Maya Mountains in the Stann Creek Department of Belize (Emmons and 
Horwitch 1996; Rabinowitz 1986).  Within the park is Belize’s highest peak, 
Victoria Mountain, and the distinctive tri-peaked Cockscomb Mountain that 
lends the region and the sanctuary its name.   Well inside the park lands are three 
Maya archaeological sites (IVU 2013-080).   
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Figure 29: Coxcomb Basin Wildlife Sanctuary (©Belize Audubon Society) 
 Many of the social and political challenges within Maya Centre are 
rooted in the formation of the Coxcomb sanctuary. In a pattern characteristic of 
archaeological and environmental reserves in Belize and elsewhere, the park was 
created as an exclusionary zone.  The eleven Maya families living in Quam 
Bank, suddenly on CBWS lands, were ordered to leave immediately after the 
park was formed in 1984 (Rabinowitz 1986, 350, IVU 2013-080).    Residents of 
Maya Centre also were ordered to abandon their milpa farms on the park’s 
perimeter, and residents of all the Maya villages in the area were banned from 
hunting on CBWS territory.   Quam Bank was taken over as the headquarters for 
the new park and the old logging road, which bisects Maya Centre, was made the 
entrance road to the sanctuary. Virtually from its inception, the CBWS has been 
subject to a co-management arrangement with the Belize Audubon Society 
(BAS) (Emmons and Horwitch 1996).  The BAS sought to garner support for the 
park by employing Maya Centre residents, ultimately retaining Ernesto Saqui, 
the village’s school teacher and only college graduate, as Park Superintendent 
with a staff of several wardens drawn from Maya Centre’s small population 
(Rabinowitz 1986). Coincidentally but importantly, Saqui also was Chairman of 
the Maya Centre Village Council.  The dislocations, however, were severe. 
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Four of the evicted Quam Bank families elected to settle in Maya Centre 
after their eviction (IVU 2013-080).  However, by then all available residential 
and farm land in the community had been allocated to other residents and these 
four families were left to find a living in the area without access to legal hunting 
or milpa farms (IVU 2013-080 and IVU 2010-006).  The family divisions 
created in 1984 linger to the present day and are reflected in the village’s current 
disharmony. Given the loss of farm and hunting land and physical dislocations 
when the CBWS was created, unless the local community could be motivated to 
restrain their incursions into the park and support conservation, the fledgling 
park was endangered.  As Ernesto Saqui puts it: 
The success of the park depends on the success of the people […] It is not 
supposed to be left away from the people with ‘you can’t fish, you can’t 
hunt’.  If you tell people this and you don’t have an alternative you better 
believe it you’re going to be dead […] After all, the bottom line is about 
money. (IVU 2010-011) 
The creation of the sanctuary thus set the stage for a community-based 
economic development and heritage preservation experiment designed to exploit 
the village’s Maya heritage and the natural heritage within the CBWS.       
Social / Political Context in Maya Centre 
Although small, ethnically homogeneous, and with many interlocking 
family relationships, Maya Centre is not a harmonious village.  For example, in 
response to Question 3.5 (“Are the relationships among people in this 
community generally harmonious or disagreeable?”), 63.3 per cent of the 
MCWG members responded “Disagreeable” while only 26.7 per cent felt they 
were “Harmonious.”   
Political divisions are the most pronounced issue in Maya Centre, with 
93.3 per cent of respondents citing politics as at least part of the explanation for 
disharmony in the village.  Disharmony among the adherents to the three 
churches in the village was also cited by 43.3 per cent of the respondents.  
Interviews make clear, however, that these factors are intertwined.  The new 
Nazarene church was formed as a break-away from the Baptist church largely 
over political differences (IVU 2013-073) and hostility between the original 
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Quam Bank families and Maya Centre residents has been reflected in their 
different political affiliations (IVU 2010-006, IVU 2013-063, IVU 2013-080).  
Political alignments, church affiliation and family disputes are all tightly 
intertwined in Maya Centre. 
  Responses to individual questions similarly reflected a lack of trust 
within the MCWG community.  For example, 63.3 per cent of interviewees 
agreed with the statement, “In this community, one has to be alert or someone is 
likely to take advantage of you,” and 66.7 per cent of respondents disagreed with 
the statement “If you drop your purse in the community someone will see it and 
return it to you.”  Indeed, 26.7 per cent of MCWG members disagreed with the 
statement “The MCWG leaders are fair and honest” and 30 per cent disagreed 
that “I trust the MCWG leaders when they handle money.”  As will be discussed 
further in Chapter 10 (see page 308), these high rates of distrust are statistically 
significant when compared to the other two project locations. 
Despite these many frictions, the village of Maya Centre operates on 
strict democratic principles rooted in the country’s long-standing democratic 
political system and village tradition.  An elected, 7-member Village Council has 
day-to-day responsibility for the affairs of the village and interviewees report 
that all decisions involving significant village policies or expenditures are 
brought before a town meeting.  Virtually all respondents said that decisions at 
these meetings are made by majority vote of the villagers in attendance.  
Elections in Belize, from the national to the local level, are conducted 
democratically and, notwithstanding the issues of corruption noted above (see 
page 218), villagers in Maya Centre follow a national practice of majoritarian 
democracy. 
The Maya Centre Women’s Group 
As tourists began to visit the CBWS in hopes of seeing jaguars or other 
animals (the park harbours several other cats, tapirs, many rare birds, and other 
important fauna), villagers perceived an economic opportunity in the tourist 
traffic.  Several men in the village, drawn largely from the Quam Bank residents 
who knew the jungle well, were trained and received government certification to 
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serve as guides for visitors (IVU 2010-006, IVU 2010-011).  The village also 
engaged in traditional crafts—textile decoration or slate and wood carving, for 
example—and, as tourists started to arrive, villagers describe their children 
bolting from their chairs in school to rush to flag down a passing car in hopes of 
selling home-made beads.  Maya Centre became known as “clay bead city,” and 
the villagers, led by the village chairman, Saqui, concluded that a different 
solution was needed to exploit the tourist trade without sacrificing their 
children’s education (IVU 2013-076, IVU 2013-080).   
In 1987, after a false-start when village men walked out of the initial 
meeting, Saqui obtained agreement from the villagers to create the Maya Centre 
Women’s Group to sell crafts for all of the traditional artisans in the village (IVU 
2013-080).  Women were given the lead because most men were leaving the 
village every day to find work, while most women stayed at home.  For five 
years, Saqui coached the group in accounting, business management and 
problem solving, contributing to the unusual operating procedures of the 
Women’s Group, before stepping back to leave the women to run the group on 
their own (IVU 2010-011, IVU 2013-080). 
In 1987 a small thatch-roofed Maya-style oval building was erected to 
house the group’s craft offerings.  It was located at the intersection of the CBWS 
access road and the Southern Highway (IVU 2013-080). When an entrance 
charge to access Cockscomb was established in 1987, the BAS installed a gate to 
the sanctuary immediately off the Southern Highway and authorized the MCWG 
to sell tickets, offering the group 10 per cent of the proceeds from tickets they 
sold (IVU 2010-001).  The gate was removed at the insistence of the national 
government in 1999, precipitating a brief revolt by the members of the Women’s 
Group, but the fee-sharing arrangements remained in place and park officials 
report that even in 2013 60 per cent of tickets to the sanctuary are sold at the 
Women’s Group’s shop (IVU 2013-083). 
Although a village dispute led to an arson fire at the cooperative building 
within the first year, it was quickly rebuilt and within a few years 20 women 
were involved in the cooperative (IVU 2013-073, IVU 2013-080).  In 2002 the 
Maya-style building was replaced with a larger cement structure that was 
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financed by a BZ$40,000 grant from the European Union matched by 
BZ$15,000 from the Women’s Group’s funds (IVU 2010-009, IVU 2013-057). 
In 2009, the facility was expanded again, with BZ$30,000 from the Women’s 
Group’s funds, to add a roadside restaurant building.  The entire building was 
designed for vertical expansion, and some members hope one day to incorporate 
a small museum of Maya culture into the group’s activities.  The restaurant was 
outfitted through a grant from the European Commission administered by the 
Belize Citrus Growers Association, who provided the MCWG with assistance 
preparing and reporting on the grant (IVU 2010-009), while the YWMCA of 
Belize provided training in cooking and hospitality management to Women’s 
Group members (IVU 2010-010).  
Today, 40 women are members of the Women’s Group, representing the 
majority of the village’s 50 or so households.  Open from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. every 
day, the MCWG shop caters to a visitor traffic to CBWS of 7103 foreign and 
2148 Belizean visitors in 2012 (IVU 2013-081). The MCWG has several sources 
of income: The 10 per cent share of CBWS ticket sales, proceeds from craft 
sales, and income from the sale of soft drinks to tourists and corn milling 
services to Maya Centre residents. Figure 30 to Figure 37 illustrate the MCWG 
shop, product offerings, and members. 
Based on a review of the available sales record books for the group, total 
annual income of the MCWG itself is estimated at about BZ$29,325 for the 12 
months ending in June 2013.  In addition, members earned an estimated 
BZ$118,310 from crafts sales, for an average of BZ$2958 per member (see page 
245 below for further detail).  These are substantial cash income sources in the 
context of a country with a GDP per capita of only BZ$9320 in 2012 (Central 
Bank of Belize 2013b),  nearly 20 per cent unemployment and 41.3 per cent of 
the population living below the poverty line (Central Intelligence Agency 2013).   
Over its history, the MCWG has undertaken new initiatives both large 
and small.  Starting from a thatched-roof crafts shop on the main intersection, the 
Group’s activities have grown to incorporate a larger, cinder-block building, the 
MCWG has invested in corn-milling equipment to start that business, and it has 
purchased refrigerators in order to sell soft drinks to visitors to the CBWS.  In 
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prior years, the group experimented with a community gardening project that 
failed (Interview 2013-052).   
The Group’s most notable experiment, however, was the opening in 2010 
of a restaurant in a new cinderblock annex constructed with BZ$30,000 from 
MCWG funds (IVU 2010.009).  Although the group received training and other 
support from the Belize YMWCA and the Belize Citrus Growers Association, 
and installed a modern kitchen paid for through a grant from the European 
Union, the venture proved a failure.  Despite the training received from the 
YMWCA, in interviews members generally attribute the failure to their own lack 
of skill managing the procurement of food, especially during the low-tourism 
season.  Losses from wastage combined with member discontent over long hours 
working in a hot kitchen for no wages resulted in serious financial losses and 
some member defections for the MCWG.  Bonuses for all members, a traditional 
use of the MCWG’s own income, were eliminated between 2010 and 2012 and 
are only expected to revive in 2013.  The restaurant was closed for the 2012-
2013 season, after a meeting and vote by the full membership, and the group has 
no present plans to reopen it.  Along with the loss of members who moved away, 
deaths and a pair of expulsions for competitive behaviour, the troubles of the 
restaurant are one reason for the decline in membership of the MCWG, which 
has dropped from roughly 50 members in 2010 to about 40 members today. 
Maya Centre is a community in which there are no local jobs outside of 
the three shops and one of the two hostelries, indoor plumbing is not universal, 
and much of the housing stock is thatch-roofed and walled with wooden planks.  
The income is particularly meaningful to village families because families are 
large and school fees are high in Belize.  Pre-school costs BZ$50 per year plus 
BZ$10 per month; the village primary school costs BZ$20 per year but 
substantial donations for supplies are also expected from parents; high school 
costs BZ$875 per year plus BZ$6 per day for the 30 minute bus trip from Maya 
Centre to Dangriga plus additional donations; and 6
th
 Form or college-level 
education costs BZ$1350 per year in tuition plus expenses (IVU2013-065).   
The tourist-related businesses have been valuable for Maya Centre 
beyond the Women’s Group.   Two other households in the village have opened 
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overnight facilities and small restaurants of modest quality but modest cost, three 
retail stores service local and tourist requirements, a competing corn mill 
produces flour for the restaurants and local families, and three family-maintained 
crafts retail stores sell family-made items in competition with the MCWG.  At 
least 6 village members are government-certified guides who maintain active 
businesses guiding visitors, particularly birders and wildlife enthusiasts, at a 
typical price of BZ$100 per person.   One family of three guides estimated that 
they conducted 140 tours each year of two or more people, translating into 
BZ$28,000 or more in income for those three guides each year (IVU 2010-006).  
According to Saqui (whose own family sells crafts in competition with the 
MCWG), spin-off businesses were part of his original vision, although the 
Women’s Group resisted the creation of competing businesses when they first 
appeared and still bars members from competing with the MCWG (IVU 2010-
022).  
The MCWG has been the recipient of grants, is the official partner of the 
Belize Audubon Society in ticketing, assists BAS to book its camp-style lodgings 
near the park headquarters, and helps build demand for tour guiding and taxi 
services in Maya Centre.  Since there is no food service at the CBWS, overnight 
campers must eat at one of the Maya Centre restaurants or buy their food from 
one of three local shops.  Since a large proportion of the day-tour groups visiting 
Maya Centre are led by guides from resorts on the Caribbean beaches, the 
Women’s Group ensures that Maya Centre is not just another village one drives 
through on the way to a Belizean tourist attraction.  An examination of the 
institutional structure of the Women’s Group contributes to understanding its 
persistent success for over 20 years in an otherwise fractious community. 
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MAYA CENTRE WOMEN’S GROUP: ILLUSTRATIONS 
All photos by P. Gould 
 
Figure 30: Maya Centre Women’s Group sign on sanctuary entrance road  
 
Figure 31: Sign featuring Mayan calendar and MCWG Motto: “Women United Have 
Strength”  
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Figure 32: Maya Centre Women’s Group building, Maya Centre  
 
Figure 33: Entrance to the MCWG crafts shop 
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Figure 34: Interior of the Maya Centre Women’s Group crafts shop 
 
Figure 35: Typical Maya Centre Women’s Group craft shop offerings 
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Figure 36: Maya Centre Women’s Group members in traditional dress; one is slate 
carving, the other reviewing the group’s sales books  
 
Figure 37: Maya Centre Women’s Group corn grinding mill  
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Institutional Structure of the Maya Centre Women’s Group 
As in Chapter 7, the results presented here are derived from responses by 
interviewees to open-ended interview questions on the structure and procedures 
of the MCWG.  The MCWG maintains no documentary materials, such as 
minute books, nor were any of the founding documents of the group available for 
review.  Again, to facilitate communication of the substance, the results of this 
information have been distilled by the author into a summary format.  As in the 
prior chapter, all closed-end questions have been reduced to an “agree” / 
“disagree” format. 
Legal structure 
The Maya Centre Women’s Group is registered with the Belizean 
government as a Non-Governmental Organisation.  The group has neither a 
written constitution nor bylaws.   
Selection of leaders 
Elections for officers of the MCWG are held every two years, when 
seven MCWG members are chosen by other members to serve on the Executive 
Body. Ten candidates for office are nominated by other members at the election 
meeting.  Members are free to decline at the time of nomination, but should they 
accept nomination they are bound to serve, if elected, in any position to which 
they are elected.  Voting is by secret ballot in an election supervised by a 
representative from the Belizean Women’s Department.  Members vote for seven 
individuals and the seven top vote recipients serve on the Executive Body.  The 
individual who receives the most votes is named ChairLady, followed in order of 
total votes received by a Vice Chair, Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer, 
Assistant Treasurer, and Counsellor. Thus, no individual “runs” for a particular 
office; she only agrees to serve in any capacity to which the group elects her. The 
Chairlady is seen as one of the four leading figures of the village, along with the 
head of the elementary school Parent-Teacher Association, the head of the Water 
Board, and the Village Chairman. 
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Executive committee role 
The MCWG is led by an “Executive Body” of seven members.  Major 
actions, such as grant applications or construction decisions, are overseen by the 
Executive Body.  Additionally, Executive Body members are the point of 
interface for the MCWG with outside officials.  They interact regularly with the 
BAS and some other NGOs, and meet with women’s groups from elsewhere in 
the country that are seeking advice on setting up their own organisations.  They 
also play a significant role in the complex financial management arrangements of 
the MCWG (see page 248). 
Decision-making / conflict resolution mechanics 
Generally, all members meet quarterly in a mandatory general meeting at 
which craft sale proceeds are distributed to members, membership applications 
are reviewed, and other business of the group is conducted.  Special general 
meetings are called by the Executive Body if a major issue requires the attention 
of the full membership.  At all meetings discussions are open and all matters are 
resolved by majority vote.  In 2013 meetings have been less regular, according to 
members, because the current ChairLady holds a full time job as a teacher in 
another village.  However, most members still regard the quarterly meeting cycle 
as the norm. 
Membership eligibility 
Membership in the MCWG is not an automatic right for Maya Centre 
residents.  Applicants must be residents of Maya Centre at the time they apply 
and must be at least 18 years old.  Member applications are reviewed by the 
group as a whole, which passes by majority vote on their desirability.  Successful 
applicants must pay a BZ$200 “initiation fee” to the group.  The fee may be paid 
in cash but typically is withheld over time from the member’s sales proceeds at 
the MCWG shop. 
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Rules in use 
When a new member is admitted to membership in the MCWG, she is 
asked to sign a “contract” with the group that covers the following rules of the 
organisation: 
 The family of each member of the MCWG is allotted a stack of three 
shelves (see Figure 34 and Figure 35) to display merchandise that the 
family offers for sale.  The name of the crafts person is indicated on a tag 
affixed to each item, but not to the shelves themselves.  Thus, the shop 
presents a consistent if unordered face to the visitor offering a variety of 
slate carvings, beadwork, wood carving, textiles, pottery, baskets and 
other materials on each adjacent set of shelves.  Tags on the individual 
items are used to record the owner and the price of the object in the 
record book for craft shop sales. 
 There are no specific rules about the source of crafts sold in the shop, but 
in general all products are made by MCWG members except for some 
ceramics and basketry, which are purchased by individual MCWG 
members from villages to the south that specialize in those crafts. 
 Each member is required to work without pay at the MCWG shop, in 
groups of three, for two consecutive day-long shifts and, on the two 
subsequent days, for one hour lunch-relief shifts. Generally, this means 
members on average work in the shop about three full days and three 
lunch shifts per month.  If a member is unable to perform her shift duties, 
she is obligated to secure a replacement.  Ordinarily this is done through 
an exchange of shifts, but on occasion members with employment outside 
the village pay other members to work their shifts.  The going rate for 
paid shift-work is BZ$20 per day shift or BZ$5 for a lunch shift (IVU 
2013-076). 
 Each member working a full-day shift at the shop is required to wear a 
traditionally embroidered Maya-style blouse and a skirt of traditional 
pattern.  Members who work relief lunch shifts are not required to wear 
traditional garb. 
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 The shop and surrounding grounds are cleaned twice per month by a crew 
of MCWG members.  Each member is required to participate with her 
assigned crew. 
 Members are obligated to attend all meetings of the group.  For officers, 
these meetings can occur as frequently as several times per month.  For 
other members, meetings are generally held at least quarterly, but may be 
more frequent if called by the Executive Body of the MCWG. 
 No member may engage in any activity that competes with the group.  
Covered activities include the sale of crafts items or the offering of corn-
milling services.   
 Each member agrees that the MCWG is entitled to 10 per cent of the sale 
proceeds from any craft item owned by that member.    
 In addition, members donate one craft item per quarter to each of two 
dedicated charitable sales shelves.  Sales of items on one shelf go 100 per 
cent to benefit the Parent Teacher Association in the village school while 
sales on the other shelf go 100 per cent to the MCWG for operating 
purposes. 
 An express rule of the group is that members must be honest and willing 
to work together in a cooperative fashion.  Commitment to collaborate is 
an express part of the “contract” signed by members when they join the 
MCWG. 
Sanctions and enforcement  
Members are subject to specific sanctions for failure to adhere to the rules 
of the organisation.  The sanctions are graduated depending upon the nature and 
severity of the infraction.  Specifically: 
 A fine of BZ$20 is subtracted from the member’s sales proceeds if she 
fails to attend any meeting of the MCWG.  Failure to attend is infrequent 
and this sanction reportedly is not rigorously enforced. 
 A fine of BZ$20 is subtracted from the member’s sales proceeds if she 
fails to attend her scheduled cleaning shift.  This sanction is reported to 
be rigorously enforced. 
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 BZ$20 is subtracted from the member’s sales proceeds for failure to 
attend a shift or obtain a replacement. Reportedly this sanction is rarely 
imposed as failure to attend or obtain a replacement is very rare. 
 No express sanction was articulated for infraction of the rule requiring 
traditional dress on full-day shifts, but during the author’s various visits 
to the MCWG over three years no member was ever observed wearing 
unapproved clothing while working on a day shift. 
 Members will be expelled from the group if they open competitive 
businesses. In recent years two members have been expelled for entering 
into competing activities. One opened a crafts shop in her home and the 
other opened a competitive corn milling operation. 
 Members whose attitudes are deemed uncooperative are first counselled 
by officers of the group.  However, a member who fails to remediate the 
situation can be subject to expulsion. 
 Sources of finance  
Based on data provided by the MCWG, total income to the group itself is 
estimated at about BZ$29,325 in the 12 months ending June 2013.  In addition, 
craft sale revenues earned by members of the group in the same period are 
estimated at BZ$118,310 for the members’ shares of direct craft sales earnings, 
or an average of BZ$2958 per member. Based on the MCWG policy to retain 
about BZ$7000 in cash reserves, more than BZ$20,000 may be available for 
annual bonus payments in 2013.  This income is summarized in Figure 38.  The 
Maya Centre Women’s Group has five distinct sources of income. 
First, the Women’s Group receives 10 per cent of the price for every 
ticket to CBWS that is sold at their shop (BZ$10 for foreigners, BZ$2.50 for 
Belizeans).  Visitors to the CBWS also can purchase tickets at the sanctuary or 
directly from the BAS in Belize City, but in 2012 at least 60 per cent of tickets 
were sold by the MCWG (IVU 2013-081).  Based on the 9251 visitors reported 
by BAS in 2012 (IVU 2013-083), income from ticket sales to the MCWG may 
be estimated at approximately BZ$7640 in that year.   
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Figure 38: Maya Centre Women’s Group total revenues by source, est. June 2012-June 
2013 (MCWG sales books and author's estimates) 
Second, the group generates substantial crafts sales, 10 per cent of which 
are retained by the MCWG.  The author reviewed the sales books of the MCWG 
for the period 12 June 2012 through 31 May 2013 (see Figure 39), which showed 
an annual rate of crafts sales of BZ$131,456, an amount that would generate 
BZ$13,146 in income to the MCWG and an average of BZ$2958 in personal 
sales proceeds per member. 
 
Figure 39: Maya Centre Women’s Group weekly craft sales, 14 June 2012 to 14 May 2013 
(MCWG sales craft sales book) 
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Third, the group sells services milling corn into a paste used to produce 
tortillas using a grinding and paste-making machine installed at the group’s 
building.  The author reviewed sales records for the mill from 1 January 2013 
through 31 May 2013 (see Figure 40).  Total sales in this period were 
$BZ771.45, or BZ$5.08 per day.  Annually, this would produce BZ$1854 for the 
group, probably a conservative estimate as the mill was out of service for several 
weeks during the period for which data was made available.   
 
Figure 40: Maya Centre Women’s Group daily corn mill sales 1 January 2013 to 1 June 
2013 (MCWG corn mill sales book) 
Fourth, the group sells water and soft drinks from an on-site refrigerator.  
Again, records for the period 1 January 2013 through 31 May 2013 were made 
available.  Gross sales for the period were BZ$2767, or an annual rate of 
BZ$6687 (see Figure 41).  Net proceeds would be reduced substantially after the 
cost of the sodas is deducted and members generally considered the profit from 
soda sales to be negligible. 
The MCWG’s fifth source of income is the proceeds from sales of crafts 
donated by members to the MCWG shelf in the store.  No data was available to 
the author on the magnitude of those sales.   
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Figure 41: Maya Centre Women’s Group daily soft drink sales, 1 January 2013 to 1 June, 
2013 (MCWG soft drink sales book) 
In recent years, the MCWG has been able to invest BZ$45,000 in two 
major expansion projects and annually has paid a “dividend” to members from 
its retained profits, except in the years 2010 through 2012 when losses from the 
Group’s restaurant project precluded bonuses.  Bonuses are expected by MCWG 
officers to be paid in 2013.  The MCWG also regularly contributes funds to 
support the materials needed by the elementary school in the village, has been 
able to make other charitable contributions to villagers.   
Financial management 
Because there is no bank close to Maya Centre, the group has devised a 
complex system to hold and protect funds generated between monthly or 
quarterly reckonings.  Each member of a two-day shift is responsible to hold the 
proceeds either from those two day’s crafts sales, corn mill sales or soda sales.  
Receipts from ticket sales to the BAS are delivered to a member of the Executive 
Body to hold. Sales in each category are recorded in separate account books that 
are permanently available at the craft shop.  Thus at any given time most 
members are holding and personally accountable for a small portion of the 
group’s cash.  They retain the cash at their homes, and are permitted to use or 
loan the cash to the extent that their crafts sales will cover those amounts.  
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Financial reckonings are conducted at monthly meetings of the Executive 
Body of the MCWG.  The rules require that each member of the committee must 
be present and that each must independently confirm the reconciliation of the 
sales reports and the attribution of craft sales revenues to members.  Amounts 
owed by members for sales from the corn mill or beverage service similarly must 
be confirmed independently by each Executive Body member, and receipts from 
sales of tickets to the CBWS and amounts owed to the BAS are reconciled 
monthly in the same way. 
Two days prior to the day set for members to deliver the funds they are 
holding, members receive text messages on their cell phones informing them of 
the amount they are to deliver to the Executive Body at the MCWG building.  
Members who fail to deliver funds are liable to repay them and subject to 
expulsion, although no such default was reported to the author in interviews.  
Although some members do complain that some crafts sales are not properly 
recorded, a problem for which the group has not devised a solution, the fact that 
all transactions occur under the eyes of three members clearly helps to mitigate 
even this problem.  In many respects, this cash-management process of the 
MCWG suggest the use of communal social pressure to ensure honesty that is 
found in successful micro-credit schemes in other countries (Yunus 2007, 
chapter 3). 
  Annual bonuses are determined by the Executive Body and allocated 
primarily based on tenure with the group.  All payments to members are by 
check.  The Chairman and Treasurer are jointly responsible for the check book 
and two signatures are required on checks and deposit slips at the bank.  CBWS 
ticket sale proceeds are conveyed by two members of the committee to the bank 
in Dangriga, 30 minutes away by bus, and as many as four members may 
accompany when the group’s own income is deposited.  In interviews, various 
explanations are offered for this procedure, though most emphasize a 
combination of poor security in Dangriga and distrust of other MCWG members 
to correctly deposit funds.   
Of all members, 76.7 per cent report receiving financial reports routinely, 
though they differ substantially on timing, with answers ranging from “every 
Page | 250  
 
meeting” to “every two years” when outgoing ChairLadies present a review of 
their tenure.  However, all members are entitled to review and question the sales 
ledger books at every reconciliation meeting before distributions are made, and 
the books are available every day for review by members at the MCWG 
building.  Members were observed by the author to routinely compute their own 
craft sales earnings while serving shift-duty. The group’s check book is available 
to Executive Body members and some other members report regular access to 
the check book.   
Comparing the Women’s Group to the Model Institutional Features 
MIF 1: Clearly defined boundaries 
Testable implication: 
 Interviewees should be able to articulate the physical boundaries that 
determine who may or may not become a member of the organisation. 
Membership in the Maya Centre Women’s Group is restricted to women 
over the age of 18 who have resided in the village of Maya Centre for at least 
one year.  The village of Kendal, one mile north on the highway, is also for legal 
purposes a part of the Maya Centre village, and residents of Kendall are 
technically eligible to join the MCWG.  No Kendall residents are members as of 
2013, however.  Maya Centre is a clearly defined legal and geographic entity, the 
land area of which is determined by lands deeded to the village council then 
resold to individual residents. 
MIF 2: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions 
Testable Implications: 
 The rules of the organisation should be clearly derived from relevant 
legal authority and/or traditional practices, or their legitimacy should be 
traceable to conditions in the community, including traditional legal 
structures, social norms, governance practices, and the degree of social 
capital in evidence in the community.   
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Eligibility to participate in the group, and therefore access to the potential 
sales from tourists stopping at the MCWG shop, is subject to residency rules and 
commitment to the social principles of the group (see page 243).  These 
principles in many respects are designed to insulate the organisation from the 
frictions in the community as a whole.  Members of both Belizean political 
parties and members of the competing family groups and religions are all 
members of the MCWG.  Despite potential conflicts, the MCWG has adopted the 
majoritarian governance tradition found in Maya Centre and nationally to 
manage the group.  It has created a complex system of checks and balances in its 
financial affairs to protect the group from the low level of trust in the 
community.   
 Indicators of social capital and trust should be consistent with the 
institutional elements of the organisation (i.e. greater protections 
associated with lower levels of trust and social capital as identified and 
vice versa). 
The political discourse in Maya Centre reflects considerable conflict, 
religious differences are pronounced, and levels of trust among members of this 
small community are low (see pages 253 and 308).  The complex character of the 
MCWG financial management procedures reflects this lack of trust.  
Furthermore, the MCWG’s requirement that members cooperate harmoniously 
and its process for conducting elections, which discourages any form of factional 
or party politics in the selection of officers, are products of a conscious effort by 
members to keep the inflamed politics of the village out of the operations of the 
Women’s Group.   
MIF 3: Collective choice arrangements 
Testable implications: 
 Projects will be organized, either as formal legal entities or informally, 
in a manner that empowers community members (either personally or 
through community-selected representatives) to participate directly in the 
governance of the project.  
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The MCWG is legally organized as a non-governmental organisation 
chartered by the Government of Belize, and as such is subject to oversight from 
government agencies, in the case of the MCWG primarily the Women’s 
Department.  All affairs of the MCWG are conducted through an elected 
Executive Body and important decisions are made at meetings of the full group 
in which majority voting, generally by raised hands, determines the decisions. 
 Government officials, supporting NGOs should perceive the project as 
“owned” or “controlled” by the community or at least by project 
members. 
Legally, the MCWG is an NGO owned by its members. Without 
exception, outside parties who work with the MCWG recognized this fact. 
 Legal documentation associated with the project, if any, should provide 
for individuals in the immediate community to “own” or “control” the 
project. 
Aside from the original charter, which is no longer available, there are no 
legal documents associated with the project. 
 Leadership of the project at the community level should have changed in 
an orderly fashion since its founding. 
Elections for new officers have been held every two years since it was 
founded.  Although Ernesto Saqui advised the group for several years at the 
beginning, his sister was the first President and the tradition of two-year terms 
(also the norm in village offices in Maya Centre) continues.  The only identified 
exception to this occurred following the 2010 election cycle, when the 
ChairLady elected in that year resigned early following the financial problems 
resulting from the failure of the MCWG’s restaurant venture (see page 232).  A 
special election was held to fill out her term but the normal rotation resumed in 
2012.   
 Interviews should reveal changes in mission, addition of new businesses 
and/or adjustment of the business model in response to experience or to 
changes in external conditions. 
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The business of the MCWG has expanded in scope over the years.   The 
group has experimented boldly and at considerable financial risk.  The decisions 
to undertake these initiatives, and to terminate the failures, were made in open 
meetings of the whole group governed by majoritarian decision making. 
 Project Members should support propositions similar to “Members have 
a direct influence on the plans and activities of the organisation.” 
Member support for such propositions is strong. Ninety per cent of 
respondents concurred with the statement “The Association members control the 
organisation;” 86.7 per cent concurred with “The Association members set their 
own rules and enforce them;”  90 per cent concurred with “Participation in 
decision making within the organisation is active;” 86.7 per cent concurred with 
“Members have direct influence on the plans and activities of the Association;” 
and 86.7 per cent concurred with the proposition that “The organisation is open 
to broad debate including opposing opinions.” 
MIF 4: Active monitoring 
Testable Implications: 
 Audited or unaudited financial records of the group are made available 
to project members with regularity. 
While there are no audited or even formal financial reports prepared for 
the members, the financial management arrangements of the organisation are 
exceptionally transparent.  All members have unfettered access to the sales books 
and to the reconciliations prepared by the Executive Body.   
 Participants should support propositions similar to “I feel well informed 
about the activities of the organisation,” “The association leaders are 
fair and honest,” or “I trust the association leaders when they handle 
money.” 
Perhaps reflecting the degree of distrust in Maya Centre generally, only 
73.3 per cent of respondents agreed that “The Association leaders are fair and 
honest” and 70 per cent agreed that “I trust the Association leaders when they 
handle money.”  A larger 80 per cent agreed that “I feel well informed about the 
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activities of the organisation.”  Ninety per cent agreed that “Attendance at 
meetings of the organisation is strong,” that “Participation in decision making in 
the organisation is active,” that “Members have a high level of knowledge of the 
procedures and policies,” and that “Members have all necessary information in 
advance of meetings,” and 77.8 per cent of the officers agreed that officers have 
all necessary information in advance of meetings.  
MIF 5: Graduated sanctions 
Testable Implications: 
 Formal or informal mechanisms should exist to enable project members 
to regulate participant compliance with obligations to the project. 
The sanctions system utilized by the MCWG (see page 244) is 
formalized, enforced by the Executive Body, and appears to be clearly 
understood by most members.  Ninety per cent of members agreed that 
“Members have a high level of knowledge of the procedures and policies” of the 
Group, and 76.7 per cent concurred with “The association follows its procedures 
and policies faithfully.” 
 A system of sanctions and penalties should exist and reflect “punishment 
to suit the infraction” or discretionary sanction imposition. 
The sanctions regime involves financial penalties that are modest 
although meaningful to members, but penalties can escalate to include expulsion 
for serious breaches such as entering into competitive businesses or failing, after 
counselling, to remediate an uncooperative attitude. 
 Evidence of effective monitoring/enforcement activity should be 
identifiable. 
The large majority of members (76.7 per cent) concurred that the “The 
association follows its procedures and policies faithfully.”  The considerable 
percentage who did not concur may reflect the general level of distrust in Maya 
Centre and the MCWG, or may reflect actual experience.  No insight into that 
question was gleaned from interviews. 
Page | 255  
 
MIF 6: Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Testable Implications: 
 Conflicts in the organisation should be resolved through institutional 
structures in ways that do not undermine the continued viability of the 
organisation.   
Interviewees consistently reported that decisions are made and 
disagreements resolved within the MCWG through majority votes, either within 
the Executive Body or in general meetings of the group as a whole.  Even a 
problem as severe as the decision to close the restaurant, over which there was 
considerable disagreement, ultimately was resolved in this way.  Despite the 
financial hardship incurred when the restaurant failed, and despite the loss of 
some members that may be attributed to it, the organisation’s viability had not 
been undermined as of 2013. 
 Project members should be able to articulate circumstances in which 
conflicts have arisen and the process through which they were resolved. 
The principal event cited by respondents that produced disagreement 
within the MCWG was the decision to close the restaurant, perhaps because it 
has occurred so recently.  Respondents all agreed that the process for making that 
decision was a recommendation from the Executive Body that was brought to the 
entire membership for a vote. 
 The conflict resolution process described in interviews should be 
managed within the institutional structure of the project. 
The restaurant decision was handled within the normal procedures of the 
MCWG.  When the President resigned in 2010 as a result of conflicts over the 
restaurant, new elections were held for an interim replacement but the normal 
election cycle resumed in 2012.  Penalties are assessed by the Executive Body.  
Financial penalties are recovered by deducting fines from payments owed to 
members for crafts sales.  No instances of sanctions being imposed outside of the 
formal structure of the organisation were identified in interviews. 
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 The conflict resolution process described in interviews should be 
perceived to be fair and efficient. 
Two questions in this regard were asked of interviewees.  To the first, 
“Conflicts within the organisation are resolved effectively and fairly,” 83.3 per 
cent of respondents agreed.  To the second, “Mechanisms to resolve conflicts 
between the organisation and community members are effective and fair,” most 
respondents had no answer and indicated such conflicts do not occur. This in part 
is because of the highly autonomous operation of the MCWG within the village 
and the dearth of interests competing with or opposed to it. 
MIF 7: Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
Testable Implications: 
 Where the entity is subject to incorporation requirements, those laws and 
regulations enable and affirm local control of the project. 
Local groups in Belize are encouraged to form organisations such as the 
MCWG, and NGO laws in Belize require only registration with the government.  
There is little regulation of NGO activities but there are numerous organisations 
in Belize to support community-based NGO activities.   
 Where the entity is not subject to incorporation requirements, 
Government officials, associated archaeologists, supporting NGOs, and 
others should perceive the project as “owned” or “controlled” by the 
community through project members. 
This section does not apply to the MCWG.  However, interviews with 
past and present Village Chairs (IVU 2010-006, IVU 2010-022, IVU 2013-063 
and IVU 2013-080) underscored the degree to which the MCWG is seen as an 
independent entity entirely under the control of its members. 
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MIF 8: Meaningful economic value to the community 
Testable Implications: 
 Economic data collected by government enterprises should reveal 
economic benefit to the community residents. 
No meaningful economic data specific to Maya Centre is collected by 
agencies of the Belizean Government. 
 Financial Records of the project should demonstrate income generation 
to the community (e.g. through distributions of revenues, dividends, etc.). 
The financial data presented above (see page 245) graphically illustrate 
the financial impact of the MCWG on the members of the group and thus on the 
majority of families in the village.  That impact is substantial in the Belizean 
context. 
 Businesses and others in the community when surveyed should report 
direct economic benefit due to the project. 
Other businesses in Maya Centre are either directly competitive with the 
MCWG (those that sell their own craft products) or not at all competitive (food 
and sundry shops, restaurants and hostels) and benefit primarily from local 
customers or tourist traffic to the CBWS.  For these reasons, few business 
owners were interviewed for this study.  Without doubt the cash income 
generated by the MCWG members has a multiplier effect at those local 
businesses that cater to the local population, and the MCWG does funnel some 
business to local tour guides and taxi services who convey visitors who arrive by 
public bus to the CBWS.  No estimates of those effects are possible, however. 
Generally, though, it is the presence of the CBWS, not the MCWG, that drives 
business to the local economy. 
 Project members when surveyed should state that economic benefits 
accrue to them from the project. 
The economic impact of the MCWG on the local community is 
substantial, and members recognize this: 43.3 per cent of respondents said that 
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their primary reason for joining the women’s group was to earn money for 
family needs or for school tuitions.  All respondents agreed with the statement “I 
believe that the association is working to improve the economy of our 
community;” 96.7 per cent agreed that “The association has been of economic 
benefit to my family;” 86.7 per cent agreed that “The community would be 
worse off if the association were ever to close;” and 96.7 per cent agreed that 
“The Association has been of economic benefit to the local community.”  
Conclusion 
The Maya Centre Women’s Group presents the most complex 
institutional structure reviewed in this thesis.  There are numerous factors behind 
this fact, which will be explored more fully in Chapter 10 when all three cases 
are compared.  However, the preceding review of the MCWG’s conformance to 
the various hypotheses and testable implications strongly supports the view that, 
in this case, the Model Institutional Features are tangibly in evidence. 
The next chapter introduces the final case study in this thesis, the Burren 
Centre in Kilfenora, Ireland.   
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Chapter 9: The Burren Centre, Kilfenora, 
Ireland 
Introduction 
This is the third of three chapters reporting on the field work conducted 
for this thesis.  The present chapter discusses the Burren Centre in Kilfenora, 
County Clare, Ireland, where field work was conducted in the fall of 2011 and 
the spring of 2012.  As with the prior chapters, it begins with a brief sketch of the 
national context within which the project is located, including a discussion of 
relevant historical points, an introduction to the economic context in which the 
community under study exists, and a brief discussion of the heritage management 
regime in place in the country. Next follows an overview of the village in which 
the project is located, which is intended to provide an introduction to the history 
of the village, the governmental structure in the community, and relevant aspects 
of the cultural context within which the project was established.  There follows a 
discussion of the findings from the field work.  Again, this is broken into two 
sections. First, the key institutional features of the organisation are recounted in 
detail.  Second, the features of the organisation and other data derived from the 
research interviews are compared with the Model Institutional Features (MIF) 
and testable implications defined in Chapter 6. 
Overview: Ireland’s History, Economy and Heritage Management 
Bartlett observes that the first “authentic” date in Irish history is the year 
431, the year when Pope Celestine dispatched Palladius to what is now Ireland as 
its first Bishop, to be followed a year later by the far more renowned Patrick  
(Bartlett 2010, 1-3). Ireland’s history predates this first official arrival of 
Christianity by millennia, however.  The first settlers arrived, probably via a 
then-existing land bridge, during the Mesolithic, perhaps around 6000 BCE or 
earlier, and proceeded to extend their presence throughout the entire island.  
Even before the arrival of Christianity, the island was the object of successive 
waves of invasions from Iberia, circa 3000 BCE, from the Celts of northern 
Europe, circa 500 BCE, and from elsewhere as human migration reached the 
edges of the Atlantic Ocean (Hollis III 2001, 12-18).  Thus, by the time of St. 
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Patrick’s arrival, Ireland had already been populated with homesteads, small 
communities, burial sites and religious venues for thousands of years. 
 The Christianized Ireland that is Patrick’s legacy became a 
beacon in Europe for religious scholarship and church leadership, with an 
extensive network of important monasteries and church sites that blanketed the 
country by about 800 CE (Bartlett 2010, 11-27).  However, the structure of 
independent monasteries and autonomous chiefdoms that evolved in Ireland in 
these centuries also made it vulnerable in ensuing centuries to continuous 
invasion.  First, the Vikings arrived in 795 to sack the north of the country and 
move on to dominate the island for 300 years (Bartlett 2010, 27-33).  As the 
Vikings’ power in Ireland waned, concern about its backward and anarchical 
state reached Rome, where in 1155 Pope Adrian IV authorized the Norman King 
Henry II of England to invade and subdue Ireland for the church (Hollis III 2001, 
26), which he did with considerable success between 1169 and 1171 (Bartlett 
2010, 34-42).  The English conquest began a period of British domination and 
Irish resistance, ultimately made more contentious when Henry VIII imposed the 
doctrines of the Protestant Church on traditionally Catholic Ireland in the mid-
1530’s (Bartlett 2010, 83).  The contention continued with varying degrees of 
colonial oppression and intense resistance even after the southern counties of 
Ireland gained their independence in 1921 (Bartlett 2010; Hollis III 2001). 
The point of this thumbnail sketch of Irish history is less to recount the 
islands complex and bloody history than to indicate the reasons that the entire 
country, including the region known as the Burren that is the subject of this 
chapter, is literally littered with Neolithic tomb sites, Medieval ring forts, ancient 
cathedrals and monastery ruins, and castles and manor homes of every 
description,.  Each of these was built and destroyed in turn by monastics, 
invaders, colonizers, and local chiefs and elites, both Catholic and Protestant.  It 
is a rich history that has left a rich legacy of archaeology and heritage sites for 
modern generations to enjoy and exploit. 
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Today, Ireland’s €163 billion9 economy is driven by export-oriented 
industries, including food products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and computers 
and electronic equipment, many of which have located in the country for its 
favourable employment and tax policies. A relatively low 39 per cent of 
Ireland’s real GDP is in the services sector, which includes tourism. As a 
consequence, the country had a substantial €42.7 billion surplus in trade in 2012, 
a balance that has grown almost 50 per cent since Ireland’s economic crisis 
began in 2008 as domestic import demand has declined in the face of economic 
pressures.  (All data from Central Statistics Office 2013.) 
Tourism into Ireland is a smaller proportion of GDP than in Peru or 
Belize.  In 2012 travel and tourism directly contributed only 2.2 per cent of 
Ireland’s GDP according to the WTTC, and directly accounts for about 2.3 per 
cent of employment.  Taking multipliers into account, the WTTC estimates that 
the total contribution to GDP and employment exceeded 9 per cent.  Visitors to 
the country accounted for €7.3 billion in exports, 4.2 per cent of the total.  
Although not large magnitudes, these percentages have been generally rising 
since Ireland’s economy collapsed in 2008-9, even though tourist visits 
themselves have declined since the crisis to 2004 levels (see Figure 42).  Over 70 
per cent of Ireland’s tourism travel is for leisure-time activities, rather than 
business travel. (All data from WTTC 2013e.)  
If tourism is a small part of Ireland’s overall economy, however, tourism 
is far more important in County Clare, the home of the Burren Centre.  Official 
estimates of the total impact of tourism at the local level are not compiled in 
Ireland, but County Clare officials have estimated that as much as 13 per cent of 
total employment in the county may be ascribed to tourism-related businesses 
(IVU 2012-23).  Aside from the Cliffs of Moher, a World Heritage Site, the key 
archaeological and natural heritage resources of the county are embedded in the 
Burren. 
 
                                                 
9 At the time of writing, €1=US$ 1.35, or £0.84 
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Figure 42: Number of overseas visitors to Ireland, 2004-2011 (Central Statistics Office 
2013) 
Archaeological and cultural heritage is essential to Ireland’s tourism 
industry.  According to a 2008 study published by the Irish government, eight of 
the top 15 paid attractions and all of the top ten free attractions in Ireland were 
heritage related, either museums, castles or heritage visitor centres.  Of all 
domestic vacationers to the island in 2008, one quarter visited old houses or 
castles, 15 per cent visited heritage or visitor centres, and 14 per cent visited 
museums. (All data from Central Statistics Office 2008, Chapter 7.) 
The management of archaeological resources in Ireland is the 
responsibility of the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht, which was 
formed in 2011 in a reorganisation that assembled functions from a number of 
disparate national government departments (Department of Arts Heritage and the 
Gaeltacht 2013).  The Department’s responsibilities include Ireland’s national 
parks and natural heritage areas, protection of the archaeological heritage 
through the National Monuments Service, and a division that regulates 
architectural policy with respect to the built heritage.  The National Monuments 
Service designates national monuments and implements controls over 
excavations at any archaeological site and over development affecting official 
monuments.  The actual management of monuments themselves, including all 
activities at sites open to the public, is handled by Ireland’s Office of Public 
Works.   
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Ireland has been designating national archaeological monuments since 
1874, enacted its first protective legislation in 1882, and was authorized to take 
direct ownership over archaeological sites, or take guardianship over 
archaeological sites not owned by the government, in the National Monuments 
Act of 1930 (Government of Ireland 1930). The act has been amended four 
times, most recently in 2004 (Government of Ireland 2004). The act regulates 
development projects that may affect archaeological sites and compels 
individuals who find archaeological objects to report those finds to one of a 
number of designated museums.  
Today the national government owns or has guardianship over nearly 
1000 individual monuments (National Monuments Service 2013b).  Given the 
density of archaeological resources in Ireland, however, the government actually 
controls only a small fraction of the more than 136,000 archaeological sites and 
monuments recorded in the Archaeological Survey of Ireland (National 
Monuments Service 2013a).  In the Burren region the vast majority of sites are 
located on private land, and protection of privately owned archaeological 
resources in Ireland is left to the owners themselves.  Frequently during the 
author’s field research in the Burren, interviewees lived on properties on which 
were located substantial ring forts, dolmen, tombs, or other constructed 
archaeological monuments.    
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The Village of Kilfenora, Ireland
10
 
 
Figure 43: Pub, store and residences on the main square in Kilfenora (Photo: P. Gould) 
Kilfenora is located in County Clare on the western edge of the Republic 
of Ireland, close to Galway Bay, the Cliffs of Moher World Heritage Site, and 
the Aran Islands (see Figure 44).  The small village centre and numerous 
surrounding farms are home to 463 people (Central Statistics Office 2011).  
Historically a farming and cattle-rearing centre, Kilfenora is also located close to 
the centre of the national park and broader geographic region known as the 
Burren.  Running from Galway Bay nearly to the Clare County seat of Ennis (see 
Figure 45), the Burren is a unique environment.  Limestone karst up-thrusts form 
rounded mountains while beneath the fractured limestone surface runs an 
underground water system that has usurped all surface streams into a network of 
underground cave-streams and turlochs, lakes that appear and disappear as the 
rainy season flows and ebbs.  Glacial activity millennia ago created a unique 
ecosystem of alpine and Mediterranean plants growing side by side in the niches 
between the stones.  It is presented to tourists as the only such environment on 
earth (Clare County Council 2011, 32).  Tillable soil is scarce, though some 
forests can be found, but there is plenty of surface fodder for the beef and dairy 
                                                 
10Elements of the following sections will appear in GOULD, P. Forthcoming 2014. A 
tale of two villages: Institutional structure and sustainable community organizations. Public 
Archaeology. 
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cattle, sheep and goats who graze throughout the Burren and have given life to 
its economy.   
 
Figure 44: The location of Kilfenora, Ireland  ©Google Maps 
The first clearly attributable archaeological remains in the Burren date 
from the Mesolithic, but it is in the warmer Neolithic period (4000 to 2400 BCE 
in Ireland) that herders and farmers began to assert a settled presence in this part 
of Western Ireland (Carthy 2011).  Within a short span, they began to 
domesticate the rugged landscape and to construct the oldest artefacts remaining 
in the Burren, a collection of megalithic dolmen and tombs epitomized by the 
iconic portal tomb at Poulnabrone (circa 3200 BCE, see Figure 48).  By the 6
th
 
Century CE, Christian churches had begun to appear in the landscape. 
Kilfenora 
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Cathedrals, such as the one now ruined in Kilfenora, had their founding late in 
the first millennium CE (Carthy 2011).  Monasteries appropriated the “holy 
wells” of earlier civilizations to serve the purposes of Christian worship and 
healing, and local clans built stone ring forts and field walls to protect family and 
livestock.  One systematically excavated ring fort, Caherconnell, has produced 
artefacts C-14  dated to the 7
th
 Century CE and has assigned structural remains to 
the late Neolithic or early Bronze Ages (Comber 2012).  County Clare officials 
report that there are over 2700 recorded monuments in the Burren (see Figure 46 
to Figure 51), including the highest concentration of Neolithic, pre-Christian, and 
early-Christian monuments in Ireland (Clare County Council 2011, 33).   As one 
essayist of the region has noted, “the Burren is more than just an open-air 
museum, it is an archaeologically saturated landscape” (Clements 2011, 25).  
Wedge tombs and ring forts in walking distance of the village centre 
testify to very early occupation in the area of Kilfenora.  Kilfenora became a 
diocese of the Catholic Church in 1152, though the village is believed to have 
hosted a monastery founded by St. Fachtna as early as the 6
th
 Century.  Although 
Kilfenora’s cathedral is in ruins today, the village still hosts the largest group of 
Celtic crosses at a single location in the country, hence its tourist moniker, “The 
City of Crosses.”  Even after the diocese was merged away in 1750, Kilfenora 
remained a market town until the latter decades of the 19
th
 Century, when the 
West Clare Railway bypassed Kilfenora in favour of nearby Ennistymon, 
establishing that town and Ennis to the east as the regional market and 
commercial centres and setting off a period of steady decline for Kilfenora. By 
the late 1960’s, when the saga of the Burren Centre begins, Kilfenora had 
reached bottom.  Interviewees today frequently describe the village in the 1960’s 
as “derelict”, citing 17 or so abandoned houses in a village centre that even today 
numbers no more than about 50 structures, many newly built. (All data Clare 
County Library 2013, IVU 2012-004, IVU 2013-013.)  Today, Kilfenora has 
rebounded. In 2011 the census reported a community of 463 people, with about 
50 homes and businesses in the traditional town Centre and scattered farms 
within the parish (Central Statistics Office 2011).   
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Figure 45: Map of the Burren, County Clare, Ireland  (Clare County Council 2011) 
    
K
il
fe
n
o
ra
 
an
d
 
th
e 
B
u
rr
en
 
C
en
tr
e 
Page | 268  
 
ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE BURREN NEAR KILFENORA, IRELAND 
All photos by P. Gould 
  
Figure 46: Kilmoon church, 15
th
 C, rests on 6
th
 C foundations 
       
Figure 47: Monks tower, 11
th
 C, Gort 
  
 Figure 48: Poulnabrone portal tomb, circa 3200 BCE 
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Figure 49: One of Kilfenora Cathedral’s six medieval crosses 
  
Figure 50: Mullaghmore Mountain, the Burren National Park 
  
Figure 51: Hilltop ringfort (circa 1000 CE) 
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That same census reported that the town’s residents are 51.6 per cent 
female and 48.4 per cent male, nearly identical to the mix among respondents to 
this survey.  Following Ireland’s economic collapse in 2008-9, the county 
experienced a reversal after years of in-migration to the country and a new 
exodus from the island began (Central Statistics Office 2011, 12). Kilfenora, by 
local accounts, has lost most of its younger adult population to larger cities or 
overseas and today skews much older than the country as a whole, as does the 
sample from Kilfenora in the present study.     
The economic drivers of the village are the rearing of cattle and sheep 
and cereal farming (often for cattle feed), and the tourism trade instigated by the 
Burren Centre.  The Burren Centre is the largest employer in the town (IVU 
2012-001).  County-wide about 13 per cent of the population is engaged in 
tourism activities, about the same level as in farming (Interview 2012.023).  In 
addition to the Burren Centre, the town has two grocery/farm supply stores, three 
pubs, a clothing store, a crafts and souvenir shop, a post-office and a few rental 
accommodations, including a hostel and several apartments or small houses that 
are rented to tourists.  Only a few buildings are unoccupied. 
Social / Political Context in Kilfenora 
Kilfenora itself has no local government officials or services.  
Government services are provided by County Clare and the national government, 
while projects that benefit a single village in western Ireland often are initiated 
by village residents.  For its population, Kilfenora boasts an impressive number 
of ambitious social projects run and substantially funded by locals.  Interviewees 
were asked to identify the three most important groups in the town. Collectively 
they identified more than 20 separate voluntary organisations, ranging from a 
nationally-recognized Céili band and music festival to athletic associations, 
youth and old-folks clubs, parade and holiday committees, and school and 
church parish councils.  Some organisations, such as the Burren Centre and the 
cattle auction market, are structured as co-operatives run by management 
committees.  At least one project, the “Deanery” community athletic facility, is a 
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shareholder-owned limited liability corporation while other groups are less 
formally organized.  
Collective action to address community needs seems endemic in 
Kilfenora.  Interviewees described the culture as one in which one or a few local 
people identify a need, call a meeting to discuss it, organize a committee to 
administer the project, and then organize volunteers to raise money or execute 
the plans.  This pattern was evident in the inception of the Burren Centre, and 
has been replicated for such diverse projects as the town’s traditional music 
festival, the St. Patrick’s Day Parade, the Deanery athletic grounds, and many 
others.  Instigators of the projects are often drawn from a smaller cadre of 
community leaders who play roles in several organisations, but broad community 
participation as volunteers and funders is the norm.   In all cases, shareholders of 
Kilfenora cooperatives and companies are local residents, the approach adopted 
by the Burren Centre’s founders in order to ensure that control of the Centre 
remained in the hands of local people (IVU 2012-013).   
The interviewees for this study were all shareholders of the Centre’s 
parent company, reflecting the fact that most families in Kilfenora have at least 
one shareholder member.  Interviewees describe a community of independent 
individuals who nevertheless demonstrate a willingness to coalesce in the event 
of personal travail or in order to sustain the village economically and socially.  
Of all interviewees, 82.1 per cent characterize interpersonal relations in the 
village as “harmonious” rather than “disagreeable” although, on average, 
interviewees rate the level of participation in the community at 3.40, only 
slightly above the “intermediate” score on a five-point very-low (1) to very-high 
scale (5). The average social capital index score (see page 308) in Kilfenora was 
1.87 on a scale of 1 (very high) to 5 (very low).   As will be seen in Chapter 10, 
the foundation of social capital as measured in this study is significantly 
stronger, in the statistical sense, in Kilfenora than in the other two villages 
studied for this thesis.  Nonetheless, only 11.1 per cent of respondents said there 
were no major conflicts in Kilfenora, and 59.2 per cent of respondents cited 
political party, family or land issues as sources of division in the community.  
However, those differences tend to be sorted out between individuals (55.6 per 
cent of responses) and family or community leaders seem not to get involved.  
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Residents speak proudly of the town’s amenities and appear intensely motivated 
to ensure the survival of its way of life.  
When there is a purpose, Kilfenora residents are generous.  Asked to 
evaluate the degree to which local residents support common development goals, 
73.3 per cent of the interviewees said people in Kilfenora “contribute both time 
and money.”  Virtually all of the volunteer projects identified by interviewees 
subsist on voluntary local donations.  Even those that receive outside grant aid 
(as the Burren Centre and the Deanery have done) have been supported with 
local philanthropy. A substantial portion of the total cost of constructing the 
original Burren Centre facility was funded from sales of shares in the parent 
cooperative (see page 282 for a description of the legal structure).  In the case of 
the Deanery, into which the community has poured about €800,000 of its own 
funds (interview 2012.016), the project has been majority funded through debt 
taken on by the Deanery cooperative that is serviced through the proceeds from a 
weekly lottery to which about 300 Kilfenora-area resident/shareholders 
voluntarily commit €100 per year in wagers.  Indeed, despite the large number of 
community projects in the Kilfenora, when asked to identify situations in which 
the community has come together but failed, 53.6 per cent of interviewees could 
not name a single failure and some projects mentioned as failures actually are 
still operating within the village.  Some ideas are still-born in Kilfenora, but the 
consensus appears to be that once a project is initiated it seems to have some 
success in this community. 
The Burren Centre 
 
Figure 52: The Burren Centre building, Kilfenora, Ireland   (Photo: P. Gould) 
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The decade of the 1960’s, when Kilfenora was at its nadir, was also a 
period when the west of Ireland was at the early stages of a revival led by the 
growing importance to international air travel of Shannon Airport, some 50 
kilometres to the southeast, near Limerick.  The Chief Executive of the Shannon 
Development Corporation, Brendan O’Reagan, saw development around the 
airport’s Free Zone and tourism in the counties surrounding Limerick as 
potential vehicles to offset the decline of rural communities in the region.  As 
participants tell the story, in 1969 O’Reagan was invited by a committee of 
citizens concerned about Kilfenora’s decline to attend a play, “The West’s 
Awake.”  Impressed, he offered to assist the village.  Brian Mooney, a young 
employee of the Limerick Adult Education Institute, had been funded by 
O’Reagan to settle for a year in a local community and identify opportunities for 
rural development.  Mooney was dispatched to Kilfenora to find and implement 
a project (Connole 2006, 8; IVU 2012.004; IVU 2012-002). 
Mooney, who is universally credited with the initiative to create the 
Burren Centre, began with a series of educational lectures in the town while he 
met with local figures and slowly assembled a committee to organize a tourism 
project.  Critically, Mooney recognized that “nobody knew about the Burren at 
that time” (Interview 2012-004).  His strategy for tourism development was to 
create an “interpretive centre,” or a place for tourists to learn about the ecology 
and archaeological heritage of the Burren before setting off to discover it for 
themselves.  His process for organizing the community was to engage in an 
extended dialog about possible ventures with community leaders from villages 
throughout the area, pivotally including Kilfenora’s parish priest and a “village 
elder” Kilfenora farmer.  Ultimately, that group came to support the creation of 
an interpretive centre about the Burren, to be located in Kilfenora.   
The project was incorporated in 1975 (Connole 2006, 5) as a cooperative 
of residents in three villages: Kilfenora, Carron in the centre of the Burren and 
New Quay to the north on Galway Bay. Formally, the Burren Centre is the 
primary activity of the Comhar Conradh na Boirne Teoranta (the “Comhar”), an 
enterprise organized under Irish cooperative laws to pursue economic 
development in the Burren region.  The founders’ idea was to build an 
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interpretive centre on the site of a derelict school building on the main square in 
Kilfenora that would make Kilfenora the first stop for tourists seeking to explore 
the region’s natural and archaeological heritage (IVU 2012-004).   
About 300 individuals subscribed £5 each for one share in the Comhar (in 
some cases, individuals contributed much more, though each shareholder 
receives only one vote).  About 80 per cent of the shareholders lived in 
Kilfenora, while 10 per cent lived in each of Carron and New Quay.  The new 
building, which opened in 1975, housed a model of the Burren and other exhibits 
through which visitors were guided by local students (see Figure 53).   
 
Figure 53: Original Burren Centre Display   (Photo courtesy of J. Morgan) 
In 1981 two nearby buildings were acquired and converted into tea rooms 
to serve Burren Centre visitors and to house a crafts shop.  Reflecting its original 
goal to serve as a platform for broader economic development in Kilfenora, the 
Comhar in 1980 hired its first full-time paid director and launched a number of 
other projects to expand the Comhar’s economic development activities beyond 
the display centre. These included ventures to produce fruit jams and wooden 
toys for sale to tourists and to cut firebricks from the local peat bogs for sale to 
locals as fuel for home fireplaces. By the early 1980’s these ancillary ventures 
had failed, a result of shortcomings in the strategy and management of the 
organisation, such as  poor planning and marketing and inattention to costs, all 
problems identified by a consultant in 1983 (Irish Productivity Centre 1983). 
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Only the display centre, tea shop and craft sales businesses have endured 
commercially. As a result, interviewees most often mentioned “interpreting the 
Burren for tourism” as the primary mission of the cooperative and gave second 
most frequent mention to “creating employment opportunities in the village.” 
The process that led to the establishment of the Burren Centre triggered 
additional development in the region.  Within a year, two of the founders of the 
Kilfenora project had launched a new venture in the northern Burren close to 
Galway, the Aillwee Cave, a commercial enterprise that opened to tourist access 
a portion of the region’s hundreds of miles of underground caves and caverns.  
As a result of the consternation resulting from their decision to compete for 
tourist attention, the two retired from active engagement with the Burren Centre 
over concerns regarding conflict of interest.  Mooney himself ventured to 
Germany for training and returned to acquire a site in the midst of the Burren on 
which to found The Burren Perfumery, where he created fragrances using the 
Burren’s unique collection of flora and offered visitors a tea room restaurant set 
in the middle of the Burren landscape.  He, too, eventually withdrew from active 
engagement with the Comhar.  Aillwee began a cheese-making operation using 
milk from a local farmer, also a Comhar shareholder, who was inspired in the 
mid-1990s to open yet another tourist venue on his property, the aforementioned 
Caherconnell ring fort complex, which now is a private archaeological park, 
restaurant and field school operated in conjunction with Irish archaeologists.  A 
founder of one of these early businesses directly credited the Burren Centre with 
creating the tourist traffic that launched his enterprise (Interview 2012.033).   
The Burren Centre was the first prominent project in the growth of 
tourism in Ireland’s mid-west, and it is frequently identified by proponents as the 
entity that “put the ‘Burren’ into the vernacular” (Interview 2012.014). Today, 
the Burren Centre’s display, tea rooms and craft shop are open to visitors from 
10 a.m. to 5 p.m. every day (see Figure 54 to Figure 61).   County Clare receives 
about 430,000 visitors annually, making it the most-visited tourism region of 
Ireland (Arkins 2010, 4).  In the past five years, paid visitors to the Burren 
Centre’s exhibit space have ranged from 21,688 in 2008, as the global financial 
crisis began, to a high of just over 30,000 visitors in 2011, totals that do not 
include crafts shoppers or tea room customers (see Figure 62).  
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BURREN CENTRE FACILITIES, 2013 
Photos by P. Gould except as indicated 
 
  
Figure 54: Entrance to the exhibit hall, Burren Centre 
 
Figure 55: Interactive map of the Burren region 
 
Figure 56: Burren Centre video display and rental theatre space 
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Figure 57: Neolithic diorama 
 
Figure 58: Diorama of a local ring fort complex 
  
Figure 59: Display boards on Burren geology and flora 
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Figure 60: The shop at the Burren Centre 
 
Figure 61: The tearooms at the Burren Centre    (Photo ©The Burren Centre) 
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Figure 62: Burren Display Centre annual attendance 2007-2011  (The Burren Centre) 
From the early 1990s until 2000, the Burren Centre faced the greatest 
crisis of its existence, the battle over a proposed national park and visitor centre 
at Mullaghmore Mountain in the Burren (see Figure 50).   By one account at 
least, the government had been acquiring land in the Burren for a national park 
from the late 1960’s (IVU 2012.014).  However, the first public suggestion of a 
National Park in the Burren region appeared in the mid-1980s and the effort took 
fire in 1991, when the European Community made funding available for four 
tourist centres in Ireland (IVU 2012-014).  National government officials chose 
to situate one of those centres adjacent to Mullaghmore in the heart of 
undeveloped Burren land less than 15 kilometres from Kilfenora.   
The saga of this fight, which lasted for a decade and wound its way to the 
Irish Supreme Court, is recorded on the web pages of the Burren Action Group, 
the leading opponents of the plan (http://homepages.iol.ie/~burrenag/).  In 
Kilfenora, the Mullaghmore facility was seen as a death threat to the Burren 
Centre.  The Comhar’s shareholders were activated but they were deeply divided 
over the correct response.  Fearful of alienating powerful government funders in 
a situation with an uncertain outcome, the Comhar’s governing Committee trod 
carefully and opposed the Mullaghmore project while seeking to negotiate a 
contingency funding arrangement at the same time.  Others in the community 
believed that more aggressive opposition was essential.  Ultimately, nearly 50 
per cent of the shareholders turned out for a 1991 Special General Meeting 
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(SGM) on the topic.  Some supported the Committee’s position while others in 
the community argued for a more combative stance.  After robust debate at that 
meeting the Committee’s position prevailed in an open vote (Comhar 1975-
2012). 
 In the end, the battle against Mullaghmore was won by the Burren 
Action Group, an independent group from a nearby town that premised its 
successful legal challenge on preserving undeveloped Burren lands.  That group 
was itself relatively indifferent to the fate of Kilfenora’s tourist attraction (IVU 
2012-014).  However, when the legal fight ended and the Mullaghmore project 
finally died in 2000, a new Irish government provided almost £1 million in 
funding to the Comhar to acquire additional land and construct a new interpretive 
centre, which opened in 2001 (Connole 2006, 8; IVU 2012-018).   
The only other crisis to affect the organisation occurred in 1993.  A 
consequence of the Mullaghmore dispute, local business owners who were 
fearful that the Burren Centre might founder sought to eliminate Article 5, a 
provision in the Comhar’s “constitution” (see page 282) that precludes 
shareholders who are owners of competitive local businesses (pubs, retail shops, 
groceries) from sitting on the Comhar’s governing Committee.  Protagonists on 
each side differ regarding the others’ motivations, but they make are unanimous 
that their mutual concern was to ensure continued life for the Burren Centre 
itself.  This dispute also led to shareholder calls for another SGM in 1993, again 
featuring a large shareholder turnout on both sides of the issue.  After robust 
debate, Article 5 was retained in the constitution and competitors remain barred 
from the Committee to the present day (Comhar 1975-2012). 
Since the mid-1990s, contention among the Comhar’s shareholders has 
moderated and today attendance at the Comhar’s Annual General Meetings is 
sparse.  To many individuals interviewed, this fact reflects a high level of 
comfort with the Comhar’s current operations, and must be viewed in a 
community context where most people seem to take an active role only when 
feel that crucial interests are at stake.  
The income from the Burren Centre, tea shop and crafts shop supports 
permanent staffs of 5 that escalates to around 18 seasonally (IVU 2012-001).  
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The Centre is the largest single employer in Kilfenora by a wide margin.  
Seasonal workers typically are school students from Kilfenora and neighbouring 
villages who rotate responsibilities across the shop, tea rooms and visitor 
galleries.  Several interviewees cited this broad work exposure as a formative 
working experience for young people in Kilfenora.   The economic performance 
of the Comhar has reflected Ireland’s difficulties after the 2008 financial crisis 
(see Figure 63).  Revenues and cash flow (operating profit plus depreciation) 
have declined steeply and, although losses in 2008 were quickly stemmed, the 
organisation has operated in recent years around break-even at the operating 
level.  Employment has been flat for the five years to 2012, both full time and 
seasonally.  Today, the Comhar and the Burren Centre may be characterized as 
self-sufficient on an operating basis, but reliant on external support for major 
capital improvements and, because some of the summer youth positions are 
subsidized by the county government, also dependent on government aid for 
some portion of the employment it provides to local youths. 
 
Figure 63: Audited financial performance, Comhar Conradh na Boirne Teoranta, 2007-
2010 (Comhar 2010)  
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Institutional Structure of the Burren Centre 
The Comhar’s institutional structure reflects the legacy of the British 
colonial legal system and Kilfenora’s roots in rural Ireland.  While many 
activities in Kilfenora are organized informally as local committees dedicated to 
particular projects, those with ambitions to operate in a business-like fashion 
elect to operate under various corporate structures.  In Kilfenora two major 
organisations, the Comhar/Burren Centre and the Deanery athletic fields, have 
elected corporate form in order to borrow money, manage physical and financial 
assets, and engage members of the community as shareholders.   
This section of the chapter will describe the formalities of the 
Comhar/Burren Centre’s institutional structure.  Unlike Asociacíon Inkallaqta, 
discussed in Chapter 7, or the Maya Centre Women’s Group, discussed in 
Chapter 8, the Burren Centre’s structure, rules, sanctions and decision-making 
systems did not evolve from community discussion but instead were adopted in 
full from model legal formats disseminated by an Irish trade association.  
However, those formats are deeply rooted in the traditional way of conducting 
collaborative projects in rural Ireland and gain legitimacy from that tradition as 
well as from Kilfenora’s traditional approach to conducting all manner of 
community-based activities. 
Like the chapter preceding, this section will present findings distilled 
from open-ended interview questions and documents, particularly the 
Constitution and minute books of the Comhar (1975-2012; 1983) that were 
reviewed during the field work in Kilfenora. This section is followed by a 
comparison of those features to the Model Institutional Features outlined in 
Chapter 6. 
Legal structure 
The Burren Centre is the primary activity of the Comhar Conradh na 
Boirne Teoranta, an enterprise organized under Irish cooperative laws.  The 
Burren Centre operates legally as “the Burren Display Centre, Ltd.,” a non-profit 
subsidiary of the Comhar, although all of the assets of the Centre are owned by 
the Comhar (Connole 2006,5).  Technically, the Comhar is a for-profit entity, 
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though it has never declared a dividend.  Co-ops are a traditional rural collective 
structure in Ireland, where a trade association, the Irish Cooperative Organisation 
Society, Ltd. (ICOS), provides a model “constitution” for the use of newly-
formed cooperatives in the country.  Unless otherwise noted, the structural and 
procedural elements of the Comhar’s structure described herein are all recorded 
in the Comhar’s constitution (Comhar 1983). 
The Comhar adopted the standard form ICOS “constitution” in 1975 and 
updated it most recently in 1983. When questioned about governance principles 
or the mechanics of managing the Comhar and the Burren Centre, interviewees 
typically point to the constitution.  It is, as one current committee member put it, 
the “Bible of the Burren Centre” (Interview 2012-18).  The constitution, as 
adopted by the Comhar, was broad in its objectives, empowering the 
organisation to engage in projects “to develop and improve the industries of 
horticulture, arboriculture, turbary [peat cutting], agriculture, fisheries and 
tourism in Ireland” and to conduct business activities ranging from selling farm 
produce to manufacturing local crafts (Comhar 1983, paragraph 4).  The 
Comhar’s ventures into other businesses were unsuccessful and the Burren 
Centre, gift shop and tea rooms are its only activities today. 
Membership eligibility; voting eligibility 
Voting rights are held by shareholders in the Comhar, who number about 
300 persons.  There are no restrictions on eligibility to purchase shares other than 
a minimum age requirement.  Shares were available for purchase in 2012 for €10 
each.  Any person over the age of 16 may purchase shares, regardless of 
residence.  However, the Comhar has not solicited new shareholders for many 
years and rarely adds to its shareholder list.  Indeed, many of the original 
shareholders are now deceased and in the course of this research the author 
discovered numerous discrepancies in the official shareholder list, including 
several names of deceased shareholders whose families had asked that they not 
be removed as shareholders (IVU 2012-001). The result is a very ambiguous 
membership roster at the present time that impacted the survey method used in 
this research (see page 170). 
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Selection of leaders 
The ICOS model constitution establishes shareholder decision-making 
exercised through a required Annual General Meeting (AGM) to which all 
shareholders are invited.  At the AGM, members elect an 11-member Committee 
of Management (the “Committee”), candidates for which must be nominated five 
days in advance of the AGM by another shareholder.  No member may nominate 
him or herself.  Elections are determined by a majority vote of those in 
attendance after a minimal required quorum of 10 shareholders is in attendance.  
The constitution was amended in 1983 to require that members rotate off of the 
Committee.  Members of the Committee serve terms of three years and may 
stand once for re-election, but may serve no more than six consecutive years 
before retiring for at least one year.  In principle, there are to be nine members of 
the Committee from Kilfenora and two each from Cairn and New Quay, 
although in practice few members living outside of Kilfenora have been willing 
to serve.  In 2012 the Committee had 11 members. 
All shareholders over the age of 21 are eligible to serve on the Committee 
except under two conditions.  First, a person who is engaged in a business that 
competes with the activities of the Comhar may not serve.  In practice, this 
provision has excluded the owner of the other crafts shop in the village and the 
owners of Kilfenora’s public houses from membership. Second, the constitution 
specifically precludes members who are bankrupt, of unsound mind, in arrears in 
payment so the Comhar, or have been disqualified for attendance reasons from 
serving on the Committee.  
Each year, the members of the Committee elect the officers of the 
Comhar, which include a Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary and occasional 
assistant officers.  Although the constitution provides for members of the 
Committee to be paid, in fact are all volunteers.  The General Manager of the 
Burren Centre, a paid position, reports to the Committee. 
Executive committee role 
The Committee (IVU 2011-012) is the body responsible for executing the 
policies and directing the operations and managing the financial condition of the 
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Comhar and its business. The Committee is required to approve all businesses 
carried on by the Comhar, all employees hired or dismissed, and all rates of 
compensation, although it has the right to delegate tasks to the General Manager.   
The constitution requires that the Committee meet at least monthly, with 
additional special meetings callable on 48 hour notice to the members.  The 
Committee has the right to replace members who leave the committee during 
their term of office, but only until the subsequent AGM.  
Decision-making / conflict resolution mechanisms 
Decisions relating to the operations of the Comhar and the Burren Centre 
fall into three categories:  First, decisions relating to the operation of the Burren 
Centre, crafts shop and tea rooms are made by the General Manager in 
consultation with the Committee.  Second, the constitution itself can be amended 
only by a vote of two-thirds of the members present at a Special General Meeting 
called for the purpose.  Third, policy decisions authorized by the constitution and 
the interpretation of the constitution are reserved to the Committee.  In a dispute 
over interpretations, differences may be arbitrated by ICOS.     
Shareholders of the Comhar report that decision making is quite formal at 
both the committee and shareholder meeting level, with raised-hand voting 
required in the constitution and generally used.  A group of five members may 
demand a secret ballot, and in the Special General Meeting relating to the Article 
5 dispute a secret ballot was recorded in the minutes.  The Committee of the 
Comhar has resisted changes to or variances from the rules of the constitution, as 
was reflected in the Article 5 dispute in 1983.  Indeed, in the midst of the 2001 
construction project the Chairman at the time reached his 6 year term limit.  
Committee members debated altering the rules to enable him to stay to supervise 
completion of the project, as was requested by some shareholders at the AGM in 
2000, but ultimately chose to abide by the constitution (IVU 2012.025). 
Rules in use 
The rules of the Comhar are spelled out in the constitution, a 25 page 
document that is registered with the Irish government through ICOS. Because the 
Comhar was originally conceived of as money-making enterprise, it includes 
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numerous provisions that are not relevant to the Burren Centre’s current non-
profit incarnation.   
The constitution specifies the purposes of the organisation, the 
membership eligibility rules, the rights of the organisation to conduct businesses 
and borrow money, rules for expulsion or other penalties, and the general 
operating rules for the Comhar.  Among the most important: 
 The organisation must hold an Annual General Meeting once each year, 
on no less than 8 day notice to members, in order to elect officers, review 
financial statements and conduct other business. 
 Votes at the meeting are to be held by hand unless 5 members request a 
secret ballot, which has occurred only once according to minutes of the 
AGMs or SGMs. 
 Upon the written petition of 20 per cent of the shareholders, the Secretary 
must call a SGM within 14 days to address the issues specifically 
stipulated in the shareholders’ call.  This was the mechanism used by 
disgruntled shareholders to call for the meetings that addressed the 
Mullaghmore and Article 5 disputes in the 1990s. 
 The Comhar must conduct an annual audit of its financial performance 
and present the audit results at the AGM for approval by the members. 
 A quorum of members present that is sufficient for the general meetings 
to conduct business is defined as no fewer than ten persons. 
 No person who conducts a business competitive with or similar to one 
conducted by the Comhar may serve on the Committee. 
 Other rules, largely affecting the Committee, were described in the 
previous section, including the limits on Committee member terms and 
the rotation of the election of Committee members over a three-year 
cycle. 
Unlike the other two projects studied in this thesis, attendance at 
meetings is not mandatory and the number of rules in use by the Comhar is 
substantially smaller and less prescriptive than in the other two organisations.  
Instead, the structure and operations of the Comhar and the Burren Centre would 
be very recognizable to any person familiar with general corporate governance 
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under laws derived from the British common law system.  It is a corporation that 
has delegated its business affairs to a board of directors (the Committee) who 
operate with considerable independence but subject to full disclosure of financial 
results to shareholders and to the right of shareholders to call the Committee’s 
members to account or to remove them from office over time. 
Sanctions and enforcement  
The constitution of the Comhar stipulates a very limited array of 
sanctions. 
Shareholders may be expelled for “conduct detrimental to the Society” by 
two thirds of the shareholders present at a special meeting for the purpose. No 
member has ever been expelled for this reason. 
Article 5, which prevents competitors from serving on the Committee, 
has led a few members to withdraw from active involvement with the Comhar.  
However, those withdrawals were not mandated by the organisations’ rules.  In 
the case of two founders who left the committee after forming a competitive 
business, their decision was unilateral although based on considerable discomfort 
felt by other members about their decision to compete. One of those founders 
remains a shareholder of the Comhar (IVU 2012-002; IVU 2012-007).  As noted 
above, members of the Committee may be removed from office due to personal 
considerations (see page 284); however, no member of the Committee has ever 
been disqualified for any of these reasons. 
Sources of finance and financial management  
The original Burren Centre building and exhibit was built for £26,000 in 
1975 (IVU 2012-004).  Funding came from the original purchases of shares by 
local residents, from a grant from Bord Failte, an Irish tourism development 
authority, and from volunteer labour. The Burren Centre has benefitted 
throughout its history from government aid, especially for capital projects.  Most 
notable is the roughly £1 million received from the national government in 2001 
to expand the building and reset the interpretive exhibition at the Centre in its 
present form.   
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In the year ended 31 December 2010, the Comhar reported gross turnover 
of €287, 545, virtually identical to the prior year, of which €87,791 represented a 
grant from the national government to employ the disadvantaged (Comhar 2010).  
The grant moneys are used to pay some of the summer employees at the Burren 
Centre.  The remaining income derives primarily from admission fees to the 
exhibit and sales in the retail shop and tearooms.  All cash and banking matters 
are managed by the Comhar’s paid manager, although checks must be signed by 
two Committee members.  Banking is with a branch bank located in Kilfenora. 
Comparing the Burren Centre to the Model Institutional Features 
This section of the chapter will compare the institutional features of the 
Comhar and the Burren Centre to the Model Institutional Features (MIF) 
outlined in Chapter 6.  As with the preceding chapters, this section will not 
compare the projects.  That task will be undertaken in Chapter 10.   In all three 
chapters, factual and statistical statements are drawn from documentary materials 
cited previously and from interviews with the shareholders of the Comhar and 
residents of Kilfenora conducted as part of the field work for this thesis. 
MIF 1: Clearly defined boundaries 
Testable implication: 
 Interviewees should be able to articulate the physical boundaries that 
determine who may or may not become a member of the organisation. 
Most (62.1 per cent) interviewees cite the Burren region as the 
geographic domain of the Burren Centre, reflecting its mission.  A minority (17.2 
per cent) cite the three towns involved in its founding—Kilfenora, New Quay 
and Carron.  Only 20.7 per cent of respondents focused on Kilfenora, despite the 
clear direct benefits that the Comhar has brought to the village itself.  Burren 
Centre management today views a successful Burren-wide tourism trade as 
essential to its survival and it appears that the Centre and its shareholders retain 
Burren-wide ambitions even though its activities and clearest direct benefits are 
largely concentrated in Kilfenora. In short, the official boundaries for eligibility 
to become a shareholder of the Comhar are geographically defined but very 
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broad, even if the practical boundary—interpreted as the location where the 
volunteers and staff largely reside and where the economic benefits of the project 
are most direct—is confined to Kilfenora itself. 
MIF 2: Congruence between provision and appropriation rules and 
local conditions 
Testable Implications: 
 The rules of the organisation should be clearly derived from relevant 
legal authority and/or traditional practices, or their legitimacy should be 
traceable to conditions in the community, including traditional legal 
structures, social norms, governance practices, and the degree of social 
capital in evidence in the community.   
The co-operative that operates the Burren Centre is a direct descendent of 
the agricultural co-operatives that formed the most conventional form of 
collective business activity in rural Ireland from the 19
th
 Century, and it 
incorporates many corporate requirements, such as statutory audits and 
mandatory AGMs, derived directly from UK corporate law that was transferred 
to Ireland when it was under English rule.  Whether forming a cattle mart or 
undertaking a social project, collective action involving significant investment in 
this part of rural Ireland tends toward cooperative form or a similar liability-
limiting corporate structure.  Even if they are not legally organized, social 
projects in Kilfenora operate in parallel fashion through management committees 
that engage with larger constituencies in formal contexts in which majority votes 
carry the day. Interviewees consistently report that the management of 
Kilfenora’s organisations is characterized by delegation to an activist group 
operating under formal majoritarian operating principles with accountability 
back to that larger constituency on major matters.  
Having said this, there are no provision or appropriation rules in effect 
within the Comhar, other than the theoretical opportunity for shareholders to 
receive a dividend from the organisation each year.  The organisation structure is 
rooted deeply in the community and its history, but it operates as an independent 
corporation and does not, in this regard, resemble Asociacíon Inkallaqta or the 
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MCWG in their controls over who may, or may not, access the flow of tourists 
into the community.   
 Indicators of social capital and trust should be consistent with the 
institutional elements of the organisation (i.e. greater protections 
associated with lower levels of trust and social capital as identified and 
vice versa). 
The social capital index constructed for this study was higher in 
Kilfenora than in the other two locations (see page 308).  The structural aspects 
of social capital in Kilfenora are extensive: 65.5 per cent of shareholders 
interviewed are leaders or active members in other organisations. When asked to 
identify those organisations a total of 27 different organisations were named—
more than one for every 20 people living in the village.   All interviewees agreed 
with the proposition that “The Burren Centre leaders are fair and honest;” all 
agreed with the proposition “I trust the Burren Centre leaders when they handle 
money;” and 93.1 per cent agreed that “The Burren Centre leaders are effective 
at their jobs.”   
The high levels of confidence and trust expressed may reasonably be 
associated with a shareholder group that is at present quite passively involved in 
the organisation and with the extensive delegation by shareholders to the 
Committee and to management at the Comhar. Institutional structures for the 
handling of cash are built strongly on trusted employees but subject to monthly 
Committee review of financial condition and a requirement that two Committee 
members must sign each bank check. Kilfenora comfortably trusts committees, 
and committees “trust but verify” their employees. 
MIF 3: Collective choice arrangements 
 Testable implications: 
 Projects will be organized, either as formal legal entities or informally, 
in a manner that empowers community members (either personally or 
through community-selected representatives) to participate directly in the 
governance of the project.  
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The formal legal structure of the Comhar, evidenced through the 
constitution, reflects contemporary European and American concepts of 
shareholder democracy. Formally, shareholders elect the Committee in a public 
election, not a secret ballot, and the Committee itself operates formally through 
open voting.  Major decisions on finance or policy find their way to AGMs or 
SGMs where they can be voted on by the shareholders. However, reflecting the 
corporate-style delegation of authority to the Committee, only 39.3 per cent of 
respondents agreed that “Shareholders control the organisation” and only 32.1 
per cent believed that “Shareholders set their own rules and enforce them.” The 
perception is widely held among shareholders that the Committee actually runs 
the Comhar day-to-day, an arrangement most find satisfactory because they feel 
that in periods of contention shareholders are able to assert themselves through 
the AGM or SGM mechanism.  As the crises of the 1990s demonstrated, 
shareholder empowerment is real within the Comhar—if the situation calls for it.   
 Government officials, supporting NGOs should perceive the project as 
“owned” or “controlled” by the community or at least by project 
members. 
Although there are too few official bodies involved with the Comhar to 
have any statistical significance, it is the case that only one outsider interviewed 
for this study failed to perceive the Comhar as a community-owned institution.    
 Legal documentation associated with the project, if any, should provide 
for individuals in the immediate community to “own” or “control” the 
project. 
The constitution of the Comhar is unequivocal on this matter. 
Shareholders own the Comhar as a for-profit cooperative and have full rights to 
elect the committee and make major policy decisions. 
 Leadership of the project at the community level should have changed in 
an orderly fashion since its founding. 
The constitution and rules adopted by the Comhar require rotating 
membership on the Committee and limit members to two terms in office. As a 
result, changes in leadership of the Burren Centre are routine. The Comhar has 
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had ten chairpersons during its existence, including one who has served twice. 
Numerous community members have served on the Committee over the years. 
 Interviews should reveal changes in mission, addition of new businesses 
and/or adjustment of the business model in response to experience or to 
changes in external conditions. 
The early years of the Comhar were a period of experimentation beyond 
the initial plan to create an interpretive centre and a tourist industry for the 
Burren.  Most of those experiments failed, but the organisation and its governing 
structure remained intact. The Burren Centre gradually expanded its food and 
catering business starting in 1981, and more recently the organisation 
successfully expanded and revitalized the Centre’s shop, tea room and 
interpretive exhibits.  Changes in the business of the Comhar have occurred 
frequently since its founding. 
 Project Members should support propositions similar to “Members have 
a direct influence on the plans and activities of the organisation.” 
Shareholders only weakly support the questions related to this point.  
Only 73.9 per cent of interviewees agreed that “Participation in decision-making 
within the organisation is active;” a smaller 51.9 per cent agreed that 
“Shareholders have direct influence on the plans and activities of the 
association;” only 39.3 per cent agreed that “Shareholders control the 
organisation;” and only 32.1 per cent agreed that “Shareholders set their own 
rules and enforce them.”  Those dissenting viewed the Committee as the primary 
decision making body and consider the shareholder base to be passive. Those 
responding affirmatively point to the fact that the constitution requires major 
decisions, such as the organisation’s debt limitation, to be approved at an AGM 
and thus ultimately the Comhar is subject to “shareholder control.”  In practical 
terms, the Committee is the body that appears to be viewed as the real authority 
in the organisation, and the members of the Committee are viewed as effective at 
their jobs (93.1 per cent agreed that “Leaders of the association are effective at 
their jobs”). 
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MIF 4: Active monitoring  
Testable Implications: 
 Audited or unaudited financial records of the group are made available 
to project members with regularity. 
The constitution of the Comhar requires that an audit be completed each 
year and financial results presented at the AGM. Overall, only 64.3 per cent of 
interviewees agreed that “Members receive financial and operational reports 
routinely.” The Constitution requires that financial audits are presented at each 
AGM, but attendance has been low in recent years. Audits are not distributed in 
the normal course to shareholders who do not attend the AGM.  Financial 
records also are available for review by shareholders upon request, which is 
reported to have occurred once (IVU 2012.001).  There have been sporadic 
requests in past AGMs to distribute financials in advance of meetings; however, 
attendance at AGMs is now announced in a newspaper advertisement not by 
direct mail.   
 Participants should support propositions similar to “I feel well informed 
about the activities of the organisation,” “The association leaders are 
fair and honest,” or “I trust the association leaders when they handle 
money.” 
A large 72.4 per cent of participants agreed with the statement “I feel 
well informed about the activities of the organisation” despite the lacklustre 
participation in AGMs and the availability of financial reports only at AGMs or 
by request. To some degree, this may reflect the communications dynamics of a 
small village where the activities of the Burren Centre are highly visible. As 
noted above, the responses to the question about the honesty and trustworthiness 
of Comhar officials and to the question about confidence in the handling of 
money are unanimously positive. Shareholders of the Comhar appear content to 
let the Committee run the organisation. 
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MIF 5: Graduated sanctions 
Testable Implications: 
 Formal or informal mechanisms should exist to enable project members 
to regulate participant compliance with obligations to the project. 
The constitution of Comhar clearly addresses the situations under which 
members may be expelled from the organisation and the procedures to be 
followed in the event of shareholder defaults on obligations.  Article 5 addresses 
the matter of conflicts of interest with regard to Committee membership, which 
has been debated at least four times in the organisation’s history according to 
minutes. However, no event of expulsion has been recorded in the minutes and 
sanctions appear rarely if ever to have been imposed.       
 A system of sanctions and penalties should exist and reflect “punishment 
to suit the infraction” or discretionary sanction imposition. 
The system of sanctions and penalties is very limited and focused 
principally on infractions that preclude members from eligibility for the 
Committee or create the grounds to expel a member as a shareholder.  There are 
no mandatory obligations, as there are in Asociacíon Inkallaqta or in Maya 
Centre, and there is no structure of graduated sanctions.   
 Evidence of effective monitoring/enforcement activity should be 
identifiable. 
Outside of AGMs and the monitoring of operations through financial 
reports, for those who elect to attend meetings or seek out the reports, general 
monitoring schemes do not exist within the Comhar.  Having said that, as noted 
above, members in this small town are well-informed about the activities of the 
Comhar and the Burren Centre.  The two crises, over the Mullaghmore and 
Article 5 (see page 272), illustrate that members do remain aware of the 
decisions and activities of the Comhar and are prepared to take steps if 
disagreements become substantial.  This is not, however, comparable to the 
monitoring / sanctions regimes in place in Asociacíon Inkallaqta or the Maya 
Centre Women’s Group. 
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MIF 6: Conflict resolution mechanisms    
Testable Implications: 
 Conflicts in the organisation should be resolved through institutional 
structures in ways that do not undermine the continued viability of the 
organisation.   
One test of institutional robustness may be the degree to which major 
divisions within the organisation have been confronted and resolved without 
destructive consequences. Debate over decisions within the Committee is 
characterized by members as vigorous but never personal, and 80 per cent of 
shareholders interviewed agreed that “The organisation is open to broad debate, 
including opposition positions.”  Decision making is described by interviewees 
as formal and the widespread acceptance of majoritarian principles results in 
most conflicting views within the organisation being resolved either through 
consensus-building discussion or a vote, usually within the Committee.   In those 
two instances where conflicts have become general, SGMs have been called by 
dissident shareholders using their rights under the constitution, the contentious 
matter has been debated at length, and a vote taken to resolve the matter.  The 
results have been accepted and all moved on. 
 Project members should be able to articulate circumstances in which 
conflicts have arisen and the process through which they were resolved. 
There is widespread awareness of the division within the Comhar’s 
shareholders at the time of Mullaghmore and the subsequent dispute over Article 
5.  No major disagreements since then have been identified. 
 The conflict resolution process described in interviews should be 
managed within the institutional structure of the project. 
The constitution, as the “Bible” of the Comhar’s operations, sets out 
mechanisms for resolving disputes generally.  The mechanism for resolution the 
Mullaghmore and Article 5 matters followed the procedures of the constitution. 
The social pressure on the two founders who set up a competing business seems 
irregular, but they were not expelled nor was their formal treatment otherwise in 
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contravention of the constitution.  Generally, disputes appear to have been 
resolved “by the book.” 
 The conflict resolution process described in interviews should be 
perceived to be fair and efficient. 
Known disputes have involved personnel matters, Mullaghmore and 
Article 5.  Of all interviewees, 86.4 per cent agreed that “Mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts within the organisation are effective and fair” and 87.5 per cent agreed 
that “Mechanisms to resolve conflicts between the organisation and community 
members are effective and fair.”  Respondents have difficulty describing the 
mechanisms, so these responses may reflect a general sense that problems have 
been adequately managed in the past. 
MIF 7: Minimal recognition of rights to organize   
Testable Implications: 
 Where the entity is subject to incorporation requirements, those laws and 
regulations enable and affirm local control of the project. 
Corporate statutes in Ireland authorize individuals to organize groups 
such as the Comhar and spell out the mechanisms for managing them. Within the 
community, the practice of assembling a committee to pursue a community 
project also is well established and this additional layer of traditional practice 
legitimizes the Comhar as it operates today. 
 Where the entity is not subject to incorporation requirements, 
Government officials, associated archaeologists, supporting NGOs, and 
others should perceive the project as “owned” or “controlled” by the 
community through project members. 
In the early days of the Comhar, Borde Failte played a large role in 
financing, overseeing and providing capacity-building expertise to the nascent 
organisation. A representative of the Borde Failte sat on the committee 
overseeing construction and was authorized to exercise a veto over certain 
changes in mission of the Comhar. In 1983, a grant-giving organisation paid a 
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consultant to evaluate the staff and the performance of the Comhar’s various 
projects and to make recommendations.   
Rapidly, however, assistance became more arms-length. In 2012, even 
though triennial employment grants are a significant source of financing at the 
Burren Centre, the cumbersome paperwork did not appear to be associated with 
significant oversight. Government efforts now underwrite region-wide marketing 
and tourist development efforts (Burren Connect) in which the Burren Centre is 
perceived by outside officials as a leader among the many groups engaged with 
and advising on that process. The major funding for rebuilding the Burren Centre 
following the Mullaghmore battle came without significant conditions attached 
but with considerable expert assistance from the national government in design 
and construction management.  Funders have supported the Centre and provided 
training and technical or marketing assistance, but they generally have not done 
so in an intrusive manner. There is no evidence that conditions attached to grants 
have materially impacted the actions or operations of the Comhar since its 
founding.   
MIF 8: Meaningful economic value to the community   
Testable Implications: 
 Economic data collected by government enterprises should reveal 
economic benefit to the community residents. 
There are no data collected in Ireland, either from tourism or economic 
agencies, that document the current or historic impact of the Comhar on 
Kilfenora or County Clare. 
 Financial Records of the project should demonstrate income generation 
to the community (e.g. through distributions of revenues, dividends, etc.). 
The organisation has never paid a dividend and has no plans to do so.  
However, for the last five years, the Comhar has weathered the Irish economic 
downturn with break-even cash flow performance while generating two-thirds to 
three-quarters of its income from its business activities and sustaining its 
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employment levels (see page 287).  The Comhar’s 37-year role as the largest 
employer in Kilfenora underscores the economic impact of the enterprise.   
 Businesses and others in the community when surveyed should report 
direct economic benefit due to the project. 
All but one business owner in Kilfenora was interviewed, and each 
asserted the importance of the Centre to his or her business by drawing in tourist 
traffic. However, none could produce specific financial data to corroborate their 
statements. One business owner observed that the Centre “puts Kilfenora on the 
map” (Interview 2012.029) while a pub owner stated, “If the Burren Centre 
wasn’t there I wouldn’t be here” (Interview 2012.034). 
 Project members when surveyed should state that economic benefits 
accrue to them from the project. 
Several questions in the survey directly address economic impact and the 
responses overwhelmingly confirm the economic value placed by the 
shareholders and Kilfenorans generally on the Burren Centre.  Asked to identify 
the benefits of the organisation to the community, 45.2 per cent cited 
employment or economic development in the community, 22.6 per cent 
mentioned tourism.   All interviewees agreed that the village “Would be worse 
off if the Burren Centre were to close.”  Of all respondents, 73.3 per cent state 
that the Centre “has benefitted my family or business financially,” and 100 per 
cent of interviewees agreed that “The Burren Centre has been of economic 
benefit to the local community.” Moreover, reflecting the Burren-wide mission 
of the organisation, 89.7 per cent agreed that “The Burren Centre has been of 
economic benefit to nearby communities.” 
Conclusion 
To this point in the presentation of data, three very different organisations 
in three very different contexts have been presented.  The Burren Centre operates 
in a village in which social capital is very high, community participation 
exceptional, and both local tradition and legal conventions leave the management 
of community projects to small leadership groups.  Organisations in the village 
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are democratic, in the sense of corporate democracy in which shareholders or 
members can ultimately affect the direction of the organisation through elections 
to boards such as the Committee.  Members are generally highly delegative 
where conditions give them confidence that the organisation is running well.  But 
they are empowered and willing to intervene if circumstances warrant.  This is a 
picture very different from Asociacíon Inkallaqta and from the Maya Centre 
Women’s Group and is at variance, in many respects, from the institutional 
structures anticipated in the hypotheses and testable implications articulated in 
Chapter 6. 
 Chapter 10, which follows, will bring the threads of the three projects 
together in a comparative assessment that will examine the two research 
questions that motivated this thesis and cull conclusions from the qualitative and 
quantitative data presented thus far regarding the role and nature of governance 
institutions as they apply to archaeologically-related projects.  
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Chapter 10: Analysis of Research Questions, 
Conclusions, Implications 
Introduction 
This chapter brings the thesis to a close.  The objective of the chapter is 
to utilize the data presented in chapters 7 through 9 in order to compare and 
contrast the three community projects studied for this thesis, address directly the 
research questions posed in Chapter 1, and then discuss the conclusions arising 
from this study and their implications for public and community archaeology. 
The chapter begins with a review of the first research question:  
1. Do long-surviving community-based heritage projects focused on local 
economic development demonstrate consistent institutional features? 
This, of course, is a threshold question for this thesis.  If the projects were 
to demonstrate no meaningful common institutional features, then the application 
of Ostrom’s CPR governance principles, or any other theoretical model, would 
be moot.  The following review of the three projects presented in the first section 
of this chapter confirms, however, that the three projects do indeed share a large 
number of common features. 
The chapter next turns to an extended consideration of the geographic, 
political, social and economic contexts of the three projects.  The methodology 
for this thesis (see page 144) posited that the local context would play an 
important role in determining the shape of the actual institutions in place in each 
community.  The MIFs examined in this thesis are abstractions from the widely 
differing details of institutions on the ground.  This section of the chapter 
explores the contextual differences among the villages and among the three 
projects themselves, and considers the manner in which the differing institutions 
in those projects have been influenced by the different community contexts in 
which they developed.  With a grasp of the differences in hand, it is possible then 
to address whether one can discern within the details of the institutions the 
abstractions of the MIFs.  This discussion engages the second research question: 
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2. To what degree do those features map onto a framework derived from the 
theoretical and empirically-based model that emerges from research into 
the governance of common pool resources? 
Chapter 6 presented the framework for this analysis in the form of Model 
Institutional Features (MIF) derived from Elinor Ostrom’s governance principles 
for long-surviving CPR regimes (see Figure 6 and page 150).  This chapter will 
adopt that same format to review the degree to which the three projects, taken 
together, conform to the governance principles articulated by Ostrom.   
Following this exploration of the degree to which the three projects 
conform to the hypothesized MIFs, the chapter considers both theoretical and 
practical reasons that the MIFs under evaluation have been strongly supported in 
two cases but not in the third.  This discussion sets the stage for a consideration 
of the implications of this research for those archaeologists who work directly 
with communities on projects that may have economic development as an 
important goal.  Finally, the chapter closes by presenting three general areas in 
which further research along the lines of this thesis would be warranted, and 
offers a closing thought on the research and its implications. 
Research Question 1: Similarities Among the Three Projects 
The first research question for this thesis asks whether the three projects 
under study demonstrate consistent institutional features.  Chapters 7 through 9 
have outlined those features in some detail, and numerous similarities indeed can 
be discerned in the basic governance institutions developed by each organisation.   
Legal framework 
All three projects are legally constituted under the authority of the local 
community or the national government.  The legal contexts themselves are of 
course quite different, with Belize emphasizing the NGO form of organisation 
for community groups, Ireland building on the tradition of farm cooperatives, 
and Peru extrapolating from the democratic structure of governance used in 
small villages.  However, in each case the governments expressly authorize and 
create the institutional means for community ventures to be formed and operate.   
 
Page | 302  
 
Membership rules 
 Each organisation has rules relating to membership.  In each case, 
members are required to pay some amount of money (more nominal in Kilfenora 
than in Raqchi or Maya Centre) to join.  However, in Raqchi and Maya Centre 
membership is strictly limited to legal residents of those communities, while the 
Burren Centre’s shareholder rules do not meaningfully constrain who may 
become a shareholder.   
Democratic decision making  
Members of all three organisations make decisions in open meetings in 
which substantial participation and debate among the members is reportedly the 
norm.  In all three organisations, democratic principles guide the decision 
process and matters are decided by a majority vote, almost always by an open 
show of hands.  These open meetings are the principal venue for resolving 
differences among the members of the organisation.  As an American, the model 
of the New England town meeting frequently occurred to this author during 
interviews in Raqchi and Maya Centre.  However, attendance at meetings of the 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta and MCWG is mandatory.  Shareholders of the Comhar 
are not subject to mandatory attendance rules, although members of its 
Committee who miss a few of the 12 monthly meetings can be removed from the 
Committee.   
Rules and sanctions  
Each organisation has specific rules governing the obligations and rights 
of members, and each organisation stipulates certain restrictions on behaviour 
and sanctions for transgressing them.  As will be explored further below (see 
page 319), differences among the three on this measure are more important than 
the similarities, but certainly Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the MCWG may be seen 
to be highly similar with regard to the complex structure of their rules and 
sanctions. 
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No accumulation of power 
In all three cases, voting rights are designed to prevent the accumulation 
of power.  In the MCWG, each woman has one vote; in Asociacíon Inkallaqta 
each family has one vote; and in the Comhar each shareholder has only one vote 
at the general meetings regardless of the number of shares he or she may own.   
Regular leadership turnover 
Each organisation has regular, predictable turnover in its leadership 
group.  In Asociacíon Inkallaqta and MCWG, officers serve for two years and 
then move out of leadership or into a different position.  In the Burren Centre, 
the officers are elected from the Committee members every year and the 
Committee members are limited to two three-year terms, after which they must 
step down. In none of these three cases is a single individual or unchanging 
group of leaders responsible for the organisation.  
Executive committee 
All three groups have some form of executive committee, although their 
roles and responsibilities differ markedly. The Executive Body of the MCWG 
has significant operational responsibilities, especially with regard to the 
management of finances.  The Committee of the Comhar has oversight of the 
day-to-day management of the Burren Centre and a dominant policy role in the 
organisation.  By contrast, the Junta of the Asociacíon Inkallaqta plays a very 
limited operational role and management role, with major decisions made by the 
group as a whole in a general assembly. However, management by a collective 
leadership group whose composition changes regularly is a common thread in all 
three organisations.  
Transparent finances  
Financial management in all the organisations is transparent to the 
members.  In Ireland, by law, cooperatives must present audited financial 
statements to members annually, and the Comhar’s staff presents financial 
reports monthly to the Committee.  In Maya Centre, all financial transactions are 
recorded in notebooks that are available every day to members, virtually all of 
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whom spend some time reviewing them while working on their shifts in the 
crafts shop.  Further, reckonings of amounts owed to and from members of the 
MCWG are both computed separately by each member of the Executive Group 
and reviewed by the individuals involved.  Asociacíon Inkallaqta has the least 
aggressive financial reporting—confined to verbal reports by the treasurer at 
association meetings—but that group also manages very small quantities of 
money and for this reason no material concerns about the situation were raised in 
interviews by members. 
Local founding leadership 
Each organisation had the benefit of catalytic local leadership at its 
inception.  In Maya Centre, Ernesto Saqui, the village chairman, initiated the 
MCWG and husbanded the development of the group for five years before it 
operated on its own.  In Kilfenora, Brian Mooney, an outsider who moved into 
town, is credited with the idea of an interpretive centre in the village.  
Interviewees involved in the founding of the Burren Centre, however, also 
credited Kilfenora’s parish priest, who was the Comhar’s first chairman, and a 
leading local farmer with persuading the village to support the project. In Raqchi, 
Enrique Leon Cusi Mamani, a resident, called together the small group that 
within a few months coalesced into the founding members of Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta, of which he was the first president.   
In addition to these institutional features, the three villages share two 
other characteristics, related to geographic location within the village and in the 
larger surrounding region that are important to note for the influence they 
probably play in the long-survival of these three organisations.  They are: 
Central physical presence 
In each community, the project has a prominent physical presence, either 
in a centrally located building (Burren Centre and MCWG) or in the centre of the 
town itself (Asociacíon Inkallaqta).  Each location is open during tourist visiting 
hours virtually every day of the year, making it a natural centre of social life in 
the village and ensuring that any departures from expected practices can be 
monitored by small, tight-knit communities.   
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Tourist destination 
Each organisation is, or is adjacent to, an important heritage tourism 
attraction.  In Raqchi, the Viracocha temple is one of Peru’s landmark sites and 
has become a top-ten tourist destination.  Maya Centre is located on the entrance 
road to the Coxcomb Basin Wildlife Sanctuary, a world-famous stopping-off 
point for eco-tourists.  Kilfenora, by building the Burren Centre, made itself a 
destination for individual tourists and tour groups beginning a visit to the Burren.  
In each case, location has been critical.  The towns adjacent to Raqchi also 
contain ruins that are part of the Raqchi archaeological park, but few tourists stop 
at them.  The village of Red Bank, 30 minutes from Maya Centre, features a 
unique flocking point for rare and beautiful Scarlet Macaws. In 2010 the village 
built a tourist centre and hostel in an attempt to capture benefit from the tour 
buses driving bird-watchers through the village, but by 2013 that building stood 
locked and idle.  Kilnaboy, a small village located a few miles east of Kilfenora 
at the junction of the road leading to Mullaghmore and the Burren National Park 
has no tourist traffic at all despite its arguably more strategic location.  As will be 
discussed further below (see page 331), the economics of the tourism industry 
cannot be overlooked when evaluating the reasons for an organisation’s success 
or failure.  If, in fact, the common pool resource that organisations such as these 
exploit is the large pool of tourists who come to visit and spend money then, as 
with fisheries, being close to the fish may be essential. 
In short, there are a substantial number of important institutional features 
that at least two and usually all three of these groups share in common.  The first 
research question therefore may be answered with an unqualified “yes.” The 
similarities among these three projects are numerous and more importantly they 
relate to institutional features that are fundamental to the operation of each 
organisation.  It then remains to address the second question, how well do these 
institutional features map onto the Model Institutional Features articulated in 
Chapter 6.  Before addressing that matter, however, it is important to consider 
certain aspects of the local context in which each project has developed.   
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Contextual Differences among the Three Projects 
The methodology for this thesis was to examine three long-surviving 
community projects in similarly sized rural villages that were situated in 
otherwise quite different contexts (see Chapter 6).  Ostrom’s Institutional 
Analysis and Design (IAD) model for analysing CPRs (see page 128) places 
substantial emphasis on the context—biophysical, economic, social and 
political—of the common pool resource.  The IAD model has been used here as 
a heuristic to support the view that the context within which the projects exist has 
a fundamental impact on the institutional options open to the members of a group 
and on the final shape of institutional solutions to CPR challenges.  Five 
contextual differences among the projects studied for this thesis are important to 
discuss before turning to the congruence of the three projects with the Model 
Institutional Features. 
Physical context 
First, although the three villages are rural with farm-based economies, 
they differ in the physical context of the villages. Raqchi and Maya Centre both 
are very small and compact villages in which residents live within a short walk 
from the town centre. There are very few motorized vehicles in either 
community.  Kilfenora, on the other hand, is a community of farmers whose 
homes and lands are spread over a substantial geographic area that makes travel 
to the centre only feasible by motorized vehicle.  People, especially the women, 
live and work at close quarters in Raqchi and Maya Centre, whereas most of 
Kilfenora’s population is dispersed to physically isolated farms.  In the two 
villages in the Americas, geographic proximity and mutual dependence for 
collective projects means individuals are constantly in contact with one another 
and accommodations to one another may be constantly required.  Fukuyama 
(2000) has pointed out that one important characteristic common to many of the 
communities studied by Ostrom is that residents have “repeated interactions” in 
isolated settings where maintaining local reputation is essential.  This condition 
may well characterize Raqchi and Maya Centre, although this study was not 
designed to incorporate the anthropological research necessary to address 
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properly the social dynamics, inter-personal relations and other matters that 
likely contribute to the performance of local institutions. 
Economic context  
Second, the Belizean and Peruvian villages are financially far less well-
off than Kilfenora, with possible implications for the nature of cooperation in 
each village.  Much of the housing stock in Kilfenora is new and modern in 
every respect.  While homes in Raqchi and Maya Centre do have access to 
potable water, neither community has a sewage system, and in Raqchi electricity 
supply is constrained.  Modern appliances are the norm in Kilfenora and 
extremely rare in the other two villages.  Automobiles, tractors and other modes 
of transport are commonplace in Kilfenora and minimally present in the other 
two villages.  Although at the time the Burren Centre was established 
Kilfenorans were concerned that their village was “dying,” the Burren Centre 
was more critical to sustaining the village way of life than to providing critically 
needed additional cash income.  In Raqchi and Maya Centre, even today, the 
community projects are vital to the cash resources of families in the villages. 
Outside assistance 
Third, the three organisations differ markedly in their relationship to 
outside sources of assistance. The Burren Centre and the Maya Centre Women’s 
Group operate out of facilities built largely with grants from government 
agencies.  Throughout its history, the Burren Centre has benefitted from 
capacity-building training offered by government agencies, while the Maya 
Centre Women’s Group has benefitted from training provided by both 
governmental and non-governmental sources. By contrast, based on the 
recollections of interviewees, Asociacíon Inkallaqta, appears to have received 
neither financial nor operational assistance from any source since it was founded.  
Although this is a distinctive difference in the business and financial practices of 
the three organisations, no evidence from this study suggests that the different 
levels of dependency on outside financial assistance played a meaningful role in 
the evolution of their institutional characteristics. 
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Evolution of the mission 
Fourth, the missions of the organisations have evolved very differently. 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta has had only one mission from its inception: the 
management of a crafts market composed of individual entrepreneur vendors 
located in the village plaza.  The nature of the crafts for sale has changed 
markedly, from locally-made artisanal ceramics to purchased merchandise, but 
the mission of Asociacíon Inkallaqta has not changed.  The Maya Centre 
Women’s Group, on the other hand, made a few small forays outside of its core 
mission, one of which—the corn mill—has survived, and made a substantial but 
failed investment in a restaurant facility.  The Comhar, in addition to the Burren 
Centre facility and its crafts shop and tea rooms, made investments in three other 
business ventures, all of which failed.  In a sense, the willingness to risk failures 
by the Comhar and MCWG suggest that all three ventures have an 
entrepreneurial aspect.  But the Comhar and MCWG have at times pursued 
broader economic development visions and had to survive the consequences of 
failure. The limited and largely invariant nature of the Asociacíon Inkallaqta 
model means its membership has endured far fewer financial or operational 
stresses than the other two organisations. 
Social capital and community engagement 
Fifth, the social capital index (SCI) developed for this study reveals 
significant differences in the trust and social capital context among the three 
villages (see page 162 for a detailed discussion of the index).  Figure 64 presents 
the results of chi squared analysis of the social capital index computed for each 
respondent in each community, cross tabulated by community project.   Values 
reported for each individual’s SCI index range from 1 (very high social capital) 
to 5 (very low).  The differences in the aggregated social capital index values 
among the communities are highly statistically significant (chi squared is better 
than the .001 significance level). An examination of the mean values of the SCI 
results indicates the source of the variation:  The mean SCI values are identical 
(mean = 2.97) in Raqchi and Maya Centre, the two rural villages in developing 
countries, and reflect significantly lower social capital than in Kilfenora (mean = 
1.93).  
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Figure 64: Chi squared test of social capital index, by organisation 
 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 Score
Count 4 9 9 6 5 33 2.97
Expected 
Count
7.1 10.3 6.4 6.0 3.2 33.0
%  within 
orgstud
12.1% 27.3% 27.3% 18.2% 15.2% 100.0%
%  within 
cscindexc
20.0% 31.0% 50.0% 35.3% 55.6% 35.5%
%  of 
Total
4.3% 9.7% 9.7% 6.5% 5.4% 35.5%
Residual -3.1 -1.3 2.6 .0 1.8
Count 15 9 0 5 1 30 1.93
Expected 
Count
6.5 9.4 5.8 5.5 2.9 30.0
%  within 
orgstud
50.0% 30.0% 0.0% 16.7% 3.3% 100.0%
%  within 
cscindexc
75.0% 31.0% 0.0% 29.4% 11.1% 32.3%
%  of 
Total
16.1% 9.7% 0.0% 5.4% 1.1% 32.3%
Residual 8.5 -.4 -5.8 -.5 -1.9
Count 1 11 9 6 3 30 2.97
Expected 
Count
6.5 9.4 5.8 5.5 2.9 30.0
%  within 
orgstud
3.3% 36.7% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 100.0%
%  within 
cscindexc
5.0% 37.9% 50.0% 35.3% 33.3% 32.3%
%  of 
Total
1.1% 11.8% 9.7% 6.5% 3.2% 32.3%
Residual -5.5 1.6 3.2 .5 .1
Total Count 20 29 18 17 9 93
Expected 
Count
20.0 29.0 18.0 17.0 9.0 93.0
%  within 
orgstud
21.5% 31.2% 19.4% 18.3% 9.7% 100.0%
%  within 
cscindexc
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%  of 
Total
21.5% 31.2% 19.4% 18.3% 9.7% 100.0%
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
28.745
a 8 .000
Likelihoo
d Ratio
34.154 8 .000
N of Valid 
Cases
93
Chi-Square Tests
a. 3 cells (20.0% ) have expected count less 
than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.90.
Crosstabulation Social Capital Index by Organization Studied
cscindexc
Total
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta , 
Raqchi, 
Peru
Burren 
Centre, 
Kilfenora, 
Ireland
Maya Centre 
Women's 
Group, Maya 
Centre, 
Belize
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Figure 65: Cross tabulations and chi square tests for questions 5.1.1 (“People are 
only interested in their own welfare,” ownwelfc), 5.1.2 (“In this community, one has to be 
alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you,” bealertc) and 5.1.6 (“If you drop your 
purse in the community, someone will see it and return it to you,” dropprsec). 
Total Total
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
Count
26b 7a 33 25b 7a 32 26a 7b 33
Expected 
Count
16.7 16.3 33.0 17.0 15.0 32.0 21.6 11.4 33.0
%  within 
orgstud
78.8% 21.2% 100.0% 78.1% 21.9% 100.0% 78.8% 21.2% 100.0%
%  within 
drpprsec
55.3% 15.2% 35.5% 51.0% 16.3% 34.8% 42.6% 21.9% 35.5%
%  of 
Total
28.0% 7.5% 35.5% 27.2% 7.6% 34.8% 28.0% 7.5% 35.5%
Residual 9.3 -9.3 8.0 -8.0 4.4 -4.4
Count
11a 19a 30 13a 17a 30 25a 5b 30
Expected 
Count
15.2 14.8 30.0 16.0 14.0 30.0 19.7 10.3 30.0
%  within 
orgstud
36.7% 63.3% 100.0% 43.3% 56.7% 100.0% 83.3% 16.7% 100.0%
%  within 
drpprsec
23.4% 41.3% 32.3% 26.5% 39.5% 32.6% 41.0% 15.6% 32.3%
%  of 
Total
11.8% 20.4% 32.3% 14.1% 18.5% 32.6% 26.9% 5.4% 32.3%
Residual -4.2 4.2 -3.0 3.0 5.3 -5.3
Count
10b 20a 30 11b 19a 30 10a 20b 30
Expected 
Count
15.2 14.8 30.0 16.0 14.0 30.0 19.7 10.3 30.0
%  within 
orgstud
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 36.7% 63.3% 100.0% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0%
%  within 
drpprsec
21.3% 43.5% 32.3% 22.4% 44.2% 32.6% 16.4% 62.5% 32.3%
%  of 
Total
10.8% 21.5% 32.3% 12.0% 20.7% 32.6% 10.8% 21.5% 32.3%
Residual -5.2 5.2 -5.0 5.0 -9.7 9.7
Total Count 47 46 93 49 43 92 61 32 93
Expected 
Count
47.0 46.0 93.0 49.0 43.0 92.0 61.0 32.0 93.0
%  within 
orgstud
50.5% 49.5% 100.0% 53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 65.6% 34.4% 100.0%
%  within 
drpprsec
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%  of 
Total
50.5% 49.5% 100.0% 53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 65.6% 34.4% 100.0%
Chi-
Square 
Tests
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
12.453
a 2 .002 12.453
a 2 .002 20.562
a 2 .000
Likelihoo
d Ratio
13.044 2 .001 13.044 2 .001 20.400 2 .000
N of Valid 
Cases
92 92 93
Crosstabulations: Own welfare, Be Alert, and Drop Purse, by Organization
a. 0 cells (0.0% ) have expected 
count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 14.02.
a. 0 cells (0.0% ) have expected 
count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 10.32.
drpprsec
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta, 
Raqchi, 
Peru
Burren 
Centre, 
Kilfenora, 
Ireland
Maya Centre 
Women's 
Group, Maya 
Centre, 
Belize
ownwelfc 
Total
a. 0 cells (0.0% ) have expected 
count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 14.02.
bealertc 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the 
.05 level.
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Figure 66: Chi squared test of Question 3.5, harmonious / disagreeable, by organisation 
Mean
1.0 1.5 2.0 Score
Count 23a 8a 2b 33 1.18
Expected 
Count
19.6 5.1 8.3 33.0
%  within 
orgstud
69.7% 24.2% 6.1% 100.0%
%  within 
mcomrel
42.6% 57.1% 8.7% 36.3%
%  of 
Total
25.3% 8.8% 2.2% 36.3%
Residual 3.4 2.9 -6.3
Count 23a 3a, b 2b 28 1.13
Expected 
Count
16.6 4.3 7.1 28.0
%  within 
orgstud
82.1% 10.7% 7.1% 100.0%
%  within 
mcomrel
42.6% 21.4% 8.7% 30.8%
%  of 
Total
25.3% 3.3% 2.2% 30.8%
Residual 6.4 -1.3 -5.1
Count 8a 3a 19b 30 1.68
Expected 
Count
17.8 4.6 7.6 30.0
%  within 
orgstud
26.7% 10.0% 63.3% 100.0%
%  within 
mcomrel
14.8% 21.4% 82.6% 33.0%
%  of 
Total
8.8% 3.3% 20.9% 33.0%
Residual -9.8 -1.6 11.4
Total Count 54 14 23 91
Expected 
Count
54.0 14.0 23.0 91.0
%  within 
orgstud
59.3% 15.4% 25.3% 100.0%
%  within 
mcomrel
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%  of 
Total
59.3% 15.4% 25.3% 100.0%
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson 
Chi-
Square
36.747
a 4 .000
Likelihoo
d Ratio
36.220 4 .000
N of Valid 
Cases
91
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of mcomrel categories whose 
column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 
level.
a. 2 cells (22.2% ) have expected count less 
than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.31.
Chi-Square Tests
Crosstabulation Question 3.5 (Harmonious or Disagreeable Community 
Relations) by Organization
mcomrel
Total
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta, 
Raqchi, 
Peru
Burren 
Centre, 
Kilfenora, 
Ireland
Maya Centre 
Women's 
Group, Maya 
Centre, 
Belize
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Figure 65 presents cross-tabulations of each village’s responses to three 
key questions of trust and cooperation that make up the index.  Again, the same 
differences among the communities and high levels of statistical significance are 
observed (in each case, chi-squared statistical significance is .002 or better).   It 
is interesting to note that the two villages with the lower SCI index results are 
those that also compel collaboration on village projects, at least in some 
circumstances. 
A parallel finding with slightly different implications arises when the 
cross tabulation is run against Question 3.5 in the survey:  “Are the relationships 
among people in this community generally harmonious or disagreeable?” 
Responses to this question were “harmonious” (scored as 1), “disagreeable” 
(scored as 2), or “neither harmonious nor disagreeable” (scored as 1.5).  Figure 
66 presents the results.  In this case, residents of Raqchi (mean score: 1.18) and 
Kilfenora (mean score: 1.13) are quite close together at values that suggest a very 
harmonious context when compared to responses from Maya Centre (mean 
score: 1.68), where 63.3 per cent of respondents said relations were 
“disagreeable.”  Again, the chi squared statistic for this cross-tabulation is highly 
significant at better than the .001 confidence level.  
These data, considered in light of the high degree of voluntary 
community engagement in Kilfenora (see page 270), reinforce the conclusion 
that Kilfenora has a significantly greater degree of social capital, voluntary 
collaborative behaviour and trust than do the two communities in the Americas, 
despite the intense, sometimes compulsory interdependence among the residents 
of Raqchi and Maya Centre. It is perhaps counter-intuitive that the Belizean and 
Peruvian villages, with far greater levels of social interaction than in Kilfenora, 
would present lower levels of cohesiveness.  While this study was not designed 
to probe systematically for the reasons for these differences among the villages, 
which was not anticipated, and notwithstanding Fukuyama’s observation above 
(see page 306), one may hypothesize that the lower level of wealth and close 
quarters in Raqchi and Maya Centre may well affect the frequency of conflict-
laden social interactions in each village, in turn requiring very different 
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approaches to problems of institutional design.  The discussion turns now to that 
topic. 
Institutional implications of the differences 
Ostrom’s IAD model is designed to lead to an understanding of how local 
conditions influence the rules governing use of or contribution to the common 
pool resource. In conventional CPRs, such as fisheries, irrigation systems or 
grazing pastures, questions of the number of users, their geographic location 
relative to the CPR (e.g., close to or far from the water source in an irrigation 
system), and the political and economic strength of different actors in the scheme 
are all factors in determining the shape of the rules governing the CPR.  In the 
case of the three organisations studied for this thesis, differences in local 
conditions have had an important influence on the structure of such institutions 
as voting mechanics, monitoring approaches and sanctions.  This is reflected 
particularly strongly in the analysis of the social capital index presented above 
(see page 308).  Although it is not feasible in a study of such a small number of 
cases to estimate the relationship between social capital outcomes and specific 
institutional forms using quantitative techniques (see page 147), it is instructive 
to consider some of these relationships qualitatively.  
Figures 64, 65, and 66 above highlight statistically significant differences 
among the villages in the social capital index and perceptions of the general 
harmony or disharmony of relations in the village. Both Maya Centre and Raqchi 
recorded significantly lower ratings on the social capital index than did Kilfenora 
(see Figure 64).  Figure 65 presents the results from three questions that are 
components of the social capital index, each relating to the degree of trust in the 
community generally.  Differences among the villages in each case are highly 
significant.  In Raqchi, questions 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, which relate to generalized 
views of people’s self-interest, were highly negative, but the response to question 
5.1.3 regarding the return of a lost purse was highly positive.  Maya Centre 
expressed the reverse sentiments: Generalized views of behaviour were positive 
but there was substantial scepticism regarding the return of the purse. Trust is 
problematic in both communities, as evidenced by the significantly lower 
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average SCI scores.  By contrast, Kilfenora consistently responded positively to 
each question relating to self-interest and trust.    
These differences are reflected in local institutions. In Maya Centre, 
where a large majority of MCWG members describe local relations as 
“disagreeable” due to long-running political, religious and family-based disputes, 
the MCWG’s rules are designed to prevent those factions from impeding the 
cooperation of the women’s group.  The system for electing officers of the 
MCWG, under which it is impossible to run for a particular office or build 
coalitions, has effectively prevented the political polarization of Maya Centre 
from disrupting the affairs of the Women’s Group.  
Problems with trust become particularly important in relation to the 
handling of money.  In Kilfenora, admittedly under the protections of corporate 
laws in Ireland, the Comhar operates with limited shareholder oversight of the 
handling of the cooperative’s funds.  This occurs within the context of the 
positive attitudes reflected in Figure 65 and unanimous support in Kilfenora for 
the proposition that “I trust the leaders of the organisation when they handle 
money.”  The institutional structure of Asociacíon Inkallaqta in Raqchi side-
steps the problem of trust in money management by operating as a cooperative of 
entrepreneurs who own their own businesses and manage their own cash income, 
thereby avoiding the high transaction costs associated with the system in Maya 
Centre.  The rules of the group are designed to require only limited funds and 
therefore, notwithstanding significantly lower levels of trust and social capital in 
the village, concern over the handling of money is muted within Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta.  
However, in Maya Centre, where social capital also is low and doubts 
about the return of a purse were significantly high, the institutional structure of 
the MCWG requires that substantial funds be handled continuously by the 
members.  The system for managing the MCWG’s funds is intricate, extremely 
transparent, reduces risk by distributing the group’s cash among all the members, 
and is subject to numerous opportunities for monitoring and sanctions.  While 
imperfect—MCWG members do complain that some members fail to record 
some other members’ crafts sales and pocket the proceeds, a problem the group 
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has not solved—the money management system has enabled MCWG to handle 
sums of money that are substantial for the village without material problems 
despite the lack of a local bank or the systems and controls typical of modern 
retail stores even in Belize. The transaction costs of this system are high for 
MCWG members, but they apparently are exceeded by the perceived costs of 
dishonesty among group members and are partially offset by a time commitment 
required of MCWG members to work in the group’s shop that is much lower 
than in Raqchi. 
In other words, in certain crucial regards, the local conditions in each 
village appear to have meaningfully influenced the institutional structures 
created to manage the projects.  Where trust is lacking or political faction 
threatens to disrupt the group, institutional protections have been implemented 
that mitigated those problems.  Moreover, as will be argued in relation to MIF 3 
(see page 317), the democratic processes put in place in each village reflect the 
decision-making structures that are traditional in the village, another reflection of 
the impact of local conditions on the rules in use. If context has informed the 
specific form of institutions in each village’s project, the question becomes 
whether, despite the variation in those institutions, the three projects nonetheless 
present evidence of higher-level conformity to the MIFs.  This shifts the focus to 
the second research question. 
Research Question 2: Comparing the Projects to the Model 
Institutional Features 
The second aspect of the research for this thesis was to evaluate whether 
the institutional features in each project conformed to the eight Model 
Institutional Features (MIFs) derived from Ostrom’s governance principles for 
common pool resources (see page 150).  The research was designed to determine 
the degree of conformity to those MIFs by evaluating a number of “testable 
hypotheses” that were linked to each MIF.   Seven of the eight MIFs were drawn 
directly from Ostrom’s (1990) book Governing the Commons, while the eighth 
was intended to evaluate the economic value to the community of the presumed 
common pool resource in each village.  The Ostrom model was chosen, as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, because it represents the approach to CPR 
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governance that is most thoroughly grounded in theory and in laboratory and 
field studies.   
The relationship of the eight MIFs to each of the three projects studied 
here has been discussed in the preceding chapters, and those discussions will not 
be repeated.  This section focuses on a comparison of those analyses.  The 
preceding section has elaborated upon several important contextual differences 
among the projects that influenced the varied institutions in each community 
project.  This section of the thesis turns to the question of whether, 
notwithstanding those differences, there are sufficient commonalities among the 
projects to support the proposition that the MIFs based on Ostrom’s governance 
principles have broad application to archaeologically-related community 
economic development projects. 
MIF 1: Clearly defined boundaries 
The first MIF, drawn directly from Ostrom, was based on the fact that 
common pool resource regimes ultimately are concerned with controlling access 
to the CPR and then regulating use of the CPR in a manner that achieves a more 
nearly optimal outcome for all users of the resource than they would enjoy 
without the collective action.  Clearly defined boundaries—unambiguous rules 
on the physical domain of the CPR and on who is eligible to appropriate 
resources from the CPR and obligated to contribute to maintaining it—are the 
first necessary step to managing use of the resource.  In both Maya Centre and 
Raqchi, those eligible for membership in the group must be legal residents of the 
community for at least one year.  In those cases, the borders and therefore the 
eligible appropriators—those persons who can benefit from the flow of 
tourists—are very clearly defined. In the case of the Comhar and the Burren 
Centre, the situation is far less clear.   The Comhar was envisioned from its 
founding as an organisation to benefit the communities in the Burren beyond 
Kilfenora.  The shareholder base is concentrated in that community but 
technically is open to any person.  In principle, the boundaries of the Comhar are 
as wide as the Burren region itself and some shareholders view it that way.  In 
summary, boundaries are not clearly defined in Kilfenora, while they are very 
well defined in Maya Centre or Raqchi. 
Page | 317  
 
MIF 2: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions 
This second MIF relates primarily to questions of appropriation and 
provision—the rules for making use of the common pool resource.  Important 
differences exist among the three sites in this regard. In a village with relatively 
lower social capital and problems of trust, Asociacíon Inkallaqta has created 
appropriation and provision rules very similar to those used by Turkish 
fishermen to manage their CPR (see page 125).  Each vendor in the Raqchi 
market is an independent entrepreneur, and the rules of the Asociacíon Inkallaqta 
are designed to ensure that each entrepreneur shares equitably in the flow of 
tourists in a relatively frictionless manner. The MCWG has allocated shelves in 
the store to each family but, unlike in Raqchi, presents itself to tourists as a 
single store.  This decision necessitated the group’s complex financial 
management arrangements, but it also ensures that MCWG members have 
equitable access to the tourist flow through the store.  Interestingly, perhaps 
because the MCWG shop is so small that tourists tend to look at every shelf, no 
issue of shelf location was ever raised by an interviewee. 
By contrast, Kilfenora has no appropriation or provision rules.  
Essentially, this is because the Burren Centre has captured internally the flows of 
tourists.  While the members of Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the MCWG are 
appropriators of the common flow of tourists, shareholders in the Comhar are not 
active appropriators—they are owners.  Tour buses stop in Kilfenora to visit the 
Burren Centre, where visitors pay to tour the exhibit and make purchases in the 
shop or tea room.  They may leave the Burren Centre to buy food or crafts in 
other shops, but neither the Comhar nor any other entity in Kilfenora controls 
how various members of the local business community appropriate business 
from the flow of tourists through the village centre.  Thus, once again the 
Comhar’s structure is not consistent with this MIF, while the institutions in 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the MCWG are fully consistent with it. 
MIF 3: Collective-choice arrangements 
The discussion above (see page 302) and in each of the preceding 
chapters on this matter is unambiguous.  Each of these three organisations has 
Page | 318  
 
implemented forms of collective choice structures that are democratic in nature 
and provide for direct involvement of the members of the group at least in key 
decisions. 
The form of democratic collective-choice mechanisms differs sharply 
among the three villages.  Both Maya Centre and Raqchi are communities where 
the local government structure employs mandatory attendance at town meetings 
in which debate is active and can be protracted, but leads eventually to a raised 
hand vote in which the will of the community is expressed and followed.  The 
artisans’ groups formed in each of those communities mimic the local legal 
structures for managing community affairs, which preceded them in time.  Just as 
in their local community assemblies, both the MCWG and Asociacíon Inkallaqta 
conduct their business in general assemblies, with mandatory attendance, 
vigorous debate, and ultimately a vote by show of hands in which the majority’s 
view carries the day.   
Kilfenora has no local government.  Instead, community projects are run 
through committees in which a few activists lead the projects and other members 
are included in discussions when needed or, in the event of dispute, when a 
meeting of the whole group is required to resolve the question with a vote.  The 
Comhar may not engage in direct democracy in the same manner as the MCWG 
or Asociacíon Inkallaqta, but its shareholders are able to assert their interests 
through elections to the Committee and aggrieved shareholders are able to 
intervene directly by calling a Special General Meeting, as in the debates over 
Mullaghmore and Article 5. Furthermore, decision-making within the Committee 
itself is democratic in form and substance. Kilfenora does have a tradition of 
cooperatives, as does Ireland as a whole (ICOS 2013).  Cooperatives in Ireland 
offer a form of limited legal liability to run businesses under collective 
ownership and community control, but with day-to-day operations delegated to a 
management committee. Whether one looks at the tradition in Kilfenora for 
managing community projects or the tradition of cooperative organisations in 
Ireland, the Comhar’s structure and rules clearly are both democratic and derived 
from local precedents. All three organisations’ decision making institutions do 
line up well with this MIF. 
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MIF 4: Monitoring and MIF 5: Graduated sanctions 
These two MIFs, monitoring and graduated sanctions, are closely related 
and will be treated together here. Chapters 7 and 8 have outlined the quite 
different but equally complex sanctions systems in place in Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta and the MCWG.  As an officially-approved activity of the community 
assembly in Raqchi, Asociacíon Inkallaqta is distinctive in the degree to which 
its activities have been integrated into the broader system of obligations and 
sanctions that operates within Raqchi as a whole.  In both Raqchi and in Maya 
Centre, the system of sanctions is comprehensive and designed to incentivise 
members’ behaviour in such important dimensions as attendance at meetings, 
fulfilment of obligations, and conduct within the organisation.  Sanctions are 
modest in most cases and accompanied by general public knowledge of the 
infraction, conditions that laboratory experiments (see page 111) have suggested 
are optimal to secure compliance with rules. As the seriousness of the infraction 
increases, sanctions also become more severe and some actions—such as 
entering into competition with the MCWG in Maya Centre—can lead to 
expulsion.  Interviewees in both villages report that sanctions can be altered by 
the group to make them more or less severe than the formal sanctions if 
conditions warrant.   
In both Raqchi and Maya Centre, the intimate geography of the village, 
the web of family and personal ties in each community, and the highly public 
nature of activities in each group contribute to an informal system of monitoring 
to ensure compliance with rules.  In Raqchi, however, there are no formal 
systems for monitoring compliance with rules other than attendance at meetings 
(where compliance is monitored because members must sign the minute book).  
In Maya Centre, the public availability of financial records and the oversight of 
financial reconciliations by the Executive Body provide an intensive layer of 
monitoring for infractions of the financial management rules.  In both cases, as 
anticipated by Ostrom, it is the members themselves, who are the appropriators, 
who do the monitoring and who enforce compliance. 
Kilfenora and the Comhar present a very different picture with regard to 
these two MIFs.  There are only a limited number of rules relating to member 
Page | 320  
 
behaviour, the primary one being the exclusion of competitors from membership 
on the Committee. The only sanctions involve expulsion from the group for 
reasons of personal financial or mental incapacity, or removal from the 
Committee for missing too many meetings.  This situation may be a by-product 
of the fact that the Comhar operates as a formal cooperative company with 
protections for shareholders under the law that do not exist in Raqchi or Maya 
Centre, or it may reflect the higher levels of trust and social capital in Kilfenora 
and the village’s traditional methods for managing community projects. Either of 
those factors would make such controls less important.  It is also the case that, as 
noted in the discussion of MIF 2 above, the Burren Centre has “captured” the 
tourist flow within its walls and does not seek to manage or discipline the actions 
of other businesses in the village.   Whatever the contribution from each of these 
factors, the result is that Kilfenora and the Comhar once again present an 
exception from the situation posited by MIFs 4 and 5, while the institutional 
arrangements of Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the MCWG are fully consistent with 
them. 
MIF 6: Conflict resolution mechanisms 
There are two dimensions along which the conflict resolution 
mechanisms of the three groups under study may be compared.  In each case, it 
is clear that such mechanisms differ but are generally effective. In response to 
the proposition “Conflicts within the organisation are resolved effectively and 
fairly,” members were overwhelmingly in agreement in all three villages: 83.3 
per cent in Maya Centre, 86.4 per cent in Kilfenora, and 93.3 per cent in Raqchi.   
First, there are day-to-day issues relating to operational issues, infractions 
of rules, minor policies or similar matters.  In Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the 
MCWG, these matters tend to be settled on the spot by officers or brought to 
general assembly meetings of the entire membership for debate and a decision by 
vote.  In the case of the Burren Centre, most day-to-day decisions are delegated 
to the professional staff, although the Committee of the Comhar is empowered to 
review those decisions at its monthly meetings and, if necessary, address 
conflicts.   
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The second category involves larger issues of policy, investments in new 
ventures, or other major decisions.  In this case the three groups operate 
similarly.  Issues are brought to general assemblies or, in the Comhar to an AGM 
or SGM, where members / shareholders are able to debate propositions and 
empowered to make decisions through a democratic voting process in which the 
will of the majority prevails.   
In general, all three organisations’ institutions are consistent with this 
sixth MIF, though the Comhar’s processes for day-to-day management once 
again are different.  The Comhar removes most authority from the members / 
shareholders and lodges it with the paid staff or the volunteer Committee.   
MIF 7: Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
In all three cases, the right to organize and operate groups is legally 
recognized. Ostrom’s research has included situations in which the rights of 
groups of individuals to organize to manage a common resource may be 
restricted by the rights of more powerful governmental or non-governmental 
forces.  In the three cases studied here, the law both provides for and encourages 
the formation of such organisations. Particularly in Belize and in Ireland, 
national and regional government authorities, non-governmental organisations 
and, in the case of Belize, international aid organisations have encouraged the 
creation and provided cash and technical assistance to further the success of 
organisations such as these.  Community-based groups operate under clear 
mandates of authority in all three locations. 
MIF 8: Meaningful economic value to the community 
As explained in Chapter 6 (see page 150), this MIF is not strictly derived 
from Ostrom’s governance principles.  Rather, it has been added to this study 
because meaningful economic impact is implicit in all conventional CPRs and 
related studies have underscored the importance of tangible economic returns to 
the willingness of individuals to cooperate. For archaeologists, this can be a 
troubling conclusion (see page 84).  MIF 8 tested whether members of these 
organisations, who invest the considerable time and money necessary to launch 
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and maintain community organisations, do so at least in part because the 
organisations deliver economic benefits to members and their communities.  
This is not to deny that other values may be important motivators.  For 
example, in Maya Centre respondents to the survey also cited help to the 
community, social interaction, family ties and empowerment for women as 
values leading them to join the MCWG. In each community, however, the 
majority of interviewees who responded to question 6.8 (“What benefits does the 
association bring to the community?”) responded with economic 
considerations—employment, greater family income, money for tuition for 
school or similar factors.  As noted in the discussion of this MIF in the prior 
three chapters, in each case responses to questions on the economic value of the 
project to members or to the community were overwhelmingly positive.  In each 
of the three cases, the projects were created to promote economic advancement 
in their communities, and members value them for their positive economic 
consequences.  In light of findings from other studies about the essential nature 
of relatively rapid economic rewards to sustained effort to manage CPRs (see 
page 150), the results of the evaluation of this MIF carry an important message 
to archaeologists about the need to acknowledge and embrace economic 
motivations when designing community projects.  
Why the Differences? 
This chapter has assembled various strands of data from the prior three 
chapters to address the two research questions that propelled this thesis.  The 
results of that meta-view of the three projects suggest some complexities.  Each 
project resembles the others and the Model Institutional Features in matters of 
collective choice, a legal right to organize, and acknowledged economic value. 
On matters of major policy disputes, all three also follow similar democratic 
procedures, although the Comhar engages in direct shareholder votes only for 
elections to the Committee and to resolve exceptional policy matters.  Although 
each organisation has a clearly-defined membership, the borders defining 
eligibility for membership are not clearly defined in the Comhar. Moreover, only 
Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the MCWG align with the remaining principles—
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congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, and 
monitoring and graduated sanctions.   
The features absent in the institutional structure of the Comhar / Burren 
Centre—the lack of clearly-defined borders, appropriation or provision rules, 
monitoring and graduated sanctions—are precisely those that the theoretical, 
experimental and case-study results described in Chapter 4 (see page 111) 
suggest are mandatory to achieve the degree of collaborative behaviour 
necessary for a collective effort to succeed. Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the 
MCWG, on the other hand, conform in every respect with the Model Institutional 
Features built on Ostrom’s principles.  The question is: Why the differences? 
Three arguments may be advanced.   
First, the differences might be attributed to the very different business 
models presented by the three organisations.  The Burren Centre operates as an 
independent business concern with professional management and a paid staff.  
Asociacíon Inkallaqta is in effect a collaboration of independent entrepreneurs 
who own their own businesses—their sales tables—but collaborate to maximize 
their collective benefit from the presence of large-scale tourism in their 
community. The Maya Centre Women’s Group is a cooperative business 
presenting a single face to the tourist in the form of its shop and then working 
behind the scenes to share costs, allocate revenues and profits, and sort out 
disputes in a manner acceptable to the majority.  These are three very different 
businesses, yet two of these models match up well with the hypotheses while one 
does not.  The selection of the business model, per se, cannot be the explanation. 
Second, it is possible that the Burren Centre’s exceptional status, 
compared to MCWG and Asociacíon Inkallaqta, may be due to its location in a 
wealthier country located in Europe with more established corporate laws. In 
Ireland, financial resources available to communities are greater, corporate-form 
enterprises are the most common device for organizing and managing business 
activities, and cooperatives are a well-established corporate form.  Legal 
requirements and shareholder protections in Ireland, as in other European or 
North American countries, may render unnecessary some of the institutions of 
traditional CPRs, such as the critical boundary, monitoring and sanctions 
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features.  There can be no doubt this contextual difference is important.  
However, corporate and NGO structures typical in Europe and North America 
are also regularly used in Peru and Belize. Indeed, the MCWG is a registered 
NGO in Belize.  Moreover, the many unincorporated community projects in 
Kilfenora share numerous institutional governance features with the Comhar.  
The fact that the Comhar is in legal form a cooperative corporation is not 
sufficient to explain the lack of critical MIFs within its institutional structure. 
Third, viewed from the standpoint of the theories advanced in Chapters 5 
and 6, one other explanation is apparent.  That is the fact that Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta and the MCWG are managing the collective use of a genuine common 
pool resource: the flow of tourists through their villages that each member 
otherwise could seek to exploit on his or her own but likely with the 
consequences foreseen by Olsen and Hardin.  The fact that Maya Centre created 
the MCWG to stop its children bolting from their school chairs to sell beads to 
passing tourists illustrates the point, as do the parallels between the Asociacíon 
Inkallaqta rotational scheme and that used by Turkish fisherman to manage a 
conventional CPR.  The orderly and non-threatening marketing of crafts to 
tourists that occurs in Raqchi and Maya Centre seems more likely to generate an 
outcome closer to the optimum than would be the result of a cacophonous and 
undisciplined group of vendors competing for tourists’ attention. 
The Burren Centre, on the other hand, is not managing a true common 
pool resource.  Rather, it has created a business built on the cooperative legal 
model that has become a tourist attraction on its own.  Other businesses in the 
village of Kilfenora benefit because the Burren Centre attracts customers for 
their enterprises, much as restaurants and hotels benefit from adjacency to 
Disney World.  But the Comhar does not regulate Kilfenora’s competition for 
the tourist resource, as do the MCWG and Asociacíon Inkallaqta.  Instead, the 
Burren Centre serves as a magnet to attract a flow of tourists into the village, a 
flow that other businesses may seek to exploit independently. 
This assessment should not undervalue the importance of those 
institutional features in which the three groups are aligned.  Collective choice 
under officially recognized rights to organize and tangible economic impact for 
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the community have been important to all three projects and must be considered 
to be  highly correlated with long survival of any community project.  The high 
degree of democratic member / shareholder empowerment and the financial and 
operational transparency at the Burren Centre clearly have been essential to its 
survival and its ability to work through crises and disputes that have arising since 
it was founded.  However, these features may be better understood not as 
examples of CPR management but rather as examples of “best practices” 
articulated in the United Kingdom or the United States for not-for-profit 
organisations or for-profit corporations. Considerations of space preclude a 
detailed discussion of the “best practices” literature, but the reader is encouraged 
to review those publications carefully.
11
  
Put simply, where a true common pool resource exists, this study 
suggests that Ostrom’s principles, as exemplified in the Model Institutional 
Features examined here, are indeed relevant to structuring long-surviving 
community-based institutions.  Where the project in question is a destination 
venue, however, models for non-profit governance best-practices may be a better 
guide to institutional design. 
This conclusion is important in light of the critique in Chapter 5 (see page 
139) of attempts by other authors to apply common pool resource theory and the 
concept of the commons to archaeology and heritage.  CPR theory is not about 
managing idealized or ill-defined “commons.”  It is about how communities self-
organize to solve specific problems in specific situational contexts involving a 
particular type of commonly-held resource.  Not all situations encountered by 
archaeologists will involve actual “common pool resources,” and this study 
illustrates the need to unambiguously define conditions in the community in 
                                                 
11
 For examples see NCVO 2013. Governance Best Practices [Online]. National 
Council for Voluntary Organizations. Available: http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/advice-
support/trustee-governance/governance/best-practice [Accessed 9/19/2013].;  or THE 
THIRDSECTOR 2013. Governance Best Practices [Online]. London: ThirdSector.co.uk. 
Available: http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/go/governance/ [Accessed 9/19/2013].; or Grant 
Thornton’s charity governance reviews (KURRE, F. L. 2013. 2012 National Board Governance 
Survey for Not-for-Profit Organizations. New York: Grant Thornton LLP, RUDGE, C. 2013. The 
Science of Good Governance: Towards Charity Best Practice. London: Grant Thornton UK LLP 
).  For a view of community project management processes, see WILCOX, D. 1994. The Guide 
to Effective Participation. London: partnerships.org.  For a perspective on corporate governance 
best practices see OECD 2004. Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris: OECD Publications. 
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order to avoid misapplying CPR principles.  The following section of this 
chapter will consider the implications of this study for archaeology in greater 
detail. 
Implications for Public and Community Archaeology 
The objective of this research was to establish whether archaeology’s 
growing interest in economic development can be advanced by incorporating 
into archaeological practice insights from other disciplines concerning the 
governance of community-based projects. This final chapter will close with an 
assessment of the implications of this study for public and community 
archaeology and some considerations on future directions for research. 
As Chapter 2 demonstrated (see page 53), there is a broad continuum of 
projects styled as “community archaeology,” ranging from passive lectures at 
local venues, to excavations in which community members are welcomed as 
participants, to models of community empowered archaeology that are typical in 
excavations involving Australian or North American indigenous populations.  
Often these projects are motivated by archaeologists’ simple desire to develop 
local support for archaeology or to fulfil archaeologists’ enthusiasm to educate 
and excite the public about heritage.  Sometimes such projects reflect more 
ambitious goals to advance social justice or remake local economic 
opportunities.  
Projects seeking to exploit tourism opportunities to benefit local 
communities have become central to this latter form of public and community 
archaeology.  However, numerous practical and ethical issues arise as a 
consequence of tourism’s increasing importance to and impact on heritage and 
archaeology.  Many of these were reviewed in Chapter 3 (see page 84), but one 
consideration in particular is critical if archaeology is to benefit local 
communities: for tourist-led local development to succeed, heritage tourism 
needs to overcome the tendency for local communities to lose out to better 
capitalized, more highly skilled individuals and organisations who often hail 
from outside the region and even the nation.  The motivation to accomplish that 
goal lies behind the enthusiasm (see page 92) with which some archaeologists 
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have taken up the local development challenge by seeking to promote tourism 
development projects at the local level.  Those projects take many forms, from 
field museums to crafts cooperatives to hospitality services aimed at tourists, all 
of which can be captured under the broad ambit of community archaeology. A 
goal of this thesis was to address whether models exist that can contribute to 
more sustainable archaeology- and heritage-based economic development at the 
community level.  
The prior sections of this chapter described the results of that research.  
Because they are derived only from the three projects studied for this thesis and 
for all the reasons explained in Chapter 6 (see page 166), any conclusions must 
be expressed tentatively.  Nonetheless, this research suggests at least seven 
lessons for archaeologists engaging in community economic development. 
1. Archaeologists can use models 
In her work, Ostrom limited her analysis to well-defined CPRs, most 
often in developing-country contexts.  The two developing-country communities 
that were studied for this thesis, Raqchi and Maya Centre, produced projects that 
conformed in virtually every respect to Ostrom’s governance principles.  The 
developed country site, the Comhar’s Burren Centre, conformed to several of 
Ostrom’s important principles, but not to those that are central to the theory of 
CPRs: clear boundaries, appropriation / provision rules, monitoring and 
graduated sanctions.  The fact that two of the projects under study conform to 
Ostrom’s governance principles does support the notion that it may be feasible to 
use theoretically-based models to analyse projects and seek to guide them.  
However, the Burren Centre’s long survival suggests that more than one 
valid model exists. The Comhar’s organisation follows cooperative legal models 
in the Ireland (and resembles non-profit corporate models in the United States 
and the UK). Models are inherently limited in their applicability, but 
archaeologists should embrace models from outside the discipline to advance the 
practice of community archaeology.  
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2. But use models with care  
Clarity in definitions and analysis is critical to the appropriate use of any 
model to organize a community project.  In this research, the key difference 
among the projects is that the tourist flows in Maya Centre and Raqchi are, in 
effect, common pool resources, the appropriation of which needs to be managed 
collectively.  This is not true in Kilfenora, with important institutional 
implications. Archaeologists today are creating community crafts projects, 
building community museums, training community members to conserve sites, 
or training them to serve tourists in other ways.  For these projects to sustain 
themselves for many years, they need to be built on institutions that have both 
theoretical validity and deep ties to local conditions.  
Tools like Ostrom’s IAD framework can provide a thought process with 
which to analyse projects and situate them in a context, but it is the context that 
will determine whether any particular organisational model is applicable or not.  
As Ostrom herself has noted (see page 150), there are no off-the-shelf 
implementation plans, no blueprints, and no cookbooks for designing economic 
development projects at the local level.  Appendix 6 presents a questionnaire 
developed by the author for a project under evaluation by the Sustainable 
Preservation Initiative that exposes but does not resolve the issues around 
organisation design.  Archaeologists setting out on this journey need to become 
astute analysts of all of these factors.  
3. Bottom-up local leadership is essential 
 These three case studies make clear that one important ingredient in the 
success of community ventures, not identified by Ostrom in her 1990 volume, is 
the role to be played by catalytic local leadership.  Ostrom did include leadership 
among the variables in a later, more elaborate model of institutional success 
(Ostrom 2009), and other authors (Baland and Platteau 1996, 337) long before 
had identified charismatic leadership as an important variable in success.  These 
three case studies make it clear that communities do not “self-organize” without 
some person or persons taking a leadership role to convene the community and 
propel the project forward.  Both Asociacíon Inkallaqta and the MCWG were 
created entirely by local people.  Brian Mooney is credited with the idea for the 
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Burren Centre, but other local leaders drove the consensus within the village to 
proceed, and Mooney himself became and remains a resident of the Burren.   
Archaeologists typically are the subject matter experts in any heritage-
related project, but their self-confidence in that role does not entitle them to 
subjugate local initiative and knowledge to their own plans and visions.  If 
projects are to identify and reconcile complex local conditions successfully, there 
is no substitute for the deep understanding of those conditions held by local 
people, what Scott (1998) has called “metis.”  Local leaders may need advice 
and counsel from archaeologists or others on how to structure the institutions of 
a new organisation, but only the local leaders have the incentive and the 
knowledge of the complex web of local relationships necessary to create a 
durable organisation 
4. External assistance needs to be “light touch” 
Where external assistance is needed, and it often will be, financial and 
other supporters need to respect the primacy of the local community.  Financial 
aid, in particular, frequently will be required.  Only the Asociacíon Inkallaqta 
project in Raqchi proceeded without significant financial assistance from outside 
groups, and neither the Burren Centre nor the MCWG project could have 
sustained themselves without material infusions of capital that could not be 
justified on strictly commercial terms.  The MCWG and the Burren Centre also 
received substantial training in financial management systems, customer 
relations, hospitality services and other aspects of “capacity building” from 
governmental and non-governmental sources.  Thus outside professional and 
financial assistance is likely to be critical to enabling local communities to 
overcome their disadvantages in the tourism marketplace (see page 86).   
Equally essential, though, is that in neither Kilfenora nor Maya Centre 
was that assistance intrusive into the operations of the organisation (except 
briefly during the initial construction phase at the Burren Centre). If the local 
community’s control and accountability are to be reinforced, it is essential that 
outside aid come with as few conditions as possible and not intrude into the 
group’s governance, a form of intervention labelled by Jones as “light touch” 
assistance (B. Jones, quoted in Halstead 2003, 15).  A recent study of 25 
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collective action projects in agricultural communities (OECD 2013, 111-112) 
reaches a similar conclusion that any aid provided to community projects needs 
to be temporary in nature and not intrusive into the governance structure of the 
organisation.  
5. Balance ethical obligations  
As noted in Chapter 2 (see page 62), engagement with communities is 
now a core ethical principle for many in the discipline. In the process, 
archaeology has been plunged into a maelstrom of ethical questions relating to 
the appropriate role of the discipline in relation to the powers and rights of 
community members (see page 45) and the discipline’s relationship to globalized 
and capitalist economic development (see page 84). However, the two prior 
observations in this section arguably create challenging new obligations for 
archaeologists who engage with economic development.   
First, archaeologists must balance their roles as external catalysts, 
advisers, sources of financing and “experts” with the need to act in a way that is 
“light touch” and deferential to local leadership. This is no ideological argument 
against “neo-colonialism,” however appropriate it might be in some 
circumstances. Rather, this is an argument based on the evidence regarding the 
nature of long-surviving community projects.   
Second, archaeologists should be prepared to make a long-term 
commitment to a community project.  Especially in developing areas that may be 
desperate for income, raising hopes about a project only to neglect it for other 
interests is ethically unacceptable and easily could create antipathy toward the 
very heritage that archaeologists are seeking to preserve for local benefit.   
Finally, archaeologists need to consider deeply whether the project they 
hope to develop is in fact desired by the community in which it is to grow.  It is 
for the community members, not the archaeologist, to decide the goals of the 
community. The mere fact that a site is important to an archaeologist is 
insufficient justification to disrupt the affairs of a local community in order to 
pursue a project in which it has no interest. 
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6. Economics does matter 
 Whether it is due to embarrassment over the discipline’s colonialist 
legacy, a consequence of the Marxist influence on the discipline in many regions 
of the world, or a demand for social justice generated by their experience of the 
uneven impact of globalized capitalism, archaeologists have at best an 
ambivalent relationship with economics (see pages 73 to 92).   These three case 
studies reinforce the need to discard those reservations when archaeologists are 
working with local communities to generate economic gain from heritage 
resources.  Two reasons emerge from the research for this thesis.   
First, difficult as it may be for some archaeologists to accept, the data 
developed for this thesis is consistent with the view that economic motivations 
are at the heart of individuals’ support for ventures such as these.  The results 
reinforce findings elsewhere (see page 150) that, absent meaningful and rapid 
economic returns to members from their investment of time, community 
economic development projects are unlikely to succeed. Each of the long-
surviving community projects studied in this thesis is the product of years of 
dedicated work by committed local residents willing to invest in that effort 
because they believed that through effective collaboration they and their 
community would be better off in economic terms.  Personal economic 
incentives matter and, as any economist would argue, can be employed to 
achieve collective ends.  
Second, the economic context of the project is critical.  Each of the three 
communities studied for this thesis lies near similar communities that tourism 
has passed by (see page 305). The fact that a community wishes to exploit its 
heritage, or that an archaeologist may wish it for them, does not guarantee that a 
project can be successful. Not only must the institutional structures be right, but 
the economics of the project must be right also.  The chain of economic value 
that must be considered when a project is being developed includes the nature of 
any national tourism-promotion strategy; the community’s access to 
transportation links; the plans and objectives of tour operators and their capacity 
and willingness to promote tourist visits; the financial and skill capacity of the 
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community to produce, maintain and operate competitive tourist offerings; and 
the potentially available supply of tourists to visit the location.  
None of the projects studied for this thesis would have been successful 
without an optimal location, a large tourism industry external to the community, 
and efforts at the national level to promote international heritage tourism in each 
country.  Altogether, these factors suggest that, rather than be repelled by 
economics, archaeologists need to embrace it critically and use economic 
insights with appropriate care to advance both theory and practice in the 
discipline’s community engagement projects.    
7. Educate the discipline 
This thesis has not produced simple, easy-to-follow guidelines for 
archaeologists.  It has instead identified that successful development projects are 
possible, but that the creation of such projects requires knowledge of models and 
skills that lay far outside the domain of conventional archaeological training.  To 
the extent that community engagement around economic development projects is 
going to be an important activity in the discipline going forward, archaeologists 
will benefit from serious study of relevant findings in other social sciences. 
Because of its exploitation of scientific research in other disciplines to advance 
field research, archaeology already is one of the most interdisciplinary of the 
social sciences.  To move forward in engaging with the economy, the discipline 
needs to add to its curriculum relevant theoretical and practical studies, such as 
of the topics discussed in this thesis, as well as practical training in management, 
finance, budgeting, decision making and group leadership that ordinarily would 
be found in schools of business not in Institutes of Archaeology.   
Areas for Further Research 
A primary objective of this thesis was to ascertain whether the topic of 
archaeology and community economic development is amenable to systematic 
research based on the interdisciplinary application of models developed in 
political science and economics.  As such it is merely a first step and many other 
aspects of the problem merit research.  Three such topics are top of mind. 
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The problem of scale 
All three of the projects studied in this thesis are small organisations in 
small communities.  Often this will not be the case. Very frequently, the 
communities involved will be large, complicating the identification of the 
individuals to engage in the governance of the CPR if one exists and making 
representative structures, similar to the Committee of the Comhar, the a more 
appropriate mode of governance. A subgroup of the community that deals 
directly with the CPR may need to become the operational unit.  In many cases 
several communities may be engaged, especially where the economic logic for a 
project requires engagement of multiple communities in a tourism-led network.  
Ostrom and others have studied larger-scale CPRs (see page 134) and her eighth 
governance principle, Nested Enterprises (see Figure 6) addresses issues that 
have arisen in her studies of CPR projects that involved multiple levels of 
governance.   
Moreover, the multi-community issues in archaeology may well be novel 
because conflicts among government entities and between governments and 
communities can take on a different flavour due to national regulation of heritage 
properties.  The author has engaged for three years with officials of the Parqi di 
Val di Cornia in Tuscany (see page 92), just such a multi-community, multi-
government system.  Further study of the models and issues associated with 
larger-scale or multi-community projects is warranted for archaeology because 
tourist networks or clusters of archaeological sites often must be developed in 
tandem,  and the institutional structures necessary for community control of such 
networks are not well understood. 
Excluded contexts 
This thesis explicitly did not address issues raised by projects based in 
urban centres (see page 79), yet enormous sums are being invested to preserve 
and resurrect urban cores worldwide. The role of communities in these settings is 
problematic. Often the investments that preserve ancient towns and city centres 
lead to “gentrification” that drives out the very residents whom preservationists 
were hoping to benefit (see page 86). While there is no reason to argue that 
Page | 334  
 
principles such as Ostrom’s do not apply to community-based archaeological 
projects in urban areas, the topic requires separate study.   
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 6 (see page 166), this study also limited 
its scope by excluding cases from countries without democratic traditions, those 
with traditional governance (such as chieftaincies), and projects in locations with 
non-Christian religious traditions and cultures.  To generalize the conclusions of 
this study more broadly, it is necessary to study whether, and to what degree, 
Ostrom’s principles or similar frameworks apply in places without strong 
democratic traditions.  Studies of community-based projects in countries in 
which religious leaders or traditional leaders hold sway over public and private 
activities could illuminate greatly the extent to which Ostrom’s principles have 
generalizable application to archaeology, as would studies in countries such as 
China in which the role of government is strong and pervasive. 
Research into other models  
As noted, this thesis identified two alternative institutional models for 
community-based economic development projects: Ostrom’s CPR principles, 
which appear to apply to situations involving true CPRs, and the cooperative or 
not-for-profit model at the Burren Centre that may apply to community museums 
and similar projects undertaken by archaeologists who are creating destination 
attractions. Further research into the non-profit governance model identified at 
the Burren Centre, which was impossible for this thesis, may have applicability 
across a broad swathe of archaeological site museums and similar projects.  
Moreover, other approaches to economic development projects are being 
attempted by archaeologists (see page 92). An entrepreneurial venture capital 
model is being tested by the Sustainable Preservation Initiative, while NGOs 
such as Heritage Watch and GHF are emphasizing skill training or similar 
capacity building activities designed to enhance individuals’ employment 
prospects with local tourist and archaeological enterprises.  Each of these 
approaches and others merit detailed assessment to identify whether, and if so 
when and why, they can be successful contributors to community economic 
development. 
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A Concluding Thought 
There is a certain idealism, if not romanticism, in community 
archaeology, a desire to engage and uplift communities, to bring the excitement 
felt by the archaeologist about heritage to the actual inheritor.  In some 
archaeologists one perceives a desire to play a somewhat heroic role as the agent 
who rights past wrongs.  In others, it is an activity closely linked to the 
legitimization of archaeological activity itself.  Ostrom’s work and perhaps this 
study have underscored a few important realities. Local social and political 
context play a greater role, for good or ill, than the archaeologist impatient for an 
impact may wish to admit, and the pecuniary incentives facing each individual in 
a community matter a great deal.  The globalized economy, national and 
international political and economic contexts, and the dissemination of cultural 
products around the globe do affect conditions and prospects in each individual 
locale. However, members of different communities will have different values 
and goals, and communities will differ one from the other.  These factors are 
only compounded by the complexities of engaging with communities due to their 
own internal dynamics.   
Development challenges resist easy solution and have frustrated 
politicians and economists because of those complexities.  Ostrom et al 
approvingly quote Roger Stone's observation about the ultimate track record for 
development projects:  
Decades of grass-roots experience have demonstrated and early returns 
from the ecodevelopment sector have confirmed, progress is most likely 
if local citizens are full partners.  Top-down planning seldom flourishes 
in the field. (1993, 190) 
The essence of this thesis has been to offer, as an alternative to top-down 
planning, insight into whether conditions may exist under which it is realistic to 
believe that individuals can partner to take advantage of a collective opportunity.  
Although the conditions associated with success are constrained, as shown in 
Chapter 4, the corpus of studies to which this thesis is a small contribution leaves 
room for optimism.  Even though the Model Institutional Features evaluated in 
this thesis do not constitute a manual for community projects, they do provide a 
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basis for archaeologists to assess local conditions and determine the best path 
forward.  Nonetheless, the role for the archaeologist in this process has limits.   
Gadsby and Chidester observe that: 
As scholars, it is our ethical duty to support the ownership and authority 
of local communities over the problems facing them […] by providing 
them with open access to our skills and knowledge rather than taking the 
power to define problems and solutions for ourselves, based on our 
authority as “experts.” (2007, 224)  
Development projects on this scale cannot be handed down by “experts,” 
they cannot be delivered in the form of charity that saps enterprise and may even 
corrupt, they do not emerge from organisational blueprints, they are neither 
facile entrepreneurism nor unfettered capitalism.  Projects, when they are 
initiated, may need technical and other forms of assistance from individuals with 
relevant expertise, they may need political intervention to eliminate de jure or de 
facto barriers to success, and they usually will require financial infusions.  
However, if projects are to be self-sustaining, they also require institutions 
adapted to local circumstances, patience, and confidence that individuals can 
themselves create durable institutions if given the opportunity and appropriate, 
light-touch support.  The argument in this thesis is that this is the task to which 
archaeologists must turn if they seek to mobilize communities in search of 
economic development. 
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Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
Survey Questionnaire as used in Kilfenora, Ireland; Raqchi, Peru; 
and Maya Centre, Belize 
English-Language and Spanish-Language Versions 
 
 
Preamble: 
 
Hello.  My Name is Peter Gould.  As part of my research at University College London, I 
am conducting a study of the Asociacíon Inkallaqta in Raqchi.  My interest is in the 
relationship of the organization to its community and the structure and operational 
procedures of the organization.  I have the permission of the Organization to conduct 
this study.  I am studying the Organization because it has been successful for many 
years and I am seeking to understand how organizations such as the organization 
succeed.   I would be grateful if you would give me about 30 minutes of your time to 
answer some questions about the Organization.  Although I wish to record the 
interview and maintain a record of your name and address, that information will be 
used solely to ensure the accuracy of my data.  Your name will never be used in 
reference to the study, participants will be identified only by interview number, and 
recordings of the interviews will never be made available to any person aside from 
individuals engaged in this study.  The confidentiality of your comments to me will be 
unconditional. 
Buenos días.  Me llamo es Peter Gould.  Para mi investigación a la universidad de 
Londres, estoy estudiando la Associacíon Inkallaqta  de Raqchi.  Mi interés esta los 
relaciones de la asociación y la comunidad, y la estructura y operación de la 
asociación.  Estudio la asociación porque la tiene muchos anos.  Busco las razones por 
que la asociación tiene con éxito. Por favor, das me 30 minutos y respuestas 
preguntas sobre la asociación.  Sus respuestas se mantendrán completamente 
confidenciales.   Aunque quiero grabar nuestra conversación y conocer tu nombre, 
usare esta información solamente de asegurar mis investigación esta correcto.  Usare 
su nombre nunca en mi investigación, los personas van a ser entrevista podre nunca 
identificado, y daré las grabaciones a nadie.  La confianza de nos conversación es 
incondicional.   
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1. General Background 
1.1.  Name of organization under study  ___________________________ 
1.2.  Type of organization:____________________  
1.3.  Location (district, village, neighbourhood) ___________________ 
1.4. Interview Number:  ____________________________ 
1.5. Date of Interview  ______________________________ 
1.6. Time initiated: ______________________________ 
1.7. Time terminated:______________________________ 
1.8. Interviewer: _______________________    
1.9. Supervisor: __________________________ 
 
2. IDENTIFICATION OF SELECTED INTERVIEWEE: 
 
2.1. Name ______________________________ 
2.2. Province/state _______________ 
2.3. District  ______________________________ 
2.4. Sub district  ______________________________ 
2.5. Town/village  ______________________________ 
2.6. Age 
[ ] <20   1 
[ ] 20> <40 2 
[ ] 40><60 3 
[  ]>60  4 
2.7. Gender   
[ ] Male  1 
[ ] Female 2 
2.8. Type of area:  
Urban   [ ] 1  
Village / Small Town  [ ] 2 
Rural  [ ] 3 
 
2.9. Role in organization  
2.9.1. Officer   [ ] 1 
2.9.2. Member   [ ] 2 
2.9.3. Non-member  [ ] 3 
2.9.4. Government /NGO   [ ] 4 
 
If the interviewee answers Government / NGO [4] to question 2.9, go to Section 8. 
Otherwise proceed to Section 3 
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3. COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS, ORGANIZATION AND RELATIONS 
3.1. How do you define the geographic domain of the Associacíon Inkallaqta ? (Probe on 
geographical boundaries, place names, and other reference points.   [Extended Response] 
Comment: _______________________________________________ 
¿Cuales son los limites de su comunidad y quieres participan en la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
 
3.2. Who are the official leaders in this community? What are their formal offices or roles? How 
do they become leaders? How are new leaders selected? 
Comment: _______________________________________________ 
¿Quienes son los líderes de la comunidad?  ¿Cual es su trabajo como líderes? ¿Como 
eligen ha los líderes? 
 
3.3. Who are the community leaders who do not hold official positions?  What is their informal 
basis for being seen as leaders?   
Comment: _______________________________________________ 
¿Quienes son los otros líderes en la comunidad que no tienen cargos oficiales? 
 
3.4. How are decisions typically made within this community? What is the role of the 
community leaders? How are community members involved?  Are these decision-making 
procedures long-standing traditions in the community? (Probe on role of traditional leaders, 
informal leaders, elites.)   
Comment: _______________________________________________ 
¿Como toman decisiones en la comunidad? ¿Cual es la función de los líderes en la toma 
de decisiones?  ¿Come participan los miembros de la comunidad en la toma de 
decisiones? ¿ Siempre usan el mismo método para tomar decisiones? 
 
3.5. Are the relationships among people in this community generally harmonious or 
disagreeable? 
¿Las relaciones entre  la gente de esta comunidad son, por regla general, agradables o 
desagradable? 
 
Harmonious [ ] 1 agradables 
Disagreeable [ ] 2 desagradable 
 
3.6. Other than the [project name] project,  have there been efforts by the community to 
improve the quality of life or overcome a problem? 
¿Aparte de la Associacíon Inkallaqta  de la comunidad Raqchi, cuales otros proyectos 
emprende la comunidad Raqchi para mejorar la calidad de vida en el pueblo o para 
resolver algún problema? 
 
Yes  [           ]   1 Si 
No  [           ]   2 No 
 
3.7. Around what issue or issues did the community organize 
Dime cuales projectos o problemas. 
 
Comment: _______________________________________________ 
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3.8.  Can you describe one such project in detail? Which community groups played an important 
role? What kinds of responses did you get from the local government? From other 
organizations? From the rest of the community? What kinds of obstacles did you have to 
deal with? What was the outcome of the effort? (Probe for locus of leadership, resources 
tapped, sources of resistance, who benefited or suffered from the outcome, the kind of 
follow-up that occurred as a result of the effort, and the mechanisms employed to ensure 
sustainability of the effort.) [Extended Response] 
¿Descríbeme que hizo la gente y los lideres de Raqchi que participaron en uno de estos 
proyectos de la comunidad?  ¿Colaboró el gobierno de Raqchi?  ¿Colaboró otras 
asociaciones de ciudadanos de esta comunidad?  ¿Colaboró el gobierno a nivel  regional 
o el gobierno a nivel nacional?  ¿Qué problemas fueron encontrados en este proyecto? 
 
3.9. Was the initiative(s) successful? 
¿Tuvo este proyecto éxito para la comunidad?  
Yes   [           ]   1   Si 
No    [           ]   2  No 
Ongoing   [           ]  3   No ha terminado 
  
 
3.10. Has this community ever attempted to make improvements but failed? Why do you think 
the attempt failed? Tell me the story.  (Probe for constraints on collective action; identify the 
roles of government, community organizations, and secondary institutions in influencing 
outcomes; and discuss the relationship between the community, representative 
organizations, local government, and other civil society actors.) [Extended Response] 
¿Hubo algún proyecto que no funcionó? ¿ Por qué?  Cuéntame. 
 
3.11. What groups, organizations, or associations function in this community?   Are these groups 
formal or informal?  How are they organized?  Are they legally constituted or not? Probe for 
a  list all the organizations, formal and informal, that exist in the community. Make sure all 
different types of organizations are included (agriculture, credit, religious, recreational, 
health, education, etc.) and that the list is as complete as possible.  [Extended Response] 
¿Cuales grupos están activos en Raqchi?  ¿Tiene Raqchi asociaciones? ¿Cooperativas? 
¿Otros grupos?  ¿Son estos grupos  formales  o informales?  ¿Cómo esta organizada la 
asociaciones, cooperativas u otras grupos? ¿Son estos constituyo legalmente o no? 
 
3.12. Please identify the three groups in the community that in your view are most 
important.(List up to three by name and code type of organization.) 
Dime los nombres de los tres grupos comunidad qué son más importantes en Raqchi. 
 
3.12.1. Group 1: ______________________  
3.12.2. Group 2: ______________________  
3.12.3. Group 3: ______________________  
 
3.13. Which organizations work together? How do they work together (hierarchically, 
collaboratively)? 
¿Cuales de estos grupos trabajan juntos?   ¿Como colaboran entre si? 
Comment: _______________________________________________ 
Proceed to Section 4 
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4. STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL 
4.1. Are you or is someone in your household a member of any other  groups, organizations, or 
associations?  If Yes, which organizations?  If No, skip to question 4.3.  
¿Es usted u otros miembros de su hogar miembros de algún grupo, asociación u 
organización en Raqchi?  ¿Cuales grupos? 
 
Yes   [ ] 1 
Organizations:_____________________________________________________ 
No   [ ] 2 
 
4.2. Do you consider yourself or your household member to be active in the group, such as by 
attending meetings or volunteering your time in other ways, or are you relatively inactive? 
Are you/household member a leader in the group? 
¿Es usted o algún miembro de su hogar un miembro activo de una organización?  ¿Por 
ejemplo, por acudiendo los reuníos de el organización o por trabajando en la 
organización?  ¿Es usted o un miembro de su hogar un líder de alguna organización? 
 
Active   [ ] 1 Activo 
Inactive   [ ] 2 Inactivo 
Leader   [ ] 3 Lider 
 
4.3. Differences often exist between people living in the same community. To what extent do 
differences such as family relationship, religion, gender, age, political party, occupation, 
education level, etc. tend to divide people in your community? 
¿Hasta que punto relaciones familiares, religión, grupos de edad, partidos políticos, 
género, ocupación, nivel de educación u otras razones han generado conflictos en la 
comunidad Raqchi?   
 
Comment:___________________________________________________________
_____ 
 
4.4. How are differences between individuals in the community usually handled? 
 ¿Como se resuelven los diferentes en Raqchi? Dime todas las opciones posibles con “sí” o 
“no”: 
     Yes          No 
4.4.1. People work it out  between themselves  
     La gente resuelve los problemas entre sí— Sí o No? 
 
     [ ] 1 [ ] 2 
4.4.2. Family/household  members intervene 
Otros miembros de las familias intervienen—Sí o No? 
     [ ] 1 [ ] 2 
4.4.3. Religious or Community leaders intervene 
     Los líderes religiosos o otros líderes de la comunidad intervienen--Sí o No?  
 
     [ ] 1 [ ] 2 
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4.5. Overall, how do you rate the spirit of participation in this community?  
¿En general, cual opinión tiene usted tú sobre el espíritu de cooperación en Raqchi? 
Very low  [ ] 1  Muy bajo  
Low  [ ] 2 bajo 
Average  [ ] 3 intermedio 
High  [ ] 4 bueno  
Very high  [ ] 5 muy bueno 
4.6. How much influence does a person like you have to make this community a better place to 
live? 
¿Cuánta influencia tiene otra persona como usted para hacer este comunidad un 
mejor lugar para vivir? 
A lot  [ ] 1   Mucha influencia  
Some  [ ] 2  Alguna influencia 
Not very much  [ ] 3 No mucha influencia 
None  [ ] 4 Ninguna influencia 
 
Proceed to Section 5 
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5. COGNITIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL 
5.1. 0  Please tell me whether in general you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
Por favor, diga hasta que punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes 
declaraciones: firmemente de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o 
firmemente en desacuerdo.   
  Strongly   Strongly 
  Agree Agree Disagree disagree 
  firma acuerdo   desacuerdo   firma 
  acuerdo   desacuerdo 
 Most people in  
this community 
are basically  
honest and  
trustworthy.    [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3    [   ]4 
La mejoría de las personas in esta comunidad son honrada y generan 
confianza. 
 
5.1.1. People are always  
interested only in  
their own welfare.  [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3    [   ]4 
Las personas están solamente interesadas en sus bienestares individuales. 
 
5.1.2. In this community, one  
has to be alert or  
someone is likely  
to take advantage  
of you.    [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3    [   ]4 
En esta comunidad, uno debe estar alerta para evitar que otros se 
aprovechen. 
 
5.1.3. If I have a problem,  
there is always  
someone to help me.  [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3    [   ]4 
Si tengo un problema, siempre habrá alguien que me ayude. 
 
5.1.4.  
The opinions of others 
in the community matter 
to me    [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3    [   ]4 
Yo presto atención a las opiniones de otras personas de esta comunidad.  
 
5.1.5. I believe I am accepted as  
a member of this  
community.    [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3    [   ]4 
Creo soy aceptado como un miembro de esta comunidad. 
 
5.1.6. If you drop your purse  
  in the community,  
  someone will see it  
and return it to you.  [ ] 1 [ ] 2 [ ] 3      [   ]4 
Si se la cae su bolso en Raqchi, quieren lo encentra, lo devuelve. 
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5.2. Do people in this community contribute time or money toward common development 
goals? 
  ¿La gente en esta comunidad ocupa tiempo o dan dinero para ayudar con 
proyectos para  desarrollar la comunidad? Tengo tres contestadores posibles: 
They contribute some or a lot of time.  [ ] 1 Dan algún o mucho tiempo 
They contribute some or a lot of money   [ ] 2 Dan algún o mucho dinero 
They contribute very little or nothing.   [ ]      3     Dan solo un  poco o ningún tiempo o 
dinero 
They contribute both time and money [       ] 4   Dan tiempo y dinero  
 
If the interviewee answered Officer or Member  to question 2.9, go to section 6 
 For individuals who answered “Non-Member” to question 2.9:  
 
Thank you so much for your time and thoughtful responses to this questionnaire.  Your responses 
will be kept completely confidential.  You will never be quoted by name nor will comments be 
attributed anonymously in a manner that might indicate their source.  The tape recording of the 
conversation will be used solely to ensure the accuracy of my notes and recollections and will not be 
presented in public, reproduced or redistributed. 
 
 
Muchas gracias por sus tiempo y reflexivos respuestas a este cuestionario. Sus respuestas 
se mantendrán completamente confidenciales. Usted nunca ser citada por su nombre ni se 
comentarios atribuirse anónimamente en una manera que podría indicar su origen. La 
grabación de la conversación será se utiliza únicamente para garantizar la exactitud de mis 
notas y registros y no se presentó en público, reproducida ni redistribuir. 
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6. ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY, ORIGINS AND IMPACT ( QUESTIONS FOR MEMBERS ONLY.  SKIP TO ITEM 8 FOR NON- 
MEMBERS.) 
 
6.1.  I would like to turn now to the activities of the [organization].  Can you describe what 
the [organization] does? 
 
Pasaré ahora a las actividades de la Associacíon Inkallaqta .  Que hace la Associacíon 
Inkallaqta ? 
 Comment:_______________________________________________________________ 
 
6.2. Why are you a member of this organization? 
 
Por Qué es usted un miembro de la associación? 
 Comment:___________________________________________________________ 
 
6.3. Tell me the history of the [organization].  How was the organization created? Who was 
most responsible for its creation (probe for government mandate, community decision, 
or suggestion of outside NGO)? [Extended Response] 
 
Cuéntame la historia de la asociación. ¿Cuando se creo la asociación? ¿Quienes 
fueron responsables en la creación de la asociación?  
 
6.4. What kinds of activities has the organization been involved in? 
 
¿En cuales actividades ha estado implicada la asociación desde su establecimiento?  
 Comment:_______________________________________________________________ 
 
6.5. Do members receive financial and operational reports routinely?  If so, what form do 
those reports take?   
 
¿Maneja la asociación dinero de sus miembros? ¿La asociación presente un informe 
periódico financiero y operativo a los miembros? ¿Como son los informes? 
 Yes   [ ] 1 
 Comment 
____________________________________________________________ 
 No   [ ] 2 
 
6.6. What are the rules and procedures of the organization?  How are the procedures, rules 
and programs of the organization decided upon?  Changed?  Do any other groups or 
authorities have the right to review or approve the changes?  What are the sanctions 
for not following the rules? [Extended Response] 
 
¿Quales son los reglas de la  asociación?  ¿Como se deciden los procedimientos, 
reglas, y programas de la asociación? ¿Como se cambian? ¿Tienen otros grupos el 
recho de  revisar o aprobar los?  ¿Cuáles son las sanciones por no seguir las reglas? 
 
6.7. How have the mission or the programs or the organization structure of the association 
changed since it was founded?  Who were the leaders of the changes? Why were 
changes made?   Describe the process leading up to the changes. [Extended Response] 
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¿Cómo ha cambiado el objetivo, las actividades, o la estructura de organización de la 
Associacíon Inkallaqta  desde su fundación?  ¿Quienes lidiaron los cambios? ¿Por qué 
se hicieron los cambios? 
 
6.8. What benefits does the association bring to the community (probe economic and non-
economic) [Extended Response] 
 
¿Qué beneficios económicos y otros beneficios trae la asociación a Raqchi?   
 
6.9. What is your view about how the organization works with businesses and other 
organizations that work in the community? [Extended Response] 
 
¿Cual es tu opinión sobre la forma como la asociación coopéra con los negocios y 
otras organizaciones de la comunidad?  
 
6.10. Can you tell me about the people involved in your organization? Who can be a member 
of the organization?  How do people become members? [Extended Response] 
 
Cuenta me sobre los miembros de la asociación.¿Quién puede ser un miembro?  
Cómo se hacen miembros?  
 
6.11. Who are the leaders or officials of the organization?  How are leaders chosen?  Why do 
people become leaders or officials in the organization? What are the responsibilities of 
leaders and officials of the organization? Are members obliged to serve as officials? 
How stable is the leadership (frequent or sudden changes, normal progressive change, 
or never changes)? Are  leadership changes generally consensual or contested? 
[Extended Response]  
 
Quienes son los líderes de la asociación?  ¿Como son elegido los lideres?  ¿Para qué 
los miembros se hacen líderes de la asociación?  ¿Cuáles son las responsabilidades de 
los lideres de la asociación? ¿Están los miembros obligados a hacer lideres a algún 
vez?   
 
6.12. Are some members in this organization also members of other organizations in the 
community/region? Do people tend to be members of just one organization or join 
many simultaneously? Can you explain why? [Extended Response] 
 
¿Son algunos miembros de la Associacíon Inkallaqta también miembros de otras 
asociaciones en la comunidad?  ¿En Raqchi, son las personas usualmente miembros 
de solo uno asociación o son  miembros de mas de  uno asociación?  
 
6.13. In general, do you Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D) or Strongly Disagree (SD) 
with the following propositions: 
 
En general, diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones:  
firmemente de acuerdo, de acuerdo, desacuerdo, o  firmemente en desacuerdo.   
  
6.13.1. The association leaders are fair and honest 
 [ SA 1/ A2 / / SD4 ] 
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   Los lideres de la Associacíon Inkallaqta son honrados y generan confianza 
 
6.13.2. I trust the association leaders when they handle money 
 [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
 Confió en  los líderes de la Associacíon Inkallaqta que manejan los dineros. 
 
6.13.3. I believe that the association is working to improve the economy of our 
community [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
 Creo que la Associacíon Inkallaqta esta trabajando para mejorar la economía 
de la comunidad de Raqchi. 
 
 
6.13.4.   The association members control the organization. 
 [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Sin excepción, los miembros de la asociación controlan la asociación. 
 
6.13.5. The association members set their own rules and enforce them  
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los miembros de la asociación establecen y hacen cumplir las reglas de la 
asociación.  
 
6.13.6. Leaders of the association are effective at their jobs  
 [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los lideres de la Associacíon Inkallaqta son eficaces a sus trabajos. 
6.13.7. The community would be worse off if the association were ever to close  
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
   La comunidad Raqchi estaría peor si la Associacíon Inkallaqta cerrara. 
6.13.8. I feel a sense of responsibility for the organization  
 [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Me siento responsable para la Associacíon Inkallaqta . 
 
6.13.9. I feel well informed about the activities of the organization 
  [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Me parece que estoy bien informado sobre las actividades de la Associacíon 
Inkallaqta . 
 
6.13.10. Membership in the organization has benefitted my family financially 
 [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Ser socio de la Associacíon Inkallaqta ha beneficiado económicamente a  mi 
familia. 
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6.13.11. Membership in the organization has been important to my standing in the                                                              
community   
 [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Ser socio de la asociación artesónal ha estado importante para mi posición en 
la comunidad Raqchi. 
 
6.13.12. The association has been of economic benefit to the local community       
[ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
La Associacíon Inkallaqta ha beneficiado económicamente la comunidad 
Raqchi. 
 
6.13.13. The project has been of economic benefit to nearby communities   
 [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
La Associacíon Inkallaqta de Raqchi ha beneficiado otras comunidades 
cercanas. 
 
6.14. I would like to discuss some qualitative aspects of the association.   In general, do 
you Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D) or Strongly Disagree (SD) with the 
following propositions: 
 
Quisiera discutir alguos aspectos cualitativos de la Associacíon Inkallaqta .  En 
general, diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones:  
firmemente de acuerdo, de acuerdo, desacuerdo, o firmemente en desacuerdo.   
 
6.14.1. Attendance at meetings of the organization is strong. 
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
  La asistencia a las reuniónes de la asociación es fuerte. 
 
6.14.2. Participation in decisionmaking within the organization is active. 
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los miembros participan activamente en la toma de  decisiónes de la 
asociación. 
 
6.14.3. Members have direct influence on the plans and activities of the 
association.  
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los miembros tienen influencia directa sobre los planes y activiades de la 
asociación. 
 
6.14.4. Members have a high level of knowledge of the procedures and policies? 
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
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  Los miembros conocen las políticas y los procedimientos de la asociación. 
 
6.14.5. The association follows its procedures and policies faithfully.  
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
  La asociación sigue las politicas y los procedimientos fielmente. 
 
6.14.6. Members  have all necessary information before decisions are made.  
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los miembros conocen toda la información necesaria antes de tomar las  
decisions. 
 
6.14.7. For officers: the officials have all necessary information in advance of 
meetings. 
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los lideres de la asociación conocen toda la información necesaria antes de 
las reuniónes. 
 
6.14.8. The organization is open to broad debate, including opposing opinions. 
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
  La asociación esta abierto para debatir, incluyendo  opiniónes contrarias. 
 
6.14.9. The results of decisions are quickly and appropriately disseminated. 
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los resultados de las decisiones son anunciadas pronta y apropriadamente  
 
6.14.10. Conflicts within the organization are  resolved effectively and fairly. 
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los conflictos dentro de la asociación son  resuelto eficaz y justamente. 
 
6.14.11. Mechanisms to resolve conflicts between the organization and 
community members are effective and fair. 
   [ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
 
Los mecanismos para resolver conflictos entre la organización y miembros de 
la comunidad son eficaces y justos. 
 
6.14.12. The association is effective at developing plans for the future rather than 
reacting to situations as they present themselves)? 
[ SA 1/ A2 / D3 / SD4 ] 
La asociación es eficaz haciendo planes para el futuro en lugar de reacciona a 
las situaciones que se presentan. 
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6.15. Does the organization make decisions through formal mechanisms, such as 
voting, or through an informal consensus process?  [Extended Response] 
 
¿Toma la organización decisiones a través de mecanismos formales, como la 
votación, o a través de un proceso de consenso informal? 
 
6.16. Can you recall any instances of serious conflict within the organization?  How 
was it resolved?  Does the organization have effective ways to manage or 
resolve conflicts among shareholders?  Was the outcome fair, in your view?   
 
¿Puede recordar algún caso del conflicto serio dentro de la organización? 
¿Cómo se resolvió? ¿Tiene la organización modos eficaces de manejar o 
resolver conflictos entre accionistas? ¿Era justo el resultado, en su opinión? 
 
6.17. Does the group have any rules governing shareholder activities, their 
engagement in the organization, or conflicts with the organization?  What is the 
source of these rules?  Are they enforced?  By Whom? Are they fairly enforced? 
[Extended Response] 
 
¿Tiene el grupo alguna cualquier regla actividades del accionista gobernantes, 
su compromiso en la organización, o entra en conflicto con la organización? 
¿Cuál es la fuente de estas reglas? ¿Se hacen cumplir? ¿Por Quien? 
¿Justamente se hacen cumplir? 
 
6.18. Does the association have clearly defined processes for identifying the needs 
and priorities of the organization? 
 
¿La Asociación Incayata han definido claramente los procesos de 
identificación de las necesidades y prioridades de la organización? 
Yes   [ ] 1 
No   [ ] 2 
 
6.19. In the last five years, have there been petitions or other formal or informal calls 
for change in organizational priorities, programs or practices by the 
shareholders? 
 
En los últimos cinco años, se han producido peticiones u otras llamadas 
formales o informales para cambian de prioridades, programas o prácticas de 
los accionistas? 
 
Yes   [ ] 1 
No   [ ] 2 
 
6.20. If you responded “yes”, in what way has the organization addressed these calls 
for change? 
 
Si usted respondió "sí", en qué forma tiene la organización abordado estos 
llamados al cambio 
 
Promotes demands of common interest [ ] 1 
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Tries to identify common elements  [ ] 2 
Tries to process them one by one  [ ] 3 
There were no demands  [ ] 4 
 
 
For individuals who answered “Member” to question 2.8:  
 
Thank you so much for your time and thoughtful responses to this questionnaire.  Your responses 
will be kept completely confidential.  You will never be quoted by name nor will comments be 
attributed anonymously in a manner that might indicate their source.  The tape recording of the 
conversation will be used solely to ensure the accuracy of my notes and recollections and will not be 
presented in public, reproduced or redistributed. 
 
 
Muchas gracias por sus tiempo y reflexivos respuestas a este cuestionario. Sus respuestas 
se mantendrán completamente confidenciales. Usted nunca ser citada por su nombre ni se 
comentarios atribuirse anónimamente en una manera que podría indicar su origen. La 
grabación de la conversación será se utiliza únicamente para garantizar la exactitud de mis 
notas y registros y no se presentó en público, reproducida ni redistribuir. 
 
For those who answered “Officer” to question 2.9, proceed to section 7.  
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7. Matters to be addressed to Board Members, Officials of the Associacíon Inkallaqta  
 
7.1. Please describe the history of the [organization] for me. 
Por favour, dime la historia de la Associacíon Inkallaqta .  
7.2. What is the legal structure of the organization?  Is it regulated by any government 
entity?  If so by which government entities?  Does the legal structure of the 
organization determine the way the organization makes decisions?  In what ways?  
Which individuals control and lead the organization?  Are those leaders chosen by 
law, by the rules of the organization, or by custom?  [Extended Response] 
 
¿Cuál es la estructura jurídica de la organización? ¿Está regulado por cualquier 
entidad gubernamental? ¿Cuales entidades de Gobierno? ¿La estructura jurídica 
de la organización determina la forma en que la organización toma las 
decisiones? ¿De qué manera? ¿Que las personas controlan y dirigir la 
organización? Son los dirigentes elegidos por ley, por las reglas de la organización 
o por encargo. 
 
7.3. May I review the legal organizational documents, bylaws, minutes, etc. of the 
organization? 
¿Puedo revisar los documentos de la organización, estatutos, actas, etc. de la 
organización? 
7.4. May I review the shareholder register in order to select individuals for interviews? 
¿Puedo revisar el registro de accionistas con el fin de seleccionar a personas para 
entrevistas? 
7.5. May I review grant documents, project reports, and so on associated with outside 
agency / organization work with the Organization. 
¿Puedo revisar los documentos de la merced, informes de proyecto, etc. ) 
relacionadas con el exterior agencia / organización trabajar con el Centro? 
7.6. May I review the financial records of the project ? 
¿Puedo examinar los archivos financieros del proyecto? 
7.7. Please describe how the organization manages its financial affairs. 
Por favor describa como el Associacíon Inkallaqta maneja sus asuntos 
financieros. 
7.8. What is the members role in governing the organization? 
¿Cuál es el papel de los miembros en el gobierno de la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
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7.9. What laws or regulations exert control over the governance or operations of the 
association? 
¿Qué leyes o reglamentos ejercen un control sobre el gobierno o las operaciones 
de la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
7.10. Can you provide examples of changes in policy or program that have occurred at 
the association since its founding.  Do you have insight into who initiated those 
changes and how the organization came to agree to pursue them?   
¿Puede usted proporcionar ejemplos de cambios en la política o programa que 
han ocurrido en el Associacíon Inkallaqta desde su fundación? ¿Tienes idea de 
quién inició los cambios y cómo la organización llegó a un acuerdo perseguirlos? 
7.11. Can you direct me to any economic data collected by government or private 
sources that would illuminate the impact of the associacion on the community and 
region? 
¿Me puede dirigir a cualquier datos económicos recaudados por el Gobierno o 
fuentes privadas que se iluminan el impacto de la Associacíon Inkallaqta en la 
comunidad y la región? 
7.12. Can you direct me to any individuals outside of the community who could 
illuminate the impact of the association on the community and region? 
¿Me puede dirigir a cualquier persona fuera de la comunidad que podría iluminar 
el impacto de la Associacíon Inkallaqta en la comunidad y la región? 
7.13. Can you describe the manner in which your organization has worked with NGOs, 
government agencies, and financing sources?  In general, has their role been to 
serve as an advisor or as an instructor, or have they taken a more directive role?  
Have they generally responded to initiatives of the organization?   
¿Puedes describir la manera en que su organización ha trabajado con 
organizaciones no gubernamentales, agencias de Gobierno y fuentes de 
financiamiento? ¿En general, ha sido su papel servir como asesor o como 
instructor, o han tomado un papel más Directiva? ¿Ellos generalmente 
respondieron a las iniciativas de la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
7.14. Has any outside agency engaged in any “capacity building” work with the 
organization?  If so, please describe. 
¿Tiene cualquier organismo externo conectado en cualquier "fomento de la 
capacidad" trabajar con la asociación? En caso afirmativo, describir, por favor. 
7.15. Has the organization attempted to organize or work with other organizations to 
achieve a mutually beneficial goal? (Ask for which activities.) [Extended Response] 
 
¿El Associacíon Inkallaqta intentó organizar o trabajar con otras organizaciones 
para lograr un objetivo beneficioso? 
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7.16. Could you describe the organization’s relationship with the local, regional and 
national governments?  Have you had experience in trying to get government 
assistance? What was your experience? Which level of government do you find 
most cooperative (local, district, national)? Has the government made particular 
requests of your organization? How has receiving assistance from the government 
affected the policies or operations of the organization? [Extended Response] 
 
¿Podría describir la relación de la Associacíon Inkallaqta con los gobiernos local, 
regional o nacionale? ¿Ha tenido experiencia en tratar de conseguir ayuda del 
Gobierno? ¿Cuál fue tu experiencia? ¿Qué nivel de Gobierno se encuentra más 
cooperativa (local, regional, nacional)? ¿El Gobierno ha hecho solicitudes 
concretas de su organización? ¿Cómo recibir asistencia del Gobierno afectó las 
políticas o las operaciones de la organización? 
 
7.17. Has the organization received financial assistance or technical assistance from any 
non-governmental outside groups?  How would you describe the relationship 
between the project and the outside group.  How has receiving assistance from 
these outside groups affected the policies or operations of the organization? 
[Extended Response] 
 
¿El Associacíon Inkallaqta  ha recibido ayuda financiera o asistencia técnica de los 
grupos no gubernamentales fuera? ¿Cómo describirías la relación entre el 
proyecto y el grupo exterior. ¿Cómo recibir asistencia de estos grupos externos 
afecta las políticas o las operaciones de la organización? 
 
7.18. Have you attempted to give input to any  government on matters affecting the 
organization? What were the circumstances? What have been the results? What 
kinds of challenges did you have to deal with? (Probe for any role in planning, 
operation, and maintenance of government-sponsored services.) [Extended 
Response] 
 
¿Se ha intentado dar entrada a cualquier gobierno sobre cuestiones que afecten 
a la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? ¿Cuáles fueron las circunstancias? ¿Cuáles han sido 
los resultados? ¿Qué tipos de retos tuviste que afrontar? 
  
Thank you so much for your time and thoughtful responses to this questionnaire.  Your responses 
will be kept completely confidential.  You will never be quoted by name nor will comments be 
attributed anonymously in a manner that might indicate their source.  The tape recording of the 
conversation will be used solely to ensure the accuracy of my notes and recollections and will not be 
presented in public, reproduced or redistributed. 
 
Muchas gracias por sus tiempo y reflexivos respuestas a este cuestionario. Sus respuestas 
se mantendrán completamente confidenciales. Usted nunca ser citada por su nombre ni se 
comentarios atribuirse anónimamente en una manera que podría indicar su origen. La 
grabación de la conversación será se utiliza únicamente para garantizar la exactitud de mis 
notas y registros y no se presentó en público, reproducida ni redistribuir. 
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8. Matters to be addressed to Government officials, NGOs, other groups outside the 
community involved with the organization (replacing sections 3 through 7 
above): 
 
8.1. Please describe the engagement your agency / organization and you personally 
have had with the organization. 
Por favor describa la contratación de su agencia / organización y usted 
personalmente ha tenido con el Associacíon Inkallaqta . 
8.2. May I review grant documents, project reports, and so on associated with 
outside agency / organization work with the organization? 
¿Puedo examinar documentos de subvención, proyectar informes, etcétera 
asociados con la agencia exterior / trabajo de organización con el Associacíon 
Inkallaqta ? 
8.3. Who owns or controls the organization?   
¿Que posee o controla la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
8.4. What is the larger community’s relationship to and role in the organization ? 
¿Cuál son la relación de la comunidad de Raqchi más grande a y el papel en el 
Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
8.5. What laws or regulations exert control over the governance or operations of the 
association ? 
¿Qué leyes o reglamentos ejercen un control sobre el Gobierno o las 
operaciones de la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
8.6. Please describe in some detail the projects on which your organization has 
worked with the organization?   
¿Por favor describa en detalle los proyectos en los que su organización ha 
trabajado con el Associacíon Inkallaqta .? 
8.7. Can you direct me to any economic data collected by government or private 
sources that would illuminate the impact of the organization on the community 
and region? 
¿Me puede dirigir a cualquier datos económicos recaudados por el Gobierno o 
fuentes privadas que se iluminan el impacto de la Associacíon Inkallaqta en la 
comunidad y la región? 
8.8. Can you direct me to any individuals outside of the community who could 
illuminate the impact of the organization on the community and regions? 
¿Puede usted dirigirme a cualquier individuo fuera de la comunidad que podría 
iluminar el impacto del Associacíon Inkallaqta en la comunidad y regiones? 
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8.9. Can you describe the manner in which your organization (for NGO, Government, 
Archaeologist, and etc. officials) has worked with the organization?   
¿Puede usted describir la manera en la cual su organización  ha trabajado con 
la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
8.10. In general, has your role been to serve as an advisor or as an instructor, or have 
you take a more directive role?  Have you generally responded to initiatives of 
the organization?   
¿En general, su papel ha debido servir de un consejero o de un instructor, o le 
hace tomar más papel de directiva? ¿Ha respondido generalmente usted a 
iniciativas de la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
8.11. Have you engaged in any “capacity building” work with the organization?  If so, 
please describe. 
Ha participado usted en cualquier trabajo de "creación de capacidad" con la 
Associacíon Inkallaqta ? En caso afirmativo, describir, por favor. 
8.12. What can you tell me about the history of the organization ? 
¿Qué me puede decir sobre la historia de la Associacíon Inkallaqta ? 
 
Thank you so much for your time and thoughtful responses to this questionnaire.  Your responses 
will be kept completely confidential.  You will never be quoted by name nor will comments be 
attributed anonymously in a manner that might indicate their source.  The tape recording of the 
conversation will be used solely to ensure the accuracy of my notes and recollections and will not be 
presented in public, reproduced or redistributed. 
 
Muchas gracias por sus tiempo y reflexivos respuestas a este cuestionario. Sus respuestas 
se mantendrán completamente confidenciales. Usted nunca ser citada por su nombre ni se 
comentarios atribuirse anónimamente en una manera que podría indicar su origen. La 
grabación de la conversación será se utiliza únicamente para garantizar la exactitud de mis 
notas y registros y no se presentó en público, reproducida ni redistribuir. 
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9. Special Questions for Business Owners in Raqchi: 
 
9.1. Would your business be stronger, the same, or weaker if the Asociacion Inkallaqta did not 
sell in the plaza? 
 
¿Estaría tus negocio más fuerte, el mismo, o más débil si la vendedores de la Asociación 
Inkallaqta no venden en la plaza? 
 
9.2. To whom does the Asociacion Inkallaqta belong?  Who controls Asociacion Inkallaqta? 
 
¿ A quien pertenece la Asociación Inkallaqta? Quien controla la Asociación Inkallaqta? 
 
9.3. How much to you pay to the community each year in fees or other charges?  
 
¿Cuanto pagas tu a la comunidad Raqchi cada ano en impuestas, cuotas u otra tarifas? 
 
9.4. Do you participate in cleaning the plaza?  
 
¿Participas tú en la limpieza de la plaza? 
 
9.5. Do you participate in Fienes or community work days?  Why? 
 
¿Participas tú en fienes, o días de trabajo, en la comunidad Raqchi? Por Qué? 
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Appendix 2: Site Candidate Survey Results 
 
 
 
The following pages present the responses to the survey conducted by the author to identify 
potential sites for inclusion in the present study.  The process for the survey is described in 
Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
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Probaba
ble Fit 
Location Site Source 
Low Australia:  
Uluru, 
NorthernT
erritory 
(Ayers 
Rock) 
Tjapukai Aboriginal Cultural Park Cairns, 
http://www.tjapukai.com.au/ and 
http://www.environment.gov.au/parks/uluru/visit
or-activities/cultural-centre.html  From Waterton 
e-mail: "I have not worked with, but am familiar 
with, the ongoing negotiations regarding the 
management of the Uluru site in Australia, which 
would no doubt be a good example or case study 
for this. I worked with this group for a few years 
as a facilitator."     Website has complete history.  
Need to contact park admin for understanding of 
details.  WHS and scale make community 
secondary.  May not fit. 
Emma 
Waterton and 
LauraJane 
Smith 
Medium Australia: 
Yoolberup 
In this project, a local community group directed 
a process of engagement and consultation focused 
on the management of a heritage complex 
associated with a wetland system known as 
Yoolberup. This led to the formalization of the 
community group into an incorporated body, 
functioning as a heritage reference council, and 
resulted in a successful land acquisition proposal 
of a block of land adjacent to the wetland, and the 
development of a larger protected area. From here 
the group became the “lead agent” in the 
development and implementation of a 
management plan to conserve and/or restore the 
natural and cultural heritage landscape. This has 
involved detailed archaeological investigations, a 
series of training programmes involving the local 
community members, the integration of a number 
of other government and NRM programmes, 
development of a legal framework for the 
protection of traditional knowledge and 
community ownership, and a number of direct 
conservation outcomes. This process, shown in 
this film, has facilitated the expansion of the 
activities of the community group and directed 
other heritage management programmes in other 
areas with similar results.  Note: Article on P 
Drive under Places 
Tim Shadla-
Hall from 
WAC bounce 
e-mail on 
drive 
High Belize Maya Centre Women's Group.  Researched in 
2012.  Heritage linkage is through Maya art and 
customs preserved and presented in the village. 
Richard 
Leventhal 
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Medium Bolivia Tiwanaku, world heritage site transferred in 2000 
to the local Indigenous Community for 
management purposes.  Big issues around firing 
of archaeologists. UNESCO eventually 
intervened.  Clare Samuels at Bucknell did her 
dissertation on touristic narratives and historical 
networks and politics at Tiwanaku.   Also 
suggests Lynn Swartley's critique of Bolivian 
raised fields projects.  Analyzes failure of the 
project.  Per B. Sillar:   Village has had 
archaeological funding since 1950s.  Continuous 
engagement. Locals manage econmics.  Is a WH 
site handed over to local control.  Failure of 
raised fields project (C. Erickson).  May be too 
complex and political to study--who will talk 
openly.  Iconic Bolivian site.  Need a guide.  Jan 
Janazek could help--Sillar intro.  Lots written 
about it. 
Donna Yates 
Medium Bolivia Community Museum, Chiripa Bolivia--Chap 7, 
Silverman, by Christine Hastorf 
E.Silverman 
Low Brazil Village to save rock paintings via tourism--in the 
Independent arts/entertainment 14 Dec 1993, 
story by David Keys. 
D. Keys 
Low Cambodia Heritage Watch, now at Aust National University.  
NGO started seveal projects for local 
communities near archaeological tourist 
attractions in cambodia.  Review of HW website 
suggests they are focused on conservation 
projects, not community development. 
John N. 
Miksic 
Medium Cambodia Preah Khan temple, Angkor Wat.  WMF set up a 
cooperative for the rstoration workers so that they 
would continue to obtain income from selling 
souvenirs. 
John N. 
Miksic 
Low Canada Ska-nah-doht, Woodland Cultural Centre, Golden 
Lake/Omamiwinini Pimadjwowin; Appears to be 
government-owned, no community control. 
Elka 
Weinstein 
Medium Canada: 
British 
Columbia 
Qay’llnagaay Heritage Centre, BC.  This seems to 
be a tribally-driven operation. Merits a contact.  
Clearly quite long-established and tourism / 
economic development focused. 
readings 
Low Canada: 
Ontario 
Algonguin Way Cultural Centre, Golden Lake 
Ontario, on the reservation .  Need understanding 
of ways that tribal governments manage this stuff. 
Elka 
Weinstein 
Low Canada: 
St. 
Lawrence 
Island 
St. Lawrence Island Canada? Silverman 
Chapter 
Medium Ecuador Museum of the Lovers of Sumpa,Santa Elena, 
Ecuador--Chp 8, Silverman:  Karen E. Stothert.  
Problem site, but long-lived. 
Silverman 
Chapter 
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Medium Ecuador, 
Cochasqui 
Cochasqui in equador (Benavides), Cotocollao in 
Equador.  See Benavides article under 
Wallerstein for references and details. Series of 
excavated pyramidal structures, medicinal 
gardens, museum.  Need to understand local 
control issues.  Lenin Ortiz is the archaeologist 
per Benavides.  see:  Paredes, Domingo, and 
Eduardo Estrella 
1989 Cochasqui: aspectos socio-economicos y 
nutritivos. Programa Cochasqui, Honorable 
Consejo Provincial de Pichincha, Quito.  Also 
see: Programa Cochasqui 
1991 Replanteamiento programtitico. Honorable 
Consejo Provincial de Pichincha, Quito.  
Benavides has written on it also--contact him. 
Benavides 
Article 
Medium Ecuador: 
Agua 
Blanca 
Agua Blanca:  Has a link to it in her email.  See 
Silverman Ch 12 for one of McEwen et al's 
artricles . Per B. Sillar:  AB museum was built to 
offset loss of income from farming, resulted in 
good income.  People very open and McEwen 
and colleagues all will be helpful.  Book 
evaluating project exists at Brit Library in 
Spanish. 
Mariuxi 
Cordero 
Low El 
Salvador, 
Ceren 
El Salvador site managed by Francoise Descamps 
from Getty Conservation institute, reported on at 
Ename conference, Ghent Belgium sept 2002  For 
reports, see:  
http://www.getty.edu/conservation/field_projects/
maya/maya_publications.html.  Probably no local 
engagement. 
F. Descamps 
Medium Fiji Tribewanted, a community/ilsand-based 
ecotourism project. Has personal contacts.  
http://www.tribewanted.com/about 
Jenn Donato 
Medium France, 
Sant 
Degan 
Écomusée du Pays d'Auray, Sant Dégan (Davis, 
111).  per Davis—local initiative.  Good example.  
All guiding done by local people. Network of 
footpaths.  Saving farmhouse.  19th C rural 
history.  Creating a pastiche of rural France in the 
1900’s.  People will be helpful. Run by  a little 
association.  Very good prospect.  Farm museum 
bulidings from 17th C on, provides glimpse of 
rurla life in 19th C Auray and before.  rural crafts, 
reconstructions of buldings. 
Peter Davis 
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Medium France, 
Alsace 
Écomusée d'Alsace (Davis 124); Per Davis:  
Alsace—started out very much as a local 
initiative.  Grown significantly and become a 
major tourist attraction.  Professionally run 
organization.  Fulfilled development agenda 
almost too successfully.  Started with young 
people but moved to open air museum.  
Interesting.  Good English.  Now nearly a "theme 
park" on history--open air museum, explains 
building construction from 15th C, 350k visitors 
annually.  180 staff.  150 volunteers.  reenact old 
skills, etc. 
Peter Davis 
Medium France, 
valee 
d'Aspe 
Per Davis, Ecomusee de la valee d'Aspe, set up 
by local mayor. Quite successful. Tryuing to help 
the local community.  Worth a look.  (Davis 131).  
Preserves old buildings in 13 towns, documents 
village life, walks and demonstrations. 
Peter Davis 
Medium France, 
Daviaud 
Écomusée Daviaud (Davis 128); Per Davis: 
Daviaud—interesting.  Wonderful site.  In the 
Maree, very exposed wetland area of French 
coast.  Geographically, botanically, 
environmentally interesting. Significant funding 
from local authorities.  Close to local 
associations. Reconstruction of local farming, etc. 
Peter Davis 
Medium Greece, 
Crete 
Museum of Gavalochori, Crete  (Davis p 161)  
women's coop, tourism re: cultural heritage.  Per 
Davis:  Women's agrotourism cooperative, 
bringing back local crafts and cultural heritage.  
Worth a look. 
Peter Davis 
Low Guatemala Mirador?  Fernando Paiz, Chair PACUNAM 
spoke at GHF forum.  Hansen also.  
GHF 
Visit Ireland: 
Kilfenora 
Burren Center, community managed project in 
heritage landscape.  
http://www.theburrencentre.ie/home.html 
Tim Schadla-
Hall 
Visit in 
June 
Italy Piombino--13th C planned town, restored.  Found 
30,000 early Renaissance pots in roof of 
cathedral.  In 2002-5, industrialists wanted to 
reopen mines.  Commune ejected them.  But 
Board may have been taken over by commune 
and decision reversed.  Visit in July 
Richard 
Hodges  and 
Giovanna 
Bianchi,  
giobianchi@ti
scalinet.it 
Visit in 
June 
Italy Rocca San Sylvestra--mining village tied to 
Rennaissance metals mining, excavated and 
turned into a network of parks.  Community 
managed.  20+ square miles--an ecomuseum, 
essentially.  Includes Etruscan mine, museum, 
train.  Visit in July 
Richard 
Hodges  and 
Giovanna 
Bianchi,  
giobianchi@ti
scalinet.it 
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High Italy: 
Cortemilla 
Cortemilia ecomuseum, No. Italy (Davis 272) 
saved buildings and traditional terraces.  Seem to 
have great local input. Cites Murtas and Davis 
article, 2009. (Pg 279) 
Peter Davis 
Low Japan: 
Hirano-
cho 
Hirano-Cho ecomuseum  (Davis 249)  mix of 
restoration of 1300 year old city. Commented on 
in Davis' Lecture.  Spread throughout town. Led 
by local Buddhist priest.  Primary goal was local 
awareness.  Innovative, but language, Japan 
situation 
Peter Davis 
Low Japan: 
Asahi-
Machi 
per Davis, this is an ecomuseum in northern 
Honshu devoted to preservng landscape and 
heritage in a soft fruit growing area. 
Peter Davis 
Low Mexico: 
Chichen 
Itza, 
Hacienda Chichen, adjacent to Chichen Itza ruins, 
have an option to participate in Maya  sacred 
ceremonies.  In general, CI has been a site of 
contention over participation by locals.  No 
general organization in place to my knoweldge.  
Atalay writes on CI. 
Monica 
Barnes 
Medium Mexico: 
Oaxaca 
Museums 
Oaxaca community museums and others in 
Mexico and elsewhere—see Hoobler article in 
Indig Rights.  See also Davis 217 for other 
references and discussion.   
Kristin 
Hoobler 
Low Namibia Various projects need to be reviewed and sorted 
due to government policy 
 
Low Peru Projecto Contisuyo--more than a field school??.  
Sillar knows nothing about this project. 
David 
Goldstein 
Low Peru:  
Sićan   
Museo Nacional Sićan  . See ch 13 Silverman 
also  (Elera and Shimada).  Sillar: No. Too 
government driven 
David 
Goldstein 
Low Peru: 
Caral 
Carai Project,  http://www.caralperu.gob.pe/ , esp 
the plan maestro link.  Seems to have a 
sustainable tourism aspect.  Need to understand 
organizational structure. 
Dan 
Sandweiss 
Medium Peru: 
Cuchichac
a 
Cuchichaca Trust--irrigation systems in peru 
revived.  See kendall public arch article.   
Original project (as opposed to othe Trust 
projects) was among people who had no 
community identity before Kendall.   Long-term 
contact with archaeologist here.  Archaeologist 
(Kendall) helped to create it.  Notes terraces were 
claimed by the national government, but village 
dealt with that--nationalism issue. 
Bill Sillar 
Low Peru: 
Cuenca 
Ingapirca Inka site, Cuenca Ecuador--museum 
with tours that was very good. 
Dan 
Sandweiss 
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Visit in 
July 
Peru: 
Cusco 
Yachay Wasi, Cusco.  Sacred Sites project.   
Http://www.yachaywasi-ngo.org  Appears to be 
an umbrella NGO supporting indigenous heritage 
and some economics (apparel and weaving, 
raising llamas and alpacas, etc.). Per Bill Sellar:  
Disparate spacially, big egos.  Not promising. 
Need to know more.  Jenn Donato can connect to 
Pres/VP 
Jenn Donato 
Visit in 
July 
Peru: 
Huaca de 
Luna 
Huaca de Luna.  See WMF website.  LJC 
considers the prime site due to available data, 
community leadership, conservation efforts.   Per 
Bill Sellar:  big site,  famous,long-term 
engagement but not clear there is community 
controlled effort here. 
Luis Jaime 
Castillo 
Low Peru: 
Kuntur 
Wasi 
Kuntur Wasi.  Other notes on site: • Kuntur Wasi, 
no Peru museum seen as an important source of 
social Capital .  Onuki, Yoshio 1999 Kuntur 
Wasi: Temple, Gold, Museum and an Experiment 
in Community Development  Museum 
International 51 (4) 42-46; or Onuki, Y.  The 
Archaeological Excavations and the Protcitn of 
Cultural Heriage in Relation with the Local 
Society: Experiences in Peru   Arcaheologies  3: 
99-115 2007.  see Brodie in Messenger.  See 
Onuki in Silverman.  Per B. Sillar:  smaller, much 
written material, conscientious long-term 
archaeological engagement. 
Rebecca E. 
Bria 
Visit in 
July 
Peru: Lake 
Titicaca 
Islands 
Also from Caroline and Larry C:  Red roofs on 
islands in Peru.  See sites to be studied for 
articles.  What is thee—community imposed?  
Around Lake Titicaca—Amantani and Taquile, 
Elaine Zorn—weaving.  Archaeological and 
crafts site—need to follow up on this.--LC to 
follow up meeting.  Per B. Sillar: traditional 
housing on pre-Inka terraces, community-run 
program with access controlled by boat access.  
community allocates overhight stays.   No long-
term archaeology underway, but community has 
real control.  Rotating system of stays.  All 
cultural heritage, not material other than houses 
themselves--visitors live with locals, experience 
customs, etc. 
Larry Coben 
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Medium Peru: 
Pucara, 
Departmen
t of Puno 
I co-direct the Pukara Archaeological Project in 
highland Peru (www.pukara.org), which has been 
running since 2000. In addition to our 
archaeological research, we have been 
collaborating with community members in the 
development and installation of an ethnographic 
exhibition space at the local archaeological site 
museum, which is directed by the National 
Ministry of Culture. This has been a long, 
complicated process, but was finally completed in 
January. The new 'sala' is dedicated to modern 
craft production in the town, both weaving and 
potting, as 80% of the community members are 
potters. The exploration of craft production also 
complements the goals of our archaeological 
project, but this really started as a community 
development project aimed at attracting local 
school groups, university students, community 
members, and tourists to spend more time in the 
town of Pucara. Save the Moche 
(http://www.savethemoche.org/)--contact Brian 
Billman, UNC Chapel Hill.  See Chap 6 in 
Silverman also.  Per B. Sillar:  Is it too early?  
Need to talk to Billman and Kasich.. 
Elizabeth 
Klarich  
Visit in 
July 
Peru: 
Raqchi 
Sillar's site.  On Coast road--community 
mentality stronger on coast.  No tourism until 15 
years ago.  Has community structure.  Site 
controlled by Nation State, but market set ujp 
outside, homestays, tourism, artisan co-opo that 
controls marketplace.  Electred body in the 
community took over community role.  Village 
meetings monthly to agree on what to do.  They 
have external support to build viviendas 
(homestays), etc. but village decided what they 
wanted.  Much written on it. 
Bill Sillar 
No. 
Conflict 
Peru: San 
Jose de 
Moro 
San Jose De Moro.  SPI activity.  Prior site 
museums.  See Luis jaime Castillo and Ull Sarella 
Homquiest, ch 10 Silverman.  Per Bill Sillar:  
Conflict of Interest?  
Bill Sillar 
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Visit in 
July 
Peru: 
Sipan 
Walter Alba project--See Silverstein.  LJC says 
might be a candidate, but it has heavy 
government management of site "wrapped 
around" by private activities.  Per Bill Sillar:  
Alba's is a good story.  Big success story--
promoted tourism up to region, helped stop 
looting. Community has  a certain ownership of 
it.  Against this: Well-known story.  However, 
assessing benefit is not yet done, and structural 
relationships not studied.  Notes this is in a 
coastal region, where "commons mentality" is 
more prevalent than in the highlands. 
Bill Sillar 
Visit in 
July 
Peru: 
Tucume 
Tucume project, Northern Peru, project organized 
by Thor Hyerdahl.  Stromme Foundation of 
Norway put up the money.--Possible per LJC call.  
Superstructure here with community underneath.  
Visit in July.  Per Bill S:  Community has 
ownership of it.  Possible. 
Dan 
Sandweiss 
No Vist--
Read 
Sweden / 
Norway 
Hembygdrörelse museums, 1400 of them, that are 
volunteer run preserving pre-industrial heritage.  
See Davis p 52 Also other Scandinavian 
museums.  See Ch. 6.  Are any of these 
independent? Says these are single-house 
museums.  There is a book on every single 
property tht is part of the organization--refrence 
needed.  Look on Web, there is a central site. 
Peter Davis 
check out 
book 
back at 
Penn 
Taiwan Aboriginal park in Taiwan—run by local group 
that lives there.  Per caroline cheong (on 
rolodex—coming to Penn as grad student)   See 
sites to be studied for articles.  
http://www.tacp.gov.tw/tacpeng/home02_2.aspx?
ID=4  check out Butler and Title:  Tourism and 
indigenous peoples : issues and implications / 
editors Richard Butler and Thomas 
Hinch.Publisher:  Amsterdam : Elsevier 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007. 
Carolline 
Cheong 
Check 
with TS-
H 
Thailand Thailand Cemeteries--TSH idea Tim Schadla-
Hall 
Low Turkey: 
Capadocia 
Calahoyuk or Asikli Hoyuk in Cappodocia.  For 
latter contadt Mihriban Ozbasaran at Istanbul 
University.  She responded with short-life issue.  
Website is www.asiklihoyuk.org 
Ian Hodder 
Medium Turkey: 
Catal 
Hoyuk 
New Proj 
Catalhoyuk project.  N ew but addressing my 
issues.  Contact Sara Perry, who is designing it. 
Stephanie 
Moser 
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Not 
likely--
poor 
communi
cation 
Turkey: 
Hüsametti-
ndere 
Hüsamettindere Village Ecomuseum (Davis 229)  
Led by Tunca Bokesoy, aim to restore 
architecture of village and document culture.  
Encourage tourism.  Davis met the principals in 
Sweden. Tried to get in touch in Turkey.  NO 
resosne. 
Peter Davis 
visit UK: 
Allenhead 
Allenheads Village Trust Heritage Center (Davis 
180).  Contact is J. Keith Walker 
(JKeithWalker@hotmail.com)  Per Peter Davis. 
Peter Davis 
visit UK: 
Argyll 
Easdale Island Folk Museum, Argyll (Davis 175)  
website is http://www.easdalemuseum.org  per 
peter davis. 
Peter Davis 
Low UK: 
Castelford, 
West 
Yorkshire,  
Castleford heritage trust - google this name and 
see their web site.     Please note though this is 
not an archaeological project, but was initiated by 
the community  .Castleford Heritage Trust: for 
information about this initiative, a good place to 
start is: http://www.castlefordheritagetrust.org.uk/   
You can also access published interviews with 
both a member of the CHT and the CCGG in the 
volume 'Taking Archaeology out of Heritage', 
published by CSP.  
Laurajane 
Smith, also 
Emma 
Waterton 
Low UK: 
Cawood, 
North 
Yorkshire,  
Cawood Castle Garth Group: again, the 
community's website would be a good place to 
start: 
http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/cawoodcastlegarth/  
You can also access published interviews with 
both a member of the CHT and the CCGG in the 
volume 'Taking Archaeology out of Heritage', 
published by CSP. Business plan suggests 
substantial community interest and data. 
Emma 
Waterton 
Visit UK: 
Crannog 
Center 
Crannog Centre, Scotland  Loch Tay—tim says 
struggling but interesting.  Defensive islands in 
lochs.Tim says struggling but interesting 
Chris Hudson 
Low UK: 
Faversham  
Faversham Society Community local amenity and 
history society 
http://www.faversham.org/pages/home.aspx?i_Pa
geID=188 
Chris Hudson 
Visit UK: Lyme 
Regis  
Dorset  
 Lyme Regis Mill Trust    Community raised the 
cash, managed the volunteers and undertook the 
project management.  Managemetn Board 
comprised of local people who manage the Mill 
and associated buildings etc. 
Peter Coe 
Check 
McClana
han 
UK: 
Orkney 
Islandss 
Angela McClanahan Thesis, Mancester U-  Joule 
Lib, Univ of Manchester.  Need to visit there to 
read it. 
Peter Davis 
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Low UK: 
Paxton 
House 
Paxton House, p 191 Rizzo & Towse,  a UK 
country house on the Scottish border.  Placed 
with a trust board.  Morphed the business 
significantly.  Worth study as it sounds like a 
commons seeded with capital but left to local 
group to run. 
Rizzo/Towse 
Low UK: North 
Pennines 
From Davis:  Get Stephanie Hawke dissertation 
on community work there.  
Stephanie.hawke@ncl.ac.uk 
Peter Davis 
Visit UK: 
Ceumanan 
Skye 
Says it is the best in the UK for my purposes.  
Contact is cailean@skye-media.com 
Peter Davis 
Visit UK: 
Flodden, 
Scotland 
Ecomuseum focused on the site of the battle of 
Flodden, as a hook to engage local communities 
for tourism and develoment.  Developed by a 
local landowner.  Still in Development in 2011.  
See Website.Contact is Lord James Joicey, Ford 
& Etal estates.  Joicey@ford-and-etal.co.uk 
Peter Davis 
Low UK: 
Sedgeford 
Community Archaeology project.  Leicestershire.  
Gabe worked there. See also article on revolt.  
See Faulkner articles in Public Archaeology 
Gabe 
Moshenska 
Low UK: 
Singleton 
 Weald and Downland Open Air Museum, 
Singleton , UK  which is a town museum of old 
buildings near Titchfield in Kent.  See Davis 173 
also..  Note Bill Sillar worked there at one point.  
Success story of created site.  Land is leased.  
Good job by community. 
Bill Sillar 
Medium US:  N.M. Acoma Pueblo, NM—town/mesa per Leventhal  
Sky City Pueblo Tours  
http://sccc.acomaskycity.org/overview 
Richard 
Leventhal 
Low US: 
Alexandria
VA 
I am not clear about what projects fit in your 
definitions.  We are full-service community 
archaeology program and have many sites 
identified, preserved, protected as well as a 
museum, a volunteer program, an archaeological 
commission, and have participated in the 
formation of serveral open 
spaces/parks/memorials as well as continual 
involvement in master planning parts of the city 
including the waterfront.  I would need to talk to 
someone to give more explicit answers.    
Pamela 
Cressey 
Low US: 
Louisiana 
Cane River National Heritage Area in Louisiana 
(material on drive).  Conservation Study Institute 
of the National Park Service: 3-site study of best 
practices in National Heritage Area management, 
plus cross- comparison. They are working on a 
new project to develop an evaluation methodlogy 
for all National Heritage Areas. 
Nancy I. M. 
Morgan, Ph.D. 
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Low US: South 
Texas 
South Texas, Brazoria county.  The Levi Jordan 
Plantation -- to publicly interpret the often-
contested archaeology/history of one southern 
plantation. Time period of the deposit: mostly 
post bellum (eg. after slavery) but it was a slave 
plantation so that element exists. Some 
conversation about communit eco dev but only 
speculative -- I still don't have data that supports 
the reality of this assumption and would love to 
get some if you have it.     
Carol 
McDavid 
Low US: South 
Texas 
Yates Community Archaeology Project -- to do 
and publicly interpret the arch of an urban site in 
Houston's Freedmen's Town, an historically 
important African American neighborhood now 
threatened (actually almost destroyed) by 
gentrification pressure. Also late 19th century.  
See also her e-mail for citations, access to SAA 
and SHA, etc. 
Carol 
McDavid 
Low Vietnam: 
Hoy An 
Hoy An, Vietnam, community ownership of 
heritage site in forest setting.  From T. Williams. 
Tim Williams 
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Appendix 3: Interview Record 
 
The following pages present the record of interviews conducted for this research.  
Names have been omitted to honour the confidentiality commitment made to each 
interviewee at the time of the interview.  Interview numbers are those cited in the text as 
(IVU 201X-XXX) when quotations or other facts cited were derived from the interview. 
Interview notes and linked voice recordings for each interview are preserved in 
enhanced PDF files.  A researcher wishing to review the interviews may contact the 
author, who will make them available under appropriate agreements relating to the 
confidentiality of the names of those individuals interviewed for this study. Written notes 
but not recorded interviews can be made available for interviews conducted in 2011 
during the site survey, and English-Language notes made contemporaneously with the 
interviews in Raqchi also can be made available, again under appropriate confidentiality 
restrictions.
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CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
      
Interview 
Number 
Interview 
Date Role Gender Organization 
Livescribe Enhanced 
PDF 
Notes Location 
 
Interviews relating to Maya Centre Women's Group conducted in 2010 utilized in the present study 
     
2010.001 1/18/2010 
NGO 
Official F 
Belize Audubon 
Society Belize 2010 notes 10-18 
2010.006 1/25/2010 Resident M 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group Belize 2010 notes 41-49 
2010.009 1/27/2010 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group Belize 2010 notes 50-57 
2010.010 1/27/2010 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group Belize 2010 Notes 57-61 
2010.011 1/27/2010 Resident M 
MCWG 
Founder/Busine
ss Owner Belize 2010 notes 62-69 
2010.018 1/28/2010 
Govt 
Official M 
Belize Social 
Investment 
Fund Belize 2010 notes 70-72 
2010.019 3/10/2010 
NGO 
Official F 
Protected Areas 
Conservation 
Trust Belize 2010  40-51 
2010.020 3/11/2010 
NGO 
Official M 
Panthera 
Belize 2010 52-56 
2010.021 3/12/2010 
Govt 
Official M 
Coxcomb Basin 
Wildlife Reserve Belize 2010 57-73 
2010.022 3/13/2010 Resident M 
MCWG 
Founder/Busine
ss Owner Belize 2010 75-83 
 
 
2010.025 3/16/2010 
NGO 
Official F 
Belize Audubon 
Society 
Belize 2010-88-94 
2010.026 3/16/2010 
NGO 
Official F 
Association of 
Protected Areas 
Management 
Organizations Belize 2010 95-100 
Interviews conducted during 2011 survey of UK/Ireland-based community projects 
 
2011.001 9/26/2011 Member M 
Evesham 
Almonry Available from Author  
2011.002 9/28/2011 Member F 
Cumannan 
Ecomuseum 
Skye Available from Author 
 
2011.003 9/30/2011 Member M 
Cumannan 
Ecomuseum 
Skye Available from Author 
 
2011.004 9/30/2011 Member M 
Cumannan 
Ecomuseum Available from Author  
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Skye 
2011.005 9/30/2011 Member F Easdale Island Available from Author  
2011.006 10/2/2011 Member F Cranoch Centre Available from Author  
2011.007 10/3/2011 Member M Easdale Island Available from Author  
2011.008 10/4/2011 Member M Broch Centre Available from Author  
2011.009 10/5/2011 Member M Flodden 2013 Available from Author  
2011.010 10/7/2011 Member F Allenheads Available from Author  
2011.011 10/9/2011 Member F 
Burren Centre, 
Ireland Available from Author  
2011.012 10/9/2011 Member F 
Burren Centre, 
Ireland Available from Author  
2011.013 11/5/2011 Member F 
Lyme Regis 
Town Mill Trust Available from Author  
2011.014 10/6/2011 Member M 
Lyme Regis 
Town Mill Trust Available from Author  
 
 
Interviews conducted in 2012 in Kilfenora, Ireland, relating to the Burren Centre 
 
   
 
 
 
2012.001 3/6/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 1 51-54  
2012.002 3/6/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 1 55-65  
2012.003 3/6/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 1 66-68  
2012.004 3/7/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 1 69-80  
2012.005 3/7/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 1 81-88  
2012.006 3/8/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 1 89-99  
2012.007 3/10/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 1 100-110  
2012.008 3/11/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 1 111-116  
2012.009 3/12/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 1 117-123  
2012.010 3/12/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 1 124-132  
2012.011 3/13/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 1 133-139  
2012.012 3/13/2012 Member F Ailwee Cave Burren 1 140-145  
2012.013 4/3/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 1 146-153  
2012.014 4/3/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 1 154-162  
2012.015 4/4/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2 1-7  
2012.016 4/5/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 10-15  
2012.017 4/5/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 16-19  
2012.018 4/6/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 20-25  
2012.019 4/6/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2 26-29  
2012.020 4/8/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2-32-41  
2012.021 4/10/2012 Member M Cather Connel Burren 2-42-49  
2012.022 4/11/2012 
NGO 
Official F 
Burren Beo 
Trust Burren 2-50-55  
2012.023 4/12/2012 
Govt 
Official F 
Burren Connect 
Burren 2-56-62  
2012.024 4/12/2012 
Govt 
Official F 
Cliffs of Moher 
Park Burren 1 163-169  
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2012.025 4/12/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2-63-75  
2012.026 4/16/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2-76-83  
2012.027 4/16/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2 84-91  
2012.028 4/16/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2 92-99  
2012.029 4/17/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 100-105  
2012.030 4/17/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2 106-112  
2012.031 4/18/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 113-116  
2012.032 4/18/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2 117-120  
2012.033 4/19/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 121-126  
2012.034 4/19/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 127-134  
2012.035 4/19/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2 135-140  
2012.036 4/21/2012 Member F Burren Centre Burren 2 141-145  
2012.037 4/22/2012 Resident F Burren Centre Word File Burren Folder  
2012.038 4/23/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 146-150  
2012.039 4/23/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 2 151-154  
2012.040 4/23/2012 Member M Burren Centre Burren 3 1-7  
2012.041 4/24/2012 
Govt 
Official F 
County Claire 
Government Burren 3 8-12  
2012.042 4/24/2012 
Govt 
Official M 
Failte Ireland 
Burren 3 13-17  
2012.043 4/25/2012 
Govt 
Official F 
Shannon Airport 
Authority Burren 3 18-22  
 
 
Interviews conducted in 2013 related to the Associacíon Inkallaqta in Raqchi, Peru 
 
2013.001 2/19/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta Peru 1-7  
2013.002 2/19/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 2-12   
2013.003 2/19/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 13-16   
2013.004 2/20/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 17-20   
2013.005 2/20/2013 
Business 
Owner F 
Raqchi Business 
Owner  Peru 21-22   
2013.006 2/20/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 23-27   
2013.007 2/20/2013 Member M 
Raqchi Business 
Owner  Peru 27-28   
2013.008 2/21/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 29-31   
2013.009 2/21/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 32-35   
2013.010 2/21/2013 
Govt 
Official F 
President, 
Raqchi  Peru 36-39   
2013.011 2/22/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 40-43   
2013.012 2/22/2013 Member F Associacíon  Peru 44-45   
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Inkallaqta 
2013.013 2/22/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 46-47   
2013.014 2/23/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 48-50    
2013.015 2/23/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 51-54   
2013.016 2/23/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 55-58   
2013.017 2/24/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 59-61   
2013.018 2/25/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 62-64   
2013.019 2/25/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 65-66   
2013.020 2/25/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 67-69   
2013.021 2/26/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 71-74   
2013.022 2/26/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 75-76   
2013.023 2/26/2013 
Business 
Owner F 
Puno-based 
vendor to 
Vendadores  Peru 78  
 
2013.024 2/27/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 79-80   
2013.025 2/28/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 81-82   
2013.026 2/28/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 84-88   
2013.027 2/28/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 89-92   
2013.028 3/1/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 93-98   
2013.029 3/1/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 99-100   
2013.030 3/1/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 101-103   
2013.031 3/2/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 106-109   
2013.032 3/34/13 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 110-112   
2013.033 3/4/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 113-114   
2013.034 3/5/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 115-116   
2013.035 3/5/2013 
Business 
Owner F 
Raqchi Business 
Owner  Peru 117   
2013.036 3/5/2013 
Business 
Owner F 
Raqchi Business 
Owner  Peru 118   
2013.037 3/5/2013 Business F Raqchi Business  Peru 119   
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Owner Owner 
2013.038 3/5/2013 
Business 
Owner F 
Raqchi Business 
Owner  Peru 120   
2013.039 3/6/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 121-124   
2013.040 3/6/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 125-126   
2013.041 3/8/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 127-128   
2013.042 3/8/2013 
Business 
Owner F 
Raqchi Business 
Owner  Peru 129   
2013.043 3/13/2013 Member M 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 130-134   
2013.044 3/14/2013 
Business 
Owner M 
Raqchi Business 
Owner  Peru 135   
2013.045 3/14/2013 
Govt 
Official F 
Chief, Raqchi 
Archaeological 
Park  Peru 136-139  
 
2013.046 3/14/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 140-142   
2013.047 3/14/2013 
Govt 
Official F 
President, 
Raqchi  Peru 143-153   
2013.048 3/15/2013 Member F 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta  Peru 154   
Interviews conducted in 2013 in Maya Centre, Belize, relating to the Maya Centre Women's Group  
 2013-049  5/22/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 3-8   
 2013-050  5/22/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 9-12   
 2013-051  5/22/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 13-17   
 2013-052  5/22/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 18-22   
 2013-053  5/22/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 23-26   
 2013-054  5/23/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 27-29   
 2013-055  5/23/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 30-33   
 2013-056  5/23/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 34-36   
 2013-057  5/24/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 37-43   
 2013-058  5/25/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 44-47   
 2013-059  5/25/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 48-50   
 2013-060  5/25/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 51-53   
 2013-061  5/27/2013 Member F Maya Centre  Belize 2013 54-58   
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Women's Group 
 2013-062  5/27/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 59-62   
 2013-063  5/27/2013 Resident F 
MCWG 
Founder/Busine
ss Owner  Belize 2013 63-65  
 
 2013-064  5/28/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 66-74   
 2013-065  5/29/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 75-83   
 2013-066  5/31/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 84-92   
 2013-067  5/31/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 93-95   
 2013-068  5/31/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 96-101   
 2013-069  6/2/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 102-106   
 2013-070  6/3/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 107-110   
 2013-071  6/3/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 111-119   
 2013-072  6/5/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 120-122   
 2013-073  6/5/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 123-128   
 2013-074  6/5/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 129-133   
 2013-075  6/5/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 134-138   
 2013-076  6/6/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 139-144   
 2013-077  6/6/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 145-147   
 2013-078  6/6/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 148-152   
 2013-079  6/8/2013 Member F 
Maya Centre 
Women's Group  Belize 2013 153-155   
 2013-080  6/9/2013 Resident M 
MCWG 
Founder/Busine
ss Owner  Belize 2013 156-167  
 
 2013-083  6/14/2013 
NGO 
Official F 
Belize Audubon  
 Belize 2013 179-183   
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Appendix 4: Provisions of Archaeological  
Codes of Ethics 
 
The following table summarizes the key elements relating to public engagement and 
economic development, extracted from the codes of ethics of major archaeological 
organizations worldwide.  These codes are the basis for Figure XX presented in the text. 
 
  
  
 Page | 424  
 
 
  Provisions of Archaeological 
Codes of Ethics 
 
  Relating to Public Engagement 
and Economic Development 
 
    
Organization Code 
Section 
Provision Source 
    
American 
Anthropological 
Association  
1. Do No 
Harm 
Anthropologists may choose to 
link their research to the 
promotion of well-being, social 
critique or advocacy. As with all 
anthropological work, 
determinations regarding what is 
in the best  interests of others or 
what kinds of efforts are 
appropriate to increase well-being 
are value-laden and should reflect 
sustained discussion with others 
concerned. Anthropological work 
must similarly reflect deliberate 
and thoughtful consideration of 
potential unintended 
consequences and long-term 
impacts on individuals, 
communities, identities, tangible 
and intangible heritage and 
environments. 
American 
Anthropological 
Association. 2012. 
Statement on 
Ethics: Principles 
of Professional 
Responsibilities. 
Arlington, VA: 
American 
Anthropological 
Association. 
Available at: 
http://www.aaanet.
org/profdev/ethics/
upload/Statement-
on-Ethics-
Principles-of-
Professional-
Responsibility.pdf  
viewed 7/27/13 
    
Archaeological 
Institute of 
America Code of 
Professional 
Standards 
II. 
Responsibili
ties to the 
Public 
Because the archaeological 
record represents the heritage of 
all people, it is the responsibility 
of professional archaeologists to 
communicate with the general 
public about the nature of 
archaeological research and the 
importance of archaeological 
resources. Archaeologists also 
have specific responsibilities to 
the local communities where they 
carry out research and field work, 
as well as to their home 
institutions and communities. 
http://www.archaeo
logical.org/news/ad
vocacy/132 viewed 
7/27/13 
  1. Professional archaeologists 
should engage in public outreach 
through lecturing, popular 
writing, school programs, and 
other educational initiatives. 
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  2. Plans for field work should 
consider the ecological impact of 
the project and its overall impact 
on the local communities. 
 
  3. For field projects, 
archaeologists should consult 
with appropriate representatives 
of the local community during the 
planning stage, invite local 
participation in the project, and 
regularly inform the local 
community about the results of 
the research. 
 
  4. Archaeologists should respect 
the cultural norms and dignity of 
local inhabitants in areas where 
archaeological research is carried 
out. 
 
  5. The legitimate concerns of 
people who claim descent from, 
or some other connection with, 
cultures of the past must be 
balanced against the scholarly 
integrity of the discipline. A 
mutually acceptable 
accommodation should be 
sought. 
 
    
Asociacion de 
arqueologos 
professionales de 
la Republica 
Argentina 
(AARPA) codigo 
de etica 
profesional 
Article 15 Artículo 15. Se deberá promover 
una interacción positiva con las 
comunidades 
locales directamente ligadas al 
área de investigación, 
independientemente de su origen 
étnico, respetando sus 
preocupaciones, costumbres, 
credos y valores, en la medida en 
que esto no implique incurrir en 
actos ilegales ni contradecir este 
código o los 
derechos fundamentales de 
cualquier ser humano. 
http://museosdesant
afe.com.ar/?page_i
d=1448 viewed 
7/27/13 
  Article 15. They must promote a 
positive interaction with the local 
communities directly linked to the 
area of research, regardless of 
their ethnic origin, while 
respecting its concerns, customs, 
religious beliefs and values, to 
the extent that this does not 
involve engaging in illegal acts 
or contradict this code or the 
fundamental rights of any human 
being. (translation P. Gould) 
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Australian 
Archaeological 
Assocation Code 
of Ethics 
1.2 Members will negotiate and make 
every reasonable effort to obtain 
the informed consent of 
representatives of the 
communities of concern whose 
cultural heritage is the subject of 
investigation. Members cannot 
assume that there is no 
community of concern. 
http://www.australi
anarchaeology.com
/about-2/code-of-
ethics/  viewed 
5/30/2013 
 1.3, 3.1, 3.2 Members recognise that there are 
many interests in cultural 
heritage, but they specifically 
acknowledge the rights and 
interests of Indigenous peoples.  
 
 3.2 Members acknowledge the 
special importance to Indigenous 
peoples of ancestral remains and 
objects and sites associated with 
such remains. Members will treat 
such remains with respect. 
 
 3.3 Members acknowledge 
Indigenous approaches to the 
interpretation of cultural heritage 
and to its conservation. 
 
 3.4 Members will negotiate equitable 
agreements between 
archaeologists and the Indigenous 
communities whose cultural 
heritage is being investigated. 
AAA endorses and directs 
members to the current guidelines 
regarding such agreements 
published by the Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Studies. 
 
    
Canadian 
Archaeological 
Association 
Principles of 
Ethical Conduct 
Aboriginal 
Relationship
s 
Recognizing that the heritage of 
Aboriginal Peoples constitutes 
the greater part of the Canadian 
archaeological record, the 
Canadian Archaeological 
Association has accepted the  
Statement of Principles for 
Ethical Conduct Pertaining to 
Aboriginal Peoples.  Members of 
the Association have agreed to 
abide by those Principles. 
http://canadianarch
aeology.com/caa/ab
out/ethics/principle
s-ethical-conduct 
viewed 7/2713 
    
 Public 
Education 
and 
Outreach 
A fundamental commitment to 
stewardship is the sharing of 
knowledge about archaeological 
topics to a broader public and to 
enlist public support for 
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stewardship.  Members of the 
CAA are encouraged to: 
    
  communicate the results of 
archaeological work to a broad 
audience; 
 
  encourage the public to support 
and involvement in 
archaeological stewardship; 
 
  actively cooperate in stewardship 
of archaeological remains with 
aboriginal peoples; 
 
  promote public interest in, and 
knowledge of, Canadaís past; 
 
  explain appropriate 
archaeological methods and 
techniques to interested people; 
 
  promote archaeology through 
education in the K-12 school 
systems; 
 
  support and be accessible to local 
archaeological and other heritage 
groups; 
 
  contribute to the CAA Web Page, 
and promote where appropriate 
electronic publication of 
archaeological materials. 
 
    
ICOMOS Principles, 
Article 3 
ICOMOS members respect the 
diverse, dynamic tangible and 
intangible values of places, 
monuments and sites that may 
hold different meaning for 
various groups and communities, 
enriching human culture. 
Members are committed to 
promoting effective community 
involvement in conservation 
processes, through collaborating 
with people or communities 
associated with the monument, 
site or place and recognising, 
respecting and encouraging the 
co-existence of diverse cultural 
values. 
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 Principles, 
Article 5 
ICOMOS members promote 
public awareness, appreciation, 
access and support for heritage, 
fostering informeddebate, 
education, training programmes 
and in particular, international 
information exchange. They 
support fellow professionals and 
mentor junior colleagues by 
promoting ethical heritage 
conservation practice to advance 
the wider understanding of 
conservation philosophy, 
standards and methods. ICOMOS 
Committees are open to a 
diversity of appropriately 
qualified experienced end 
committed applicants for 
membership. 
 
 Code of 
Ethics 1.1.c 
An archaeologist shall e sensitive 
to, and respect the legitimate 
concerns of, groups whose 
culture histories are the subjects 
of archaeological investigations 
and actively consult with them 
when archaeological work is 
proposed; 
 
    
New Zealand 
Archaeological 
Association 
Principles of 
Archaeological 
Ethics 
Principle 4 Archaeologists should reach out 
to, and participate in cooperative 
efforts with, others interested in 
the archaeological record with the 
aim of improving the 
preservation, protection, and 
interpretation of the record. In 
particular, archaeologists should 
undertake to: (1) enlist public 
support for the stewardship of the 
archaeological record; (2) explain 
and promote the use of 
archaeological methods and 
techniques in understanding 
human behaviour and culture; and 
(3) communicate archaeological 
interpretations of the past. Many 
publics exist for archaeology 
including students and teachers; 
Maori and other ethnic, religious, 
and cultural groups who find in 
the archaeological record 
important aspects of their cultural 
heritage; lawmakers and 
government officials; reporters, 
journalists, and others involved in 
http://nzarchaeolog
y.org/ethics.htm 
viewed 7/27/13  
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the media; and the general public. 
Archaeologists who are unable to 
undertake public education and 
outreach directly should 
encourage and support the efforts 
of others in these activities. 
    
 Principle 6 Within a reasonable time, the 
knowledge archaeologists gain 
from investigation of the 
archaeological record must be 
presented in accessible form 
(through publication or other 
means) to as wide a range of 
interested publics as possible. 
The documents and materials on 
which publication and other 
forms of public reporting are 
based should be deposited in a 
suitable place for permanent 
safekeeping. An interest in 
preserving and protecting in situ 
archaeological sites must be taken 
into account when publishing and 
distributing information about 
their nature and location. 
 
    
Register of 
Professional 
Archaeologists 
1.1a a. An archaeologist shall 
recognize a commitment to 
represent Archaeology and its 
research results to the public in a 
responsible manner;  
http://www.rpanet.
org/displaycommon
.cfm?an=1&subarti
clenbr=3  viewed 
02/17/11 
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Society for 
American 
Archaeology 
Code of Ethics 
Principle 4 Public Education and Outreach: 
Archaeologists should reach out 
to, and participate in cooperative 
efforts with others interested in 
the archaeological record with the 
aim of improving the 
preservation, protection, and 
interpretation of the record. In 
particular, archaeologists should 
undertake to: 1) enlist public 
support for the stewardship of the 
archaeological record; 2) explain 
and promote the use of 
archaeological methods and 
techniques in understanding 
human behavior and culture; and 
3) communicate archaeological 
interpretations of the past. Many 
publics exist for archaeology 
including students and teachers; 
Native Americans and other 
ethnic, religious, and cultural 
groups who find in the 
archaeological record important 
aspects of their cultural heritage; 
lawmakers and government 
officials; reporters, journalists, 
and others involved in the media; 
and the general public. 
Archaeologists who are unable to 
undertake public education and 
outreach directly should 
encourage and support the efforts 
of others in these activities. 
http://www.saa.org/
AbouttheSociety/Pr
inciplesofArchaeol
ogicalEthics/tabid/2
03/Default.aspx  
Viewed 14 january 
2011 
    
The Society for 
Historical 
Archaeology 
Principle 7 Members of the Society for 
Historical Archaeology 
encourage education about 
archaeology, strive to engage 
citizens in the research process 
and publicly disseminate the 
major findings of their research, 
to the extent compatible with 
resource protection and legal 
obligations. 
http://www.sha.org/
about/ethics.cfm  
viewed 2/17/2011 
    
World 
Archaeological 
Congress 
First Code 
of Ethics 
1990 
Principles to 
Abide By 
1. To acknowledge the 
importance of indigenous cultural 
heritage, including sites, places, 
objects, artefacts, human remains, 
to the survival of indigenous 
cultures. 
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  2. To acknowledge the 
importance of protecting 
indigenous cultural heritage to the 
well-being of indigenous peoples. 
 
  3. To acknowledge the special 
importance of indigenous 
ancestral human remains, and 
sites containing and/or associated 
with such remains, to indigenous 
peoples. 
 
  4. To acknowledge that the 
important relationship between 
indigenous peoples and their 
cultural heritage exists 
irrespective of legal ownership. 
 
  5. To acknowledge that the 
indigenous cultural heritage 
rightfully belongs to the 
indigenous descendants of that 
heritage. 
 
  6. To acknowledge and recognise 
indigenous methodologies for 
interpreting, curating, managing 
and protecting indigenous 
cultural heritage. 
 
  7. To establish equitable 
partnerships and relationships 
between Members and 
indigenous peoples whose 
cultural heritage is being 
investigated. 
 
  8. To seek, whenever possible, 
representation of indigenous 
peoples in agencies funding or 
authorising research to be certain 
their view is considered as 
critically important in setting 
research standards, questions, 
priorities and goals.  
 
 Rules to 
Adhere To 
1. Prior to conducting any 
investigation and/or examination, 
Members shall with rigorous 
endeavour seek to define the 
indigenous peoples whose 
cultural heritage is the subject of 
investigation. 
 
  2. Members shall negotiate with 
and obtain the informed consent 
of representatives authorized by 
the indigenous peoples whose 
cultural heritage is the subject of 
investigation. 
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  3. Members shall ensure that the 
authorised representatives of the 
indigenous peoples whose culture 
is being investigated are kept 
informed during all stages of the 
investigation. 
 
  4. Members shall ensure that the 
results of their work are presented 
with deference and respect to the 
identified indigenous peoples. 
 
  5. Members shall not interfere 
with and/or remove human 
remains of indigenous peoples 
without the express consent of 
those concerned. 
 
  6. Members shall not interfere 
with and/or remove artefacts or 
objects of special cultural 
significance, as defined by 
associated indigenous peoples, 
without their express consent. 
 
  7. Members shall recognise their 
obligation to employ and/or train 
indigenous peoples in proper 
techniques as part of their 
projects, and utilise indigenous 
peoples to monitor the projects. 
 
 
 Page | 433  
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Summary of International 
Agreements 
 
 
The  table that follows presents a very abbreviated summary of the provisions of 
major international agreements relating to cultural heritage, archaeology, architecture and the 
various issues of protection, conservation, and use of heritage during times of war and peace.  
This table is derived from information obtained from the Getty Conservation Institute 
on its website, which was viewed on August 15, 2013.  For complete summaries and links to 
the underlying documents see: 
.http://www.getty.edu/conservation/publications_resources/research_resources/charters.html  
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International Agreements, Relating to Heritage, 1904-2008 
Year Agreement Subject Matter 
1904 Madrid Conference Architectural conservation 
1931 Athens Conference Introduced idea of common world heritage, 
importance of monuments 
1931 Carta di atene Conservation and restoration work 
1932 Charter of Athens Urban design 
1935 Roerich Pact American States: Protection of sites in times of 
conflict 
1954 Hague Convention UN protection of sites in times of conflict 
1954 European Cultural Convention Europe: Nations as protectors of heritage 
1956 Archaeological Excavations UN : requires prior authorization, remains belong to 
state, undertake education, restoration 
1956 Town planning competitions Principles for design competitions 
1957 Access to museums Museum education, public access, 
intellectual/cultural centres, etc.  
1962 Safeguarding landscapes Calls for regulating development, education action 
to raise public awareness, media 
1964 Venice Charter Conservation practice principles.   
1964 Illicit trafficking Inventories of cultural property and national 
services to prevent illegal export 
1967 Norms of Quito Americas: calls for enhancing utility and value of 
heritage, economic value, cultural tourism 
1968 Cultural property endangered Protection from public works 
1969 European convention on  
archaeological heritage 
Scientific method in research, end illegal 
excavations, reserve zones for future excavation 
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1970 Prohibiting illicit import and 
export 
Cooperation to prevent illicit movement, exports 
certificates, etc. 
1972 Protection of world cultural 
heritage 
World Heritage Convention.  Protect cultural and 
natural heritage; international recognition; heritage 
list 
1972 Protect of heritage at the 
National level 
Polices to protect, conserve, present national 
cultural and natural heritage 
1972 Ancient groups of buildings Introduction of new architecture into groups of 
ancient buildings 
1975 European Charter of 
Architectural Heritage 
Integrated conservation, effective use of laws and 
regulations, administrative support, technical and 
final support, trading 
1975 Amsterdam Declaration Europe: Planning, education, legal, admin to protect 
architect heritage 
1975 Smaller towns Strategies: planning, economic policies, instil sense 
of pride 
1976 Cultural Tourism Recognizes sites as sources of economic benefit 
and cult education.  
1976 San Salvador Convention OAS: protect from illegal trafficking, registration of 
collections, illegal to trade, cooperation in OAS 
1976 Historic Areas Protect historic areas to avoid economic loss and 
social disturbance 
1976 International exchange of 
Cultural Property 
Encourages exchanges of cult prop, aid to poorer 
countries museums 
1978 Movable cultural property Protect movable cultural property, education of 
children and public on value of cultural property 
1980 Safeguard moving images protect moving images 
1982 Florence Charter Historic Gardens preservation 
1982 Deschambault Quebec Defines special nature of Quebec heritage.  Sees 
citizens as chief protectors. Education. 
1982 Tlaxcala small settlements Rights of local communities to be involved in 
decisions,  protection 
1982 Dresden Declaration Reconstruction of monuments destroyed by war 
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1983 Appleton Charter Protect built environment.  Public participation in 
decision making. 
1984 Rome Declaration Italian heritage problems 
1985 Offenses related to cultural 
property 
Enhance public awareness, cooperate in 
prosecution, restitution 
1985 Protection of architectural 
heritage in Europe 
Safeguard heritage, public awareness and 
education, conservation planning, adaptive reuse 
1987 Brazilian Seminar Historic city centres, allow traditional residences 
and work, protect them, prioritize social over 
economic value 
1987 Washington Charter Protection of historic towns, compliments Venice 
Charter, social and economic aspects 
1989 Safeguard traditional culture 
and folklore 
Promote folklore and creation of archives, 
museums, education programs,  
1989 Vermillion Charter WAC policy on  treatment of the dead 
1990 Protection and management of 
archaeological heritage 
Principles/guidelines to protect archaeological 
heritage. 
1991 Quebec City Dec Network of world heritage towns; management 
guide, information on management 
1992 Places of Cult Heritage Value New Zealand guides to preservation. 
1992 USA Historic Towns US ICOMOS adaptation of 1987 Historic Towns.  
Involvement of residents in planning. 
1992 Courmayeur charter Illicit trade of cultural objects, police cooperation, 
export permissions, etc. 
1992 European convention on the 
protection of archaeological 
heritage 
Europe: echoes ICOMOS 1990. Integration of 
conservation and plans, funding for archaeology, 
public awareness 
1992 New Orleans Charter Historic structures and artefact preservation;  
1992 Rio Declaration Environment conference.  
1993 Oaxaca Declaration Inclusion of indigenous peoples in problem solving, 
cultural pluralism; support indigenous rights 
1993 Fez Charter Cities as cultural centres; protection 
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1993 Conservation of monuments Education of conservators  
1993 UN Resolution on restitution of 
cult property 
Restitution of cultural property resolution. 
1994 Buenos Aires Draft Cong Protect of Underwater Cultural Heritage, 
educational programs to raise awareness 
1994 Nara Document on 
Authenticity 
Recognizes cultural and social values in tangible 
and intangible expression.  Follows other charters 
1994 Resolution on information as 
protection against wartime 
damage 
Deliberate war damage a war crime, school 
programs, training for media 
1995 Unidroit Convention Stolen or illegally exported cult obj. time limits. 
1995 Bergen Protocol Organization of World Heritage cities 
1995 Charter for Sustainable 
Tourism 
Acknowledges positive and negative effects of 
tourism, protect heritage, sustainability 
1995 U.S. Secretary of the Interior 
standards 
USNPS: Regulations for all registered historic 
buildings in US 
1996 Underwater Cultural Heritage Principles of conservation, management,  
maintenance.   Information to the public on 
significance 
1996 NATO partnership for peace Protection of cultural property during wartime 
1996 Valencia Declaration Encourage teaching cultural heritage, university 
exchanges 
1996 San Antonio Declaration Authenticity.  Connection between authenticity and 
identity; architecture, urbanism, archaeological 
sites, etc 
1997 Quebec Declaration University and heritage network reaffirmed 
1997 Pavia Document Standards for education and training of 
conservators 
1997 Evora Appeal Threats and benefits of cultural tourism in historic 
areas.   
1998 Stockholm Declaration 50th anniversary of Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, reaffirms. Right to cultural heritage 
an integral human right 
 Page | 438  
 
1998 Melbourne Declaration University network, student training and exchanges 
1998 Integrating conservation into 
historic complexes 
Europe: Identify historic complexes and legislate to 
protect them 
1999 Burra Charter Principles for management of cultural sites in 
Australia; cultural significance 
1999 Built Vernacular Heritage Reaction to globalization; guidelines for 
conservation practice, adaptive reuse, etc. 
1999 International Wood Committee Protection of timber structures 
1999 Managing Tourism Tourism management to  involve host communities 
and indigenous people, sustainability 
1999 Second Hague Protocol Protection in war time, criminal violations 
2000 Convention n Bio Diversity Require bio-diversity strategies, rehabilitate 
ecosystems, promote awareness 
2000 Euro Convention on Landscape Preservation of landscapes. 
2001 Protect underwater heritage Safeguarding underwater cultural heritage 
2002 Intangible cultural heritage Defines Intangible Cultural Heritage, recommends 
ways to preserve, revitalize 
2007 Presentation of Cultural 
Heritage Sites 
Guidelines for interpretation, public communication 
and education, include all stakeholders 
2008 Cultural Routes Defines cultural routes, use them for sustainable 
economic development, cooperation in 
development and conservation 
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Appendix 6: Guidelines Prepared for 
Sustainable Preservation Initiative Project  
 
The following document was written by the author for use by applicants seeking 
funding for community-based economic development projects from the Sustainable 
Preservation Initiative, of which the author is a Director. 
The first use of this document was for a project under development in Belize 
involving the transfer of traditional ceramics production technology to a local women’s 
group, assistance to them in initiating production, and assistance to them in distribution of the 
product and management of the resulting business enterprise. 
The document is presented as an illustration of the manner in which the subject 
matter of this thesis may be applied, along with a considerable range of other information, to 
facilitate the design of successful community economic-development projects oriented 
toward heritage and archaeology. 
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Checklist of Considerations in Building 
 a Community Economic Development Enterprise1 
 
By Peter G. Gould 
This paper outlines a five-step process to be used by potential applicants for 
grant funding from the Sustainable Preservation Initiative to support community-
based economic development projects related to archaeological sites or heritage 
projects. The objective of this brief checklist is to assist potential grant recipients to 
define the project and its community context, position it in the marketplace, and 
anticipate operational, organizational, legal and financial issues that will arise as the 
project progresses.  It is unlikely that answers to all questions will be available at the 
outset of project planning, but by seeking answers project sponsors will be better able 
to identify key areas for future work as the project proceeds.   
The results of this review may be incorporated into the SPI grant application 
or provided separately as background material to the application form.  The various 
consideration entering into the development of a community organization business 
plan have been organized into five major topic areas:  
1. Market Analysis,  
2. Community Context,  
3. Business Model,  
4. Governance, and  
                                                     
1 This document was developed by the author for the use of the Sustainable Preservation 
Initiative in assisting prospective grant recipients to design community projects that may become 
eligible for funding from SPI.  ©Peter G. Gould  2013. 
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5. Sources of Assistance and Financing.   
The various issues raised in each section have been formatted as questions in 
order to stimulate thinking about potential problems or opportunities associated with 
the project.  Once answers to the questions presented here have been prepared, a 
project plan should be developed that includes a business (financial) plan, operational 
plans, and organizational details, including specific governance mechanics.  This 
latter, in particular, needs to be developed with, or preferably by, the members of the 
organization itself after exposing them to the full range of questions and issues that 
may arise in the management of the organization.  Plans need not be extensive but 
should address the primary business and governance issues necessary to ensure that 
the venture has reasonable prospects for financial survival and governance mechanics 
that are in tune with the community and likely to survive the stresses and conflicts 
inevitable in operating such ventures. 
The objective of this exercise is not to produce a corporate-style strategic 
business plan.  Rather it is to sensitize the project organizers to the issues and engage 
the community members is designing organizational strategies and operational plans 
that can form the basis for launching the project.  Such a document also will facilitate 
grant proposals to agencies providing financial or capacity-building assistance to the 
organization. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Market Analysis 
• Describe the archaeological site or heritage resource directly related to this 
project, either as a venue for the project (e.g. crafts store adjacent to a site) or 
as the content of the project (e.g. traditional dance theatre or traditional 
pottery atelier)? 
o What is its importance from the perspective of global interest in 
archaeology or heritage? 
o What is its importance to the local, regional or national community? 
• Is customer demand from the business based on tourism or on non-tourism 
activities? 
• If it is based on tourism, what is the structure of the local and regional tourism 
market that will be the source of visitors? 
o Why do tourists visit the site?  
o Are visits seasonal or year-round? 
o Do they arrive in organized groups or individually? 
o Is there an estimate of the current volume of tourism visitation? 
o What are the demographics of the tourists (e.g., age, national origin, etc.)? 
o What is known about the tourists’ reasons for visiting?  
o Are visits sufficiently long to afford time to visit the project? 
o Which are the leading companies in the tourism market in the locale or 
region? 
o Is there demonstrated willingness of organized market participants (e.g. 
tour operators) to support the project by enabling tourists to visit?  
• What forms of government regulation govern tourism-related projects and 
tourist service operators? 
o Are tourism organizations honest or corrupt? 
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o Are special permits required to operate in the tourism industry? From 
which government entities? 
o Do project members require special training or certification (e.g., guides) 
• If the project is not based on tourism, what is the nature of the market that it 
will serve? 
o What is the product or service to be offered? 
o Have the market requirements for the product / service been determined 
clearly (form, quality, delivery standards, etc.) 
o What is the source of demand for the product or service? 
o Do estimates exist of the size of the market to be served and the potential 
number, nature and location of customers? 
• For either tourism or non-tourism businesses,  
o What is the nature of competition?  
 In the immediate locale?  
 Regionally?  
 Nationally or Internationally? 
o Are there other projects, sites, or services in the immediate vicinity of the 
project that can synergistically support the proposed project by supporting 
demand (e.g., through a tourist network) or assisting with distribution 
(e.g., nearby product retail centres)? 
• For either tourism or non-tourism businesses, 
o Is the purpose of the business to create and manage a tourist attraction / 
business enterprise (e.g. a museum—a corporate form); or 
o Is the purpose of the business to manage the community’s collective 
exploitation of a tourism opportunity (e.g. to optimize activities of 
individual artisans, guides or others selling to visiting tourists—a common 
pool resource)? 
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Community Context 
• Has leadership in the community been identified that is enthusiastic to 
organize the project? 
o Are those individuals respected as leaders in the community? 
o Do those individuals bring liabilities in terms of family, social, political, 
economic or other disputes? 
o Are they willing to give up leadership in the future to others in the 
community? 
• Has support for the project been evidenced in the community? 
o What forces in the community may be opposed to the project, and why? 
• Are there precedents in the community for such projects?  
o What has been the measure of their success? (e.g., longevity, jobs created, 
income generated, tax revenues?) 
o What has been the leadership model in the establishment of successful 
organizations? 
o What has been the governance structure (see point 4 below) of successful 
organizations?  
o Why did project failures occur? 
• What fault-lines for conflict exist in the community that may undermine the 
project? 
o Inter-family disputes? 
o Social distinctions? 
o Differential economic power / control over resources? 
o Political party divisions? 
o Competing projects? 
o Other factors? 
• What benefits will accrue to the community, and in what time frame? 
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o Economic? 
o Social? 
o Political? 
o Other? 
Business Model 
• Describe the products or services to be offered by the project 
• Do the skills required to deliver it exist in the community? 
o If not, what is the plan to create the capacity to do so, who will deliver the 
training, and what is the cost and time frame? 
o If government certifications or approvals (e.g. guide licenses) are required 
to execute the planned project, what plans exist to train for and obtain 
certifications? 
• What is the revenue model for the business? 
o What is to be offered? 
o What is the pricing?   
o Are different products / services to be offered at different prices?  
 Are prices fixed or negotiable? 
o Will all products / services be offered only at the project location? 
 If not, what is the plan for distribution of products /services beyond the 
location? 
 Has the cost of distribution (transportation, packaging, wholesale 
discounts, etc.) been determined? 
• What is the cost structure of the project activity? 
o What material costs are involved? 
o What operational costs (e.g. electricity) are involved? 
o What personnel costs (e.g. payroll) are involved? 
o What packaging or other product costs are involved? 
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o For non-product projects, what expenses will the project face? 
o Will the project purchase materials or will individual participants do so? 
o Costs to operate facilities? 
• Does the project require a physical presence, such as a workshop, retail outlet, 
practice space, etc.? 
o What approvals are needed from governments to construct a building? 
o Capital to construct a facility? Local in-kind contributions? 
 Land acquisition? 
 Design? 
 Construction? 
o Capital to acquire and install needed equipment? 
o Working capital (cash to pay bills)? 
• Has a business plan for the organization been prepared that includes at least 
near-term revenue, expense, capital and other financial projections? 
• How will the profits of the project be distributed to members? 
o Through payroll related to hours worked? 
o Share of sale price / piecework rates? 
o Dividends to shareholders? 
o Bonus? 
o Other? 
• What is the financial management plan for the project itself? 
o Are costs paid out before revenues are distributed to participants, or does 
the project operate off of a share of the revenues only? 
o What proportion of revenues remains with the project?   
o How will those funds be managed? 
o Are banking facilities available, convenient and inexpensive? 
• How are finances reported to members? 
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o How will members be assured finances are handled honestly and members 
receive whatever they are due?  
o What will be the financial reporting process? 
o Are audits required? What is their cost? 
• Business skills Inventory: What training is needed? Do project members have: 
o Financial management knowledge? 
o Sales / marketing knowledge? 
o Customer relations knowledge? 
o Operations management knowledge? 
o If not, is it available from outside the organization? At what cost? 
Governance 
• What is the legal context of the project? 
o Does legal authority exist to organize the project? 
 Locally? 
 Regionally? 
 Nationally? 
o What forms of organization are legally permitted? 
 Non-Governmental Organization? 
 Not for Profit? 
 Cooperative? 
 For-Profit corporation? 
 Other? 
o What entities must approve creation of the organization, certify members, 
regulate activities, or otherwise authorize or monitor the organization? 
 Licensing? 
 Financial review / audits / reports? 
 Compliance with laws? 
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 Is the entity subject to taxation? The members? 
 
• What is the essential nature of the project? 
o Individual entrepreneur’s business? 
o Cooperative of community members? 
o Organization regulating individual local entrepreneurs accessing the same 
market (e.g. a crafts-sellers’ group or a group of guides)? 
o Other? 
• What are the basic rules of membership in the organization? 
o Geographically limited (e.g., legal village residents only)? 
o Other limits to membership? 
• Who are the officers of the organization and how are they selected? 
o What is the roster of officers (President, Vice President, Secretary, 
Treasurer, etc.)? 
o How are candidates nominated? 
o How are the officers chosen? By whom? 
o Is there an executive committee of the group? 
 What are its powers and limits of authority 
o Are officers elected for specific terms (e.g. 1 or 2 years)? 
 How frequently do/will members rotate into leadership positions? 
• What are the decision-making processes in the organization? 
o What decisions are reserved to full membership? 
o How are decisions made? Voting? Secret or open ballot? 
o Majority rule or super-majority? 
o Can any member or group of members overrule the group? 
• What are the rules of the organization? 
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o Can members compete with the organization? 
o Do members have other obligations to the organization (e.g. time working 
in the shop, personal attire required, financial contributions to the 
organization, etc.)? 
o How are rules enforced? 
 Who monitors compliance with the rules? Members? Others? 
 What sanctions have been defined for individuals who do not comply 
with the rules of the organization? 
 Are sanctions graduated (“punishment fits the crime”)? 
 Are sanctions enforced in practice? 
• What mechanisms exist to resolve conflicts within the organization? 
• What mechanisms exist to change the mission or activities of the organization 
over time? 
Sources of Assistance / Financing 
• What types of assistance are needed? 
o Capital financing? 
o Operational subsidies? 
o Grants of land or other assets? 
o Is capacity-building assistance needed? 
 Artisanal or technical skills? 
 Business management skills? 
 Financial management skills? 
 Customer relations / hospitality skills? 
 Other? 
o Is government-relations / navigating bureaucracies / compliance with laws 
and regulations assistance needed? 
• What forms of assistance are available from: 
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o National government agencies? 
o Regional government agencies? 
o Local government agencies? 
o International government organizations  (e.g. UNESCO or the European 
Union or USAID)? 
o Development banks (World Bank and affiliates, regional development 
banks)? 
o Non-governmental organizations (SPI, Global Heritage Fund, World 
Monuments Fund, etc.)? 
• What are the terms and conditions of assistance? 
o Do donors require specific organizational or legal structures? 
o Do donors impose restrictions on governance, group activities, decision-
making, or other actions of the organization? 
o Do donors become involved directly in the operations of the organization? 
o Are donor gifts tied in any way, such as to purchases from particular 
countries or companies? 
• If donors / advisers are from the private sector, do they have the qualifications 
to provide the assistance they propose to offer? 
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Appendix 7: Master Coding Tables 
 
This appendix presents two sets of tables relating to the coding of the variables as 
presented in SPSS cross-tabulation outputs.  The first listing presents the coding used to 
transfer non-numeric data to SPSS for cross-tabulation processing.  The second listing 
presents the variable names used for each variable and relates those variables to the 
questionnaire presented in Appendix 1.  The results of the Cross-Tabulations are 
presented in Appendix 8. 
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Questionaire 
Item 
Question Code 
Number 
Definition Applicable 
Site 
     
3.1 Geographic Boundaries 1 Kilfenora Burren 
Centre 
  2 Burren Region Burren 
Centre 
  3 Kilfenora-to New 
Quay 
Burren 
Centre 
  4 Maya Centre Maya 
Centre WG 
  5 Raqchi Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
     
3.2 Official Leaders 1 None Burren 
Centre 
  2 County Officials Burren 
Centre 
  3 Village Council Maya 
Centre WG 
and 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
     
3.3 Unofficial Leaders 1 Priest Burren 
Centre 
  2 Parrish Council Burren 
Centre 
  3 Pub Owners Burren 
Centre 
  4 Everybody Burren 
Centre 
  5 Specific 
Individuals 
Burren 
Centre 
  6 Committees Burren 
Centre 
  7 None All 
     
3.4 Decision Making Style 1 Cooperatively All 
  2 Democratically / 
Voting 
All 
  3 Consensus All 
  4 Small Group 
Leadership 
All 
  5 Social 
Entrepreneurship 
All 
     
3.7 Other Organizations  1 GAA/Deanery 
Fields 
Burren 
Centre 
and  in Community 2 Traditional Music Burren 
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Festival Centre 
3.12, 4.1 Three Leading Groups 3 Set Dancing / 
Magazine 
Burren 
Centre 
  4 Old Folks Group Burren 
Centre 
  5 Tidy Towns Burren 
Centre 
  6 Youth Group Burren 
Centre 
  7 Clare Cattle Mart 
Co-Op 
Burren 
Centre 
  8 Parish Council / 
Church Roof 
Burren 
Centre 
  9 Plays Burren 
Centre 
  10 Mulloghmore Burren 
Centre 
  11 Water System Burren 
Centre 
  12 FAS Employm,ent Burren 
Centre 
  13 St. Patricks Day 
Parade 
Burren 
Centre 
  14 Community Hall Burren 
Centre 
  15 Credit Union Burren 
Centre 
  16 ICWA Burren 
Centre 
  17 Basketball Team Burren 
Centre 
  18 Flower Festival Burren 
Centre 
  19 Senior Citizens 
Group 
Burren 
Centre 
  20 Youth Club Burren 
Centre 
  21 Gun Club Burren 
Centre 
  22 St. Stephen's Day 
Singing 
Burren 
Centre 
  23 Wall Repairs Burren 
Centre 
  24 Burren Centre Burren 
Centre 
  25 Irish Farmers' 
Association 
Burren 
Centre 
  26 School Board Burren 
Centre 
  27 Boxing Club Burren 
Centre 
  28 Maya Centre 
Women's Group 
Maya 
Centre WG 
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  29 Water Board Maya 
Centre WG 
  30 Village Council Maya 
Centre WG 
and 
Associacion 
Inkallaqta 
  31 Parent Teacher 
Association 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  32 Girls Football 
Team 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  33 Maya Dancing 
Group 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  34 Pottery Group Maya 
Centre WG 
  35 School Cleanup 
Projects 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  36 Home Stays Maya 
Centre WG 
  37 Training Maya 
Centre WG 
  38 Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  39 Turistica 
Vivenciales de 
Raqchi 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  40 Asociacíon Qapaq 
Sunqu Ayllu  
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  41 Las Mujeres (food 
for aged) 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  42 Associacíon 
Artesenales 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  43 Associacíon Los 
Inkas (ceramicists) 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  44 Turismo Rural 
Communitario 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  45 Vendadores de 
Folletos Turistico 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  46 Creadores de Cuy Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  47 Community 
Assembly 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  48 Committee de 
Cultura y Deportes 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  49 Junta de 
Administration de 
Saneamiento y 
Salud 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  50 Committee 
Servicios 
Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
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  51 Football teams Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  52 None All 
     
     
3.10 Failed Projects 1 Clare Cattle Mart 
Co-Op 
Burren 
Centre 
  2 Tidy Towns Burren 
Centre 
  3 Father Ted Festival Burren 
Centre 
  4 Millenium 
Committees 
Burren 
Centre 
  5 Community Hall Burren 
Centre 
  6 Tourism 
Committee 
Burren 
Centre 
  7 Senior Fund 
Raising 
Burren 
Centre 
  8 Anti-Vandalism 
Campaign 
Burren 
Centre 
  9 None All 
     
     
4.3 Source of Differences 1 Family Relations All 
  2 Religion All 
  3 Gender All 
  4 Age All 
  5 Political Party All 
  6 Occupation All 
  7 Education level All 
  8 Blow-Ins Kilfenora 
  9 Not Much All 
  10 Money All 
  11 Land All 
  12 Personality All 
  13 Politics and 
Religion 
All 
  14 Politics, Religion 
and Family 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  15 Politics and Family Maya 
Centre WG 
  16 Religion and 
Education 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  17 The INC Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  18 Money and Politics Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
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  19 Envy Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
  20 Opinions on issues All 
     
6.1 Activities of 
Organizatoin 
1 Employment Burren 
Centre 
  2 Interpreting the 
Burren 
Burren 
Centre 
  3 Community Centre Burren 
Centre 
  4 Education Burren 
Centre 
  5 Promote Tourism Burren 
Centre 
  6 Crafts Sales All 
  7 Tea Room Burren 
Centre 
  8 Economic 
Development 
Burren 
Centre 
  9 Meetings/Lectures Burren 
Centre 
  10 Protect 
Environment 
Burren 
Centre 
  11 Blank  
  12 Corn Mill Maya 
Centre WG 
  13 Restaurant Maya 
Centre WG 
  14 Soda Sales Maya 
Centre WG 
  15 Capacity Training Maya 
Centre WG 
  16 BAS Ticket Sales Maya 
Centre WG 
     
6.2 Why a Member? 1 Money for Families Maya 
Centre WG 
  2 Family Ties Maya 
Centre WG 
  3 Socializing Maya 
Centre WG 
  4 Help Community Maya 
Centre WG 
  5 Tuition Maya 
Centre WG 
  6 Empower Women Maya 
Centre WG 
  7 Mandatory Associacíon 
Inkallaqta 
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6.8 Benefits of 
Organization 
1 Employment Burren 
Centre 
 to Community 2 Pride/Positive 
Atmosphere 
Burren 
Centre 
  3 Community Center Burren 
Centre 
  4 Tourism Burren 
Centre 
  5 Economic 
Development 
Burren 
Centre 
  6 Number of Visitors Burren 
Centre 
  7 None All 
  8 Funds for School / 
PTA 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  9 Girls Football 
Team 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  10 Tuition for 
Children 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  11 Family Income Maya 
Centre WG 
  12 Donations to 
projects 
Maya 
Centre WG 
  13 Empower Women Maya 
Centre WG 
     
6.9 Work with Businesses 1 Well Burren 
Centre 
  2 Accommodate each 
other 
Burren 
Centre 
  3 Poorly Burren 
Centre 
  4 Other Burren 
Centre 
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Appendix 8:  SPSS Cross-Tabulation Results 
 
The following pages present the results of cross tabulations on each variable in the 
questionnaire that was either directly numeric in form or was converted , via the coding 
chart presented at Appendix 4, into numeric form.  Each variable was cross-tabulated 
against the three sites, Raqchi, Kilfenora and Maya Centre, and appropriate statistics 
were generated for each cross tabulation. 
 
Variable Names as they appear in SPSS 
 
Questionnaire 
Raw or Computed Variable Name 
Variable 
Item Abbreviation 
1.1 RAW orgstudied1.1 orgstud 
1.4 RAW interviewnum1.4 ivunum 
2.6 RAW ivueeage2.6 ivueage 
2.7 RAW ivugender2.7 ivuegen 
2.9 RAW ivueeroleinorganization2.9 ivuerole 
3.1 RAW memdefcommboundaries3.1 mbndry 
3.5 RAW memcomreltn3.5 mcomrel 
3.6 RAW othproj3.6 othproj 
3.9 RAW othprojsuccs3.9 othprojsc 
3.10 RAW failothproj3.10 othprjfl 
3.13 RAW othgrpcollab3.13 othgrpco 
4.1 RAW othgrpmem4.1 othgrpmm 
4.1 RAW othgrpmemname4.1 othgrpnm 
4.2 RAW othgrpmemldr4.2 othgrpld 
4.3 RAW commdifsrce4.3 comdifsc 
4.4.1 RAW commdifsol4.4.1 cmdifsol1 
4.4.2 RAW commdifsol4.4.2 cmdifsol2 
4.4.3 RAW commdifsol4.4.3 cmdifsol3 
4.5 RAW spiritpartic4.5 spirpart 
4.6 RAW indivinfluen4.6 indinfl 
 Computed cogsoccapindex cscindex 
 Computed cogsoccapindexc cscindexc 
5.1.0 Raw honesttrust5.1.0 hontrust 
5.1.0 Computed honesttrust5.1.0c hontrustc 
5.1.1 Raw ownwelf5.1.1 ownwelf 
5.1.1 Computed ownwelf5.1.1c ownwelfc 
5.1.2 Raw bealert5.1.2 bealert 
5.1.2 Computed bealert5.1.2c bealertc 
5.1.3 Raw problemhelp5.1.3 probhelp 
5.1.3 Computed problemhelp5.1.3c probhelpc 
5.1.4 Raw opinmattr5.1.4 opinmatt 
5.1.4 Computed opinmattr5.1.4c opinmattc 
5.1.5 Raw accepted5.1.5 accepted 
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5.1.5 Computed accepted5.1.5c acceptedc 
5.1.6 Raw droppurse5.1.6 drpprse 
5.1.6 Computed droppurse5.1.6c drpprsec 
5.2 RAW timemoney5.2 timemony 
6.1.1 RAW projactivities6.1.1 projactv1 
6.1.2 RAW projactivities6.1.2 projactv2 
6.1.3 RAW projactivities6.1.3 projactv3 
6.2 RAW whymembr6.2 whymem 
6.4 RAW mainpurp6.4 mainpurp 
6.5 RAW recfinrpt6.5 recfinrp 
6.8.1 RAW communbenefits6.8.1 commben 
6.8.2 RAW communbenefits6.8.2  
6.8.3 RAW communbenefits6.8.3  
6.9 RAW businesscollab6.9 busncoll 
6.13.1 Raw fairhonest6.13.1 farihon 
6.13.1 Computed fairhonest6.13.1c farihonc 
6.13.2 Raw trustmoney6.13.2 trumony 
6.13.2 Computed trustmoney6.13.2c trumonyc 
6.13.3 Raw improvcomm6.13.3 impcomm 
6.13.3 Computed improvcomm6.13.3c impcommc 
6.13.4 Raw membrcontrol6.13.4 memcntl 
6.13.4 Computed membrcontrol6.13.4c memcntlc 
6.13.5 Raw membersetrules6.13.5 memrule 
6.13.5 Computed membersetrules6.13.5c memrulec 
6.13.6 Raw leaderseffect6.13.6 ldreffct 
6.13.6 Computed leaderseffect6.13.6c ldreffctc 
6.13.7 Raw worseoffclose6.13.7 worseoff 
6.13.7 Computed worseoffclose6.13.7c worseoffc 
6.13.8 Raw feelrespons6.13.8 feelresp 
6.13.8 Computed feelrespons6.13.8c feelrespc 
6.13.9 Raw wellinform6.13.9 wellinfo 
6.13.9 Computed wellinform6.13.9c wellinfoc 
6.13.10 Raw benefitfinancial6.13.10 benfinl 
6.13.10 Computed benefitfinancial6.13.10c benfinlc 
6.13.11 Raw importstanding6.13.11 impstnd 
6.13.11 Computed importstanding6.13.11c impstndc 
6.13.12 Raw commeconbenefit6.13.12 commben 
6.13.12 Computed commeconbenefit6.13.12c commbenc 
6.13.13 Raw othcommeconbenefit6.13.13 ocommben 
6.13.13 Computed othcommeconbenefit6.13.13c ocommbenc 
6.14.1 Raw attendstrong6.14.1 attstrng 
6.14.1 Computed attendstrong6.14.1c attstrngc 
6.14.2 Raw activeparticipation6.14.2 active 
6.14.2 Computed activeparticipation6.14.2c activec 
6.14.3 Raw memberimpact6.14.3 memimpct 
6.14.3 Computed memberimpact6.14.3c memimpctc 
6.14.4 Raw memberknow6.14.4 memknow 
6.14.4 Computed memberknow6.14.4c memknowc 
6.14.5 Raw caryprocfaith6.14.5 procfaith 
6.14.5 Computed caryprocfaith6.14.5c procfaithc 
6.14.6 Raw membernecinfo6.14.6 meminfo 
6.14.6 Computed membernecinfo6.14.6c meminfoc 
6.14.7 Raw mgmtnecinfo6.14.7 mgmtinfo 
6.14.7 Computed mgmtnecinfo6.14.7c mgmtinfoc 
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6.14.8 Raw opendebate6.14.8 opendbat 
6.14.8 Computed opoendebate6.14.8c opendbatc 
6.14.9 Raw resultdissem6.14.9 resltdis 
6.14.9 Computed resultdissem6.14.9c resltdisc 
6.14.10 Raw intnlconflresfair6.14.10 intconfl 
6.14.10 Computed intnlconflresfair6.14.10c intconflc 
6.14.11 Raw commconflresfair6.14.11 commcnfl 
6.14.11 Computed commconflresfair6.14.11c commcnflc 
6.14.12 Raw plansforfuture6.14.12 planfut 
6.14.12 Computed plansforfuture6.14.12c planfutc 
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Crosstabulations 
 
 
 
Output Created 
Comments 
Notes 
 
 
31-AUG-2013 12:49:11 
Input 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Missing Value Handling 
Data C:\Users\peter\Documents\PHD 
Files\Thesis Chapters\Thesis Data 
Analysis\survey data file 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in 
Working Data File  94 
Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based 
on all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
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Syntax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources 
CROSSTABS 
/TABLES=orgstudied1.1 BY 
ivueeage2.6 ivugender2.7 
ivueeroleinorganization2.9 
memcomreltn3.5 othproj3.6 
othprojsuccs3.9 failothproj3.10 
othgrpcollab3.13 othgrpmem4.1 
othgrpmemname4.1 
othgrpmemldr4.2 commdifsrce4.3 
commdifsol4.4.1 spiritpartic4.5 
indivinfluen4.6 cogsoccapindexc 
honesttrust5.1.0c ownwelf5.1.1c 
bealert5.1.2c problemhelp5.1.3c 
opinmattr5.1.4c accepted5.1.5c 
droppurse5.1.6c timemoney5.2 
projactivities6.1.1 projactivities6.1.2 
projactivities6.1.3 whymembr6.2 
mainpurp6.4 recfinrpt6.5 
communbenefits6.8.1 
businesscollab6.9 fairhonest6.13.1c 
trustmoney6.13.2c 
improvcomm6.13.3c 
membrcontrol6.13.4c 
membersetrules6.13.5c 
leaderseffect6.13.6c 
worseoffclose6.13.7c 
feelrespons6.13.8c 
wellinform6.13.9c 
benefitfinancial6.13.10c 
importstanding6.13.11c 
commeconbenefit6.13.12c 
othcommeconbenefit6.13.13c 
attendstrong6.14.1c 
activeparticipation6.14.2c 
memberimpact6.14.3c 
memberknow6.14.4c 
caryprocfaith6.14.5c 
membernecinfo6.14.6c 
Processor Time 00:00:00.48 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.51 
Dimensions 2 
Cells Available 174734 
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[DataSet1] C:\Users\peter\Documents\PHD Files\Thesis Chapters\Thesis Data Analysis\survey data file Comprehensive Proofed Final.sav 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
orgstud * ivueage 94 100.0% 0 0.0% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * ivuegen 94 100.0% 0 0.0% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * ivuerole 94 100.0% 0 0.0% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * mcomrel 91 96.8% 3 3.2% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * othproj 60 63.8% 34 36.2% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * othprojsc 31 33.0% 63 67.0% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * othprjfl 29 30.9% 65 69.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * othgrpco 18 19.1% 76 80.9% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * othgrpmm 92 97.9% 2 2.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * othgrpnm 35 37.2% 59 62.8% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * othgrpld 21 22.3% 73 77.7% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * comdifsc 89 94.7% 5 5.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * cmdifsol1 66 70.2% 28 29.8% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * spirpart 89 94.7% 5 5.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * indinfl 80 85.1% 14 14.9% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * cscindexc 94 100.0% 0 0.0% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * hontrustc 93 98.9% 1 1.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * ownwelfc 93 98.9% 1 1.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * bealertc 92 97.9% 2 2.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * probhelpc 93 98.9% 1 1.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * opinmattc 93 98.9% 1 1.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * acceptedc 92 97.9% 2 2.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * drpprsec 93 98.9% 1 1.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * timemony 93 98.9% 1 1.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * projactv1 87 92.6% 7 7.4% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * projactv2 46 48.9% 48 51.1% 94 100.0% 
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orgstud * projactv3 11 11.7% 83 88.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * whymem 94 100.0% 0 0.0% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * mainpurp 94 100.0% 0 0.0% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * recfinrp 87 92.6% 7 7.4% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * commben 94 100.0% 0 0.0% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * busncoll 25 26.6% 69 73.4% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * farihonc 92 97.9% 2 2.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * trumonyc 91 96.8% 3 3.2% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * impcommc 92 97.9% 2 2.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * memcntlc 90 95.7% 4 4.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * memrulec 90 95.7% 4 4.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * ldreffctc 90 95.7% 4 4.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * worseoffc 92 97.9% 2 2.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * feelrespc 92 97.9% 2 2.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * wellinfoc 90 95.7% 4 4.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * benfinlc 90 95.7% 4 4.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * impstndc 90 95.7% 4 4.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * commbenc 92 97.9% 2 2.1% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * ocommbenc 91 96.8% 3 3.2% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * attstrngc 84 89.4% 10 10.6% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * activec 84 89.4% 10 10.6% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * memimpctc 88 93.6% 6 6.4% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * memknowc 88 93.6% 6 6.4% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * procfaithc 88 93.6% 6 6.4% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * meminfoc 89 94.7% 5 5.3% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * mgmtinfoc 34 36.2% 60 63.8% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * opendbatc 86 91.5% 8 8.5% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * resltdisc 85 90.4% 9 9.6% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * intconflc 82 87.2% 12 12.8% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * commcnflc 60 63.8% 34 36.2% 94 100.0% 
orgstud * planfutc 87 92.6% 7 7.4% 94 100.0% 
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orgstud * ivueage 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 ivueage 
 
 
Total 2 3 4 
orgstud AIR Count 17a 12a 4a 33 
  Expected Count 14.0 12.3 6.7 33.0 
  % within orgstud 51.5% 36.4% 12.1% 100.0% 
  % within ivueage 42.5% 34.3% 21.1% 35.1% 
  % of Total 18.1% 12.8% 4.3% 35.1% 
  Residual 3.0 -.3 -2.7  
 BC Count 4a 13b 14c 31 
  Expected Count 13.2 11.5 6.3 31.0 
  % within orgstud 12.9% 41.9% 45.2% 100.0% 
  % within ivueage 10.0% 37.1% 73.7% 33.0% 
  % of Total 4.3% 13.8% 14.9% 33.0% 
  Residual -9.2 1.5 7.7  
 MCWG Count 19a 10a 1b 30 
 Expected Count 12.8 11.2 6.1 30.0 
 % within orgstud 63.3% 33.3% 3.3% 100.0% 
 % within ivueage 47.5% 28.6% 5.3% 31.9% 
 % of Total 20.2% 10.6% 1.1% 31.9% 
 Residual 6.2 -1.2 -5.1  
Total Count 40 35 19 94 
Expected Count 40.0 35.0 19.0 94.0 
% within orgstud 42.6% 37.2% 20.2% 100.0% 
% within ivueage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 42.6% 37.2% 20.2% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of ivueage categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.229a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 27.188 4 .000 
N of Valid Cases 94 
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orgstud * ivuegen 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 ivuegen 
 
 
Total 1 2 
orgstud AIR Count 14a 19a 33 
  Expected Count 10.5 22.5 33.0 
  % within orgstud 42.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
  % within ivuegen 46.7% 29.7% 35.1% 
  % of Total 14.9% 20.2% 35.1% 
  Residual 3.5 -3.5  
 BC Count 16a 15b 31 
  Expected Count 9.9 21.1 31.0 
  % within orgstud 51.6% 48.4% 100.0% 
  % within ivuegen 53.3% 23.4% 33.0% 
  % of Total 17.0% 16.0% 33.0% 
  Residual 6.1 -6.1  
 MCWG Count 0a 30b 30 
 Expected Count 9.6 20.4 30.0 
 % within orgstud 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % within ivuegen 0.0% 46.9% 31.9% 
 % of Total 0.0% 31.9% 31.9% 
 Residual -9.6 9.6  
Total Count 30 64 94 
Expected Count 30.0 64.0 94.0 
% within orgstud 31.9% 68.1% 100.0% 
% within ivuegen 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 31.9% 68.1% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of ivuegen categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.275a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 29.800 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 94 
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orgstud * ivuerole   
 
Crosstab 
 ivuerole 
 
 
Total 1 2 3 
orgstud AIR Count 4a 27a, b 2b 33 
  Expected Count 6.7 25.6 .7 33.0 
  % within orgstud 12.1% 81.8% 6.1% 100.0% 
  % within ivuerole 21.1% 37.0% 100.0% 35.1% 
  % of Total 4.3% 28.7% 2.1% 35.1% 
  Residual -2.7 1.4 1.3  
 BC Count 8a 23a 0a 31 
  Expected Count 6.3 24.1 .7 31.0 
  % within orgstud 25.8% 74.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within ivuerole 42.1% 31.5% 0.0% 33.0% 
  % of Total 8.5% 24.5% 0.0% 33.0% 
  Residual 1.7 -1.1 -.7  
 MCWG Count 7a 23a 0a 30 
 Expected Count 6.1 23.3 .6 30.0 
 % within orgstud 23.3% 76.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
 % within ivuerole 36.8% 31.5% 0.0% 31.9% 
 % of Total 7.4% 24.5% 0.0% 31.9% 
 Residual .9 -.3 -.6  
Total Count 19 73 2 94 
Expected Count 19.0 73.0 2.0 94.0 
% within orgstud 20.2% 77.7% 2.1% 100.0% 
% within ivuerole 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 20.2% 77.7% 2.1% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of ivuerole categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.516a 4 .238 
Likelihood Ratio 6.140 4 .189 
N of Valid Cases 94 
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orgstud * mcomrel 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 mcomrel 
 
 
Total 1.0 1.5 2.0 
orgstud AIR Count 23a 8a 2b 33 
  Expected Count 19.6 5.1 8.3 33.0 
  % within orgstud 69.7% 24.2% 6.1% 100.0% 
  % within mcomrel 42.6% 57.1% 8.7% 36.3% 
  % of Total 25.3% 8.8% 2.2% 36.3% 
  Residual 3.4 2.9 -6.3  
 BC Count 23a 3a, b 2b 28 
  Expected Count 16.6 4.3 7.1 28.0 
  % within orgstud 82.1% 10.7% 7.1% 100.0% 
  % within mcomrel 42.6% 21.4% 8.7% 30.8% 
  % of Total 25.3% 3.3% 2.2% 30.8% 
  Residual 6.4 -1.3 -5.1  
 MCWG Count 8a 3a 19b 30 
 Expected Count 17.8 4.6 7.6 30.0 
 % within orgstud 26.7% 10.0% 63.3% 100.0% 
 % within mcomrel 14.8% 21.4% 82.6% 33.0% 
 % of Total 8.8% 3.3% 20.9% 33.0% 
 Residual -9.8 -1.6 11.4  
Total Count 54 14 23 91 
Expected Count 54.0 14.0 23.0 91.0 
% within orgstud 59.3% 15.4% 25.3% 100.0% 
% within mcomrel 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 59.3% 15.4% 25.3% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of mcomrel categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 36.747a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 36.220 4 .000 
N of Valid Cases 91 
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orgstud * othproj 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 othproj 
 
 
Total 1 2 
orgstud AIR Count 4a 2a 6 
  Expected Count 4.0 2.0 6.0 
  % within orgstud 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
  % within othproj 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
  % of Total 6.7% 3.3% 10.0% 
  Residual 0.0 0.0  
 BC Count 28a 0b 28 
  Expected Count 18.7 9.3 28.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within othproj 70.0% 0.0% 46.7% 
  % of Total 46.7% 0.0% 46.7% 
  Residual 9.3 -9.3  
 MCWG Count 8a 18b 26 
 Expected Count 17.3 8.7 26.0 
 % within orgstud 30.8% 69.2% 100.0% 
 % within othproj 20.0% 90.0% 43.3% 
 % of Total 13.3% 30.0% 43.3% 
 Residual -9.3 9.3  
Total Count 40 20 60 
Expected Count 40.0 20.0 60.0 
% within orgstud 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within othproj 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of othproj categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 29.077a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 36.647 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 60 
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orgstud * othprojsc 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 othprojsc 
 
 
Total 1 2 3 
orgstud BC Count 23a 0b 1a 24 
  Expected Count 20.9 2.3 .8 24.0 
  % within orgstud 95.8% 0.0% 4.2% 100.0% 
  % within othprojsc 85.2% 0.0% 100.0% 77.4% 
  % of Total 74.2% 0.0% 3.2% 77.4% 
  Residual 2.1 -2.3 .2  
 MCWG Count 4a 3b 0a 7 
 Expected Count 6.1 .7 .2 7.0 
 % within orgstud 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 100.0% 
 % within othprojsc 14.8% 100.0% 0.0% 22.6% 
 % of Total 12.9% 9.7% 0.0% 22.6% 
 Residual -2.1 2.3 -.2  
Total Count 27 3 1 31 
Expected Count 27.0 3.0 1.0 31.0 
% within orgstud 87.1% 9.7% 3.2% 100.0% 
% within othprojsc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 87.1% 9.7% 3.2% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of othprojsc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.509a 2 .003 
Likelihood Ratio 10.466 2 .005 
N of Valid Cases 31 
a. 4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23. 
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orgstud * othprjfl 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 othprjfl 
 
 
Total 1 2 
orgstud BC Count 13a 15a 28 
  Expected Count 13.5 14.5 28.0 
  % within orgstud 46.4% 53.6% 100.0% 
  % within othprjfl 92.9% 100.0% 96.6% 
  % of Total 44.8% 51.7% 96.6% 
  Residual -.5 .5  
 MCWG Count 1a 0a 1 
 Expected Count .5 .5 1.0 
 % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 % within othprjfl 7.1% 0.0% 3.4% 
 % of Total 3.4% 0.0% 3.4% 
 Residual .5 -.5  
Total Count 14 15 29 
Expected Count 14.0 15.0 29.0 
% within orgstud 48.3% 51.7% 100.0% 
% within othprjfl 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 48.3% 51.7% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of othprjfl categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.110a 1 .292   
 
 
 
.483 
 
 
 
 
 
.483 
Continuity Correctionb .001 1 .972 
Likelihood Ratio 1.495 1 .221 
Fisher's Exact Test  
N of Valid Cases 29 
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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orgstud * othgrpco 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 othgrpco 
 
 
Total 1 2 3 
orgstud BC Count 8a 4a 6a 18 
  Expected Count 8.0 4.0 6.0 18.0 
  % within orgstud 44.4% 22.2% 33.3% 100.0% 
  % within othgrpco 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 44.4% 22.2% 33.3% 100.0% 
  Residual 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Total  Count 8 4 6 18 
  Expected Count 8.0 4.0 6.0 18.0 
  % within orgstud 44.4% 22.2% 33.3% 100.0% 
  % within othgrpco 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 44.4% 22.2% 33.3% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of othgrpco categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square 
N of Valid Cases 
.a 
18 
a. No statistics are computed because orgstud is a 
constant. 
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orgstud * othgrpmm 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 othgrpmm 
 
 
Total 1 2 
orgstud AIR Count 16a 17a 33 
  Expected Count 13.3 19.7 33.0 
  % within orgstud 48.5% 51.5% 100.0% 
  % within othgrpmm 43.2% 30.9% 35.9% 
  % of Total 17.4% 18.5% 35.9% 
  Residual 2.7 -2.7  
 BC Count 19a 10b 29 
  Expected Count 11.7 17.3 29.0 
  % within orgstud 65.5% 34.5% 100.0% 
  % within othgrpmm 51.4% 18.2% 31.5% 
  % of Total 20.7% 10.9% 31.5% 
  Residual 7.3 -7.3  
 MCWG Count 2a 28b 30 
 Expected Count 12.1 17.9 30.0 
 % within orgstud 6.7% 93.3% 100.0% 
 % within othgrpmm 5.4% 50.9% 32.6% 
 % of Total 2.2% 30.4% 32.6% 
 Residual -10.1 10.1  
Total Count 37 55 92 
Expected Count 37.0 55.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 40.2% 59.8% 100.0% 
% within othgrpmm 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 40.2% 59.8% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of othgrpmm categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.704a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 26.219 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 92 
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orgstud * othgrpnm 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
         
1 2 9 10 12 14 20 25 
orgstud AIR Count 0a 0a, b 0a 0a 0a, b 0a, b 0a, b 0a, b 
  Expected Count 3.0 .4 .9 1.7 .4 .4 .4 .4 
  % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % within othgrpnm 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  Residual -3.0 -.4 -.9 -1.7 -.4 -.4 -.4 -.4 
 BC Count 7a 1a, b, c 2a, c 4a 1a, b, c 1a, b, c 1a, b, c 1a, b, c 
  Expected Count 3.6 .5 1.0 2.1 .5 .5 .5 .5 
  % within orgstud 38.9% 5.6% 11.1% 22.2% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 
  % within othgrpnm 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 20.0% 2.9% 5.7% 11.4% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 
  Residual 3.4 .5 1.0 1.9 .5 .5 .5 .5 
 MCWG Count 0a 0a, b, c, d 0a, b, c, d 0a 0a, b, c, d 0a, b, c, d 0a, b, c, d 0a, b, c, d 
 Expected Count .4 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 
 % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % within othgrpnm 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Residual -.4 -.1 -.1 -.2 -.1 -.1 -.1 -.1 
Total Count 7 1 2 4 1 1 1 1 
Expected Count 7.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
% within orgstud 20.0% 2.9% 5.7% 11.4% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 
% within othgrpnm 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 20.0% 2.9% 5.7% 11.4% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of othgrpnm categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 70.000a 26 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 60.807 26 .000 
N of Valid Cases 35 
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29 30 32 33 36 37 Total 
0a, b 0a, b 5c 6c 2b, c 2b, c 15 
.4 .4 2.1 2.6 .9 .9 15.0 
0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 40.0% 13.3% 13.3% 100.0% 
0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 42.9% 
0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 17.1% 5.7% 5.7% 42.9% 
-.4 -.4 2.9 3.4 1.1 1.1  
0b, c, d 0b, c, d 0d 0d 0b, d 0b, d 18 
.5 .5 2.6 3.1 1.0 1.0 18.0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 51.4% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 51.4% 
-.5 -.5 -2.6 -3.1 -1.0 -1.0  
1c, d 1b, d 0a 0a 0a, b, c, d 0a, b, c, d 2 
.1 .1 .3 .3 .1 .1 2.0 
50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 
2.9% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 
.9 .9 -.3 -.3 -.1 -.1  
1 1 5 6 2 2 35 
1.0 1.0 5.0 6.0 2.0 2.0 35.0 
2.9% 2.9% 14.3% 17.1% 5.7% 5.7% 100.0% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2.9% 2.9% 14.3% 17.1% 5.7% 5.7% 100.0% 
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orgstud * othgrpld 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 othgrpld 
 
 
Total 1 2 3 
orgstud AIR Count 1a 0a 0a 1 
  Expected Count .5 .1 .4 1.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within othgrpld 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 
  % of Total 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 
  Residual .5 -.1 -.4  
 BC Count 9a 2a 8a 19 
  Expected Count 9.0 1.8 8.1 19.0 
  % within orgstud 47.4% 10.5% 42.1% 100.0% 
  % within othgrpld 90.0% 100.0% 88.9% 90.5% 
  % of Total 42.9% 9.5% 38.1% 90.5% 
  Residual .0 .2 -.1  
 MCWG Count 0a 0a 1a 1 
 Expected Count .5 .1 .4 1.0 
 % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % within othgrpld 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 4.8% 
 % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 4.8% 
 Residual -.5 -.1 .6  
Total Count 10 2 9 21 
Expected Count 10.0 2.0 9.0 21.0 
% within orgstud 47.6% 9.5% 42.9% 100.0% 
% within othgrpld 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.6% 9.5% 42.9% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of othgrpld categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.456a 4 .653 
Likelihood Ratio 3.201 4 .525 
N of Valid Cases 21 
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orgstud * comdifsc 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 comdifsc        
1 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 
orgstud AIR Count a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m 1m c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m 14n, o, p 2i, j, k, l, o, p c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o 0e, f, g, h, k, l, m 
  Expected Count 2.5 8.3 .4 .7 6.8 1.1 1.4 1.1 
  % within orgstud 6.3% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 43.8% 6.3% 3.1% 0.0% 
  % within comdifsc 28.6% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 73.7% 66.7% 25.0% 0.0% 
  % of Total 2.2% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 15.7% 2.2% 1.1% 0.0% 
  Residual -.5 -7.3 -.4 -.7 7.2 .9 -.4 -1.1 
 BC Count 5a, b, c 8c, d, e 1a, b, c 2a, b, c 3e, f 1a, b, c, d, e, f 3a, b, c 3b 
  Expected Count 2.1 7.0 .3 .6 5.8 .9 1.2 .9 
  % within orgstud 18.5% 29.6% 3.7% 7.4% 11.1% 3.7% 11.1% 11.1% 
  % within comdifsc 71.4% 34.8% 100.0% 100.0% 15.8% 33.3% 75.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 5.6% 9.0% 1.1% 2.2% 3.4% 1.1% 3.4% 3.4% 
  Residual 2.9 1.0 .7 1.4 -2.8 .1 1.8 2.1 
 MCWG Count 0a 14b, c, d, e, f 0a, e, f 0a, d, f 2a 0a 0a 0a 
 Expected Count 2.4 7.8 .3 .7 6.4 1.0 1.3 1.0 
 % within orgstud 0.0% 46.7% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % within comdifsc 0.0% 60.9% 0.0% 0.0% 10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % of Total 0.0% 15.7% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Residual -2.4 6.2 -.3 -.7 -4.4 -1.0 -1.3 -1.0 
Total Count 7 23 1 2 19 3 4 3 
Expected Count 7.0 23.0 1.0 2.0 19.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 
% within orgstud 7.9% 25.8% 1.1% 2.2% 21.3% 3.4% 4.5% 3.4% 
% within comdifsc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 7.9% 25.8% 1.1% 2.2% 21.3% 3.4% 4.5% 3.4% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of comdifsc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 92.503a 30 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 103.456 30 .000 
N of Valid Cases 89 
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Total 
1c, d, g, h, m 0b, d, f, h, j, l, m 
 
c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o 
 
c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o 5p 4p 1a, i, n, o, p 
 
c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, n, o, p 32 
3.6 1.1 .4 .4 1.8 1.4 .4 .7 32.0 
3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.6% 12.5% 3.1% 3.1% 100.0% 
10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 50.0% 36.0% 
1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 4.5% 1.1% 1.1% 36.0% 
-2.6 -1.1 -.4 -.4 3.2 2.6 .6 .3  
0f 0d, e, f 0a, c, d, e, f 0a, c, d, e, f 0d, e, f 0d, e, f 0a, c, d, e, f 1a, b, c, d, e 27 
3.0 .9 .3 .3 1.5 1.2 .3 .6 27.0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 100.0% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 30.3% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 30.3% 
-3.0 -.9 -.3 -.3 -1.5 -1.2 -.3 .4  
9c 3c 1b, c, d, e, f 1b, c, d, e, f 0a 0a 0a, b, d, e, f 0a, b, d, e, f 30 
3.4 1.0 .3 .3 1.7 1.3 .3 .7 30.0 
30.0% 10.0% 3.3% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
90.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.7% 
10.1% 3.4% 1.1% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.7% 
5.6 2.0 .7 .7 -1.7 -1.3 -.3 -.7  
10 3 1 1 5 4 1 2 89 
10.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 89.0 
11.2% 3.4% 1.1% 1.1% 5.6% 4.5% 1.1% 2.2% 100.0% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
11.2% 3.4% 1.1% 1.1% 5.6% 4.5% 1.1% 2.2% 100.0% 
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orgstud * cmdifsol1 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 cmdifsol1 
 
 
Total 1 2 
orgstud AIR Count 11a 3a 14 
  Expected Count 8.7 5.3 14.0 
  % within orgstud 78.6% 21.4% 100.0% 
  % within cmdifsol1 26.8% 12.0% 21.2% 
  % of Total 16.7% 4.5% 21.2% 
  Residual 2.3 -2.3  
 BC Count 15a 12a 27 
  Expected Count 16.8 10.2 27.0 
  % within orgstud 55.6% 44.4% 100.0% 
  % within cmdifsol1 36.6% 48.0% 40.9% 
  % of Total 22.7% 18.2% 40.9% 
  Residual -1.8 1.8  
 MCWG Count 15a 10a 25 
 Expected Count 15.5 9.5 25.0 
 % within orgstud 60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
 % within cmdifsol1 36.6% 40.0% 37.9% 
 % of Total 22.7% 15.2% 37.9% 
 Residual -.5 .5  
Total Count 41 25 66 
Expected Count 41.0 25.0 66.0 
% within orgstud 62.1% 37.9% 100.0% 
% within cmdifsol1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 62.1% 37.9% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of cmdifsol1 categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.152a 2 .341 
Likelihood Ratio 2.283 2 .319 
N of Valid Cases 66 
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orgstud * spirpart 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 spirpart 
 
 
Total 
 
 
Average 1 2 3 4 5 
orgstud AIR Count 1a 2a 18a 10a 0a 31 3.19 
  Expected Count 1.0 2.4 17.1 8.7 1.7 31.0  
  % within orgstud 3.2% 6.5% 58.1% 32.3% 0.0% 100.0%  
  % within spirpart 33.3% 28.6% 36.7% 40.0% 0.0% 34.8%  
  % of Total 1.1% 2.2% 20.2% 11.2% 0.0% 34.8%  
  Residual .0 -.4 .9 1.3 -1.7   
 BC Count 1a 4a, b 12a 8a 5b 30 3.40 
  Expected Count 1.0 2.4 16.5 8.4 1.7 30.0  
  % within orgstud 3.3% 13.3% 40.0% 26.7% 16.7% 100.0%  
  % within spirpart 33.3% 57.1% 24.5% 32.0% 100.0% 33.7%  
  % of Total 1.1% 4.5% 13.5% 9.0% 5.6% 33.7%  
  Residual .0 1.6 -4.5 -.4 3.3   
 MCWG Count 1a 1a 19a 7a 0a 28 3.14 
 Expected Count .9 2.2 15.4 7.9 1.6 28.0 
 % within orgstud 3.6% 3.6% 67.9% 25.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 % within spirpart 33.3% 14.3% 38.8% 28.0% 0.0% 31.5% 
 % of Total 1.1% 1.1% 21.3% 7.9% 0.0% 31.5% 
 Residual .1 -1.2 3.6 -.9 -1.6  
Total Count 3 7 49 25 5 89 
Expected Count 3.0 7.0 49.0 25.0 5.0 89.0 
% within orgstud 3.4% 7.9% 55.1% 28.1% 5.6% 100.0% 
% within spirpart 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.4% 7.9% 55.1% 28.1% 5.6% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of spirpart categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.142a 8 .078 
Likelihood Ratio 15.226 8 .055 
N of Valid Cases 89 
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orgstud * indinfl 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 indinfl 
 
 
Total 1 2 3 4 
orgstud AIR Count 5a 8a, b 10a, b 3b 26 
  Expected Count 7.2 6.5 11.1 1.3 26.0 
  % within orgstud 19.2% 30.8% 38.5% 11.5% 100.0% 
  % within indinfl 22.7% 40.0% 29.4% 75.0% 32.5% 
  % of Total 6.3% 10.0% 12.5% 3.8% 32.5% 
  Residual -2.2 1.5 -1.1 1.7  
 BC Count 14a 7a, b 5b 1a, b 27 
  Expected Count 7.4 6.8 11.5 1.4 27.0 
  % within orgstud 51.9% 25.9% 18.5% 3.7% 100.0% 
  % within indinfl 63.6% 35.0% 14.7% 25.0% 33.8% 
  % of Total 17.5% 8.8% 6.3% 1.3% 33.8% 
  Residual 6.6 .3 -6.5 -.4  
 MCWG Count 3a 5a 19b 0a 27 
 Expected Count 7.4 6.8 11.5 1.4 27.0 
 % within orgstud 11.1% 18.5% 70.4% 0.0% 100.0% 
 % within indinfl 13.6% 25.0% 55.9% 0.0% 33.8% 
 % of Total 3.8% 6.3% 23.8% 0.0% 33.8% 
 Residual -4.4 -1.8 7.5 -1.4  
Total Count 22 20 34 4 80 
Expected Count 22.0 20.0 34.0 4.0 80.0 
% within orgstud 27.5% 25.0% 42.5% 5.0% 100.0% 
% within indinfl 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 27.5% 25.0% 42.5% 5.0% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of indinfl categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.267a 6 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 22.849 6 .001 
N of Valid Cases 80 
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orgstud * cscindexc 
 
 
 
orgstud * cscindexc Crosstabulation 
 cscindexc 
 
 
 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
orgstud AIR Count 4 9 9 6 5 33 
  Expected Count 7.1 10.3 6.4 6.0 3.2 33.0 
  % within orgstud 12.1% 27.3% 27.3% 18.2% 15.2% 100.0% 
  % within cscindexc 20.0% 31.0% 50.0% 35.3% 55.6% 35.5% 
  % of Total 4.3% 9.7% 9.7% 6.5% 5.4% 35.5% 
  Residual -3.1 -1.3 2.6 .0 1.8  
 BC Count 15 9 0 5 1 30 
  Expected Count 6.5 9.4 5.8 5.5 2.9 30.0 
  % within orgstud 50.0% 30.0% 0.0% 16.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
  % within cscindexc 75.0% 31.0% 0.0% 29.4% 11.1% 32.3% 
  % of Total 16.1% 9.7% 0.0% 5.4% 1.1% 32.3% 
  Residual 8.5 -.4 -5.8 -.5 -1.9  
 MCWG Count 1 11 9 6 3 30 
 Expected Count 6.5 9.4 5.8 5.5 2.9 30.0 
 % within orgstud 3.3% 36.7% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
 % within cscindexc 5.0% 37.9% 50.0% 35.3% 33.3% 32.3% 
 % of Total 1.1% 11.8% 9.7% 6.5% 3.2% 32.3% 
 Residual -5.5 1.6 3.2 .5 .1  
Total Count 20 29 18 17 9 93 
Expected Count 20.0 29.0 18.0 17.0 9.0 93.0 
% within orgstud 21.5% 31.2% 19.4% 18.3% 9.7% 100.0% 
% within cscindexc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 21.5% 31.2% 19.4% 18.3% 9.7% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.745a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 34.154 8 .000 
N of Valid Cases 93 
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orgstud * hontrustc 
 
Crosstab 
 
 hontrustc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 3a 33 
  Expected Count 29.8 3.2 33.0 
  % within orgstud 90.9% 9.1% 100.0% 
  % within hontrustc 35.7% 33.3% 35.5% 
  % of Total 32.3% 3.2% 35.5% 
  Residual .2 -.2  
 BC Count 29a 1a 30 
  Expected Count 27.1 2.9 30.0 
  % within orgstud 96.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
  % within hontrustc 34.5% 11.1% 32.3% 
  % of Total 31.2% 1.1% 32.3% 
  Residual 1.9 -1.9  
 MCWG Count 25a 5a 30 
 Expected Count 27.1 2.9 30.0 
 % within orgstud 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
 % within hontrustc 29.8% 55.6% 32.3% 
 % of Total 26.9% 5.4% 32.3% 
 Residual -2.1 2.1  
Total Count 84 9 93 
Expected Count 84.0 9.0 93.0 
% within orgstud 90.3% 9.7% 100.0% 
% within hontrustc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 90.3% 9.7% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of hontrustc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.071a 2 .215 
Likelihood Ratio 3.228 2 .199 
N of Valid Cases 93 
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orgstud * ownwelfc Note: 2 and 3 Reversed in this Question 
Crosstab 
 ownwelfc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 7a 26b 33 
  Expected Count 16.3 16.7 33.0 
  % within orgstud 21.2% 78.8% 100.0% 
  % within ownwelfc 15.2% 55.3% 35.5% 
  % of Total 7.5% 28.0% 35.5% 
  Residual -9.3 9.3  
 BC Count 19a 11a 30 
  Expected Count 14.8 15.2 30.0 
  % within orgstud 63.3% 36.7% 100.0% 
  % within ownwelfc 41.3% 23.4% 32.3% 
  % of Total 20.4% 11.8% 32.3% 
  Residual 4.2 -4.2  
 MCWG Count 20a 10b 30 
 Expected Count 14.8 15.2 30.0 
 % within orgstud 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
 % within ownwelfc 43.5% 21.3% 32.3% 
 % of Total 21.5% 10.8% 32.3% 
 Residual 5.2 -5.2  
Total Count 46 47 93 
Expected Count 46.0 47.0 93.0 
% within orgstud 49.5% 50.5% 100.0% 
% within ownwelfc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 49.5% 50.5% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of ownwelfc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value 
 
df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.397a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 17.189 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 93 
orgstud * bealertc Note: 2 and 3 Reversed in this Question 
Crosstab 
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Each subscript letter denotes a subset of bealertc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.453a 2 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 13.044 2 .001 
N of Valid Cases 92 
 bealertc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 7a 25b 32 
  Expected Count 15.0 17.0 32.0 
  % within orgstud 21.9% 78.1% 100.0% 
  % within bealertc 16.3% 51.0% 34.8% 
  % of Total 7.6% 27.2% 34.8% 
  Residual -8.0 8.0  
 BC Count 17a 13a 30 
  Expected Count 14.0 16.0 30.0 
  % within orgstud 56.7% 43.3% 100.0% 
  % within bealertc 39.5% 26.5% 32.6% 
  % of Total 18.5% 14.1% 32.6% 
  Residual 3.0 -3.0  
 MCWG Count 19a 11b 30 
 Expected Count 14.0 16.0 30.0 
 % within orgstud 63.3% 36.7% 100.0% 
 % within bealertc 44.2% 22.4% 32.6% 
 % of Total 20.7% 12.0% 32.6% 
 Residual 5.0 -5.0  
Total Count 43 49 92 
Expected Count 43.0 49.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 46.7% 53.3% 100.0% 
% within bealertc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 46.7% 53.3% 100.0% 
orgstud * probhelpc 
Crosstab 
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 probhelpc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 31a 2a 33 
  Expected Count 28.4 4.6 33.0 
  % within orgstud 93.9% 6.1% 100.0% 
  % within probhelpc 38.8% 15.4% 35.5% 
  % of Total 33.3% 2.2% 35.5% 
  Residual 2.6 -2.6  
 BC Count 27a 3a 30 
  Expected Count 25.8 4.2 30.0 
  % within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
  % within probhelpc 33.8% 23.1% 32.3% 
  % of Total 29.0% 3.2% 32.3% 
  Residual 1.2 -1.2  
 MCWG Count 22a 8b 30 
 Expected Count 25.8 4.2 30.0 
 % within orgstud 73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
 % within probhelpc 27.5% 61.5% 32.3% 
 % of Total 23.7% 8.6% 32.3% 
 Residual -3.8 3.8  
Total Count 80 13 93 
Expected Count 80.0 13.0 93.0 
% within orgstud 86.0% 14.0% 100.0% 
% within probhelpc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 86.0% 14.0% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of probhelpc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.132a 2 .047 
Likelihood Ratio 5.861 2 .053 
N of Valid Cases 93 
orgstud * opinmattc 
Crosstab 
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 opinmattc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 3b 33 
  Expected Count 26.3 6.7 33.0 
  % within orgstud 90.9% 9.1% 100.0% 
  % within opinmattc 40.5% 15.8% 35.5% 
  % of Total 32.3% 3.2% 35.5% 
  Residual 3.7 -3.7  
 BC Count 22a 8a 30 
  Expected Count 23.9 6.1 30.0 
  % within orgstud 73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
  % within opinmattc 29.7% 42.1% 32.3% 
  % of Total 23.7% 8.6% 32.3% 
  Residual -1.9 1.9  
 MCWG Count 22a 8a 30 
 Expected Count 23.9 6.1 30.0 
 % within orgstud 73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
 % within opinmattc 29.7% 42.1% 32.3% 
 % of Total 23.7% 8.6% 32.3% 
 Residual -1.9 1.9  
Total Count 74 19 93 
Expected Count 74.0 19.0 93.0 
% within orgstud 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
% within opinmattc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 79.6% 20.4% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of opinmattc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.046a 2 .132 
Likelihood Ratio 4.477 2 .107 
N of Valid Cases 93 
orgstud * acceptedc 
Crosstab 
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 acceptedc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 29a 3a 32 
  Expected Count 29.9 2.1 32.0 
  % within orgstud 90.6% 9.4% 100.0% 
  % within acceptedc 33.7% 50.0% 34.8% 
  % of Total 31.5% 3.3% 34.8% 
  Residual -.9 .9  
 BC Count 29a 1a 30 
  Expected Count 28.0 2.0 30.0 
  % within orgstud 96.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
  % within acceptedc 33.7% 16.7% 32.6% 
  % of Total 31.5% 1.1% 32.6% 
  Residual 1.0 -1.0  
 MCWG Count 28a 2a 30 
 Expected Count 28.0 2.0 30.0 
 % within orgstud 93.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
 % within acceptedc 32.6% 33.3% 32.6% 
 % of Total 30.4% 2.2% 32.6% 
 Residual .0 .0  
Total Count 86 6 92 
Expected Count 86.0 6.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 93.5% 6.5% 100.0% 
% within acceptedc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 93.5% 6.5% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of acceptedc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .929a 2 .629 
Likelihood Ratio    
 .983 2 .612 
N of Valid Cases 
 
92 
orgstud * drpprsec 
Crosstab 
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 drpprsec 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 26a 7b 33 
  Expected Count 21.6 11.4 33.0 
  % within orgstud 78.8% 21.2% 100.0% 
  % within drpprsec 42.6% 21.9% 35.5% 
  % of Total 28.0% 7.5% 35.5% 
  Residual 4.4 -4.4  
 BC Count 25a 5b 30 
  Expected Count 19.7 10.3 30.0 
  % within orgstud 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
  % within drpprsec 41.0% 15.6% 32.3% 
  % of Total 26.9% 5.4% 32.3% 
  Residual 5.3 -5.3  
 MCWG Count 10a 20b 30 
 Expected Count 19.7 10.3 30.0 
 % within orgstud 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
 % within drpprsec 16.4% 62.5% 32.3% 
 % of Total 10.8% 21.5% 32.3% 
 Residual -9.7 9.7  
Total Count 61 32 93 
Expected Count 61.0 32.0 93.0 
% within orgstud 65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
% within drpprsec 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of drpprsec categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.562a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 20.400 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 93 
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orgstud * timemony 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 timemony 
 
 
 
Total 1 2 3 4 
orgstud AIR Count 11a 1a, b 11b 10a, b 33 
  Expected Count 6.7 1.8 14.5 9.9 33.0 
  % within orgstud 33.3% 3.0% 33.3% 30.3% 100.0% 
  % within timemony 57.9% 20.0% 26.8% 35.7% 35.5% 
  % of Total 11.8% 1.1% 11.8% 10.8% 35.5% 
  Residual 4.3 -.8 -3.5 .1  
 BC Count 3a 1a, b 22b 4a 30 
  Expected Count 6.1 1.6 13.2 9.0 30.0 
  % within orgstud 10.0% 3.3% 73.3% 13.3% 100.0% 
  % within timemony 15.8% 20.0% 53.7% 14.3% 32.3% 
  % of Total 3.2% 1.1% 23.7% 4.3% 32.3% 
  Residual -3.1 -.6 8.8 -5.0  
 MCWG Count 5a, b, c 3c 8b 14a, c 30 
 Expected Count 6.1 1.6 13.2 9.0 30.0 
 % within orgstud 16.7% 10.0% 26.7% 46.7% 100.0% 
 % within timemony 26.3% 60.0% 19.5% 50.0% 32.3% 
 % of Total 5.4% 3.2% 8.6% 15.1% 32.3% 
 Residual -1.1 1.4 -5.2 5.0  
Total Count 19 5 41 28 93 
Expected Count 19.0 5.0 41.0 28.0 93.0 
% within orgstud 20.4% 5.4% 44.1% 30.1% 100.0% 
% within timemony 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 20.4% 5.4% 44.1% 30.1% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of timemony categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.546a 6 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 20.149 6 .003 
N of Valid Cases 93 
orgstud * 
projactv492 
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 projactv1 
1 2 5 6 7 10 
orgstud AIR Count 0a 0a 0a 32b 0a, b 0a, b 
  Expected Count 2.6 4.4 2.2 22.1 .4 .4 
  % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % within projactv1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 53.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 36.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
  Residual -2.6 -4.4 -2.2 9.9 -.4 -.4 
 BC Count 7a 12a 6a 0b 1a 1a 
  Expected Count 2.2 3.7 1.9 18.6 .3 .3 
  % within orgstud 25.9% 44.4% 22.2% 0.0% 3.7% 3.7% 
  % within projactv1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 8.0% 13.8% 6.9% 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 
  Residual 4.8 8.3 4.1 -18.6 .7 .7 
 MCWG Count 0a 0a 0a 28b 0a, b 0a, b 
 Expected Count 2.3 3.9 1.9 19.3 .3 .3 
 % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % within projactv1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 46.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 32.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Residual -2.3 -3.9 -1.9 8.7 -.3 -.3 
Total Count 7 12 6 60 1 1 
Expected Count 7.0 12.0 6.0 60.0 1.0 1.0 
% within orgstud 8.0% 13.8% 6.9% 69.0% 1.1% 1.1% 
% within projactv1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 8.0% 13.8% 6.9% 69.0% 1.1% 1.1% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of projactv1 categories whose column proportions 
do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 87.000a 10 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 107.771 10 .000 
N of Valid Cases  
87 
orgstud * 
projactv493 
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 projactv2        
1 2 3 4 5 6 13 16 
orgstud BC Count 5a 3a 1a 1a 5a 1a 0b 0b 
  Expected Count 2.2 1.3 .4 .4 2.2 .4 .8 .8 
  % within orgstud 25.0% 15.0% 5.0% 5.0% 25.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % within projactv2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % of Total 10.9% 6.5% 2.2% 2.2% 10.9% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
  Residual 2.8 1.7 .6 .6 2.8 .6 -.8 -.8 
 MCWG Count 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a 1b 1b 
 Expected Count 2.8 1.7 .6 .6 2.8 .6 .2 .2 
 % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 
 % within projactv2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 9.1% 
 Residual -2.8 -1.7 -.6 -.6 -2.8 -.6 .8 .8 
Total Count 5 3 1 1 5 1 1 1 
Expected Count 5.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
% within orgstud 10.9% 6.5% 2.2% 2.2% 10.9% 2.2% 9.1% 9.1% 
% within projactv2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 10.9% 6.5% 2.2% 2.2% 10.9% 2.2% 9.1% 9.1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of projactv2 categories whose column proportions 
do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 46.000a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 62.985 9 .000 
N of Valid Cases  
46 
a. 18 cells (90.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .43. 
orgstud * 
projactv494 
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 projactv3      
1 2 3 4 7 8 
orgstud BC Count 3a 1a, b 1a, b 1a, b 1a, b 2a, b 
  Expected Count 2.5 .8 .8 .8 .8 1.6 
  % within orgstud 33.3% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 
  % within projactv3 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 27.3% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 18.2% 
  Residual .5 .2 .2 .2 .2 .4 
 MCWG Count 0a 0a, b 0a, b 0a, b 0a, b 0a, b 
 Expected Count .5 .2 .2 .2 .2 .4 
 % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % within projactv3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Residual -.5 -.2 -.2 -.2 -.2 -.4 
Total Count 3 1 1 1 1 2 
Expected Count 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
% within orgstud 27.3% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 18.2% 
% within projactv3 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 27.3% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 18.2% 
Each subscript letter denotes   
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.000a 7 .139 
Likelihood Ratio 10.431 7 .165 
N of Valid Cases 11 
a. 16 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .18. 
orgstud * whymem 
Crosstab 
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 whymem       
 1 2 3 4 5 8 
orgstud AIR Count 31a, b 1c 0a, b, c 0c 0c 0b, c 0a, b 
  Expected Count 23.2 3.5 .7 2.1 1.8 1.4 .4 
  % within orgstud 93.9% 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % within whymem 47.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % of Total 33.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  Residual 7.8 -2.5 -.7 -2.1 -1.8 -1.4 -.4 
 BC Count 31a 0b 0a, b 0b 0b 0a, b 1b, c 
  Expected Count 21.8 3.3 .7 2.0 1.6 1.3 .3 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 
  % within whymem 47.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 33.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
  Residual 9.2 -3.3 -.7 -2.0 -1.6 -1.3 .7 
 MCWG Count 4a 9b 2b, c 6b 5b 4b 0a, b, c 
 Expected Count 21.1 3.2 .6 1.9 1.6 1.3 .3 
 % within orgstud 13.3% 30.0% 6.7% 20.0% 16.7% 13.3% 0.0% 
 % within whymem 6.1% 90.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
 % of Total 4.3% 9.6% 2.1% 6.4% 5.3% 4.3% 0.0% 
 Residual -17.1 5.8 1.4 4.1 3.4 2.7 -.3 
Total Count 66 10 2 6 5 4 1 
Expected Count 66.0 10.0 2.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 1.0 
% within orgstud 70.2% 10.6% 2.1% 6.4% 5.3% 4.3% 1.1% 
% within whymem 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 70.2% 10.6% 2.1% 6.4% 5.3% 4.3% 1.1% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of whymem categories whose column proportions 
do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 74.167a 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 83.760 12 .000 
N of Valid Cases 94 
orgstud * mainpurp 
Crosstab 
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 mainpurp      
 1 15 2 3 6 
orgstud AIR Count 33a 0b 0a, b 0b 0a, b 0a, b 
  Expected Count 23.9 2.5 .4 4.2 .7 1.1 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % within mainpurp 48.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % of Total 35.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  Residual 9.1 -2.5 -.4 -4.2 -.7 -1.1 
 BC Count 6a 7b 0a, c 12b 2b, c 3b 
  Expected Count 22.4 2.3 .3 4.0 .7 1.0 
  % within orgstud 19.4% 22.6% 0.0% 38.7% 6.5% 9.7% 
  % within mainpurp 8.8% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 6.4% 7.4% 0.0% 12.8% 2.1% 3.2% 
  Residual -16.4 4.7 -.3 8.0 1.3 2.0 
 MCWG Count 29a, b 0c 1b 0c 0a, b, c 0a, c 
 Expected Count 21.7 2.2 .3 3.8 .6 1.0 
 % within orgstud 96.7% 0.0% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % within mainpurp 42.6% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % of Total 30.9% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Residual 7.3 -2.2 .7 -3.8 -.6 -1.0 
Total Count 68 7 1 12 2 3 
Expected Count 68.0 7.0 1.0 12.0 2.0 3.0 
% within orgstud 72.3% 7.4% 1.1% 12.8% 2.1% 3.2% 
% within mainpurp 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.3% 7.4% 1.1% 12.8% 2.1% 3.2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 70.915a 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio    
 80.112 12 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
 
94 
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orgstud * recfinrp 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 recfinrp 
 
 
 
Total 1 2 
orgstud AIR Count 7a 22b 29 
  Expected Count 16.0 13.0 29.0 
  % within orgstud 24.1% 75.9% 100.0% 
  % within recfinrp 14.6% 56.4% 33.3% 
  % of Total 8.0% 25.3% 33.3% 
  Residual -9.0 9.0  
 BC Count 18a 10a 28 
  Expected Count 15.4 12.6 28.0 
  % within orgstud 64.3% 35.7% 100.0% 
  % within recfinrp 37.5% 25.6% 32.2% 
  % of Total 20.7% 11.5% 32.2% 
  Residual 2.6 -2.6  
 MCWG Count 23a 7b 30 
 Expected Count 16.6 13.4 30.0 
 % within orgstud 76.7% 23.3% 100.0% 
 % within recfinrp 47.9% 17.9% 34.5% 
 % of Total 26.4% 8.0% 34.5% 
 Residual 6.4 -6.4  
Total Count 48 39 87 
Expected Count 48.0 39.0 87.0 
% within orgstud 55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
% within recfinrp 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of recfinrp categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.838a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 18.526 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 87 
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 Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 135.276a 22 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 146.447 22 .000 
N of Valid Cases 94 
 
Likelihood Ratio 146.447 22 .000 
N of Valid Cases 94   
 
 
 
 
 
 
orgstud * commben 
 commben        
 1 10 11 13 2 3 4 
orgstud AIR Count 13 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 
  Expected Count 7.7 3.9 1.8 8.1 .4 .7 .7 1.4 
  % within orgstud 39.4% 0.0% 0.0% 60.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % within commben 59.1% 0.0% 0.0% 87.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  % of Total 13.8% 0.0% 0.0% 21.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 BC Count 5 11 0 0 0 2 2 4 
  Expected Count 7.3 3.6 1.6 7.6 .3 .7 .7 1.3 
  % within orgstud 16.1% 35.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.5% 6.5% 12.9% 
  % within commben 22.7% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 5.3% 11.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 2.1% 4.3% 
 MCWG Count 4 0 5 3 1 0 0 0 
 Expected Count 7.0 3.5 1.6 7.3 .3 .6 .6 1.3 
 % within orgstud 13.3% 0.0% 16.7% 10.0% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % within commben 18.2% 0.0% 100.0% 13.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 % of Total 4.3% 0.0% 5.3% 3.2% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total Count 22 11 5 23 1 2 2 4 
Expected Count 22.0 11.0 5.0 23.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 
% within orgstud 23.4% 11.7% 5.3% 24.5% 1.1% 2.1% 2.1% 4.3% 
% within commben 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 23.4% 11.7% 5.3% 24.5% 1.1% 2.1% 2.1% 4.3% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. 27 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
 
 
 
a. 27 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .32. 
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Total 5 6 7 8 
0 0 0 0 33 
1.1 1.1 .4 6.0 33.0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 35.1% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 35.1% 
3 3 1 0 31 
1.0 1.0 .3 5.6 31.0 
9.7% 9.7% 3.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 33.0% 
3.2% 3.2% 1.1% 0.0% 33.0% 
0 0 0 17 30 
1.0 1.0 .3 5.4 30.0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 56.7% 100.0% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 31.9% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.1% 31.9% 
3 3 1 17 94 
3.0 3.0 1.0 17.0 94.0 
3.2% 3.2% 1.1% 18.1% 100.0% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
3.2% 3.2% 1.1% 18.1% 100.0% 
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orgstud * busncoll 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 busncoll 
 
 
Total 1.0 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 0a 2b 0a, b 2 
  Expected Count 1.4 .4 .2 2.0 
  % within orgstud 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within busncoll 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 8.0% 
  % of Total 0.0% 8.0% 0.0% 8.0% 
  Residual -1.4 1.6 -.2  
 BC Count 18a 3b 2a, b 23 
 Expected Count 16.6 4.6 1.8 23.0 
 % within orgstud 78.3% 13.0% 8.7% 100.0% 
 % within busncoll 100.0% 60.0% 100.0% 92.0% 
 % of Total 72.0% 12.0% 8.0% 92.0% 
 Residual 1.4 -1.6 .2  
Total Count 18 5 2 25 
Expected Count 18.0 5.0 2.0 25.0 
% within orgstud 72.0% 20.0% 8.0% 100.0% 
% within busncoll 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.0% 20.0% 8.0% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of busncoll categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.696a 2 .013 
Likelihood Ratio    
 7.208 2 .027 
N of Valid Cases 
 
25 
a. 5 cells (83.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .16. 
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orgstud * farihonc 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 farihonc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 28a 4a 32 
  Expected Count 27.8 4.2 32.0 
  % within orgstud 87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
  % within farihonc 35.0% 33.3% 34.8% 
  % of Total 30.4% 4.3% 34.8% 
  Residual .2 -.2  
 BC Count 30a 0b 30 
  Expected Count 26.1 3.9 30.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within farihonc 37.5% 0.0% 32.6% 
  % of Total 32.6% 0.0% 32.6% 
  Residual 3.9 -3.9  
 MCWG Count 22a 8b 30 
 Expected Count 26.1 3.9 30.0 
 % within orgstud 73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
 % within farihonc 27.5% 66.7% 32.6% 
 % of Total 23.9% 8.7% 32.6% 
 Residual -4.1 4.1  
Total Count 80 12 92 
Expected Count 80.0 12.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 87.0% 13.0% 100.0% 
% within farihonc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 87.0% 13.0% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of farihonc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.417a 2 .009 
Likelihood Ratio    
 12.339 2 .002 
N of Valid Cases 
 
92 
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orgstud * trumonyc 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 trumonyc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 28a 3a 31 
  Expected Count 26.9 4.1 31.0 
  % within orgstud 90.3% 9.7% 100.0% 
  % within trumonyc 35.4% 25.0% 34.1% 
  % of Total 30.8% 3.3% 34.1% 
  Residual 1.1 -1.1  
 BC Count 30a 0b 30 
  Expected Count 26.0 4.0 30.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within trumonyc 38.0% 0.0% 33.0% 
  % of Total 33.0% 0.0% 33.0% 
  Residual 4.0 -4.0  
 MCWG Count 21a 9b 30 
 Expected Count 26.0 4.0 30.0 
 % within orgstud 70.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
 % within trumonyc 26.6% 75.0% 33.0% 
 % of Total 23.1% 9.9% 33.0% 
 Residual -5.0 5.0  
Total Count 79 12 91 
Expected Count 79.0 12.0 91.0 
% within orgstud 86.8% 13.2% 100.0% 
% within trumonyc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 86.8% 13.2% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of trumonyc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.298a 2 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 14.602 2 .001 
N of Valid Cases 91 
orgstud * impcommc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 23a 9b 32 
  Expected Count 28.9 3.1 32.0 
  % within orgstud 71.9% 28.1% 100.0% 
  % within impcommc 27.7% 100.0% 34.8% 
  % of Total 25.0% 9.8% 34.8% 
  Residual -5.9 5.9  
 BC Count 30a 0b 30 
  Expected Count 27.1 2.9 30.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within impcommc 36.1% 0.0% 32.6% 
  % of Total 32.6% 0.0% 32.6% 
  Residual 2.9 -2.9  
 MCWG Count 30a 0b 30 
 Expected Count 27.1 2.9 30.0 
 % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 % within impcommc 36.1% 0.0% 32.6% 
 % of Total 32.6% 0.0% 32.6% 
 Residual 2.9 -2.9  
Total Count 83 9 92 
Expected Count 83.0 9.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 90.2% 9.8% 100.0% 
% within impcommc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 90.2% 9.8% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of impcommc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.705a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 20.907 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 92 
orgstud * memcntlc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 2b 32 
  Expected Count 24.2 7.8 32.0 
  % within orgstud 93.8% 6.3% 100.0% 
  % within memcntlc 44.1% 9.1% 35.6% 
  % of Total 33.3% 2.2% 35.6% 
  Residual 5.8 -5.8  
 BC Count 11a 17b 28 
  Expected Count 21.2 6.8 28.0 
  % within orgstud 39.3% 60.7% 100.0% 
  % within memcntlc 16.2% 77.3% 31.1% 
  % of Total 12.2% 18.9% 31.1% 
  Residual -10.2 10.2  
 MCWG Count 27a 3b 30 
 Expected Count 22.7 7.3 30.0 
 % within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
 % within memcntlc 39.7% 13.6% 33.3% 
 % of Total 30.0% 3.3% 33.3% 
 Residual 4.3 -4.3  
Total Count 68 22 90 
Expected Count 68.0 22.0 90.0 
% within orgstud 75.6% 24.4% 100.0% 
% within memcntlc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 75.6% 24.4% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of memcntlc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 29.068a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 28.119 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 90 
orgstud * memrulec 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 32a 0b 32 
  Expected Count 23.8 8.2 32.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within memrulec 47.8% 0.0% 35.6% 
  % of Total 35.6% 0.0% 35.6% 
  Residual 8.2 -8.2  
 BC Count 9a 19b 28 
  Expected Count 20.8 7.2 28.0 
  % within orgstud 32.1% 67.9% 100.0% 
  % within memrulec 13.4% 82.6% 31.1% 
  % of Total 10.0% 21.1% 31.1% 
  Residual -11.8 11.8  
 MCWG Count 26a 4a 30 
 Expected Count 22.3 7.7 30.0 
 % within orgstud 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
 % within memrulec 38.8% 17.4% 33.3% 
 % of Total 28.9% 4.4% 33.3% 
 Residual 3.7 -3.7  
Total Count 67 23 90 
Expected Count 67.0 23.0 90.0 
% within orgstud 74.4% 25.6% 100.0% 
% within memrulec 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 74.4% 25.6% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of memrulec categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 39.677a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio    
 43.579 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
 
90 
orgstud * ldreffctc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 24a 7a 31 
  Expected Count 24.1 6.9 31.0 
  % within orgstud 77.4% 22.6% 100.0% 
  % within ldreffctc 34.3% 35.0% 34.4% 
  % of Total 26.7% 7.8% 34.4% 
  Residual -.1 .1  
 BC Count 27a 2b 29 
  Expected Count 22.6 6.4 29.0 
  % within orgstud 93.1% 6.9% 100.0% 
  % within ldreffctc 38.6% 10.0% 32.2% 
  % of Total 30.0% 2.2% 32.2% 
  Residual 4.4 -4.4  
 MCWG Count 19a 11b 30 
 Expected Count 23.3 6.7 30.0 
 % within orgstud 63.3% 36.7% 100.0% 
 % within ldreffctc 27.1% 55.0% 33.3% 
 % of Total 21.1% 12.2% 33.3% 
 Residual -4.3 4.3  
Total Count 70 20 90 
Expected Count 70.0 20.0 90.0 
% within orgstud 77.8% 22.2% 100.0% 
% within ldreffctc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 77.8% 22.2% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of ldreffctc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.565a 2 .023 
Likelihood Ratio 8.244 2 .016 
N of Valid Cases 90 
orgstud * worseoffc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 25a 7b 32 
  Expected Count 28.2 3.8 32.0 
  % within orgstud 78.1% 21.9% 100.0% 
  % within worseoffc 30.9% 63.6% 34.8% 
  % of Total 27.2% 7.6% 34.8% 
  Residual -3.2 3.2  
 BC Count 30a 0b 30 
  Expected Count 26.4 3.6 30.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within worseoffc 37.0% 0.0% 32.6% 
  % of Total 32.6% 0.0% 32.6% 
  Residual 3.6 -3.6  
 MCWG Count 26a 4a 30 
 Expected Count 26.4 3.6 30.0 
 % within orgstud 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
 % within worseoffc 32.1% 36.4% 32.6% 
 % of Total 28.3% 4.3% 32.6% 
 Residual -.4 .4  
Total Count 81 11 92 
Expected Count 81.0 11.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 88.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
% within worseoffc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 88.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of worseoffc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.119a 2 .028 
Likelihood Ratio 10.174 2 .006 
N of Valid Cases 92 
orgstud * feelrespc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 32a 0b 32 
  Expected Count 28.5 3.5 32.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within feelrespc 39.0% 0.0% 34.8% 
  % of Total 34.8% 0.0% 34.8% 
  Residual 3.5 -3.5  
 BC Count 21a 9b 30 
  Expected Count 26.7 3.3 30.0 
  % within orgstud 70.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
  % within feelrespc 25.6% 90.0% 32.6% 
  % of Total 22.8% 9.8% 32.6% 
  Residual -5.7 5.7  
 MCWG Count 29a 1a 30 
 Expected Count 26.7 3.3 30.0 
 % within orgstud 96.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
 % within feelrespc 35.4% 10.0% 32.6% 
 % of Total 31.5% 1.1% 32.6% 
 Residual 2.3 -2.3  
Total Count 82 10 92 
Expected Count 82.0 10.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 89.1% 10.9% 100.0% 
% within feelrespc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 89.1% 10.9% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of feelrespc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.994a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio    
 17.835 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
 
92 
orgstud * wellinfoc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 1b 31 
  Expected Count 25.8 5.2 31.0 
  % within orgstud 96.8% 3.2% 100.0% 
  % within wellinfoc 40.0% 6.7% 34.4% 
  % of Total 33.3% 1.1% 34.4% 
  Residual 4.2 -4.2  
 BC Count 21a 8a 29 
  Expected Count 24.2 4.8 29.0 
  % within orgstud 72.4% 27.6% 100.0% 
  % within wellinfoc 28.0% 53.3% 32.2% 
  % of Total 23.3% 8.9% 32.2% 
  Residual -3.2 3.2  
 MCWG Count 24a 6a 30 
 Expected Count 25.0 5.0 30.0 
 % within orgstud 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
 % within wellinfoc 32.0% 40.0% 33.3% 
 % of Total 26.7% 6.7% 33.3% 
 Residual -1.0 1.0  
Total Count 75 15 90 
Expected Count 75.0 15.0 90.0 
% within orgstud 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within wellinfoc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of wellinfoc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.762a 2 .034 
Likelihood Ratio    
 8.079 2 .018 
N of Valid Cases 
 
90 
orgstud * benfinlc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 0b 30 
  Expected Count 27.0 3.0 30.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within benfinlc 37.0% 0.0% 33.3% 
  % of Total 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 
  Residual 3.0 -3.0  
 BC Count 22a 8b 30 
  Expected Count 27.0 3.0 30.0 
  % within orgstud 73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
  % within benfinlc 27.2% 88.9% 33.3% 
  % of Total 24.4% 8.9% 33.3% 
  Residual -5.0 5.0  
 MCWG Count 29a 1a 30 
 Expected Count 27.0 3.0 30.0 
 % within orgstud 96.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
 % within benfinlc 35.8% 11.1% 33.3% 
 % of Total 32.2% 1.1% 33.3% 
 Residual 2.0 -2.0  
Total Count 81 9 90 
Expected Count 81.0 9.0 90.0 
% within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
% within benfinlc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of benfinlc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.074a 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 14.951 2 .001 
N of Valid Cases 90 
orgstud * impstndc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 0b 30 
  Expected Count 22.7 7.3 30.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within impstndc 44.1% 0.0% 33.3% 
  % of Total 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 
  Residual 7.3 -7.3  
 BC Count 10a 20b 30 
  Expected Count 22.7 7.3 30.0 
  % within orgstud 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
  % within impstndc 14.7% 90.9% 33.3% 
  % of Total 11.1% 22.2% 33.3% 
  Residual -12.7 12.7  
 MCWG Count 28a 2b 30 
 Expected Count 22.7 7.3 30.0 
 % within orgstud 93.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
 % within impstndc 41.2% 9.1% 33.3% 
 % of Total 31.1% 2.2% 33.3% 
 Residual 5.3 -5.3  
Total Count 68 22 90 
Expected Count 68.0 22.0 90.0 
% within orgstud 75.6% 24.4% 100.0% 
% within impstndc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 75.6% 24.4% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of impstndc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 43.797a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 47.220 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 90 
orgstud * commbenc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 29a 3a 32 
  Expected Count 30.6 1.4 32.0 
  % within orgstud 90.6% 9.4% 100.0% 
  % within commbenc 33.0% 75.0% 34.8% 
  % of Total 31.5% 3.3% 34.8% 
  Residual -1.6 1.6  
 BC Count 30a 0a 30 
  Expected Count 28.7 1.3 30.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within commbenc 34.1% 0.0% 32.6% 
  % of Total 32.6% 0.0% 32.6% 
  Residual 1.3 -1.3  
 MCWG Count 29a 1a 30 
 Expected Count 28.7 1.3 30.0 
 % within orgstud 96.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
 % within commbenc 33.0% 25.0% 32.6% 
 % of Total 31.5% 1.1% 32.6% 
 Residual .3 -.3  
Total Count 88 4 92 
Expected Count 88.0 4.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 95.7% 4.3% 100.0% 
% within commbenc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 95.7% 4.3% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of commbenc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.382a 2 .184 
Likelihood Ratio 4.227 2 .121 
N of Valid Cases 92 
orgstud * ocommbenc 
Crosstab 
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 ocommbenc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 12a 20b 32 
  Expected Count 20.0 12.0 32.0 
  % within orgstud 37.5% 62.5% 100.0% 
  % within ocommbenc 21.1% 58.8% 35.2% 
  % of Total 13.2% 22.0% 35.2% 
  Residual -8.0 8.0  
 BC Count 26a 3b 29 
  Expected Count 18.2 10.8 29.0 
  % within orgstud 89.7% 10.3% 100.0% 
  % within ocommbenc 45.6% 8.8% 31.9% 
  % of Total 28.6% 3.3% 31.9% 
  Residual 7.8 -7.8  
 MCWG Count 19a 11a 30 
 Expected Count 18.8 11.2 30.0 
 % within orgstud 63.3% 36.7% 100.0% 
 % within ocommbenc 33.3% 32.4% 33.0% 
 % of Total 20.9% 12.1% 33.0% 
 Residual .2 -.2  
Total Count 57 34 91 
Expected Count 57.0 34.0 91.0 
% within orgstud 62.6% 37.4% 100.0% 
% within ocommbenc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 62.6% 37.4% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of ocommbenc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.692a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio    
 19.216 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
 
91 
orgstud * attstrngc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 24a 7a 31 
  Expected Count 21.4 9.6 31.0 
  % within orgstud 77.4% 22.6% 100.0% 
  % within attstrngc 41.4% 26.9% 36.9% 
  % of Total 28.6% 8.3% 36.9% 
  Residual 2.6 -2.6  
 BC Count 7a 16b 23 
  Expected Count 15.9 7.1 23.0 
  % within orgstud 30.4% 69.6% 100.0% 
  % within attstrngc 12.1% 61.5% 27.4% 
  % of Total 8.3% 19.0% 27.4% 
  Residual -8.9 8.9  
 MCWG Count 27a 3b 30 
 Expected Count 20.7 9.3 30.0 
 % within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
 % within attstrngc 46.6% 11.5% 35.7% 
 % of Total 32.1% 3.6% 35.7% 
 Residual 6.3 -6.3  
Total Count 58 26 84 
Expected Count 58.0 26.0 84.0 
% within orgstud 69.0% 31.0% 100.0% 
% within attstrngc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 69.0% 31.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of attstrngc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.224a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio    
 23.055 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 
 
84 
orgstud * activec 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 1a 31 
  Expected Count 27.3 3.7 31.0 
  % within orgstud 96.8% 3.2% 100.0% 
  % within activec 40.5% 10.0% 36.9% 
  % of Total 35.7% 1.2% 36.9% 
  Residual 2.7 -2.7  
 BC Count 17a 6b 23 
  Expected Count 20.3 2.7 23.0 
  % within orgstud 73.9% 26.1% 100.0% 
  % within activec 23.0% 60.0% 27.4% 
  % of Total 20.2% 7.1% 27.4% 
  Residual -3.3 3.3  
 MCWG Count 27a 3a 30 
 Expected Count 26.4 3.6 30.0 
 % within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
 % within activec 36.5% 30.0% 35.7% 
 % of Total 32.1% 3.6% 35.7% 
 Residual .6 -.6  
Total Count 74 10 84 
Expected Count 74.0 10.0 84.0 
% within orgstud 88.1% 11.9% 100.0% 
% within activec 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 88.1% 11.9% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of activec categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.741a 2 .034 
Likelihood Ratio 6.581 2 .037 
N of Valid Cases 84 
orgstud * memimpctc 
Crosstab 
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 memimpctc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 29a 2b 31 
  Expected Count 24.3 6.7 31.0 
  % within orgstud 93.5% 6.5% 100.0% 
  % within memimpctc 42.0% 10.5% 35.2% 
  % of Total 33.0% 2.3% 35.2% 
  Residual 4.7 -4.7  
 BC Count 14a 13b 27 
  Expected Count 21.2 5.8 27.0 
  % within orgstud 51.9% 48.1% 100.0% 
  % within memimpctc 20.3% 68.4% 30.7% 
  % of Total 15.9% 14.8% 30.7% 
  Residual -7.2 7.2  
 MCWG Count 26a 4a 30 
 Expected Count 23.5 6.5 30.0 
 % within orgstud 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
 % within memimpctc 37.7% 21.1% 34.1% 
 % of Total 29.5% 4.5% 34.1% 
 Residual 2.5 -2.5  
Total Count 69 19 88 
Expected Count 69.0 19.0 88.0 
% within orgstud 78.4% 21.6% 100.0% 
% within memimpctc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 78.4% 21.6% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of memimpctc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.654a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 16.031 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88 
orgstud * memknowc 
Crosstab 
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 memknowc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 28a 2b 30 
  Expected Count 23.2 6.8 30.0 
  % within orgstud 93.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
  % within memknowc 41.2% 10.0% 34.1% 
  % of Total 31.8% 2.3% 34.1% 
  Residual 4.8 -4.8  
 BC Count 13a 15b 28 
  Expected Count 21.6 6.4 28.0 
  % within orgstud 46.4% 53.6% 100.0% 
  % within memknowc 19.1% 75.0% 31.8% 
  % of Total 14.8% 17.0% 31.8% 
  Residual -8.6 8.6  
 MCWG Count 27a 3b 30 
 Expected Count 23.2 6.8 30.0 
 % within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
 % within memknowc 39.7% 15.0% 34.1% 
 % of Total 30.7% 3.4% 34.1% 
 Residual 3.8 -3.8  
Total Count 68 20 88 
Expected Count 68.0 20.0 88.0 
% within orgstud 77.3% 22.7% 100.0% 
% within memknowc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 77.3% 22.7% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of memknowc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.341a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 21.455 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88 
orgstud * procfaithc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 23a 7a 30 
  Expected Count 25.2 4.8 30.0 
  % within orgstud 76.7% 23.3% 100.0% 
  % within procfaithc 31.1% 50.0% 34.1% 
  % of Total 26.1% 8.0% 34.1% 
  Residual -2.2 2.2  
 BC Count 28a 0b 28 
  Expected Count 23.5 4.5 28.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within procfaithc 37.8% 0.0% 31.8% 
  % of Total 31.8% 0.0% 31.8% 
  Residual 4.5 -4.5  
 MCWG Count 23a 7a 30 
 Expected Count 25.2 4.8 30.0 
 % within orgstud 76.7% 23.3% 100.0% 
 % within procfaithc 31.1% 50.0% 34.1% 
 % of Total 26.1% 8.0% 34.1% 
 Residual -2.2 2.2  
Total Count 74 14 88 
Expected Count 74.0 14.0 88.0 
% within orgstud 84.1% 15.9% 100.0% 
% within procfaithc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 84.1% 15.9% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of procfaithc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.769a 2 .021 
Likelihood Ratio 11.923 2 .003 
N of Valid Cases 88 
orgstud * meminfoc 
Crosstab 
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 meminfoc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 1a 31 
  Expected Count 27.9 3.1 31.0 
  % within orgstud 96.8% 3.2% 100.0% 
  % within meminfoc 37.5% 11.1% 34.8% 
  % of Total 33.7% 1.1% 34.8% 
  Residual 2.1 -2.1  
 BC Count 23a 5a 28 
  Expected Count 25.2 2.8 28.0 
  % within orgstud 82.1% 17.9% 100.0% 
  % within meminfoc 28.8% 55.6% 31.5% 
  % of Total 25.8% 5.6% 31.5% 
  Residual -2.2 2.2  
 MCWG Count 27a 3a 30 
 Expected Count 27.0 3.0 30.0 
 % within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
 % within meminfoc 33.8% 33.3% 33.7% 
 % of Total 30.3% 3.4% 33.7% 
 Residual .0 .0  
Total Count 80 9 89 
Expected Count 80.0 9.0 89.0 
% within orgstud 89.9% 10.1% 100.0% 
% within meminfoc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 89.9% 10.1% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of meminfoc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.465a 2 .177 
Likelihood Ratio 3.686 2 .158 
N of Valid Cases 89 
orgstud * mgmtinfoc 
Crosstab 
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 mgmtinfoc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 12a 0a 12 
  Expected Count 10.9 1.1 12.0 
  % within orgstud 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within mgmtinfoc 38.7% 0.0% 35.3% 
  % of Total 35.3% 0.0% 35.3% 
  Residual 1.1 -1.1  
 BC Count 12a 1a 13 
  Expected Count 11.9 1.1 13.0 
  % within orgstud 92.3% 7.7% 100.0% 
  % within mgmtinfoc 38.7% 33.3% 38.2% 
  % of Total 35.3% 2.9% 38.2% 
  Residual .1 -.1  
 MCWG Count 7a 2a 9 
 Expected Count 8.2 .8 9.0 
 % within orgstud 77.8% 22.2% 100.0% 
 % within mgmtinfoc 22.6% 66.7% 26.5% 
 % of Total 20.6% 5.9% 26.5% 
 Residual -1.2 1.2  
Total Count 31 3 34 
Expected Count 31.0 3.0 34.0 
% within orgstud 91.2% 8.8% 100.0% 
% within mgmtinfoc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 91.2% 8.8% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of mgmtinfoc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.190a 2 .203 
Likelihood Ratio 3.708 2 .157 
N of Valid Cases 34 
orgstud * opendbatc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 1a 31 
  Expected Count 27.4 3.6 31.0 
  % within orgstud 96.8% 3.2% 100.0% 
  % within opendbatc 39.5% 10.0% 36.0% 
  % of Total 34.9% 1.2% 36.0% 
  Residual 2.6 -2.6  
 BC Count 20a 5a 25 
  Expected Count 22.1 2.9 25.0 
  % within orgstud 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
  % within opendbatc 26.3% 50.0% 29.1% 
  % of Total 23.3% 5.8% 29.1% 
  Residual -2.1 2.1  
 MCWG Count 26a 4a 30 
 Expected Count 26.5 3.5 30.0 
 % within orgstud 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
 % within opendbatc 34.2% 40.0% 34.9% 
 % of Total 30.2% 4.7% 34.9% 
 Residual -.5 .5  
Total Count 76 10 86 
Expected Count 76.0 10.0 86.0 
% within orgstud 88.4% 11.6% 100.0% 
% within opendbatc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 88.4% 11.6% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of opendbatc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.920a 2 .141 
Likelihood Ratio    
 4.409 2 .110 
N of Valid Cases 
 
86 
orgstud * resltdisc 
Crosstab 
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 resltdisc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 30a 1a 31 
  Expected Count 28.8 2.2 31.0 
  % within orgstud 96.8% 3.2% 100.0% 
  % within resltdisc 38.0% 16.7% 36.5% 
  % of Total 35.3% 1.2% 36.5% 
  Residual 1.2 -1.2  
 BC Count 22a 2a 24 
  Expected Count 22.3 1.7 24.0 
  % within orgstud 91.7% 8.3% 100.0% 
  % within resltdisc 27.8% 33.3% 28.2% 
  % of Total 25.9% 2.4% 28.2% 
  Residual -.3 .3  
 MCWG Count 27a 3a 30 
 Expected Count 27.9 2.1 30.0 
 % within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
 % within resltdisc 34.2% 50.0% 35.3% 
 % of Total 31.8% 3.5% 35.3% 
 Residual -.9 .9  
Total Count 79 6 85 
Expected Count 79.0 6.0 85.0 
% within orgstud 92.9% 7.1% 100.0% 
% within resltdisc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 92.9% 7.1% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of resltdisc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.149a 2 .563 
Likelihood Ratio    
 1.268 2 .530 
N of Valid Cases 
 
85 
orgstud * intconflc 
Crosstab 
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Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 28a 2a 30 
  Expected Count 26.3 3.7 30.0 
  % within orgstud 93.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
  % within intconflc 38.9% 20.0% 36.6% 
  % of Total 34.1% 2.4% 36.6% 
  Residual 1.7 -1.7  
 BC Count 19a 3a 22 
  Expected Count 19.3 2.7 22.0 
  % within orgstud 86.4% 13.6% 100.0% 
  % within intconflc 26.4% 30.0% 26.8% 
  % of Total 23.2% 3.7% 26.8% 
  Residual -.3 .3  
 MCWG Count 25a 5a 30 
 Expected Count 26.3 3.7 30.0 
 % within orgstud 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
 % within intconflc 34.7% 50.0% 36.6% 
 % of Total 30.5% 6.1% 36.6% 
 Residual -1.3 1.3  
Total Count 72 10 82 
Expected Count 72.0 10.0 82.0 
% within orgstud 87.8% 12.2% 100.0% 
% within intconflc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 87.8% 12.2% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of intconflc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.459a 2 .482 
Likelihood Ratio 1.555 2 .459 
N of Valid Cases 82 
orgstud * commcnflc 
Crosstab 
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 commcnflc 
 
 
 
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 27a 1a 28 
  Expected Count 25.2 2.8 28.0 
  % within orgstud 96.4% 3.6% 100.0% 
  % within commcnflc 50.0% 16.7% 46.7% 
  % of Total 45.0% 1.7% 46.7% 
  Residual 1.8 -1.8  
 BC Count 21a 3a 24 
  Expected Count 21.6 2.4 24.0 
  % within orgstud 87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
  % within commcnflc 38.9% 50.0% 40.0% 
  % of Total 35.0% 5.0% 40.0% 
  Residual -.6 .6  
 MCWG Count 6a 2a 8 
 Expected Count 7.2 .8 8.0 
 % within orgstud 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
 % within commcnflc 11.1% 33.3% 13.3% 
 % of Total 10.0% 3.3% 13.3% 
 Residual -1.2 1.2  
Total Count 54 6 60 
Expected Count 54.0 6.0 60.0 
% within orgstud 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
% within commcnflc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of commcnflc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.452a 2 .178 
Likelihood Ratio    
 3.299 2 .192 
N of Valid Cases 
 
60 
orgstud * planfutc 
Crosstab 
 
Page | 525   
 planfutc   
Total 2.0 3.0 
orgstud AIR Count 21a 9a 30 
  Expected Count 20.7 9.3 30.0 
  % within orgstud 70.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
  % within planfutc 35.0% 33.3% 34.5% 
  % of Total 24.1% 10.3% 34.5% 
  Residual .3 -.3  
 BC Count 23a 4b 27 
  Expected Count 18.6 8.4 27.0 
  % within orgstud 85.2% 14.8% 100.0% 
  % within planfutc 38.3% 14.8% 31.0% 
  % of Total 26.4% 4.6% 31.0% 
  Residual 4.4 -4.4  
 MCWG Count 16a 14b 30 
 Expected Count 20.7 9.3 30.0 
 % within orgstud 53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 
 % within planfutc 26.7% 51.9% 34.5% 
 % of Total 18.4% 16.1% 34.5% 
 Residual -4.7 4.7  
Total Count 60 27 87 
Expected Count 60.0 27.0 87.0 
% within orgstud 69.0% 31.0% 100.0% 
% within planfutc 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 69.0% 31.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of planfutc categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.759a 2 .034 
Likelihood Ratio 7.012 2 .030 
N of Valid Cases 87 
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Value 
 
df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 
184.000a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 201.865 8 .000 
N of Valid Cases 92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
orgstud * mbndry 
 mbndry   
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
orgstud AIR Count 0 0 0 0 33 33 
  Expected Count 2.2 6.5 1.8 10.8 11.8 33.0 
  % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % within mbndry 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 35.9% 
  % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 35.9% 35.9% 
 BC Count 6 18 5 0 0 29 
  Expected Count 1.9 5.7 1.6 9.5 10.4 29.0 
  % within orgstud 20.7% 62.1% 17.2% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  % within mbndry 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 31.5% 
  % of Total 6.5% 19.6% 5.4% 0.0% 0.0% 31.5% 
 MCWG Count 0 0 0 30 0 30 
 Expected Count 2.0 5.9 1.6 9.8 10.8 30.0 
 % within orgstud 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 % within mbndry 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 32.6% 
 % of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 32.6% 0.0% 32.6% 
Total Count 6 18 5 30 33 92 
Expected Count 6.0 18.0 5.0 30.0 33.0 92.0 
% within orgstud 6.5% 19.6% 5.4% 32.6% 35.9% 100.0% 
% within mbndry 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.5% 19.6% 5.4% 32.6% 35.9% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. 6 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count 
